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ABSTRACT 
 
AGUSTINA GIRAUDY: Subnational Undemocratic Regime Continuity After 
Democratization: Argentina And Mexico In Comparative Perspective 
(Under the direction of Dr. Jonathan Hartlyn) 
 
 This dissertation addresses the issue of regime juxtaposition –that is, the existence of 
subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) alongside national democratic governments.  
More specifically, the study explores the factors that facilitate the reproduction of these 
regimes in Argentina and Mexico, two countries that have recently experienced national 
democratization albeit in a territorially uneven fashion.  The first part of this study builds on 
an original dataset collected during fieldwork in Argentina and Mexico to measure levels of 
democracy across all twenty-four Argentine provinces and thirty-two Mexican states. In 
doing so, this dissertation then provides a systematic and comprehensive assessment of how 
subnational democracy has varied and evolved among disparate subnational units and over 
time. The second part of the dissertation develops an analytic framework to explain SUR 
continuity.  The framework is then tested using a variety of qualitative and quantative 
methodologies in two countries and four subnational cases.  Building on a cross-sectional 
time series analysis, and on an in-depth qualitative comparative study which gathered 
evidence in 150 original interviews with key national and subnational political actors, the 
study finds that SURs’ financial dependency on the federal government and the nature of 
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SURs’ state-administrations, in combination with national variables, are the primary factors 
explaining different trajectories of SUR continuity. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 During the past two decades a growing number of countries have transitioned away 
from autocracy and authoritarianism towards democracy.  Yet, much of this democratic 
advancement has been territorially uneven and mostly limited to the national level.  Indeed, 
one persistent aspect of these new democracies is the existence of what scholars have 
referred to as “regime juxtaposition” –that is, the prevalence of subnational undemocratic 
regimes (SURs1) alongside a democratic national government.  
Latin American countries have certainly not escaped this trend. Quite the contrary, as 
numerous studies show, many countries in the region combine nationally democratic regimes 
with subnational undemocratic regimes.2  The existence of regime juxtaposition has 
presented analysts with the challenge of advancing explanations about SUR continuity.  
Despite the fact that recent scholarship has begun to generate knowledge about the conditions 
that foster SUR’s survival, most explanations still remain partial. This may be explained by 
the tendency of analysts of regime juxtaposition to generate explanations based on evidence 
drawn from a small number of either national or subnational cases (i.e., many subnational 
cases within a single country, or one single subnational unit across different countries).  As a 
                                                 
1
 Unless otherwise specified, the term “subnational” only refers to state/provincial-level (rather than municipal 
or lower-tier) governments/regimes/politicians. 
2
 See Fox 1994; Rodríguez and Ward (1995); Eisenstadt 1999, 2004; Snyder 1999, 2001; Solt 2003; Gibson 
2005; Gervasoni 2006, 2008; Montero 2007; Lakin 2008; Benton forthcoming; and the series of chapters in the 
edited volume by Cornelius, Eisenstadt, and Hindley 1999. 
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result, the scope of these explanations has been limited because it fails to account for SUR 
continuity occurring across subnational units and across countries. Thus, from a theoretical 
point of view, the issue of how and why SURs are still alive despite national democracy still 
looms large. 
 This dissertation seeks to advance a new analytic framework to better understand the 
conditions and factors that facilitate the continuity of subnational undemocratic regimes in 
contemporary Latin America.  The framework I develop in this study builds on and integrates 
existing approaches to regime juxtaposition. By building on existing works, I acknowledge 
that current scholarship provides valuable analytic tools to explain SUR continuity. Yet, by 
refining these models, I also recognize that current approaches are limited and incomplete, in 
that they do not have explanatory power beyond a selected set of case studies.   
 The analytic framework developed in this study is tested in contemporary Argentina 
and Mexico, two federal countries that have recently experienced national democratization 
processes, although in a territorially uneven way.3  These two countries, as I will show in 
chapter 3, offer a wide variety of SURs and thus constitute excellent country cases to test the 
theoretical propositions outlined in this dissertation.  To assess the validity of my theoretical 
premises, I use a variety of methodologies, including cross-country and within-country 
comparisons, as well as a combination of both quantitative analysis and in-depth, qualitative 
case studies. Before turning to present and briefly discuss the building blocks of the analytic 
framework, some clarifications are in order.   
 
 
                                                 
3
 See below for a justification of the cases’ selection. 
 3 
SUR continuity versus SUR origins and change 
In this dissertation I am only concerned with understanding the factors that allow 
SUR continuity.  For this reason, I look at the provinces/states that continue to be or became 
undemocratic and remained so (i.e., survived), despite national democratization.  This means 
that my study does not look at SUR origins or SUR change.  In other words, I do not seek to 
explain how subnational political regimes became undemocratic –be it before or after 
national democratization began its course.  Nor am I interested in putting forward an 
explanation about how subnational units that were undemocratic when national democracy 
first ensued managed to move away from non-democracy to (subnational) democracy.   
 There are two primary reasons for focusing on regime continuity rather than regime 
change.  As I will show in chapter 3, subnational nondemocratic regimes tend to be far 
“stickier” than previously thought.  Indeed, the evidence that I present in this dissertation 
indicates that once in place, the vast majority of SURs stay alive for long periods of time, 
with only few of them making strides towards democracy.  Thus, the conditions that facilitate 
the sustainability or stickiness of SURs deserve careful attention, as they seem to be more 
important than the conditions that spark regime change, which occurs rarely. 
The second reason that justifies my focus on subnational regime continuity rather 
than regime change responds to the fact that, as I will show throughout this dissertation, 
national incumbents are only seldom in a strong political position to pursue strategies of 
wholesale SUR dismantlement.  In general, presidents are prevented from promoting 
democratization in subnational arenas because the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits of 
keeping these regimes alive (Gibson 2005).  This is especially so in the case of weak 
presidents who, for instance, do not have solid legislative majorities; whose parties are weak, 
 4 
divided, or do not reach the peripheries; or who face deep economic crises and social/ethnic 
uprisings. Under these circumstances, presidents may find it politically costly to dismantle 
SURs, as nondemocratic governors may become key partners to strengthen president’s 
political positioning.   
 
Explaining SUR continuity in contemporary Latin America 
 Regime juxtaposition, and more specifically SUR continuity, has usually been 
analyzed from an intergovernmental perspective (see Snyder 1999, 2001; Cornelius 1999; 
Gibson 2005, 2008; Gervasoni 2006).  This view assumes that in large-scale systems of 
territorial governance, such as occurs in federal countries, political institutions are entangled 
across space, and precisely for that reason, political action and political outcomes (such as 
the continuity of SURs) are not limited to a single arena. Indeed, the unfolding of politics 
within subnational units is strongly determined by the dynamics that play out at the 
intersection of national and state-level arenas.4   
 Several works illustrate how intergovernmental relations affect SUR continuity. For 
example, Snyder (1999; 2001) shows that the implementation of market reforms at the 
national level contribute to SUR strengthening. These reforms, as he notes, trigger 
reregulation projects in the states through which incumbent nondemocratic elites generate 
rents and resources to remain in power.  Alternatively, Gibson (2005) shows that national 
incumbents’ strategic needs may lead federal politicians to foster SUR continuity.  As long as 
subnational nondemocratic rulers meet these needs, national democratic incumbents have 
                                                 
4
 An alternative view, found in the works by Montero (2007) and McMann (2006), contends that factors specific 
to subnational territorial entities, rather than the interconnectedness of arenas, are the main driving forces 
behind SUR continuity.    
 5 
incentives to prevent democracy from trickling down. Similarly, in an analysis of Argentina, 
Gervasoni (2006) argues that the institutions of fiscal federalism shape the prospects for 
democratization in subnational arenas, as provinces that are highly dependent on federal 
transfers are better equipped to maintain SURs in place.  Finally, Cornelius (1999) and 
Montero & Samuels (2004) argue that processes of decentralization, which shifts political, 
fiscal, and administrative power away from the national government toward subnational 
units, give nondemocratic state-level rulers greater autonomy, resources, and leverage to 
strengthen and maintain SURs alive.   
Underlying most explanations about SUR continuity, however, is the idea that 
nondemocratic subnational regimes are essentially all of one type.5  As a result, scholars have 
assumed that all SURs interact with the federal government in similar ways and that 
precisely for that reason they are affected by political events occurring at the federal level of 
government in ways that are basically similar.  This assumption, in turn, has led analysts to 
provide incomplete and underspecified accounts of SUR continuity, as they have attributed 
the same set of causes or causal processes to explain the continuity of all SURs. 
One of the findings of this dissertation is that there are different types of subnational 
nondemocratic regimes, and these differences strongly shape the pattern of interaction with 
the central government in ways that determine whether and how SURs reproduce themselves 
over time.  In fact, as the qualitative subnational case-studies presented in chapters 6 and 7 
demonstrate, contrary to what most explanations on regime juxtaposition have posited, that 
there are multiple trajectories rather than a single trajectory of SUR continuity.   
                                                 
5
 Snyder (1999; 2001) is an exception. 
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The central argument of this dissertation is that trajectories of SUR continuity are 
primarily determined by the capacity (or lack thereof) of national incumbents to exert 
control, and thus discipline, subnational nondemocratic rulers.  An undemocratic subnational 
ruler who is subject to presidential manipulability and control can in fact be very beneficial 
for a president needing political support.  With their tight control over voters and national 
legislative delegations, subservient undemocratic governors can provide important benefits to 
national incumbents (Gibson 2005).  If presidents can successfully induce governors to 
cooperate with the center, the latter might find it very convenient to engage in mutually 
beneficial vertical coalitions6.  When this occurs, I contend that a first type of SUR continuity 
ensues, namely, SUR reproduction from above7.  The trajectory leading to this outcome is 
schematized in figure 1.1 below. 
However, presidential penetration and control over nondemocratic 
incumbents/arenas, is not always attainable.  In fact, recalcitrant and powerful undemocratic 
governors may stand in a position to prevent and/or neutralize presidential leverage and 
control. When this occurs, presidents may have few incentives to promote the continuity of 
SURs upon which they cannot exercise any control, much less induce their rulers to join in 
vertical coalitions.  In such a context, the center not only will avoid reproducing SURs from 
above, but whenever possible, it will seek to weaken these regimes.  Nonetheless, the 
entrenched position of autonomous and non-controllable undemocratic incumbents, coupled 
with presidents’ weak disciplining power, allows the former to maintain the status quo and 
                                                 
6
 By vertical coalitions I mean electoral, legislative, and governing coalitions built across different levels of 
government. 
7
 By reproduction I mean that presidents deliberately act in ways that are favorable to SURs’ survival. The 
specific mechanisms through which this occurs are discussed in detail in chapters 2 and 5. 
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keep their regimes alive.  When this occurs, a different trajectory of SUR continuity ensues, 
namely, SUR self-reproduction (see figure 1.1). 
 The capacity of presidents to exercise control over nondemocratic subnational 
incumbents, as well as the nondemocratic governors’ ability to resist this control, are central 
building blocks for explaining how intergovernmental interactions shape SUR continuity.  
Hence, one of the principal tasks of this study is to identify and subsequently analyze the 
major instruments that both governors and presidents can use to increase their power, control, 
and autonomy vis-à-vis other levels of government.  
 Building on the literature on political parties and fiscal federalism, I identify two 
major instruments through which presidents can penetrate and control SURs.  National 
incumbents can control nondemocratic rulers via their party structures, and/or fiscal leverage 
or through both of these instruments of territorial and political control.  I thus identify three 
possible paths through which presidents can exert leverage and control over SURs, namely, 
the fiscal path of presidential control, the partisan path of presidential control, and a 
combined fiscal-partisan path of presidential control.  
 These paths are presented in figure 1.1 with dotted arrows, which denote 
substitutability.  The three paths of territorial and political control are schematized as 
substitutable because there are multiple paths through which presidents can control or 
penetrate provincial arenas and any one can be sufficient to attain territorial/political control 
over SURs. In fact, as I will show in chapters 4, 6, and 7, these paths vary across countries 
and over time. 
Presidential control, however, is mediated by variables specific to each SUR, which is 
why a purely intergovernmental perspective is incomplete.  Presidential control can be 
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neutralized or enhanced depending on the capacity of each SUR to avert or succumb to 
control from the central government. Regardless of how control is exercised (i.e., via 
partisan, fiscal, or both instruments) presidents can only gain leverage over subnational 
politics and rulers if a combination of national and subnational variables is present.  To be 
able to politically/territorially penetrate, and thus exert control over undemocratic provincial 
arenas, presidents need to have the means necessary to subjugate undemocratic governors to 
their rule and the undemocratic governors’ capacity to resist penetration from above must be 
minimal.  Neither of these two conditions alone (except at the extremes) is sufficient for a 
president to gain leverage over subnational arenas.   
Building on the literature of fiscal federalism and state building, I contend that 
nondemocratic governors can counterbalance control from the central government provided 
they are financially autonomous, and/or stand in a position to exercise tight control over their 
territory, the local population, and state-resources. The first source of gubernatorial 
autonomy is determined by subnational incumbents’ financial situation, whereas the second 
is shaped by the nature of the state/province’s state-administration8. These instruments of 
gubernatorial autonomy, which vary across SURs, strongly shape the prospects of 
presidential control, unleashing in turn different trajectories through which SURs can 
survive, and eventually determining the type of SUR continuity.  
 In light of the varied access to instruments of control across levels of government, 
subnational units, countries, and time, I build a theoretical framework that captures cross-
                                                 
8
 State administrations are here understood in the Weberian sense, as the set of rules and procedures through 
which rulers manage political power.  In its extreme, state administrations can be either purely bureaucratic or 
patrimonial. Under a bureaucratic state-administration political power is exercised along impersonal, routinized, 
and rational rules and procedures. By contrast, under a patrimonial state-administration political power is 
exercised in a discretional, unchecked, and unroutinized manner (Weber 1976 [1925]). 
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SUR differences, their interactions with the center, and demonstrates how these interactions 
vary across federations and over time.  Such a complex and dynamic framework is better 
equipped to explain how presidents exercise (political and territorial) control over governors, 
and thus how trajectories of SUR continuity persist.   
 
Figure 1.1: An integrated analytical framework to explain trajectories of SUR continuity across countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case selection, research design, methodology, and outline of the study  
The analytic framework put forward in this study is tested in Argentina and Mexico. I 
have chosen Argentina and Mexico as the two country cases because they both have federal 
systems within which SURs maintain a persistant presence.  These types of systems grant 
subnational territorial units considerable legal and political autonomy to design local rules 
and institutions, and to insulate local electoral processes from the influence of national 
incumbents.  As a result, federal systems raise the likelihood of regime juxtaposition.   
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The countries also exhibit many socioeconomic commonalities (such as level of 
economic and social development), institutional similarities (such as a presidential system 
and a bicameral system), and more recently, political similarities (such as the type of the 
national political regime), and thus allow for controlled cross-national comparisons.  In 
addition, as I will show in chapter 3, Argentina and Mexico offer a wide variation in terms of 
SURs, thus allowing testing the different trajectories of SUR continuity.  Finally, the two 
country cases have in common the hypothesized causal factors that explain trajectories of 
SUR continuity. Yet, Argentina and Mexico vary in other ways that are theoretically 
relevant, specifically with regards to how SUR continuity is possible –either through fiscal, 
partisan, and/or fiscal-partisan means. A comparison of these two countries, therefore, allows 
testing the relative importance of the primary explanatory variables outlined in the analytic 
framework.  
 The dissertation is divided into 6 empirical chapters.  In chapter 2, I present the 
general analytic framework, and discuss each of its components parts. In the first part of the 
chapter I review the two main theoretical approaches that have been used so far to explain 
SUR continuity.  One of the main claims of this study is that these approaches provide 
merely partial explanations of SUR continuity.  However, a second central assertion of this 
dissertation is that each of these approaches emphasizes different and important elements of 
the national-subnational reality, and that precisely for that reason each of them should be 
synthesized into a more satisfying model.  Thus, the framework I develop and test in this 
study builds on and integrates these two (apparently) opposing approaches to the study of 
subnational politics in contemporary Latin America.  This framework is discussed 
extensively in the second part of chapter 2. 
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In chapter 3, I assess the territorial extension of democracy in Argentina (1983-2007) 
and Mexico (1997-2006).  To do so, I first engage in an extensive and detailed discussion of 
the concept of subnational democracy.  Building on on Mazzuca’s (1998, 2007) conceptual 
framework, I then turn to refine existing conceptualizations of subnational political regimes. I 
conceptualize subnational political regimes along the access to political power and exercise 
of political power dimensions, which is why I adopt a minimalistic definition of democracy 
and treat all other liberal attributes of democracy as attributes of a new concept, i.e., the state-
administration.   
Building on this conceptual framework I proceed to measure democracy in all 24 
Argentine provinces and 32 Mexican states.  Using an original data set, I present maps of 
subnational democracy which not only reveal the extension of democracy in these two 
countries, but perhaps more interestingly, show how subnational political regimes have 
evolved over time.  In the second part of the chapter I use the access-exercise framework to 
advance a new classification of SURs in contemporary Argentina and Mexico.  This 
classification, which reveals that SURs vary systematically regarding the type of state-
administration they posses, is central to understanding how different trajectories of SUR are 
eventually unleashed.  
Testing the analytic framework requires a two-phase comparison. The first phase 
occurs at the country level, and is focused on identifying the distinct paths of presidential 
control present in Argentina and Mexico.  The second phase instead, focuses on within 
country comparisons, and aims at showing that trajectories of SUR continuity are primarily 
determined by the capacity (or lack thereof) of national incumbents to exert control, and thus 
discipline, subnational nondemocratic rulers.  
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In chapter 4, I measure and compare fiscal and partisan instruments of presidential 
control in Argentina and Mexico. An examination of each of the post-1983 presidencies in 
Argentina reveals that presidents used multiple paths to secure their control.  While Peronist 
President Menem followed the fiscal/partisan path, thus exerting control over governors 
using two types of instruments, Peronist Presidents Duhalde and Kirchner disciplined 
governors using fiscal instruments.  By contrast, president Fox in Mexico followed the 
partisan path of presidential control.  
After establishing the specific path of control through which presidents constrict 
undemocratic governors, I carry out an intra-country comparison and explore whether 
different trajectories of SUR continuity were contingent upon undemocratic governors’ 
capacity to resist (or succumb to) presidential control.  In chapter 5, I test the more general 
claim of my argument, namely, that presidential control leads to SUR reproduction from 
above.  To do so, I perform different cross-sectional time-series analyses, each of which tests 
if presidential control leads to SUR reproduction from above.  The chapter analyzes the 
administrations of president Fox (2000-2006) in Mexico, and the administrations of Menem 
(1989-1999), De la Rúa (1999-2002), and Duhalde/Kirchner (2003-2007) in Argentina.9 The 
analyses confirm that whenever presidential control over SURs is possible, national 
incumbents opt to reproduce these regimes. 
Because quantitative anlyses do not permit the testing and substantiation of the 
specific mechanisms through which presidential control leads to SUR reproduction, the 
second goal in this (second) phase of research is to reconstruct the causal chain that links the 
cause (i.e. the specific instruments and paths of national politicians for controling SURs) 
                                                 
9
 The administration of Alfonsín (1983-1989) is not tested due to data unavailability. 
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with the effect (i.e., the type of SUR continuity that ensues).  To do so, I conduct a “causal 
process observation, ” as proposed by Brady & Collier (2004), through which I seek to 
identify pieces of data that provide information about the context, processes, and mechanisms 
through which the initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes (George & 
Bennett 2005).  More specifically, following Van Evera’s (1997) recommendations, I break 
down the causal chain of events into its component parts using evidence gathered from over 
150 in-depth interviews, archival documents, and newspapers articles. I, then, flesh out and 
analyze how each component part of the two trajectories of SUR continuity unfolds to 
produce the hypothesized outcome.   
In chapter 6, I analyze SUR continuity in Mexico under the presidency of Vicente 
Fox (2000-2006). Evidence presented in chapter 4, indicates that if SUR reproduction from 
above is to take place, it should occur via a partisan path of presidential control.  In order to 
explore how partisan presidential control (lack thereof) triggers different trajectories of SUR 
continuity, I conduct an in-depth qualitative analysis of Puebla and Oaxaca, two 
undemocratic states that underwent different trajectories of SUR continuity.10  Puebla, which 
did not have sufficient instruments of autonomy to resist presidential control, represents a 
case of SUR reproduction “from above,” and Oaxaca, which managed to neutralize national 
incumbents’ partisan control, illustrates the trajectory of SUR “self-reproduction.”  
In chapter 7, I examine SUR continuity in Argentina during the presidency of Néstro 
Kirchner (2003-2007).  As demonstrated in chapter 4, if SUR reproduction from above is to 
take place, it should occur via the fiscal path of presidential control.  I study San Luis and La 
Rioja, two undemocratic provinces that have resisted and succumbed to federal penetration, 
                                                 
10
 A justification of this subnational case selection is provided in chapter 6. 
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respectively, and consequently experienced different trajectories of SUR continuity.11 
Whereas San Luis represents a case of SUR self-reproduction, La Rioja illustrates the 
alternative trajectory of regime continuity –SUR reproduction from above.   
Despite the fact that the theoretical framework outlines a third path of presidential 
control, which occurs when a combination of fiscal-partisan instruments is present, I do not 
carry out an in-depth analysis of its effect on SUR continuity. The reason for doing so is 
because the specific mechanisms that operate to trigger different trajectories of SUR survival 
are extensively spelled out in chapters 6 and 7 where I analyze the fiscal and partisan paths 
individually.  
Table 1.1 below summarizes the research design of this study as well as the national 
and subnational cases selected to test the analytic framework.  The left hand side column 
presents information about the paths of presidential control existent in each country during 
two different administrations.  The remaining columns oultine the subnational cases studied 
in this dissertation and the type of SUR continuity observed in each of them.  
  
Table 1.1: Summary of research design and case selection  
Path of presidential 
control Country
SUR reproduction from 
above SUR self-reproduction
Fiscal Argentina 
(2002-2007)
Partisan Mexico 
(2000-2006)
La Rioja San Luis
Puebla Oaxaca
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 A justification of this subnational case selection is provided in chapter 7. 
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 The final chapter of this dissertation presents a summary of the argument, as well as a 
discussion of the study’s findings and primary contributions.  I conclude the chapter 
advancing potential areas for future research, and offering a discussion of the study’s 
implications for the three relevant areas of research beyond Argentina and Mexico –the 
analysis of SURs, the study of intergovernmental relations, and the analysis of federalism 
more broadly.  
 
  
 
Chapter 2: An analytic framework to explain subnational undemocratic 
regime continuity 
 
 “This is my state,” yelled the Oaxacan Priísta governor to one of the federal officials 
held hostage in ‘his’ state, “and I decide who meets with whom, and whether or not you hold 
meetings in Oaxaca” (interview Lepine).  In August 2002, two years after Mexico’s national 
democratization took place, a group of federal officials from the Ministry of Social 
Development (Sedesol) were kidnapped in the Oaxacan city of Mitla.  The federal officials 
had travelled down south from Mexico City to answer the PAN mayors’ claims that the 
Sedesol programs, which were administered by the PRI state government, were not being 
distributed according to eligibility criteria.  Instead, the mayors argued the programs were 
allocated to political and partisan allies, and consequently did not reach PAN ruled 
mayoralties.  The kidnapping occurred when the group of Sedesol officials and the PAN 
mayors were discussing strategies to cope with the discretional distribution of social 
programs. “All of a sudden”, as one of the kidnappees reported, “the doors of the meeting 
room were opened and Ulises Ruiz [then, federal senator of Oaxaca, today governor of the 
state], leading a crowd of 100 PRI mayors, burst into the room, violently apprehended the 
federal officials and took us away in a pick up truck, holding us hostages for one day” 
(interview Lepine).  This episode, which vividly illustrates Oaxacan non-democratic 
entrenched practices, had important implications for both the state and the federal 
government.  After this episode, “(Oaxaca’s governor) José Murat refused to sign subsequent 
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‘treaties of social development’ (Convenio de Desarrollo Social) with the federal 
government,12 which is why Oaxacans did not benefit from some of Fox’s social programs” 
(interview Lepine).   
 This incident and its implications reveal important aspects of the relationship between 
an undemocratic regime and the federal government. For one, it shows President Fox’s 
incapacity to trespass Oaxacan borders, his inability to discipline and control recalcitrant 
governors, and his determination to cut off ties (i.e., social programs) with Oaxaca’s 
governor. Furthermore, the episode not only shows the governor’s unwillingness to maintain 
a collegial relationship with the federation, but also his resolve to confront the president.  
A different pattern of intergovernmental relations can be observed in Oaxaca’s 
neighboring state: Puebla.  Unlike Oaxaca, where federal political penetration is scarce and 
intergovernmental relations are confrontational, PRI-ruled Puebla –also one of the least 
democratic states of Mexico (see chapter 3), has experienced far greater federal infiltration.  
Much of this penetration has occurred at the municipal level where, beginning in 1995, the 
political presence of the PAN increased; and more recently (e.g. early 2000s) at the 
legislative level, when the PAN has began to control federal legislative slots that were 
previously monopolized by the PRI.13 The PAN in Puebla, as many interviewees reported, 
was, and remains, an actual threat to the PRI hegemony, which has controlled the 
governorship since the 1930s.  Yet despite the growing and challenging presence of the PAN 
in Puebla, Poblano governors, unlike their Oaxacan counterparts have always have 
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 Every year each Mexican state signs these treaties with the federal government in which both parties stipulate 
what social programs will be co-financed by the state and the federal government. 
13
 In the mid-term elections of 2006, Puebla elected 2 PAN federal senators (out 3), and 14 PAN 
Representatives (out of 19).  
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maintained a “smooth” relation with PAN presidents.  Not only have they let federal officials 
cross provincial borders and make inroads into their state, but they also have supported many 
of the (i.e., Panista) federal legislative and gubernatorial initiatives. In turn, as I will show in 
this study, PAN presidents have rewarded Puebla with abundant federal programs and 
transfers.  This collegial and mutually beneficial relationship is possible, as one interviewee 
noted, “because of the existence of an informal deal through which PRI governors are left 
untouched provided they do not interfere in electoral local processes, and give the PAN room 
of maneuver to compete and keep on winning local and legislative positions” (interview 25). 
Similar dramatic differences across adjoining subnational undemocratic regimes can 
also be found in Argentina.  The neighboring provinces of San Luis and La Rioja, two of the 
most undemocratic provinces of the country (see chapter 3), maintain diametrically different 
relationships with the federal government.  La Rioja is located in one of the least 
economically developed regions of Argentina and is one of the most financially dependent 
provinces of the country on the federal government.  As a result of this dependence, Riojano 
governors have virtually no room to maneuver vis-à-vis the central government.  This lack of 
autonomy from the central government has obliged La Rioja’s incumbents to act in 
agreement with the president’s agenda and will.  An example of this subordination occurred 
in the mid-term elections of 2005, when former President Néstor Kirchner forced then 
Peronist Governor Ángel “Didí” Maza to campaign for a seat in the national senate . 
Kirchner’s imposition on Governor Maza was a reaction to Menem’s decision to run for one 
of the three Riojano seats in the senate.14  Kirchner and Menem, close allies in the early 
1990s, had become strong enemies after they both had competed for the presidency in 2003, 
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 La Rioja is former president Menem’s home-state.  
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when the Peronist party went to the polls with split-tickets.  Kirchner not only wanted to 
avoid Menem’s victory in La Rioja, but most importantly wanted a landslide victory for 
Maza in Menem’s own stronghold.  To that end, he compelled Governor Maza, the 10-year 
governor whose political fate and career depended on Menem’s power, to run against his 
very own political mentor (interviews Maza (a), Maza (b)).  Had Maza not done so, as a top 
rank national official and close friend of President Kirchner told the governor, “La Rioja 
would not receive a single penny from the federal government” (interview with Maza (b)).   
Such a presidential imposition and intrusion in provincial affairs would be impossible 
in the undemocratic province of San Luis.  During his 18-year administration, Peronist 
Adolfo Rodríguez-Saá ruled the province along Prussian standards.  Not only did he keep his 
iron grip on power, but, like his European ‘counterparts’, also developed a modern and 
efficient state bureaucracy, passing several bills all aiming at maintaining provincial finances 
in check.  Moreover, “el Adolfo,” as the former governor is named, followed a balanced-
budget policy, according to which he destined 50 percent of the provincial budget for public 
works and infrastructure development.  This financial austerity and orderly budgetary 
execution allowed him to diligently build a local proto-type of a “developmentalist state.”  
One of the unintended consequences of the province’s sound economy and balanced financial 
situation was that the governor managed to neutralize political and partisan impositions from 
the center.  Not only have presidents found it hard to make inroads in the state and thus 
meddle in local politics, but, most importantly, they have also been victims of the political 
impudence of the Rodríguez-Saá brothers.15 These have included, among others, the fierce 
opposition to numerous presidential iniatives, such as Senator Alberto Rodríguez Saá’s vote 
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 Alberto Rodríguez-Saá (Adolfo’s brother) has held the governorship since 2003. 
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against Menem’s most desired project, i.e., the constitutional reform in 1994 through which 
he intended to introduce the consecutive reelection of presidents, and the numerous claims 
filed with the federal Supreme Court against the Kirchner administration denouncing the 
government for its unfair political practices vis-à-vis San Luis province.  
All together, these examples reveal important aspects of how undemocratic regimes 
operate within nationally democratic countries.  First, the examples show that there are 
important political, partisan, and economic cross-SUR differences.  These differences in turn, 
have important implications for placing undemocratic subnational units and governors in 
diverse positions vis-à-vis the center, as they enhance or limit the capacity of subnational 
rulers to prevent federal intromission.  These cross-subnational differences, which determine 
undemocratic governors’ clout in their dealing with the center, are key to understanding how, 
and under what conditions, SURs continue to survive. 
Second, and perhaps more important, the examples listed above suggest that there are 
different types of political dynamics between SURs and the center.  Whereas some SURs 
seem to provide strategic benefits to the needs of federal incumbents, as exemplified by the 
cases of Puebla and La Rioja, some others inflict substantive damage on federal incumbents. 
This is illustrated by the cases of Oaxaca and San Luis, whose governors have managed to 
impose their own conditions on the federal government.  Acknowledging that there are 
different relationships between SURs and the federal government is key to discovering the 
causal mechanisms that underpin the SUR continuity. 
Third, the examples listed above further underscore another important factor 
regarding intergovernmental relations and SUR continuity in particular, namely, that 
presidential authority cannot penetrate homogenously throughout the national territory. This 
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indicates that presidential control cannot be exerted equally across subnational units.  These 
facts, as I will show in the next chapters, denote the incapacity of the central state to 
penetrate and win over undemocratic subnational areas and rulers, and are decisive in 
explaining types and trajectories of SUR continuity.     
Finally, the examples enumerated earlier reveal that there are important cross-country 
differences with regard to how presidents can penetrate and control nondemocratic arenas 
and exert control over recalcitrant undemocratic rulers.  Whereas in some cases political and 
territorial control can occur through partisan structures, as shown by the Mexican case of 
Puebla, in others it can be exercised via economic and financial means –as illustrated by the 
Argentine province of La Rioja.  These examples reveal that any cross-national explanation 
of SUR continuity must acknowledge the varied instruments that facilitate (or prevent) the 
broadcasting of presidential power into the peripheries, and which, in turn, shape 
intergovernmental relations within and across countries. 
In summary, the examples listed above reveal that (a) SURs are not all of one kind 
and that these differences have important implications for intergovernmental realtions, (b) 
they are not all functional to the center, in that they do not provide strategic benefits to 
national incumbents, (c) they cannot be equally subjugated and controlled by the federal 
government, and (d) the instruments that federal incumbents employ to exert control over 
some SURs differ cross-nationally and cross-temporally.   
These four important observations about subnational nondemocratic regimes have 
been largely overlooked by most works within the regime juxtaposition literature.  For 
instance, the literature has generally treated SURs as homogenous entities that do not differ 
among one another regarding political, institutional, or economic variables. On these 
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grounds, existing works have taken for granted that all SURs interact with the federal 
government in similar ways (see Cornelius 1999, Gibson 2005, Gervasoni 2006).16  Precisely 
for this reason, this literature has advanced general explanations of SUR continuity that do 
not apply well to all nondemocratic regimes.  In other words, current explanations only 
account for the dynamics of continuity observed in a selected number of SURs, not in the 
totality of them. In effect, it would be misleading to claim that  all SURs survive because 
they meet the strategic needs of national incumbents (Gibson 2005), since there are some 
SURs that survive in spite of being ‘functional’ to the central government.   
Another central assumption of current works on regime juxtaposition is that national 
incumbents’ capacity to exert control over governors is the same (i.e., does not vary) across 
provinces.  This misconstruction, in turn, has prevented scholars from assessing the fact that 
presidents are limited in their capacity to discipline and control recalcitrant governors, and 
are constrained regarding the strategies they employ to take advantage of, or weaken, 
nondemocratic subnational arenas/governors.  Finally, scholars studying subnational 
nondemocratic regimes have only summarily explored the instruments that structure 
intergovernmental relations and precisely for that reason have not been able to fully spell out 
the mechanisms through which national incumbents may facilitate or prevent the continuity 
of SURs. 
In order to address these issues, this study takes cross-subnational differences 
seriously. Even more importantly, I pay close attention to how these differences shape the 
pattern of interaction between nondemocratic areas/governors and the national incumbents.  
Moreover, the analytic framework developed in this dissertation to explain how and why 
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 Snyder (1999; 2001) is an exception. 
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SURs continue to exist despite national democratization, is built in such a way as to capture 
cross-SUR differences, their multiple interactions with the center, and how these interactions 
vary across federations and over time.  In identifying and theoretically addressing these key 
features, the theoretical framework presented in this study explains both SUR continuity 
across federations, and trajectories of SUR continuity within federations and through time. 
 In what follows, I outline the two main theoretical approaches (i.e., “the territorial 
politics approach,” and “the provincial approach”) that have been employed to explain SUR 
continuity in developing countries.  After discussing their contributions and limitations, I 
synthesize, in section II, the best elements of these two approaches in an integrated 
framework to explain SUR continuity. The integrated analytic framework and its components 
parts are analyzed in detail in sections III and IV of this chapter. 
 
I. Existing literature: contributions and limitations 
 Two different analytical approaches have tackled the issue of regime juxtaposition.  
The first approach, which I term the “territorial politics approach,” focuses on how the 
politics and political conflict that play out at the intersection of national and provincial arenas 
affect SUR continuity.17  A core assumption of this literature is that central governments and 
their territorial subunits are politically linked.  Thus, the linkages18 between the center and 
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 Territorial politics, as Tarrow (1978) notes, “is not about territory, but is about how politics is fought out 
across territory (1978:1). The territorial approach to politics has been used extensively in the subfield of 
European politics, especially within the literature of state building, political parties, and regionalism (see the 
works by Rokkan 1970, Rokkan and Urwin 1982, 1983; Keating 1998; Tarrow 1978; Tarrow, Katzenstein and 
Graziano 1978, among others).  Recent works inspired by the territorial approach to politics are Gibson (1997, 
2005, 2008); Falleti (2003, 2005, forthcoming); Eaton (2004), Wibbels (2005), among others. 
18
 Linkages, as Gibson (2005:112) notes, can include all types of institutions regulating intergovernmental 
relations, such as agencies monitoring provincial activities and expenditures, revenue and communication flows, 
and diverse networks of exchange, such as unions, parties, etc. 
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periphery of the political system, as well as the skills and resources of the politicians who 
serve as gatekeepers between each level of government, are central to understanding how 
different sub-systems (i.e., higher and lower arenas of government) interact with each other, 
and in turn, how national political events shape political outcomes occurring in subnational 
arenas (Tarrow 1978; Rokkan & Urwin 1983; Gibson 2005, 2008).   
 Several works illustrate how the interconnectedness of higher and lower arenas 
affects SUR continuity. For instance, Snyder (1999; 2001) shows that events occurring at the 
federal level of government, such as the implementation of neoliberal (market) reforms, can 
contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of SURs. These reforms, as he notes, trigger 
reregulation projects in the states through which incumbent nondemocratic elites generate 
rents and resources to survive.  Alternatively, Gibson (2005) contends that national 
incumbents’ strategic needs may lead federal politicians to foster SUR continuity.  As long as 
subnational nondemocratic rulers meet these needs, national democratic incumbents have 
incentives to prevent democracy from trickling down.  On a similar note, in an analysis of 
Argentina, Gervasoni (2006) argues that the institutions of fiscal federalism shape the 
prospects for democratization in subnational arenas, as provinces that are highly dependent 
on federal transfers are better equipped to maintain SURs in place.  Finally, Cornelius (1999) 
and Montero & Samuels (2004) argue that processes of decentralization, which shift political, 
fiscal, and administrative power away from the national government toward subnational 
units, give nondemocratic state-level rulers greater autonomy, resources, and leverage to 
strengthen and maintain SURs alive.   
The second approach to the study of regime juxtaposition, which I here refer to as 
“the provincial approach,” posits that the linkages (see footnote 18) that make 
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intergovernmental connections possible are not always prevalent.  As a result, this strand of 
reasoning holds that it would be wrong to assume that political outcomes unfolding at the 
subnational level are a direct consequence of events occurring at higher levels of 
government. Advocates of this approach argue that SUR continuity is better understood by 
looking at specific provincial factors present in each SUR.  
 Echoing this approach, Montero (2007) claims that, in countries such as in Brazil, 
where subnational politicians neither have the desire (i.e., progressive career ambition) nor 
the resources (i.e. party structures) to venture into national politics, SUR continuity cannot be 
explained by looking at the intersection of national and provincial arenas.  Instead, he argues 
that the level of provincial capitalist development and citizens’ economic autonomy from the 
(provincial) state are the main factors explaining SUR continuity in Brazil (Montero 2007).19 
Each of these two approaches separately offers key analytical and theoretical insights 
to better understand the prospects for subnational undemocratic regimes continuity in 
contemporary Latin America.  Yet, because each of them views subnational politics from 
rather opposing viewpoints, they fail to provide a comprehensive and accurate explanation of 
the political dynamics that unfolds in the subnational world and that feeds SUR continuity.  
For instance, the “territorial politics approach” is correct in assuming that in any large-scale 
system of territorial governance, such as federal states, political institutions are entangled 
across space and precisely for this reason political outcomes and political action are not 
limited to a single arena.   
                                                 
19
 McMann (2006) offers a similar argument to explain subnational undemocratic regimes in Russia and 
Kyrgyzstan.  
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Yet, with its emphasis on intergovernmental interactions, this approach underplays 
the influence of provincial factors on the prospects for SUR continuity.  In fact, many of the 
elements that shape the interaction between higher and lower-level incumbent politicians are 
determined by provincial variables. The leverage that national politicians can exercise over 
subnational arenas, as well as undemocratic incumbents’ capacity to thwart national leverage 
in subnational arenas is, to a large extent, determined by structural subnational variables 
(such as the level of economic provincial/state independence from the center, and the type of 
state-administrations –which facilitate or hinder political penetration from federal actors and 
institutions).  Thus, by focusing on the processes (i.e., intergovernmental interactions), rather 
than the structural subnational variables that shape national and subnational actors’ ability to 
feed SURs, the territorial approach misses an important part of the explanation of subnational 
regime continuity. 
By the same token, the provincial approach, which centers exclusively on the effect 
of subnational variables, overlooks key “exogenous” (i.e. national) factors, such as the 
incidence of national parties, institutions, and actors in subantional arenas, all of which may 
drive political continuity in subnational units.  The provincial approach assumes that 
subnational units are isolated entities, impervious to the political, economic, institutional, and 
social events occurring at the national level (or even other subnational units themselves).  
Still, despite the legal autonomy conferred to them by the constitution, subnational units are 
embedded in a larger (national) political system, and consequently they cannot be regarded as 
sovereign countries, as the provincial approach does.  As Gibson (2008) notes, “in a country, 
the intervention of the central government in provincial affairs is regular and substantial” (2).  
Thus, an explanation of SURs’ continuity necessarily must incorporate variables that capture 
 27 
the political and institutional incidence of the national government on subnational political 
dynamics (as suggested by the territorial politics approach).   
Given that each of these two approaches emphasizes different and important elements 
of the national-subnational reality, which should be taken into consideration when studying 
SUR continuity, the analytic framework I develop and test in this dissertation synthesizes the 
central building blocks of each of these approaches into a more satisfying model.  From the 
territorial politics approach, I borrow the idea that SUR continuity should be understood from 
an intergovernmental and “system-based” perspective.  As mentioned before, given the 
interconnectedness between higher and lower levels of government (i.e., subsystems), and 
the constant interplay between these arenas, political outcomes in the subnational world are 
necessarily shaped by what happens in higher (and also cross-provincial) levels of 
government.  Thus, any theory about SUR continuity should incorporate the interactive 
dynamics that take place at the intersection of national and provincial politics (see Gibson 
2005, 2008). 
From the provincial approach I borrow the idea that provincial variables play an 
important and decisive role in shaping SUR continuity.  As I will show in the coming 
sections of this chapter, structural provincial variables such as the nature of state 
administrations20, and the fiscal/financial autonomy of provinces from the center, are key to 
understanding how the interconnectedness across levels of government operates, and, in turn, 
                                                 
20
 State administrations are here understood as the set of institutions and rules that organize government.  These 
institutions establish the parameters through which rulers exercise the (political) power conferred to them by 
their ruling position. Following Max Weber (1925), state-administratios can take be patrimonial or bureaucratic.  
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how SUR continuity and reproduction ensues.21  Put differently, the politics that play out at 
the intersection of national and subnational arenas, which is central to determine the 
territorial strategies that give way to SUR continuity, cannot be understood without taking 
into consideration political, institutional, and economic subnational factors.  
 
II. Explaining SUR continuity in contemporary Latin America: control, autonomy, and 
trajectories of SUR continuity 
Before turning to present and discuss the analytic framework, a word about partisan 
affiliation and ideology is in order.  The analytic model developed in this chapter does not 
assume that presidential control is more likely when presidents and governors belong to the 
same political party or share the same ideology.  Rather, it assumes that both opposition-
governed and co-partisan-ruled provinces are prone to be controlled from above (i.e., by the 
central government) under certain circumstances, and that as result of this control presidents 
may opt to reproduce both opposition-governed and co-partisan-ruled SURs.22 That is, co-
                                                 
21
 Note that my hypothesis, contrary to what the provincial approach claims (see Montero 2007, McMann 
2006), rules out socioeconomic variables as potential driving forces behind SUR continuity.  I do so, because as 
I will show in the next chapter, socioeconomic variables are misleading predictors of SUR continuity, as both 
less developed and poor, and mid developed and rich undemocratic provinces have managed to outlast national 
democracy.  This assertion does not deny the fact that socio-economic variables may play a key role at 
explaining SUR origins or SUR change (but not regime continuity, which is the central topic of this 
dissertation). 
22
 To illustrate this point take the case of an opposition-governed undemocratic province undergoing a profound 
economic crisis and which at the same does not have sufficient local resources (i.e., provincial taxes) to meet its 
fiscal and financial imbalances.  This province, which is highly dependent on federal transfers for its 
subsistence, can be easily controlled from above regardless of its partisan affiliation and ideology.  A president 
with abundant fiscal resources can exercise leverage on the opposition governor without difficulty, inducing 
him/her to act and behave subserviently, thus ensuring his/her loyalty.  The same president, by contrast, may 
have less leverage to discipline a co-partisan-ruled and rich undemocratic province, which due to its financial 
autonomy may impose resistance or raise the stakes of presidential control, and thus his/her loyalty to the 
president. 
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partisanship and shared ideology at both levels of government do not ensure, in and of 
themselves, greater presidential control over provincial incumbents.  
One central assertion of the territorial approach is that the degree to which the 
boundaries of a periphery can be penetrated has important consequences for its internal 
structuring (see Tarrow 1978, Rokkan & Urwin 1983, Gibson 2005).  Despite the fact that 
this contention has received wide acceptance within the literature, few studies have 
substantiated it empirically. In contrast, this dissertation carefully investigates the different 
mechanisms through which this penetration can be achieved (or prevented), and by piecing 
out evidence I explore how this penetration affects the prospects and types of SUR 
continuity.  
Drawing on this insight, I argue that the capacity of national incumbents to penetrate 
subnational undemocratic arenas as well as the ability of provincial incumbents to resist and 
neutralize that penetration strongly determines the prospects for SUR continuity. I thus 
hypothesize that nationally democratic politicians who can effectively penetrate in provincial 
arenas, and threaten the autonomy and power of recalcitrant nondemocratic governors, will 
have incentives to promote SUR continuity.23  Underlying this hypothesis is the idea that 
controllable and inducible undemocratic governors can become valuable partners for 
coalition building (Gibson 2005).  Indeed, if presidents can successfully induce governors to 
cooperate with the center, the latter might find it very convenient to engage in mutually 
beneficial vertical coalitions. An undemocratic subnational ruler who is subject to 
                                                 
23
 It should be noted that these very same conditions may lead national incumbents to promote subnational 
democratization.  Yet, the extent to which national politicians embark in SUR reproduction or SUR 
‘dismantlement’ depends on the relative power position of national incumbents.  Presidents who, for instance, 
do not have solid legislative majorities, who confront strong and highly nationalized and extended territorialized 
opposition parties, who face deep economic crises and social/ethnic uprisings, or who rule during transitional 
periods, have less incentives to democratize SURs than presidents ruling under the exact opposition conditions. 
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presidential control and manipulability can in fact be very beneficial for a president seeking 
political support.  With their tight control over voters and national legislative delegations, 
subservient undemocratic governors can provide important benefits to national incumbents.  
Under these circumstances, the costs of promoting the democratization of undemocratic 
enclaves outweigh the cost of dismantling them. To be clear, unless presidents can not wield 
power and influence over undemocratic governors, limit their autonomy, and thus induce or 
subjugate them, they will not have incentives to reproduce SURs. 24  
“Controllable and weak” undemocratic governors, for their part, also reap the benefits 
stemming from siding with presidents.  Not only do they avoid having their regimes 
dismantled, but most importantly, they ensure that their regimes will be strengthened “from 
above.” When this occurs, I contend that both presidents and undemocratic governors engage 
in a mutually functional relationship of cooperation, establishing mutually functional vertical 
political coalitions.25  This chain of events leads to a first trajectory of SUR continuity, what I 
here refer to as SUR reproduction from above. This trajectory benefits both national and 
subnational rulers. 
Yet, presidential penetration and control over nondemocratic incumbents/arenas, is 
not always attainable.  Recalcitrant and powerful undemocratic governors may stand in a 
                                                 
24
 By reproduction I mean that presidents deliberately act in ways that are favorable to SURs’ survival. There 
are different mechanisms through which presidents can reproduce these regimes. For instance, they may veto 
legislative pieces, such as a declaration of federal intervention seeking to overturn undemocratic regimes in 
specific states/provinces.  Presidents can also discourage bills or veto laws intended to enhance subnational 
democratization in a given SUR, or prevent independent (federal) agencies of control such as the Supreme 
Court, the Constitutional Tribunals, or federal auditing agencies from sanctioning undemocratic governors.  
Similarly, presidents can actively contribute to SUR reproduction by rewarding SURs with economic benefits, 
such as federal transfers and federally funded programs, all of which contribute to enrich the coffers of 
undemocratic regimes. 
25
 By vertical coalitions I mean electoral, legislative, and governing coalitions built across different levels of 
government. 
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position to prevent and/or neutralize presidential leverage and control. I then hypothesize that 
if presidents cannot wield power and influence over undemocratic rulers, and consequently 
are incapable of undermining undemocratic rulers’ autonomy, the center will have few 
incentives to promote the continuity of SURs upon which it cannot exercise any control, 
much less induce their rulers to take part in vertical coalitions.  In such a context, the center 
not only will avoid reproducing SURs from above, but whenever possible, it will seek to 
weaken these regimes.  Nonetheless, the entrenched position of autonomous and non-
controllable undemocratic incumbents, coupled with presidents’ weak disciplining power, 
allows the former to maintain the status quo and keep their regimes alive.  When this occurs, 
I contend that a different trajectory of SUR continuity ensues, namely, SUR self-
reproduction. This trajectory, unlike the former, benefits subnational rulers alone, and not 
national incumbents, as no vertical coalitions are likely. 
Drawing on these hypotheses, I put together a simple model to explain trajectories of 
SUR continuity in contemporary Latin America.  Figure 2.1 below presents, in graphic terms, 
the propositions just outlined above. 
Figure 2.1: A model of trajectories of SUR continuity 
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These two alternative ways through which SURs persist indicate that the capacity of 
national actors to exert effective control over subnational arenas and governors, as well as the 
autonomy that nondemocratic governors can attain vis-à-vis national incumbents, are key 
building blocks in explaining how intergovernmental interactions affect the fate of 
subnational nondemocratic regimes (Gibson 2005, 2008).  Identifying to what extent national 
incumbents can wield control and power over governors and subnational arenas (or its polar 
opposite –how governors can attain autonomy from the central government), is then central 
to understanding how and why SURs survive. But perhaps more importantly, understanding 
how and under what circumstances control and autonomy are exercised is crucial for 
explaining and predicting different trajectories of SUR continuity.  Consequently, one of the 
main tasks of the theoretical framework presented in this study is to identify, and 
subsequently schematize, the major instruments that both governors and presidents can 
deploy to increase their respective power positions vis-à-vis the other level of government. 
 
III. Control and autonomy across levels of government  
It bears emphasis that subnational undemocratic governors, unlike their more 
democratic counterparts, stand, from a political point of view, in a more powerful position to 
both resist political/territorial penetration from the center, and to control provincial politics.  
The absence of democratic procedures through which opposition forces may eventually 
undermine the power of nondemocratic governors, enables subnational incumbents to act as 
powerful gatekeepers, constraining in turn the capacity of national rulers to penetrate and 
control subnational arenas.  It is in this context that the control exerted by the federal 
government to either engage nondemocratic governors’ cooperation or curb their power 
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(from above or from below –i.e., via the municipal level) is critical to their ability to win over 
and penetrate nondemocratic arenas, and precisely for that reason becomes a key building 
block in the analytic framework.   
Control by national incumbents over subnational politicians and subnational arenas 
can be exercised in two distinct major ways: (a) over governors (both opposition and co-
partisan), and (b) over different aspects of subnational politics/arenas.  Control over 
governors materializes when presidents can induce subnational incumbents to concede 
political spaces that they would otherwise not concede.26  By contrast, control over (some 
aspects of) subnational politics/arenas takes place when incumbent national politicians can 
trespass provincial borders and broadcast their authority and power over provincial political 
structures, thus circumventing and also undermining undemocratic subnational rulers’ power 
within their own territorial domains. Hereafter, I will refer to this control as “control from 
below” because it occurs via municipal or local political structures27  Finally, autonomy of 
subnational rulers from the center is materialized when governors manage to block or 
neutralize presidents’ (or national officials’) capacity to discipline and control them, thus 
increasing their room for maneuverability to act indifferently to, or oppose, the president’s 
will and agenda.  
 
                                                 
26
 Examples of this type of control include:  governors’ willingness to support candidates endorsed by national 
politicians whom they would otherwise not endorse (this includes mobilizing voters to vote for the president’s 
endorsed candidate); legislative support for bills that run counter to the governor’s/province’s/partisan interests; 
general support (materialized in the assistance to public rallies, and public declarations) for policies enacted by 
the national government that are not in consonance with a governor’s agenda and/or ideological stand; siding 
with local organized groups and with the local civil society more broadly. 
27
 Examples of this type of territorial breach include, siding with and strengthening (with political and economic 
means) provincial opposition parties; establishing and sustaining political loyalties at lower (municipal) levels 
of government; controlling provincial outlets of public opinion and media, among others.     
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Instruments of territorial and political autonomy/control 
One effective instrument through which national politicians can augment their control 
over subnational governments is through the centralization of political, administrative, and 
fiscal authority.  In recent decades, however, Latin American central governments have 
conceded power to lower levels of government, with this trend resulting in a substantial 
increase in the power and autonomy of subnational officials vis-à-vis the center (see Montero 
& Samuels 2004, and the contributors to their edited volume; Eaton 2004; Garman, Haggard, 
and Willis 2001; Falleti 2003, 2005, forthcoming).  This shift in the balance of 
intergovernmental power indicates that national incumbents now enjoy less capacity to 
control undemocratic subnational incumbents and arenas than they had a decade ago.  
The power conferred to governors or presidents by the decentralization of political, 
fiscal, and administrative authority, however, assumes a zero-sum distribution of authority 
across levels of government, and consequently is useful to identify whether the locus of 
power lies at higher or lower levels of government.  Yet, this way of assessing who controls 
whom in intergovernmental relations is not helpful in determining the degree of autonomy of 
each individual governor vis-à-vis the center. In other words, decentralization of authority 
affects all subnational politicians in the same way, conferring all subnational politicians the 
same autonomy vis-à-vis the central government.28  As a result, the zero-sum logic intrinsic 
in the processes of decentralization is silent with respect to cross-subnational differences.  
Because in this dissertation I am particularly concerned with variations across 
(nondemocratic) subnational units, as these are key to understanding different trajectories of 
                                                 
28
 For instance, once decentralization of administrative policy domains ensues, all subnational politicians will 
enjoy the same scope of authority over administrative issues, and all of them will be equally “administratively” 
autonomous from the center. 
 35 
SUR continuity, I thus focus on instruments of control and autonomy that are cross-
provincially variant.    
I identify four major instruments of territorial and political control/autonomy, two of 
them available to presidents, and two others accessible to governors.  Presidential control can 
be exerted through partisan structures and/or fiscal instuments.29  Gubernatorial autonomy 
instead, can be attained through financial autonomy and/or neopatrimonial state-
administrations (as opposed to bureaucratic state-administrations). Table 2.1 below 
summarizes the 4 instruments of territorial and political autonomy/control available to both 
national and subnational rulers, as well as their predicted effect on rulers’ autonomy and 
control. I describe each of these instruments in the following section.   
                                                 
29
 Wibbels (2005) also identifies these two instruments as the main mechanisms through which presidents can 
discipline governors. 
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Table 2.1: Governors and presidents’ instruments of territorial and political autonomy/control (in 
absolute terms) 
Type of 
instrument Value
Predicted effect 
on governors' 
autonomy
Predicted effect 
on presidents' 
control
high fiscal discretion ↓ ↑
low fiscal discretion ↑ ↓
high electoral presence of pres. party ↓ ↑
low electoral presence of pres. party ↑ ↓
provincial financial autonomy ↑ ↓
provincial financial dependency ↓ ↑
bureaucratic state administration ↓ ↑
patrimonial state administration ↑ ↓
State 
administration
Presidents' instruments of territorial and political control
Fiscal 
Partisan
Governors' instruments of territorial and political autonomy
Financial
 
 
1) Presidents’ instruments of territorial control 
(a). Fiscal instruments 
At the national level of government, officials can resort to fiscal instruments to 
exercise control over subnational politicians (Eaton 2004, Falleti 2005, Wibbels 2005, Díaz-
Cayeros 2006).  In countries where intergovernmental fiscal relations are structured along a 
system of revenue-sharing30, and where the rules that regulate such a system are vague, lax, 
easily changeable, and hardly enforceable, presidents may easily encroach on the power of 
lower levels of government.  By withholding and/or altering the amount and timing of the 
                                                 
30
 In a revenue-sharing system a country’s main (domestic) taxes are collected by the federal government and 
then distributed in two rounds.  In the first round, taxes are split into two (not necessarily equal) parts between 
the federal government and the subnational.  In the second round, the subnational share is distributed among the 
provinces/states. 
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transfers sent to a given subnational unit, national incumbents can easily buy off or induce 
lower-tier incumbents to act in agreement with their will/agenda.  
Presidential fiscal control over governors is more likely to increase in countries where 
intergovernmental transfers are not channeled using automatic and formula-based criteria, 
but rather, on a discretional basis (Bonvecchi & Lodola 2008). Indeed, federal transfers that 
are automatically channeled to subnational units and which, by definition, are less susceptible 
to presidential discretion, hinder presidents’ ability to fiscally manipulate and exercise 
control over subnational incumbents.   
Finally, the level of presidential fiscal power over subnational units also depends on 
the revenues that are not subject to sharing.  In almost all federal countries, there are taxes 
that are collected by the federal government and that are not reallocated to the provinces 
(such as import/export duties and other special taxes).  In some cases, these taxes comprise a 
large bulk of a country’s total revenues. They thus provide national incumbents with a 
considerable share of fiscal resources that remain exclusively at the federal level of 
government, and which can be used with virtually complete presidential discretion. The 
larger the percentage of the taxes (out of total revenues) not subject to sharing, the larger the 
president’s capacity to use these resources in a discretionary way, and the more fiscal power 
presidents get vis-à-vis governors.   
 
(b). Partisan instruments  
 National political parties and more specifically, political parties’ organizational 
structures, constitute powerful means through which national-level politicians can control 
subnational rulers and penetrate peripheries.  Different strands of literature within political 
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science have long recognized the crucial role played by national political parties in 
domesticating and controling local potentates and subnational politicians.  The literature on 
state building and party system formation, for example, has viewed political parties as crucial 
instruments to exercise political influence and win over the peripheries and to undermine 
local potentates’ authority (Caramani 2004, Rokkan 1970, Tilly 1990, Keating 1998).  In this 
vein, the formation of state(nation)-wide parties is viewed as a means for penetrating and 
standardizing the peripheries. It also stands as a reflection of the central government’s 
capacity to appeal, win over, and discipline provincial political elites and peripheral rulers. 
From a similar perspective, the literature on federalism has long acknowledged the 
importance of political parties, and partisan structures as a means to control subnational 
elites, while empowering central governments (Mainwaring 1999; Jones, Sanguinetti & 
Tommasi 2000; Stepan 2000; Garman, Haggard, and Willis 2001; Samuels 2003; Wibbels 
2005; Levitsky 2003; Leiras 2006).  Strong, cohesive, institutionalized, and territorially 
extended parties are said to facilitate the central government’s ability to discipline and 
control subnational copartisans. 
The vast literature on parties and party system has identified a number of mechanisms 
through which political parties and party organizational structures can contribute to enhance 
national politicians’ control and dominion over subnational incumbents.  For instance, 
national party leaders can limit subnational rulers’ political autonomy, thus exerting tighter 
control over them, by inducing provincial incumbents to act along national party lines 
(instead of provincial party lines).  One possible way in which national partisans can lead 
their subnational counterparts to act in agreement with a president’s agenda/will is via their 
power over selection, nomination, and appointment of candidates (Samuels 2000; Wibbels 
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2005; Willis, Garman & Haggard 1999). Provincial leaders with progressive career ambition, 
and who depend on national leaders’ nominations will most likely side with national 
incumbents and act along the center’s agenda, even if so doing implies a loss in their relative 
autonomy vis-à-vis presidents. 
Another mechanism through which political parties may induce subnational rulers to 
follow a president’s agenda/will, at the expense of giving up their autonomy, is via coattails 
effects (Wibbels 2005, Rodden 2003). As Rodden notes, “copartisanship can encourage 
‘electoral externalities,’ whereby subnational politicians aligned with the central government 
forego particularistic benefits in favor of policies [reforms] that benefit their party as a 
whole.”  If subnational officials fail to contribute to these policies [reforms], as Rodden’s 
argument goes, non-compliance “may weaken the national party, thus reducing provincial 
incumbents own reelection chances.” In this case, provincial rulers will give up their 
autonomy and follow the president’s agenda/will out of prospective concerns for what may 
happen in future elections if they do not (see Wibbels 2005). 
When analyzing the effects of political parties on lower-levels of government, 
scholars of federalism have, for the most part, concentrated on either one or both types of 
mechanisms (Rodden 2003, Samuels 2000, Wibbels 2005, Shugart and Carey 1992).  In 
doing so, they have underplayed the importance of a third, and more basic mechanism of 
presidential partisan control, that antecedes (and enables the operation of) the above-
mentioned mechanisms, namely, the effective presence of a president’s party in any given 
subnational unit.  Presidential leverage over subnational rulers via control over candidates’ 
selection and nomination, and control through coattails, are both meaningless in provinces 
where the presidential party does not exist, i.e., does not have an electoral presence and a 
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minimal organizational structure.  Thus, in order for a president to control or appeal a 
governor via his/her power over selection and nomination, a governor necessarily must 
belong to the president’s party.  The same holds true for coattails effects:  in order for a 
governor to benefit from electoral externalities and have incentives to strengthen their party 
at the national level, the president’s party needs to be present in the governor’s district. In 
summary, the first mechanism that allows president to control subnational copartisans is the 
effective territorial presence of the president’s party in any given subnational unit. 
Note that the preceding instruments of partisan control (i.e., coattails and 
manipulation via nominations) refer to instances where the president and the governor belong 
to the same party.  Yet, instances of partisan control can also occur when presidents and 
governors are not co-partisans.  Territorially extended parties may also facilitate a presidents’ 
capacity to control governors from the opposition.  Even though presidents cannot resort to 
internal partisan mechanisms to discipline opposition governors –simply because they do not 
belong to their party, the existence of the president’s party in any given subnational unit 
confers presidents the possibility of using their partisan structures as springboards to 
penetrate the state.  Presidents who can take hold over their state-level partisan branches may 
expand their power in subnational units as well as threaten (opposition) governors’ power 
from “below,” thus challenging their authority.  
 
2) Governors’ instruments of territorial autonomy 
 As noted in the previous section, presidents can become powerful vis-à-vis governors 
provided they have effective access to partisan and financial instruments.  Yet, the authority 
conferred by these instruments to presidents might be overshadowed by the power of 
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governors to gain autonomy from the central government. Two instruments of territorial and 
political autonomy that can help governors neutralize presidential power are the governor’s 
economic/financial autonomy (from the center) and the existence of neopatrimonial state-
administrations (as opposed to a bureaucratic administration). I turn next to these devices. 
 
(a). Financial instruments 
 With the exception of the country capitals and a few other highly populated and/or 
rich provinces, subnational units in most federations of the developing world lack significant 
own-state revenues, and consequently depend to a large extent on the revenues that are 
allocated by the federal government (Wibbels 2005, Courchene & Diaz-Cayeros 2000; Diaz-
Cayeros 2004, 2006; Rodden 2006; Spiller & Tommasi 2007; Saiegh & Tommasi 1998).  
The fiscal dependence of subnational units on the center may be accentuated provided the 
rules that regulate the intergovernmental distribution of fiscal resources are lax and 
conducive to augmenting national politicians’ distributional discretion.31 
 There is, however, another way in which subnational rulers, regardless of their 
capcity to raise their own revenues, can become economically dependent on the central 
government.  Profligate subnational units, which incur severe financial imbalances (i.e., high 
deficits and high levels of indebtedness), can become extremely dependent on the center 
regardless of whether they receive abundant, automatic shared revenues from the center or 
                                                 
31
 This conception of fiscal dependency of subnational units on the center –i.e., one in which 
provinces/states/regions are conceived to be dependent on the central state because the former channels 
revenues from taxes to subnational units, has dominated the fiscal federalism literature.  Yet, these works have 
omitted the fact that in most federations, the transfers that flow to the states within revenue-sharing agreements 
do so in an automatic way.  Thus, even though formally speaking subnational units are “dependent” on the 
center, this dependency is neutralized because these transfers are channelled automatically (for a discussion of 
this point and related issues Bonvecchi & Lodola 2008). 
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raise copious state taxes. Provincial financial mismanagement is commonly seen among 
subnational units in federal systems (see Rodden 2006, Remmer & Wibbels 2000, Wibbels 
2005).  In fact, a recurring practice among lower-tier governments is to resort to the central 
government for financial aid and bailouts (see Sanguinetti 1999; Hernández Trillo, Diaz-
Cayeros & Gamboa González 2002; Wibbels 2005; Rodden 2006).   
 Under these circumstances, and given that federal governments have considerable 
leeway in deciding when and what provinces/states they rescue, profligate governors can 
easily become hostages of the federal government.32  By contrast, governors who are 
financially and economically responsible, and who, as a result, do not need to resort to the 
national government for financial assistance stand in a solid position to preserve their 
autonomy from federal politicians. In sum, the less the governors’ need for financial aid, the 
greater their potential for political independence vis-à-vis the center and thus for 
confrontation with national incumbents.  
 
(b). Neopatrimonial state-administrations 
 Compared to their more democratic counterparts, undemocratic governors stand in an 
exceptional position to exercise control over the territorial areas they rule.  Due to the fact 
that provincial/state-level elections in undemocratic regions are minimally pluralistic, 
minimally competitive, and minimally open, undemocratic governors are “protected” against 
other opposition forces, which might incidentally dispute their political power.   
                                                 
32
 Economic and financial dependence on the center can become even more acute in contexts where the 
borrowing autonomy of subnational units is limited.  That is, in countries where lower-tier governments are not 
allowed to borrow from lenders other than the central government, lower-tier politicians are virtually 
subordinated to the political will of national politicians. 
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 Yet, the exercise of authority and political power can differ substantially.  
Subnational state-administrations, i.e. the set of institutions and rules that organize 
government, establish the parameters through which rulers exercise the (political) power 
conferred to them by their ruling position (see Weber 1976 [1925]; Hartlyn 1998b;  Bratton 
& van de Walle 1997; Ertman 1997; Mazzuca 1998, 2007).  As I will show in detail in 
chapter 3, these administrations concentrate and disperse the capacity of subnational 
incumbents to wield control over persons, territory, resources, and institutions, thus 
constraining or empowering subnational rulers’ relative power position vis-à-vis local 
subnational groups (i.e., political parties, elites, local organized groups, and civil society 
more generally). 
 Following Max Weber (1976 [1925]), the management of state resources is 
administered either through (neo) patrimonial or bureaucratic administrations.  Whereas 
neopatrimonial state (provincial) administrations allow for a greater concentration of power, 
thus enhancing governors’ political clout over their subnational domains, bureaucratic 
administrations disperse political power, thus lessening the rulers’ capacity to control 
persons, resources, other branches of government, and territory.  
 The existence of different state administrations, and how these in turn allow for 
subnational incumbents’ encroachment or constraint of political power is decisive for 
governors’ capacity to avert penetration and control from the central government.33  Unlike 
neopatrimonial state-administrations, bureaucratic administrations prevent rulers from 
exerting tight control over state-agencies, opposition forces, local organized groups, and civil 
                                                 
33
 For a similar reasoning on how the concentration/dispersion of subnational power empowers/weakens 
subnational elites see Boone (2003). 
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society, thus paving the way for the existence of autonomous local groups.  The existence of 
a more independent civil society and opposition, in turn, creates a “window of opportunity” 
for national incumbents to further expand their presence and leverage over recalcitrant 
incumbents, as they stand in a position to side with and/or activate local groups and political 
structures, and thus challenge and control nondemocratic governors from “below.”34 
 By contrast, neopatrimonial administrations, which enable subnational incumbents to 
exert a tight grip over state-agencies of control, local opposition and organized groups, and 
civil society, prevent national officials from striking alliances with local forces, and thwart 
their capacity to trespass provincial borders and control governors from “below.” By doing 
so, neopatrimonial administrations not only contribute to expand gubernatorial autonomy but 
also enable governors to act as ‘levies’ to curb federal penetration and control. 
 It should be noted that the instruments of territorial and political autonomy/control 
described above are not permanently fixed, neither are they absolute.  Instead they can 
change over time and across countries, and thus become more or less available to both 
presidents and governors. In effect, the instruments that confer presidents and governors 
power in a given situation may fail to do so in others.  For instance, within a given country, 
SURs that have neopatrimonial administrations may stand in a powerful position to avert 
national penetration, whereas SURs with bureaucratic administrations may not be able to 
resist instances of national territorial and political encroachment.  Also, due to financial 
mismanagement and provincial fiscal imbalances, some SURs might be more susceptible to 
experiencing national intrusion, thus becoming less autonomous vis-à-vis the center. Others, 
in contrast, due to their economic and financial situation, may be able to avert national 
                                                 
34
 For a similar argument about territorial breach and control, see Gibson (2005, 2008). 
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penetration and retain their autonomy.  Likewise, within the same country, presidential 
instruments of territorial control may be generous at t1, while scarce at t2, thus giving 
president ruling at t1 greater leverage over SURs than president governing at t2. Some 
presidents may also be able to access both fiscal and partisan instruments of political and 
territorial control, whereas others might only access one. 
 This varied access to instruments of control across countries, levels of government, 
subnational units, and time, suggests that any theoretical framework seeking to explain how 
presidents exercise (political and territorial) control over governors has to capture not only 
this complex variation, but also the possible combinations among these different types of 
instruments.  In other words, the challenge is to incorporate the combination of all these 
variables (i.e., instruments) across countries, and within countries through time into the 
simple model of SUR continuity outlined in section II.  To that end, in the next section I 
create a two-level framework35 that captures these cross-country, within-country, and cross-
temporal interactions. 
 
IV. A two-level framework to explain trajectories of SUR continuity  
 Regardless of what instruments of territorial control and autonomy are available to 
presidents and governors, respectively, national incumbents can only gain leverage over 
subnational incumbents or subnational politics/arenas if a combination of (national and 
subnational) variables is present.  To be able to politically/territorially penetrate, and thus 
exert control over, undemocratic provincial arenas, presidents need the means necessary to 
                                                 
35
 One of the main advantages of two-level theoretical models, as Goertz & Mahoney (2006) note, is that they 
allow researchers to model the impact of  variables that pertain to different levels (i.e., national and 
international) in a rather simply way.   
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subjugate an undemocratic governor, and in turn, undemocratic governors’ capacity to resist 
penetration from above must be minimal.  Neither of these two conditions alone (except at 
the extremes) is sufficient for a president to gain leverage over provincial arenas, rather it is 
the combination of both that is necessary and jointly sufficient.  
 For instance, a president with high levels of fiscal discretion will most likely be able 
to exert control over financially dependent subnational rulers (albeit not over financially 
autonomous governors).  Similarly, presidents are more prone to exert control or penetrate in 
subnational districts where their party has a strong electoral presence (and not where his/her 
party is electorally and territorially weak), and where bureaucratic state-administration enable 
presidents to take hold over local opposition party structures.  In summary, the capacity of 
presidents to penetrate, and thus control, provincial arenas is determined not only by the 
absolute (fiscal and/or partisan) power of presidents, but also by the capacity (or lack thereof) 
of subnational rulers to neutralize presidential power.   
Each of the 3 clusters of variables (located in the left-hand side of the figure 2.2) 
denotes different combinations of national and subnational variables that are needed for a 
president to attain control over undemocratic governors/arenas.  Each of the three clusters of 
variables is made up of four variables (five in the last cluster).  The lower two boxes in each 
cluster denote the instruments of territorial autonomy available to governors (i.e., the type of 
provincial state infrastructure and the level of financial autonomy), while the upper two 
(three in the last cluster) depict the instruments of territorial control available to presidents 
(i.e., electoral presence of of the presidential party and extent of presidential fiscal power).   
These three clusters of variables produce three different “paths of control” through 
which presidents can wield power and influence over undemocratic governors and arenas, 
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namely, the fiscal path of control, the partisan path of control, and the fiscal-partisan path of 
control.36  These paths are presented in figure 2.2 with the dotted arrows, which denote 
substitutability.  The reason why the three paths of territorial and political control are 
schematized as substitutable responds, as noted earlier, to the fact that there are multiple 
paths through which presidents can control penetrate provincial arenas and either one is 
sufficient to attain territorial/political control over SURs.  For instance, presidents in country 
A (or at t1) may be able to exercise territorial control over undemocratic governors via their 
political party, whereas presidents in country B (or at t2) may stand in a good position to 
exercise political and territorial control by means of fiscal instruments.  Both means of 
exercising control and wielding power over governors are perfectly substitutable. 
  
                                                 
36
 The paths of control are named after the predominant instrument of territorial/political control available to 
presidents. The paths exhaust all possible combinations of presidential instruments of territorial and political 
control identified in this study, and thus illustrate the only 3 possible ways in which presidents may discipline 
undemocratic governors. 
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Figure 2.2: A two-level (sub-)model of presidential territorial and political control 
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presidential manipulation and control, no matter how much fiscal discretion presidents 
have.37   
 The partisan path of presidential control occurs when the president’s party has a high 
electoral presence and low levels of fiscal discretion.  Here, the main mechanism through 
which presidents can wield power and exercise control over undemocratic rulers is through 
partisan structures.  For this to happen, two variables must be present, i.e., undemocratic 
governors must belong to the president’s party –and thus be subjected to direct partisan 
control from above, or in the case of belonging to an opposition party, the province/state 
must have a bureaucratic state administration, as these administrations facilitate presidential 
penetration.38   
Finally, the fiscal-partisan path of presidential control takes place when presidents 
have high levels of both fiscal discretion and partisan presence.  In this case, presidents gain 
leverage over subnational arenas/governors by disciplining provincial incumbents and by 
controlling them via party structures.  For this to happen, undemocratic governors’ financial 
dependency must be low, or one of the following variables must be present: either the 
governors belong to the president’s party or their provincial state administration is 
bureaucratic.  
                                                 
37
 Presidential fiscal control can also become effective if subnational units have bureaucratic state-
administrations.  Despite the fact that this variable is not necessary (thus the sign “+”), such an administration 
allows presidents to win over local organized groups and opposition mayors. It is by funneling transfers directly 
to the municipalities that presidents may expand their capacity to exert pressure (and ultimately control) over 
governors from below. 
38
 Recall, that bureaucratic state-administrations facilitate the subsistence of opposition forces (either at the 
municipal or legislative level), and consequently enable presidents to side with local groups and rely on their 
local party branch to challenge and control undemocratic rulers from below. 
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 These three alternative paths of presidential control indicate instances in which 
national incumbents can effectively subordinate undemocratic governors.  Yet, I have noted 
that presidential is not always attainable. This occurs when any of the three relevant 
subnational variables (i.e., provincial financial autonomy, governor’s party=president’s party, 
and type of state-administration) scores in the opposite direction.   
 
V. An integrated analytical framework to explain SUR continuity across countries 
 Drawing on the analytic insights described above, I now turn to develop the 
integrated analytic framework to explain SUR continuity across and within countries (and 
over time).  The framework, which is presented in figure 2.3, results from combining the 
analytic elements of figures 2.1 and 2.2, and can be read as follows:  it does not matter what 
path of presidential control is taken.  What is relevant is that whenever national incumbents 
stand in a position to gain leverage over undemocratic governors and/or subnational arenas, 
they will have incentives to co-opt/induce them.  This is so because controllable 
nondemocratic subnational rulers can easily be engaged in vertical coalitions that provide 
strategic benefits for national incumbents.  If that occurs, national incumbents may actively 
reproduce SURs from above. By contrast, when this control is not attainable, federal officials 
will have incentives to both isolate and implement strategies to weaken recalcitrant 
governors. Yet, SUR continuity is likely to ensue due to the ability of autonomous 
nondemocratic governors to marshal the resources needed to sustain their regimes.   
What may vary across countries (and even within countries) over time is the way in 
which presidential control (or lack thereof) is attained.  Whereas in some countries (and at a 
given period) this control can be achieved via fiscal instruments, in others (and at other time 
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periods) it can be attained through partisan instruments.  Still in others (and at different time 
periods) presidential control can be exerted via both fiscal and partisan instruments. 
 
Figure 2.3: An integrated analytical framework to explain trajectories of SUR continuity across countries 
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Chapter 3: Political regimes and state administrations in the subnational 
world: conceptualization, measurement, and typologies 
 
 The southern Mexican states of Oaxaca, Chiapas, Guerrero, Tabasco, Puebla, and 
Veracruz –the poorest and less economically developed states of Mexico– have repeatedly 
been classified as the least democratic states of the country.39  Similarly, several of the 
Argentine provinces located in the central and northern part of the country, such as La Rioja, 
Formosa, Santiago del Estero, San Luis, and Catamarca have been regarded as the most 
politically backwards and non-democratic provinces of the country.40   
All these undemocratic subnational regimes are typically associated with low levels 
of contestation and turnover; low levels of horizontal and societal accountability; 
patrimonial, discretional, and clientelistic politics; violations of civil and human rights; and 
fraudulent elections.  In other words, these subnational units are considered undemocratic, 
not only for their low-scoring democratic attributes (i.e., violations of civil rights and 
liberties, restrained electoral competition, and fraudulent elections), but also because of their 
patrimonial, clientelistic, unaccountable, and arbitrary institutions and rulers. In more 
abstract and analytic terms, this conceptualization of subnational political regimes reflects 
                                                 
39
 See the works by see Fox 1994, Cornelius, Eisenstadt, and Hindley 1999; Eisenstadt 1999, 2004; Snyder 
1999, 2001; Solt 2003; Lakin 2008; Benton forthcoming. 
40
 See Gibson 2005; Gervasoni 2006, 2008; Leiras 2007; Suárez-Cao 2001; Gibson and Suárez-Cao 2008. 
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scholars’ tendency to lump together aspects that are intrinsically related to the access to 
political power, such as constestion, clean elections, and inclusion, with the liberal dimension 
of political regimes, such as horizontal accountability and attachement to the rule of law, 
which is associated with the exercise of political power. 
I contend that the conceptual operation of adding further attributes to the minimal, 
procedural, Schumpeterian concept of democracy has led scholars of regime juxtaposition to 
augment, to use Sartori’s (1970) words, the concept’s intension and reduce its extension.  In 
other words, analysts have generated a less general concept of democracy, and in turn, one 
that is applicable to fewer cases (Collier & Mahon 1993; Collier & Levitsky 199; Goertz 
2006). As a result, current characterizations of SURs become problematic, as they have 
underestimated the number of existing nondemocratic regimes.  This underestimation, in 
turn, has had an important theoretical limitation: it has prevented scholars from drawing valid 
causal inferences and elaborating comprehensive theories about nondemocratic regimes.  In 
fact, theories about SURs in general, and SUR continuity in particular, have been partial at 
best, precisely because they rely on inferences drawn from only few cases.  
I argue that one way to avoid these problems is to take seriously the task of 
conceptualizing contemporary SURs. Hence, the first goal of this chapter is to refine existing 
conceptualizations of subnational political regimes. To do so, I build on Mazzuca’s (1998; 
2007) analytic and conceptual framework, and measure undemocratic subnational regimes in 
Argentina and Mexico along two dimensions: the access to political power and the exercise 
of political power. The second goal of the chapter is to use this framework to measure 
subnational political regimes across Argentine and Mexican subnational units. Finally, the 
third goal of the chapter is to advance a new classification of SURs. This classification, in 
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turn, is used to fulfill the fourth objective of the chapter, which is to single out the cases that 
have remained nondemocratic since the onset of national democratization –in other words, 
the cases that make up the universe of SURs and that are the main focus of this dissertation. 
The chapter is organized as follows.  In the first section, I outline the “access-
exercise” framework used to reconceptualize and measure subnational political regimes in 
contemporary Mexico.  In section II, I conceptualize subnational democracy and discuss 
some methodological issues associated with previous subnational regime conceptualizations.  
After addressing these issues, I measure subnational democracy in all 24 Argentine 
provinces, and 32 Mexican states.  To do so, I use an original data-set constructed during my 
fieldwork in Argentina and Mexico that spans the 1983-2006 period in Argentina, and 1997-
2006 in Mexico. Building on these measurements, I create country maps of subnational 
political regimes to evaluate the territorial spread of subnational democracy.  In section III, I 
conceptualize subnational state-administrations, and also drawing on an original dataset built 
during fieldwork, I measure state-administrations in all Argentine and Mexican 
provinces/states.  This sub-section is followed by a discussion of state-administration 
variation in each country. Section IV advances a new classification of subnational political 
regimes and elaborates on its methodological implications for defining the universe of 
nondemocratic regimes and SUR types.  In the last section, I draw conclusions from these 
findings and discuss their implications for this study. 
 
I. The access-exercise framework 
In an analysis of the research agenda that has developed around the concept of the 
‘quality of democracy,’ Mazzuca (1998; 2007) claims that this program “has been framed in 
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such a way that the politics of democratic quality is interpreted as an extension of the politics 
of democratization studied under the rubrics of transitions to, and consolidation of, 
democracy” (Munck 2007:15).  To overcome this problem, Mazzuca proposes to separate 
into two different ‘conceptual containers’ the attributes that are lumped together in the 
expanded definition of democracy adopted by the ‘quality of democracy’ research agenda.  
He argues that the original attributes of the minimal, procedural definition of democracy (i.e., 
civil rights and liberties, free and fair elections, and universal suffrage), should be placed in 
the ‘political regime’ container, as these are all attribute that denote the access to political 
power. By contrast, attributes such as clientelism, patronage, corruption, low horizontal and 
societal accountability, and particularistic distribution of public goods, should be regarded as 
component parts of the ‘state-administration’41 container, as these are all attributes that 
denote the exercise of political power.  
 These two containers refer to two different processes and consequently should not be 
lumped together. In fact, as Mazzuca notes, access to power and exercise of political power, 
are two analytically distinct aspects of the institutional structure of the state, and as such 
should be analyzed separately (see figure 1).  The former refers to rules and procedures 
through which citizens (politicians) can gain control over state positions.  The latter, instead, 
refers to the set of institutions that regulate the management of state resources and political 
power.  Thus, unlike the strategy of “conceptual expansion” employed by scholars 
subscribing to the expanded definition of democracy, the access-exercise framework relies on 
a strategy of “conceptual separation” (Mazzuca 2007:47-48).  Building on this conceptual 
                                                 
41
 Here understood in the Weberian sense. In its extremes, a state-administration can be either patrimonial or 
bureaucratic. 
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framework, in the next sections I conceptualize and measure subnational political regimes 
and subnational state-administrations. 
 
Figure 3.1: The “Access - Exercise” conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Mazzuca (2007) 
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quality of democracy.  Unlike these two existing studies, my measurement of subnational 
democracy covers two countries, and 56 subnational units, thus enlarging the number of 
cases where democracy is being measured.  Finally, unlike Gervasoni’s work, the measure of 
democracy presented in this study captures the evolution of the Argentine (and Mexico) 
subnational democracy over time, thus extending the time series covered in previous studies. 
 
1) Conceptualization of subnational democracy 
 A political regime is here understood as the set of rules and procedures that regulate 
access of civil society to state power (Mazzuca 1998, 2004, 2007; Munck 2004, 2007; 
Munck & Verkuilen 2002).  Democracy is a type of political regime, and as such sets the 
specific rules and procedures that are needed to access state power.  Thus, the definition of 
democracy adopted in this dissertation follows the tradition of Joseph Schumpeter, who 
understand democracy in procedural terms, rather than in terms of substantive policies or 
other outcomes that might be viewed as democratic.   
 Unlike leading analysts, who have adopted a "procedural minimal" definition of 
democracy (Collier & Levitsky 1997; Diamond, Hartlyn, Linz, and Lipset 1999; O’Donnell 
2001;  Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán 2001, 2007), in this dissertation I subscribe to a 
“procedural subminimal” definition of (subnational) democracy, along the lines of 
Przeworski (2000) and his coauthors.42  This definition, which centers on electoral 
                                                 
42
 The decision to adopt a subminimal definition of democracy responds mostly to data unavailability problems.  
As I discuss below, I am aware that democracy entails more than mere political competition, as understood by 
the subminimal.  I agree with those scholars who claim that issues such as effective guarantees of civil liberties, 
including freedom of speech, assembly, and association, as well as the ability of elected rulers to exercise real 
governing power, are all central aspects of a democratic regime (Collier & Levitsky 1997; Mainwaring, Brinks, 
and Pérez-Liñán 2007).  Yet, the availability of data that would be needed to operationalize these dimensions at 
the subnational level is spotty at best.   
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contestation exclusively, conceives of democracy as “a regime in which those who govern –
i.e., the holder(s) of the chief executive office, and those sitting in the legislature, are selected 
through contested elections exclusively” (Przeworski et al. 2000:15).  This subminimal 
definition of democracy, however, is “silent” with respect to the quality of the electoral 
process. Consequently, I precise Przeworski et al.’s definition in the following terms: 
“democracy is a political regime in which those who govern are selected through contested 
and clean elections exclusively.”43  
 Conceived in these terms, democracy has two defining properties: (a) fully contested 
and (b) clean elections.  Based on Przeworski’s (1991) dictum, that “democracy is a system 
in which parties lose elections,” Przeworski et al. (2000) add a third dimension to their 
definition of democracy, namely, alternation.44  Hence, in this dissertation democracy is 
conceived of as having four constitutive elements: (a) fully contested elections (for both (a.1) 
legislative and (a.2) executive posts), (b) clean elections, and (c) alternation (turnover) in 
office.    
 
2) Reducing the perils of using a subminimal definition of democracy 
 As Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán (2007) argue, such a subminimal definition 
of democracy, which focuses on political competition exclusively, has several problems.  In 
effect, a subminimal definition of democracy can lead to severe misclassifications, which can 
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 It should be noted that the definition of democracy adopted in this study follows Przeworski et al.’s (2000); 
yet the translation of this conceptual definition into a numeric measure is different (see discussion on concept-
measure consistency below).  
44
 This defining attribute of democracy has been the most contested of all the three (see Mainwaring, Brinks, 
and Pérez-Liñán 2001, 2007). For a justification of why I have also decided to consider “alternation” as a 
defining property of democracy, see methodological Appendix I.   
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result in counting some authoritarian regimes as democracies.  This error in regime 
classification is a product of excluding important dimensions of a democratic regime from 
the definition of democracy, such as universal adult suffrage, effective guarantees of civil 
liberties, as well as the ability of elected rulers to exercise real governing power.  For 
instance, without broad adult suffrage, no matter how competitive elections are, the root 
meaning of democracy is violated.  If governments are elected in contests that exclude most 
of the adult population, that government cannot be classified as democratic.  Also, without 
protection of civil liberties, the electoral process itself is violated, and the resulting regime 
cannot be considered democratic.   
 Some of these problems, however, can be mitigated when one studies subnational 
democracy in nationally democratic countries.  It is important to bear in mind that, unlike 
countries, subnational units are not fully autonomous territorial entities (Sartori 1976, Gibson 
2008, Gervasoni 2008).  While it is true that many of them have the legal and constitutional 
prerogatives to set and reform their own provincial constitutions, electoral rules, and other 
major institutions regulating the democratic and electoral processes, it also holds true that 
these units are part of nationally democratic countries. As such, they must adhere, at least in 
theory, to a number of nationally established democratic rules and institutions.  In fact, the 
subordinated autonomy of subnational units operating within the borders of a nationally 
democratic regime entails that national constitutional and legal rules guarantee basic 
democratic procedures, such as the protection of minimal civil and political rights, and 
universal suffrage.45  Thus, the costs of using a subminimal definition of democracy are 
                                                 
45
 On this point, see also Gervasoni (2008), who argues that because subnational units “are embedded in a 
national democracy, subnational leaders are severely constrained in the extent to which they can restrict 
political rights. 
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virtually offset because here I am concerned with subnational political regimes that are 
embedded within a nationally democratic country. 
 The problems with adopting a subminimal definition of democracy are further 
overcome by employing the access-exercise framework.  The inclusion of the “exercise” 
dimension for the classification of subnational regimes taps into a number of extra-electoral 
political aspects that are critical for classifying political regimes.  Issues that may have major 
impact in-between elections and that are thus missed in evaluations of whether elections are 
“free and fair,” can be captured by the “exercise” dimension. Such issues may include rulers’ 
discretion to exercise political power, as well as other important political aspects that 
impinge on civil liberties and political rights, such as institutions that enhance societal 
accountability,  Thus, the access-exercise framework employed in this study lowers the risks 
that may derive from using a subminimal definition of democracy.   
 
3) From concept to measurement:  additive vs. multiplicative indexes of democracy 
 Explicitly noting how one conceptualizes and defines democracy is of paramount 
importance not only to set out conceptual boundaries, but also, and most importantly, to 
specify the proper mathematical and quantitative tools that are needed to measure a given 
concept.  When creating numeric measures, as I will do in the coming subsections of this 
chapter, one should be careful to choose the measurement strategies/techniques (as well as 
the indicators) that best capture the underlying concept that is being measured.  This is what 
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Goertz (2006) refers to “concept-measure consistency,” which is nothing else but the degree 
to which the numeric measure reflects the basic structure of the concept.46     
As I mentioned in the previous section, I conceive of democracy as a political regime 
in which those who govern are selected through contested and clean elections, and alternate 
in power.  Conceived in this way, the definition of democracy uses one of the prototypical 
concept structures, i.e., the “necessary and sufficient condition” structure (Goertz 2006).47 
This means that in order for a subnational political regime to be conceived of as democratic, 
a number of conditions must be present (i.e., are necessary), and these conditions in turn, are 
jointly sufficient to make a given polity be classified as democratic.  If any of these 
conditions is absent, then the subnational polity cannot be conceived as democratic.   
                                                 
46
 For an assessment of the negative consequences that might arise when measurement strategies/techniques do 
not capture the underlying concept that is sought to be measured see Adcock and Collier (2001), Lieberman 
(2002), Goertz (2006), Soifer (2008).    
47
 Conceptualizing democracy within the realms of the necessary and sufficient structure is, as Goertz (2006) 
notes, common among most prominent scholars who have studied, defined, and conceptualized democracy (see 
Collier and Levitsky 1997; Dahl 1971; Lipset 1960; Przeworski et al. 2000; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens 1992; Alvarez et al. 1996). Yet, as he notes, most analysts who quantify democracy do not use the 
appropriate mathematical formalization to validly operationalize the concept-structure of democracy into a 
quantitative measure (see Goertz (2006) chapter 4).  Exceptions of scholars who choose appropriate measures to 
operationalize democracy are: Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán (2001, 2007); Bowman, Lehoucq, and 
Mahoney (2005); Munck & Verkuilen (2003). 
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Figure 3.2: A necessary and sufficient concept structure of subnational democracy 
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In the definition of democracy I use in this dissertation, contestation (for both 
executive and legislative posts), clean elections and turnover are all necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions of democracy. Thus, if one of the secondary-level dimensions –
contestation, clean elections, and turnover does not obtain, i.e. if it scores zero, it implies a 
basic-level democracy value of zero, which means that the polity cannot be conceived of as 
democratic.   
In order to translate a necessary and sufficient concept structure into mathematical 
terms, I measure subnational democracy using the scheme outlined in Figure 3.1.48 To 
increase concept-measure consistency I use multiplication, as it is the arithmetic instrument 
that captures the necessary and sufficient concept structure of democracy.  Accordingly, as 
figure 3.1 shows, contestation (for both executive and legislative posts), clean elections, and 
turnover –i.e., the necessary conditions, are “connected” via the logical AND49  –a first 
cousin of multiplication (denoted with the * symbol).50   
 
                                                 
48
 A detailed description of the indicators used to measure democracy as well as how they are aggregated is 
provided in the methodological Appendix I, section I. 
49
 In general, the necessary and sufficient condition concept structure is mathematically modeled by the logical 
AND or the intersection in set theory (see Goertz 2006; Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008; Mahoney & Goertz 2006; 
Mahoney 2000).  
50
 If I were to add up the secondary-level dimensions I would not be coherent between the concept structure and 
the numeric measure. Because the concept of democracy employed in this dissertation has a multilevel 
structure, adding up across all secondary-level dimensions would wash away the essence of the concept’s 
structure at the measurement level.  It is precisely for this reason, that weighting secondary-level dimensions is 
not an option either. The necessary and sufficient condition concept structure inevitably assumes equal 
weighting of dimensions.  That is why I cannot assign weights to any of these dimensions because each of them 
is equally necessary to attain democracy. 
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4) Concept extension and cutoff points: democracy, non-democracy, and 
authoritarianism 
 In addition to bringing clarity to how the concept of democracy should be translated 
into a numeric measure, the necessary and sufficient concept structure of democracy helps 
delimit the concept’s extension (or coverage). The identification of clear cutoff points or 
thresholds to establish boundaries between political regime-categories and cases is important, 
as I will show next, to refine current subnational regime (mis)conceptualizations and 
(mis)classifications. 
 Most scholars studying regime juxtaposition refer to what I here called subnational 
undemocratic regimes as simply “authoritarian” regimes.  However, a fully authoritarian 
regime, as most leading analysts agree, is a regime in which no viable channels exist through 
which opposition forces may contest legally for the access to state power.  Examples of these 
regimes are Cuba, Saudi Arabia, or China, where no democratic institutions exist (see figure 
3.2).  
 Hence, if an authoritarian regime is defined along these lines, none of the subnational 
units present in Argentina or Mexico should be coded as authoritarian. Virtually all 
contemporary Argentine and Mexican subnational regimes have viable channels through 
which opposition forces may contest legally for the access to state power –elections are held 
regularly, opposition parties are able to campaign on relatively even footing, and electoral 
contests are more or less competitive, in that opposition parties are not legally barred from 
disputing elections and more than one party is permitted to compete.   
 This study focuses primarily on those cases that score zero (delimited by the grid 
rectangle in figure 3.2). These cases include states or provinces in which any of the necessary 
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(and defining) dimensions of democracy (i.e., contestation, turnover, and clean elections) are 
coded as zero.  Concrete examples of these cases are the Mexican states of Oaxaca (in 2004), 
Tabasco (in 2000 and 2006), Sonora (in 2003), and Guerrero (in 2005), where elections were 
held on a regular basis, opposition parties were permitted to campaign and compete, but 
where elections were marred with fraud.51  In other words, these were cases where viable 
channels to access power existed but where elections where not clean.  
 Finally, as it can be observed in figure 3.2, the grid rectangle, which denotes the cases 
to be studied in this dissertation, includes some cases that are just above zero.  These cases 
are so close to the cutoff point that, at times, it becomes extremely hard to distinguish them 
from the cases that score a perfect zero (see chapter 5, tables 5.6 and 5.7 for a list of the 
provinces/states falling below 0.1).  For instance, the Argentine province of La Rioja scores 
0.006 throughout the 1990s (in a scale that ranges from 0 to 0.73).  La Rioja, then, is 
considered as undemocratic as the province of San Luis, which scores a perfect 0.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 These are all cases that the literature on regime juxtaposition has classified as authoritarian. 
52
 It should be noted, as I explain in the methodological Appendix I, section I, that the cases that are right above 
zero (such as the Argentine province of Formosa, La Rioja, and Santa Cruz, or the Mexican case of Tamaulipas, 
Sinaloa, and Hidalgo) would score a perfect zero had I not chosen to cumulate the party/head (turnover) 
variable.  Had I used a dummy variable to denote turnover, the lack of alternation would have been coded as 
zero, and thus, given the concept structure of democracy used in this study (which multiplies each of 
democracy’s constitutive dimensions), cases such as the ones listed above would have scored a perfect zero.  
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Figure 3.3: A schematization of political regimes’ classification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (a) Cases falling into this regime category are the Chinese provinces. 
(b) Cases falling into this regime category are the Argentine province of San Luis, and the Mexican states of 
Tabasco, Sonora, Oaxaca. 
(c) Cases falling into this category are the Argentine provinces of La Rioja, Formosa, and the Mexican states of 
Puebla, Coahuila. 
         Cases studied in this dissertation. 
* See Gibson (2005), Montero (2007), Lakin (2008), Cornelius (1999). 
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5) Results and discussion: subnational regimes in Argentina and Mexico 
 The data set used to measure subnational democracy (hereafter “access to political 
power”) covers 24 provinces in Argentina, and 32 states in Mexico.  The data span the period 
1983-2006 in Argentina, and 1997-2006 in Mexico.  The dataset consists of 522 yearly 
observations in Argentina, and 316 in Mexico. Time intervals in each country start with the 
onset of the (latest) transition to democracy at the national level.53   
The graphs and maps54 of subnational political regimes presented below, show that 
the territorialization of democracy in Argentina and Mexico is quite uneven, thus confirming 
the trend observed in previous qualitative, case-oriented studies of regime juxtaposition.55 
Indeed, the systematized and comprehensive picture of subnational democracy presented in 
the graphs and maps indicates that a considerable number of the subnational units in 
Argentina and Mexico have not followed the regime trajectory towards democratization 
observed at the national level.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 The onset of democratization in Argentina is set in 1983, when military rule was replaced by a democratically 
elected civilian government.  In Mexico, it is set in 1997.  I have chosen 1997 as the first time point because 
according to many Mexican scholars, 1997 marked the onset of the Mexican democratization process at the 
federal level (see for instance Magaloni 2005). In 1997, the PRI lost its majority in the lower chamber, and 
consequently its hegemony in the legislative arena. 
54
 Maps presenting non-averaged results can be found in the last section of Appendix II. 
55
 This cross-provincial variation is also confirmed statistically. In Argentina, the variable access to power has a 
mean value of 0.149, a standard deviation of 0.161, a minimum value of 0, and a maximum score of 0.732.  In 
Mexico, the access to power variable has a mean value of 0.106, a standard deviation of 0.137, a minimum 
value of 0, and a maximum score of 0.782. 
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Graph 3.1: Political regimes --access to state power (Argentina 1983-2006) 
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Map 3.1: Subnational Democracy (avg. 1983-2006) 
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Graph 3.2: Political regimes --access to state power (Mexico 1997-2006) 
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Map 3.2: Subnational democracy (1997-2006) 
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As graph 3.1 indicates, at least five out of twenty-four provinces in Argentina 
(20.83%) have been, and still remain, undemocratic (i.e., they obtain a score below 0.01), as 
shown by the case of La Rioja, San Luis, Santiago del Estero, Santa Cruz, and Formosa.  By 
contrast, only five provinces (20.83%) –Mendoza, San Juan, and Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 
Chubut, and Entre Ríos have reached high levels of “democraticness” throughout the 1980s, 
1990s, and 2000s.    
Likewise, the Mexican map of subnational democracy reveals that the process of 
national democratization, beginning in 1997 and deepening in 2000, with the arrival of the 
PAN to the national executive, has not trickled down in an evenly territorial way.  In fact, 
graph 3.2 shows the existence of a greater disparity of regime-type than in Argentina, as a 
larger number of cases (at least ten out of thirty-two states, a 31.25%) have remained 
undemocratic.56  In contrast, only a few (six) states (18.75%), among which are Mexico City, 
Chihuahua, Querétaro, Michoacán, Nuevo León, and Zacatecas, have remained constantly 
democratic throughout the late 1990s and 2000s.  
Altogether, these findings suggest that the territorially uneven process of 
democratization has been much more severe than past single-case studies have shown.  Due 
to their limited scope, such studies have not been able to capture the overall patterns of 
democratic territorialization, and have thus identified only a limited number of cases as 
nondemocratic.  As a result, these studies present an incomplete view of the matter, 
portraying a less dramatically uneven territorialization of democracy than the one observed in 
this study.  As the above findings show, the presence of nondemocracies in the subnational 
                                                 
56
 These states include: Oaxaca, Puebla, Baja California, Coahuila, Colima, Hidalgo, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, 
Veracruz, and Yucatán. 
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world has been quite ubiquitous, with democracy only taking hold in 18.75% of the Mexican 
states, and 20.83% of the Argentine provinces.   
In addition, and perhaps more interestingly, graphs 3.1 and 3.2 show that the 
evolution (or lack thereof) towards democracy has not been constant over time.  In effect, 
subnational democracy has expanded and retrenched over the years, as illustrated by the 
Argentine provinces of Chaco, Salta and San Juan, and the Mexican states of Aguascalientes, 
Tlaxcala, Mexico City, and Nayarit. Despite the political opening experienced during the late 
1980s and 1990/2000s, respectively, these provinces and states have seen democratic 
setbacks in the (late) 2000s.  These findings contrast sharply with the pattern observed in the 
provinces of San Luis, La Rioja, and Santa Cruz in Argentina, and the Mexican states 
Tabasco, Puebla, and Oaxaca (among others), where regimes have, over the last ten years, 
remained extremely stable and non-democratic. Finally, the graphs also reveal that some 
Argentine provinces such as Misiones, Tierra del Fuego, and Entre Ríos, as well as the 
Mexican states of Chiapas, Chihuahua, and Zacatecas, have made steady progress towards 
democratization without experiencing setbacks.   
 Interestingly, there is no discernable relationship between the pattern of territorial 
democracy and partisanship.  In both Argentina and Mexico, different levels of democracy 
are not associated with the presence of any particular political party.  Contradicting 
commonly held (but untested) assumptions, in Argentina, it is possible to observe that both 
Peronist (or PJ) and non-Peronist ruled provinces obtain relatively low levels of democracy.  
The Peronist provinces of La Rioja and San Luis as well as the Radical provinces of Córdoba 
(during the 1980s and early 1990s) and Rio Negro (throughout the entire period under study), 
all show very low levels of democracy.  In a similar vein, provinces that have been 
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systematically ruled by the Peronist party since the onset of national democratization in 1983, 
such as the province of Santa Fe, present much higher levels of democracy than provinces 
which have also been ruled by the PJ uninterruptedly, as shown by La Rioja, San Luis, and 
Formosa.  Hence, unlike what previous studies have argued (see Gervasoni 2006), Peronist-
ruled provinces are not necessarily less democratic than Radical and provincial party ruled 
provinces.57 In fact, the correlation between PJ and the access variable is -0.09. 
The partisan pattern observed in Mexico is similar to that seen in Argentina.  Graph 
3.2 shows that PRI, PAN, and PRD-ruled states, such as Oaxaca, Jalisco, and Guerrero, 
respectively, all score low on democracy.  These findings suggest an interesting pattern of 
regime evolution in subnational Mexico, one that is marked by the existence of ruling 
dominant parties.  The hegemony held by the PRI in all Mexican states until 1989 –when the 
PAN won the governorship of Baja California, has given way to the dominance of the other 
two main, national Mexican parties (i.e., the PAN and PRD).  The PAN, for example, whose 
correlation with subnational democracy is 0.15, has become a dominant party in Guanajuato 
and Jalisco, where it has had undisputed control over the past 15 years.58 A similar pattern 
can be observed in Baja California Sur, where the PRD has held a solid dominance.  Yet, 
despite the existence of PAN and PRD undemocratic states, the PRI maintains the largest 
                                                 
57
 That said, it should be noted that the provinces that rank lowest on the access dimension are Peronist-ruled 
provinces. 
58
 In these states, the PAN has controlled the governorship since the mid-1990s, as well as solid majorities in the 
state legislatures.  Similarly, gubernatorial, mid-term, and local elections have been won by very large margins 
of victory. 
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number of low scoring democratic states, as well as the highest negative correlation with 
subnational democracy (-0.47).59  
 In sum, the findings presented in graphs 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that Argentine and 
Mexican democracy at the subnational level is not evenly distributed, neither across the 
territory, nor across time.  Furthermore, the maps of political regimes also show that levels of 
democracy are not clearly associated with any particular party, although the lowest levels of 
subnational democracy in both countries can be observed in Peronist and PRI-ruled 
provinces. 
 
Cross-provincial differences among undemocratic regimes 
 In addition to substantiating previous findings and shedding light on new (temporal 
and partisan) patterns of provincial political regimes, the “map” of subnational political 
regimes uncovers one major aspect that has, so far, gone unnoticed by most studies on the 
subject, namely, that undemocratic regimes differ greatly with respect to their economic, 
geographical, and socio-demographic structures.60  As graphs 3.1 and 3.2 show, provinces as 
economically, geographically, and socio-demographically diverse as La Rioja (located in one 
of the poorest and least developed regions of Argentina –the northwestern part of the 
country) and Santa Cruz (situated in one of the second most economically developed and 
richer parts of the country –Patagonia region), have similar levels of democracy.  Likewise, 
                                                 
59
 Yet, there are cross-state differences within PRI-ruled states. For instance, the PRI states of Campeche and 
Estado de Mexico present higher levels of democracy than their counterparts of Oaxaca, Tabasco, Puebla, and 
Tamaulipas. 
60
 Exceptions are Snyder 1999, 2001, who distinguishes among different types of subnational undemocratic 
regimes. 
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the state of Jalisco, one of the richest, most developed central states of Mexico, has similar 
levels of democracy than the poor, and least developed southern state of Oaxaca.61 
Acknowledging that subnational undemocratic regimes are not all alike is critical for 
a variety of reasons.  First, the identification of geographical differences among subnational 
undemocratic regimes suggests that extant assertions about the geographical location of 
subnational undemocratic regimes –i.e., central-northern Argentina, and southern Mexico– 
are both unwarranted and misleading (see Sawers 1996, Cornelius 1999, Rodríguez and 
Ward 1995). Moreover, the fact that undemocratic provincial regimes are spread throughout 
the national territory undermines the explanatory power of (local) cultural, anthropological, 
and ethnographic explanations.  If undemocratic regimes are located in multiple geographical 
locations, which differ in terms of their culture, local traditions, and ethnicity, explanations 
based exclusively on these aspects are unlikely to advance our knowledge about how and 
why these regimes continue to exist. 
Second, addressing the fact that subnational undemocratic regimes are different in 
terms of their economic development and socio-demographic structures also carries 
important implications for both theory-building and theoretical generalizations.  For instance, 
explanations on subnational undemocratic regimes’ survival and reproduction commonly 
suggest that these regimes become entrenched due to low levels of economic development.  
However, if one observes the map presented above, one soon discovers that provinces that 
fall into the category of non-democracies present divergent levels of economic development.  
Provinces with medium-high levels of economic development, such as Santa Cruz and San 
                                                 
61
 A similar pattern of socio-demographic and economic development is found by Gervasoni (2006) in 
Argentina, and McMann (2003) in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. 
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Luis in Argentina, and Jalisco and Guanajuato in Mexico, are as undemocratic as the least 
economically developed Argentine provinces of La Rioja and Formosa, and the Mexican 
states of Oaxaca and Puebla.62  This finding indicates that theories focusing on economic 
factors alone might not sufficiently explain subnational undemocratic regime continuity and 
change.  As suggested by the maps presented above, undemocratic regimes in contemporary 
Argentina and Mexico prevail regardless of levels of economic development and well being.  
The observed variation in terms of geography, economic development, and socio-
demographic structure is complemented, as I will show in the next sub-section, with 
differences across state-administrations.  To these differences I turn next. 
 
III. Subnational state administrations and exercise of political power 
1) Conceptualization of subnational state administrations 
 State administrations, i.e. the set of institutions and rules that organize government, 
establish the parameters through which rulers exercise the (political) power conferred to them 
by their ruling position. As discussed earlier, exercise of political power denotes the 
downward relationship between state and society, whereas a political regime (i.e., 
democracy) characterizes the upward movement between society and the state (Mazzuca 
1998, 2007).   
 The management of state resources –that is, the exercise of political power, is 
administered following Max Weber in a continuum from extreme patrimonial to highly 
                                                 
62
 The low and even negative correlation between levels of economic development and democracy at the 
subnational level (-0.18 in Mexico, and 0.34 in Argentina), further suggests that general (i.e., national) theories 
about democracy, which argue that higher levels of economic development are needed to attain democracy, 
might not be suitable to account for democratic sustainability at the subnational level of government. 
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bureaucratic administrations.  Patrimonial administrations (or patrimonialism) are 
characterized by (a) the centralization of power in the hands of the ruler; (b) the erosion of 
horizontal control across different spheres of government; (c) the reduction of citizens’ 
autonomy due to the generation of ties of loyalty and dependence –commonly through 
complex patron-client linkages; (d) rulers’ appropriation of state funds for private 
consumption; (e) the use of political influence and public resources for the purposes of 
entrenching the position of the ruling group –such as covert funding of party campaigns and 
patronage; (f) the discretionary and particularistic provision of public goods –as opposed to 
distribution based on merit and need (see Weber 1976 [1925]; Bratton and van de Walle 
1997; Ertman 1997; Hartlyn 1998b; Mazzuca (1998, 2007).63  
 Bureaucratic administrations (or bureaucratization), by contrast, are characterized, as 
Weber noted, by the complete separation between the personage of the ruler and the means of 
administration, warfare, and financial organization.  Put differently, bureaucratization entails 
the lack of rulers’ private appropriation of public resources, and his/her maximum 
adherencesto the rules.  
 Neopatrimonial and bureaucratic administrations are “ideal types,” and as such can 
rarely be found in practice, and thus may not apply in all particular cases.  They simply serve 
as endpoints in a continuum to indicate that there can be nothing, conceptually at least, which 
is more ideal. They do, however, draw attention to the fact that state administrations can be 
different enough to stand at polar opposites. 
 
                                                 
63
 From here on out, following Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and Hartlyn (1998b), I refer to these 
administrations as “neopatrimonial,” as Weber’s characterization of patrimonial administrations does not 
adequately characterize any of the national [and subnational] political systems existing in our time.   
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2) From concept to measurement:  an additive index of state administrations  
 Unlike the concept structure of democracy, which is organized along necessary and 
sufficient conditions, neopatrimonialism (and its negative pole, bureaucratization) pertains to 
the family-resemblance concept structure.  The family resemblance concept structure, as 
Goertz asserts “is as a rule about sufficiency with no necessary condition requirements” 
(2006:36).64 
The presence of any of the constitutive dimensions (“a” through “f”, listed above) 
places any given subnational unit, say, province A, in the category of neopatrimonial 
provinces. Yet, province A might be grouped together with other patrimonial province, say, 
province B, despite the fact that the characteristic that makes province B neopatrimonial, is 
different from the one that makes province A neopatrimonial.  Thus, it is possible that two or 
more provinces classified as neopatrimonial will not share all of what may be seen as the 
defining attributes of neopatrimonialism, yet still capture a set of commonalities considered 
to be constitutive of this type of state administration.65 
Of all the secondary-level dimensions of neopatrimonialism listed above, the 
contemporary literature has identified some dimensions as analytically important for coding 
an administration as neopatrimonial.  These include: (a) the centralization of power in the 
hands of the ruler and rulers’ encroachment over other branches of government (i.e., lack of 
horizontal accountability); (b) the reduction of autonomy of the rulers’ followers by 
                                                 
64
 An example of a family resemblance concept structure is the concept of corporatism. As Collier and Mahon 
(1993) indicate, “the literature on corporatism generally presents a series of defining attributes, usually without 
the expectation that the full set of attributes would be found in every instance (Malloy 1977; Schmitter 1974).” 
Thus, “over many decades during the twentieth century, it was reasonable to characterize labor relations in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico as corporative, despite variation in the features of corporative structuring, 
subsidy, and control of groups found in the four cases (Collier and Collier 1991)” (Collier and Mahon 1993). 
65
 I illustrate this point with two examples from Argentina in footnote Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
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generating ties of loyalty and dependence (i.e., clientelism and patronage); (c) the use of non-
universalistic criteria to distribute public goods; and (d) lack of citizens’ autonomy to 
effectively control rulers’ activities (i.e., lack of societal accountability (Bratton and van de 
Walle 1997, Hartlyn 1998b, Mazzuca 1998, 2007; Smulovitz & Peruzzotti 2000, 2002).  
Accordingly, the basic-level concept of neopatrimonialism used in this dissertation is 
comprised of four dimensions: (1) horizontal accountability, (2) societal accountability, (3) 
patronage, and (4) rulers’ fiscal discretion.66 As was done  with the measurement of 
democracy, to ensure concept-measure consistency, I proceed to measure neopatrimonialism 
according to the scheme presented in figure 3.3. 67   
As previously discussed in section II, a necessary condition can have no 
substitute.That is precisely why, to measure democracy –a concept with a necessary and 
sufficient structure, I have created a multiplicative index (and modeled it with the logical 
AND). In contrast, the family resemblance concept structure allows for the absence of any 
given characteristic to be compensated for by the presence of another.68  Thus, I model the 
concept using the logical OR (which is closely associated with addition) (Goertz 2006: 39-
                                                 
66
 Unlike the necessary and sufficient concept structure, concepts with the family resemblance structure can be 
assessed by identifying attributes that are present to varying degrees in particular cases, rather than being simply 
present or absent. This is why all four secondary-level dimensions do not need to be present (i.e., measured).  
Such is the case of the secondary-level dimension societal accountability.  Due to constraints of data 
availability, no measure of societal accountability is provided for the Argentine provinces.  
67
 I have chosen to measure (and thus operationalize) the highest value of the regime continuum (i.e., 
democracy), and the lowest value of the state administration continuum (i.e., neopatrimonialism).   
68
 To illustrate this point, take the case of two Argentine provinces.  Santa Cruz and San Luis both score high on 
the neopatrimonial-bureaucratic continuum (i.e., relatively speaking, they are more bureaucratic than other 
Argentine provinces).  Yet, they do so for different reasons. San Luis stands among the provinces with lower 
quantities of public employees in the country, whereas Santa Cruz ranks among the provinces with 
intermediate-high levels of public employment. By contrast, Santa Cruz ranks among the provinces that have a 
medium-high score on the exercise indicator “independence of the judiciary,” whereas San Luis obtains one the 
of the lowest scores.  However, when the two indicators (together with the rest of the exercise indicators) are 
added up, both provinces score low on neopatrimonialism. 
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44; Mahoney & Goertz 2006). In other words, the secondary-level dimensions of the 
neopatrimonialism concept are all substitutable and that is why I add them all up. 69   
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
69
 A detailed description of the indicators used to measure neopatrimonialism, as well as how they are 
aggregated, is provided in the methodological Appendix I, section II. 
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Figure 3.4: A family resemblance concept structure of neopatrimonialism 
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3) Results and discussion: subnational state-administrations in Argentina and Mexico 
 The data set used to measure neopatrimonialism covers 23 provinces in Argentina, 
and 31 states in Mexico.70  The data span the period 1983-2006 in Argentina, and 1997-2006 
in Mexico, time periods that begin with the onset of the most recent transition to democracy 
at the national level.   
The graphs and maps presented below show that the exercise of political power in the 
Argentine provinces and the Mexican states varies across units, although in a less 
pronounced way than democracy.71 Graphs 3.3 and 3.4 indicate that the lower levels of 
neopatrimonialism (i.e., high scores) of the Argentine provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, 
and San Luis contrast sharply with the high levels of neopatrimonialism (i.e., low scores) 
observed in La Rioja, Formosa, and Tierra del Fuego. Likewise whereas power in the 
Mexican states of Jalisco, Nuevo León, Morelos, San Luis Potosí, Estado de México, and 
Guanajuato is exercised along fairly bureaucratic norms and procedures (as indicated by the 
low score on the neopatrimonial scale), political power in the states of Oaxaca, Hidalgo, 
Guerrero, and Tabasco is exercised in the opposite fashion.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70
 The city of Buenos Aires and Mexico City are not included in this dataset because, unlike the other provinces, 
they do not possess lower levels of government (aka municipalities).  As a result, the secondary-level dimension 
“rulers’ fiscal discretion” does not exist. 
71
 In Argentina, the exercise variable has a mean value of 0.469, a standard deviation of 0.134, a maximum 
value of 0.119, and minimum value of 0.750.  The variable exercise in Mexico has a mean value of 0.427, a 
standard deviation of 0.085, a maximum value of 0.153, and a minimum value of 0.686. 
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Graph 3.3:Subnational state-administrations --exercise of state power (Argentina 1983-2006) 
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Map 3.3: Subnational neopatrimonialism (average 1983-2006) 
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Graph 3.4: Subnational state-administrations --exercise of state power (Mexico 1997-2006) 
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Map 3.4: Subnational neopatrimonialism (average 1997-2006) 
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Unlike the pattern observed in the access graphs (3.1 and 3.2), it is possible to discern 
a few socioeconomic and geographical trends within the exercise dimension that are worth 
mentioning.  Provinces with high levels of socioeconomic development are, on average, 
associated with lower levels of neopatrimonialism.  In Argentina, for instance, the provinces 
of Mendoza, Santa Fe, Entre Ríos, Buenos Aires (together with Córdoba), all of which 
comprise the bulk of the richest and most economically developed Argentine provinces, 
receive the highest scores on the exercise dimension.  In Mexico, a similar pattern is 
observed, as states with the highest levels of socioeconomic development, such as Jalisco, 
Nuevo León, and Morelos, receive the lowest scores on the neo-patrimonial scale.  In 
contrast, the provinces and states that, on average, present the highest levels of 
neopatrimonialism, are those located in the least economically developed and poorest areas 
of Argentina and Mexico.  Such is the case of the Argentine provinces of La Rioja, Formosa, 
Corrientes, and Jujuy, and the Mexican states of Oaxaca, Chiapas, Guerrero, and Tabasco72.  
Between these two poles, provinces and states with intermediate levels of economic 
development fall, on average, somewhere in the middle of the neopatrimonialism-
bureaucracy continuum.73  
The partisanship trends observed in Argentina are mixed at best, with Peronist 
governors ranking very high on the exercise dimension (such as the governors from Santa Fe, 
Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, Mendoza, and La Pampa), and still others scoring at the bottom of 
                                                 
72
 Despite the fact that Tabasco is one of the oil-producing states of Mexico, receiving large amount of revenues 
from oil production, it still ranks among the poorest and least economically developed states of Mexico. 
73
 These findings suggest, following Weber’s classic assertion that, at the subnational level in both Argentina 
and Mexico, there is a moderate ‘elective affinity’ between capitalist development and bureaucratic 
administrations (evidenced by a correlation of 0.32 in Mexico and 0.22 in Argentina).   
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the scale (such as the governors of La Rioja and Formosa).74  The same can be said about 
other Argentine national and provincial parties, which no relationship between partisanship 
and the exercise of political power.  The Radical-ruled provinces fall both high (Mendoza 
and Chubut) and low (Tierra del Fuego and Rio Negro) on the exercise scale, and provinces 
ruled by provincial parties, such as Neuquén, Tucumán, and San Juan, also rank on divergent 
positions along the exercise scale.  Thus, in Argentina, it is difficult to establish any pattern 
of association between exercise of political power and partisanship. 
 
IV. Access to state power vs. exercise of state power: a new classification of 
subnational political regimes 
As noted earlier, access to power and exercise of political power, as Mazzuca (1998, 
2007) claims, are simply two analytically distinct aspects of the institutional structure of the 
state.75  The analytic distinction between access and exercise suggests that these two 
variables can be treated as orthogonal, thus setting the parameters for a typology of 
subnational political regimes.   
Graphs 3.5 and 3.6 plot states and provinces along the access and exercise analytic 
dimensions, classifying political regimes according to types of state-administration.76  The 
new regime classification sheds new and notable light on different analytic, methodological, 
                                                 
74
 The correlation between PJ and the exercise variable is almost inexistent (0.11). 
75
 A simple test of statistical correlation between access and exercise substantiates in empirical terms this 
analytic differentiation.  The correlation between the access and exercise variables is 0.23 in Argentina, and 
0.27 in Mexico, both significant at the 0.00 level. 
76
 Note that scores are averages for the 1983-2006 period in Argentina, and the 1997-2006 period in Mexico. It 
should be noted that the typologies presented in the graphs below are static, i.e., they constitute averaged 
snapshots of the periods under study. Yet, given that the average scores have been calculated on longer time-
periods than in previous studies, these typologies provide a more realistic snapshot.   
  86 
and theoretical aspects of subnational political regimes. First, the classifications present the 
full of range of political regimes, thus allowing for a clearer delimitation of the cases that 
should be regarded as democratic, and those cases that should be considered nondemocratic.  
Cases ranking between 0 and 0.1 on the vertical axis (i.e., the access dimension) denote 
nondemocratic regimes, whereas cases falling above the 0.1 cutoff point can be regarded as 
democratic. 
Second, the classification of state-administrations further enables scholars to identify 
cases where power is exercised along neopatrimonial rules, and cases where rulers govern in 
a less discretional, impersonal, and unchecked manner. The vertical line right in the middle 
of the horizontal axis (i.e. the exercise dimension) separates cases on the basis of each 
province’s type of state-administration.  Thus, the right-hand section of each graphs groups 
all bureaucratic states, whereas the left-right hand section comprises the neopatrimonial 
provinces.   
Third, and more importantly, the new regime classification also allows for a clearer 
definition of the universe of nondemocratic regimes. The graphs indicate that cases scoring 
low on the y-axis make up the bulk of SURs in contemporary Argentina and Mexico.  As can 
be observed, the universe of SURs expands considerably once a procedural minimal 
definition of democracy is used. Indeed, cases that, according to the expanded definition of 
democracy, would have not been regarded as nondemocratic (i.e., states/provinces falling in 
the bottom-right of the graphs77), can and should be considered members of the population of 
Argentine and Mexican SURs.  
                                                 
77
 Recall that the expanded definition of democracy conceived as of SURs states that have: (a) low levels of 
contestation and turnover, (b) high levels of fraud, (c) low levels of horizontal and societal accountability, and 
(d) high levels of clientelism and patronage –i.e., states/provinces falling in the bottom right side of the graphs. 
 Graph 3.5: Neopatrimonial vs. bureaucratic regimes in Argentina (1983-2006 avg.) 
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Graph 3.6: Neopatrimonial vs. bureaucratic regimes in Mexico (1997-2006 avg.) 
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Graphs 3.5 and 3.6 reveal that the universe of SURs, i.e., the set of cases that 
constitute the focus of this dissertation are:  the Argentine provinces of La Rioja, 
Formosa, La Pampa, San Luis, and Santa Cruz, Santiago del Estero, Corrientes, Rio 
Negro, and Córdoba, among others, and the states of Tabasco, Oaxaca, Baja California, 
Sonora, Colima, Quintana Roo, Yucatán, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Puebla, Coahuila, 
Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Campeche, Estado de México, Durango and Veracruz.78 
Maintaining a clearer understanding of the universe of cases is crucial because it 
improves, as Munck (2004) notes, the researcher’s ability to construct theories, define 
strategies for measurement and case selection, and establish comparisons/contrasts 
among cases.  Thus, the classification presented in this dissertation, provides scholars of 
regime juxtaposition tools to gain leverage in each of these undertakings. 
Finally, the new regime classification reveals that SURs are not of one type.  In 
fact, nondemocratic states pertain either to the family of bureaucratic nondemocratic 
regimes or to the population of neopatrimonial SURs.79 Recognizing that subnational 
nondemocratic regimes are of two broad types is critically important to refine current 
explanations about SURs in general, and SUR continuity in particular.  As I will show in 
the remaining chapters of this dissertation, types of SURs, and their distinct interactions 
                                                 
78
 Given the inexistence of systematic indexes of political regimes, I cannot verify in statistical terms the 
external validity of my measurements.  Yet, all the cases that are here considered as nondemocratic have 
also been regarded as such by scholars studying regime juxtaposition in Argentina and Mexico (see the 
works by Gibson 2005; Gervasoni 2006; Eisenstadt 1999, 2004; Snyder 1999, 2001; Solt 2003; Lakin 
2008; Benton forthcoming, and the works included in the edited volume by Cornelius, Eisenstadt, and 
Hindely 1999). 
79
 States falling into the bottom left side of the graphs make up the universe of neopatrimonial SURs.  
Conversely, the bottom-right side clusters the bureaucratic SURs. 
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with the central government, greatly shape the prospects and trajectories of their 
continuity. 
 
V. Conclusion  
At the beginning of this chapter, I noted that scholars of regime juxtaposition have 
not clearly defined, measured, and classified subnational undemocratic regimes.80  I 
argued that because of this oversight, scholars have, in general, misidentified subnational 
undemocratic regimes and, as a result, have elaborated incomplete and theoretical 
accounts of SUR continuity.  To overcome these porblems I engaged in a careful 
conceptualization of subnational political regimes, and proceeded to measure democracy 
using the conceptual and analytic framework put forward by Mazzuca (1998, 2007) 
which differentiates between (i) the access to power and (ii) the exercise of power. 
The maps and graphs of subnational democracy presented in this chapter showed 
that the levels of democracy in the Argentine provinces and Mexican states vary 
considerably across subnational units, evidencing that democracy in these two countries 
has not trickled down evenly.  These results confirm that SURs are ubiquitous, that they 
are present in both rich and poor subnational units, and are not associated with any 
particular party or geographic area of the country. 
Turning to the exercise of political power, the findings presented in this chapter 
demonstrate that state-administrations in the Argentine provinces and the Mexican states 
vary across units, although in a less pronounced way than democracy. The results also 
revealed that unlike the pattern observed with political regimes, it is possible to discern 
                                                 
80
 Exceptions are Solt (2003) and Gervasoni (2006, 2008). 
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some socioeconomic and geographical trends regarding subnational state-administrations.  
Indeed, provinces/states with high levels of socioeconomic development are, on average, 
associated with lower levels of neopatrimonialism.  In addition, at least in the case of 
Mexico, I found a positive correlation between PAN-ruled and bureaucratic exercise of 
political power.  
Finally, I showed that the new conceptualization of political regimes advanced in 
this chapter provided useful analytic tools to overcome the problems deriving from 
current SUR characterizations.  In addition, and most importantly, this new 
conceptualization laid the groundwork for a classification of subnational political 
regimes, which in turn helped achieve one of the central goals of the paper, namely, 
singling out the cases that have remained nondemocratic since then, and which 
consequently make up the universe of cases that this dissertation studies.  
 Altogether, the evidence presented in this chapter provides the first elements to 
test the theoretical framework: (i) the universe of cases where the framework is deemed 
to be applied, (ii) the distinction between bureaucratic and neopatrimonial SURs, and (iii) 
the insight that SURs also vary considerably regarding their levels of socioeconomic 
development.  In the next chapter, I analyze the remaining elements that are needed to 
test the framework.  To that end, I study the elements that enable presidents to exert 
leverage and control over nondemocratic governors. To these national variables I turn 
next. 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 4: Fiscal and partisan instruments of territorial control: 
Argentina and Mexico in comparative perspective 
 
 Carlos Menem and Fernando De la Rúa were Argentina’s only two presidents 
during the 1990s.  They belonged to different political parties (the Peronist and the 
Radical party, respectively), represented different constituencies (labor-middle class-and 
poor sectors vs. middle and upper class, respectively), and most notably, maintained 
diametrically different relationships with governors.  Whereas Menem, especially during 
the second half of his first administration (1989-1994), was able to control governors 
from virtually all provinces, De la Rúa proved incapable of doing so.  Indeed, during De 
la Rúa’s term governors even managed to coalesce in a formal league against the 
president, the so-called Frente Federal Solidario de Gobernadores (Olmeda 2008).  Part 
of Menem’s success in controlling and disciplining the governors stemmed from his 
capacity to penetrate provincial arenas via the Peronist party (Novaro 1994, McGuire 
1997, Levitsky 2003, Wibbels 2005, Eaton 2004, 2005).  
In effect, after 1991, Menem intervened most Peronist provincial organizations 
and removed recalcitrant provincial bosses who opposed him (McGuire 1997, Novaro 
1994). Menem also had abundant financial resources to discipline governors.  The 
windfall gains accruing from the privatization of public enterprises, coupled with the 
central government’s capacity to raise taxes due to the greater stability of the economy, 
gave Menem additional financial resources that he used to buy off co-partisan and 
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opposition governors (Gibson & Calvo 2000).  In constrast, De la Rúa’s incapacity to 
keep governors in check was caused by the exact opposite factors: his inability to 
penetrate provincial arenas via the party apparatus (Calvo & Murillo 2004, 2005), and his 
lack of fiscal disciplining power, caused by the agonizing economic situation (Benton 
n.d., Olmeda 2008). 
These contrasting intergovernmental relations are illustrative of the changing 
nature of presidential power, and they clearly reveal that presidential control over 
subnational units can vary tremendously, even within the same country and within a very 
short period of time.  They also suggests that whereas some presidents may have a 
multiplicity of tools to exert control over governors, such as partisan and financial 
instruments, others might have a complete lack of them.  
This chapter identifies the different paths of control (i.e., fiscal, partisan, 
fiscal/partisan) taken by each president in Argentina and Mexico after the latest transition 
to democracy in each country.  To meet that goal, the chapter explores the different 
instruments of territorial and political control available to presidents.  Following the 
argument presented in chapter 2, I argue that different combinations of fiscal and 
territorial instruments shape the path of control taken by any given president at any given 
time.   
This chapter is divided into 3 sections.  In the first section I discuss the fiscal 
instruments of presidential control found in Mexico and Argentina. To do so, I focus on 3 
different sources that determine this type of control, namely, (a) the type of revenue-
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sharing system81 and main intergovernmental transfers, (b) the stability of the rules that 
structure the distribution of fiscal transfers between the central government and the 
subnational units, and (c) the actual fiscal power and fiscal discretion of presidents as a 
function of the revenues that are not transferred to the provinces.  After discussing the 
instruments of fiscal control in each country, I engage in a cross-country comparison to 
determine which president (and country) has higher/lower levels of fiscal presidential 
discretion and fiscal power, and thus more capacity to exert fiscal control over 
subnational units.82   
The second section of this chapter analyzes and compares the instruments of 
partisan control present in Argentina and Mexico.  Finally, building on the previous 
sections, in the last part of the chapter I explore the different types of paths of control 
(i.e., fiscal, partisan, fiscal/partisan) taken by each president in Argentina and Mexico, 
comparing and contrasting presidential accessibility to the two instruments of control 
discussed above.   
Before turning to the analysis of the instruments of presidential control, a note is 
in order regarding the analytical approach adopted in this chapter.  In chapter 2, I took 
notice of the fact that provinces and governors varied considerably regarding, and that 
this variation had important effects on the capacity of national rulers to act on the 
                                                 
81
 In a revenue-sharing system a country’s main (domestic) taxes are collected by the federal government 
and then distributed in two rounds.  In the first round, tax revenues are split in two (not necessarily equal) 
parts between the federal government and the subnational units.  In the second round, the subnational share 
is distributed among each of the constitutive units of the federation. 
82
 I treat fiscal power and fiscal discretion as two different dimensions.  Fiscal power increases/decreases 
depending on whether national incumbents get (or not) additional revenues. By contrast, fiscal discretion 
increases/decreases regardless of whether a country’s revenues augment or diminish.  During a year of 
economic downturn, for instance, presidents who can easily alter the rules structuring intergovernmental 
fiscal relations can still have high fiscal discretion vis-à-vis subnational units. 
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periphery.  In this chapter however, I treat governors and subnational units as if they were 
a homogenous bloc.  I momentarily overlook subnational differences because the aim in 
this chapter is to determine the type of presidential control prevalent in each country.  
Thus, I measure the absolute power that presidents have vis-a-vis governors, regardless of 
whether this power is neutralized by specific characteristics of subnational units and 
subnational incumbents.   
Thus the indicators selected to determine whether presidents have either one (or 
both) instruments of control also overlook provincial differences.  For instance, instead of 
measuring whether the president’s party is present in any particular subnational unit, I 
measure the extent to which the presidential party has a homogenous (or heterogeneous) 
presence throughout the territory, i.e., across all subnational units.  That is the reason for 
using the level of presidential party nationalization as the indicator of partisan control. 
The same holds true for the indicators that measure presidential fiscal power. These 
indicators capture whether presidents are (or are not) fiscally powerful vis-à-vis 
subnational units as a whole.  
 
I. Fiscal instruments of territorial and political control 
 There are three potential sources that increase or decrease the capacity of 
presidents to exercise fiscal control over subnational rulers: (a) the type of revenue-
sharing system and principal intergovernmental transfers, (b) the stability of the rules that 
structure the distribution of fiscal transfers between the central government and the 
subnational units, and (c) the fiscal power and fiscal discretion of presidents as a function 
of the revenues that are not transferred to the provinces.   
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By “type of revenue-sharing system and main intergovernmental transfers,” I refer 
to the rules that shape the distribution of funds across levels of government.  In particular, 
I focus on the rules and procedures that determine the criteria through which transfers 
flowing from the center to subnational units are distributed, such as whether they are 
automatic and whether they are distributed based on a fixed formula.  By “stability of the 
rules of fiscal federalism,” I refer to the changes made to the rules that structure the 
distribution of federal transfers.  In particular, I look at the frequency with which these 
rules have been altered, and at the effects these have had on a president’s ability to 
enlarge his or her fiscal power and fiscal discretion vis-à-vis governors. Finally, I look at 
the actual fiscal discretion and fiscal power of presidents vis-à-vis all governors by 
focusing the proportion of shareable revenues that remains at the federal level of 
government exclusively (i.e., that is not shareable with the subnational units).  
The first two aspects —the type (automatic and formula-based) and stability of 
the rules— capture presidential discretion vis-à-vis lower levels of government.  
Presidential discretion is lower in countries where intergovernmental transfers are 
automatic and distributed according to fixed formulae.  The third aspect, in turn, is meant 
to gauge a president’s fiscal power vis-à-vis governors.  The greater the proportion of 
shareable revenues that remains at the federal government, the more fiscally powerful a 
president is vis-à-vis subnational incumbents.  
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1) Mexico 
(a). Revenue-sharing system and main intergovernmental transfers 
 The Mexican revenue-sharing system was instituted in 1980, with the passage of 
the Ley de Coordinación Fiscal (LCF – Law of Fiscal Coordination).  The new law was a 
watershed in the history of Mexico’s fiscal federalism.  For the first time, states agreed to 
give up their authority over taxation in return for unconditional revenue-sharing transfers, 
the so-called participaciones (Díaz-Cayeros 2006).  With the intention of diminishing 
presidential discretion and ensuring a steady flow of funds to the states, the new fiscal 
arrangement tied participaciones to explicit formulas that took into consideration 
population, revenue collected in the past, and indicators of state performance in tax 
collection (Courchene and Díaz-Cayeros 2000, Díaz-Cayeros 2006).  In addition, the 
LCF stipulated very strict provisions regarding how automatic the distribution of 
participaciones must be and the sanctions to be applied whenever the federal government 
failed to comply.  
The 1980 LCF stipulated that 17.6% of the taxes subject to sharing be assigned to 
the Fondo General de Participaciones’ (FGP –General Fund of Participations), the main 
sub-fund making up the participaciones fund. 83 In other words, since 1980, 17.6% of the 
taxes subject to sharing flowed automatically to the states and were based on a fixed 
formula. This percentage was subsequently increased to 18.26% in 1989, 18.51% in the 
early 1990s, and 20% in 1997 (SHCP 2007).84  The amount of participaciones (including 
                                                 
83
 The other sub-funds include: Fondo de Fomento Municipal (FFM –Fund for Municipal Promotion), and 
the Fondo de Compensación (FC –Fund for Compensations).  
84
 If to that one adds the remaining participaciones sub-funds, roughly 23% of the total shareable revenues 
are automatically channeled to the states. In addit
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all sub-funds and special taxes) has remained stable over time, accounting for an average 
of 25.46% of the total shareable revenue between 2000 and 2006 (see table 4.1).  It is 
important to note that every additional increase of the FGP and other participaciones sub-
funds’ share meant a decrease in the president’s fiscal discretion, as the federal 
government was forced to automatically transfer a greater proportion of tax revenues to 
the states. 
In 1997, within the broader context of public services’ decentralization and a 
“New Federalism” program, President Zedillo introduced another major change in the 
Mexican system of intergovernmental transfers.  Most of the funds/programs that before 
1997 were distributed by the federal government (through a myriad of federal agencies) 
and that were earmarked for specific purposes at both the state and municipal level, were 
incorporated into the LCF within a broader fund, the so-called aportaciones fund.85  
Conditional cash transfers, such as the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL 
–National Solidarity Program) as well as another funds for poverty alleviation, the fund 
for Inversión Pública Federal (IPF – Federal Infrastructural Development), and funds 
destined to the payroll of teachers and the provision of health care were all subsumed 
under the aportaciones funds.86   
 The incorporation of these funds into the LCF was a major step toward limiting 
presidential fiscal discretion.  Indeed, after 1997, the allocation of transfers destined to 
                                                                                                                                                  
economic incentives are also subsumed under participaciones, such as the property tax on automobiles 
(tenencia) and tax on new cars (ISAN).  Like all the participaciones sub-funds, these additional taxes are 
transferred automatically to the states along arithmetic formulae. 
85
 For a detailed description of the aportaciones fund and how it was created see Ortega (2004). 
86
 The aportaciones subfunds were 5 in 1997 and 7 in 1999.  See table 4.1 for a list of these sub-funds. 
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cope with social, welfare, and infrastructure development would be regulated by stricter 
distributional rules rather than by the discretion of each federal agency.  This was the 
case because the LCF stipulated that some aportaciones sub-funds would be 
automatically transferred to the states and based on a fixed formula.87  Nonetheless, the 
1997 law was less strict on the distributional criterion of other aportaciones sub-funds, 
such as the education and health sub-funds.  Still, when compared to the pre-1997 
criterion used to allocate these sub-funds, the post-1997 regulation significantly limited 
the federal government’s capacity to determine the amount of transfers flowing to the 
states.88  The greater constriction over presidential fiscal discretion has meant that an 
average of 26.53% of the total shareable revenue has been subject to tighter rules of 
allocation during the 2000-2006 period (see table 4.1).  
 Another step was taken to limit presidential fiscal discretion and fiscal power in 
2003 when a new fund, the Fideicomiso para la Infraestructura de los Estados (FIES –
Trusteeship for States’ Infrastructure) was incorporated into the LCF.  The FIES’ main 
purpose was to transfer oil surpluses to the states, thus slicing off another portion of 
revenues from the federal government. As a result, since 2003 states have had the 
opportunity to reap part of the benefits of oil exports as automatic tax transfers89. Indeed, 
                                                 
87
 Such was the case of FAIS (fund for infrastructural development), FAM (fund for educational 
infrastructure development), and FORTAMUN-DF (fund for municipal financial strengthening and 
investment). 
88
 The LCF provides some guidelines for the distribution of the education and health funds, but they are 
vague and general and do not become binding formulae (see Courchene and Díaz-Cayeros 2000).  
However, because the amount of the funds to be distributed among states is determined each year in the 
lower house, when the budget is discussed, the states (via their governors and congressional delegations) 
have gained a considerable amount of leeway to limit presidents’ fiscal discretion (see Sour et al. 2003, 
Olmeda 2009). 
89
 The FIES is distributed using the same formulas employed to allocate the FGP. 
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in 2003, 1.4% of the total federal transfers flowing to the states came in the form of FIES, 
and that amount increased to 2.4% in 2004, then back to 2% in 2005 and 1.9% in 2006 
(due to the volatility of the oil prices) (SCHP –Diagnóstico 2007).  
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Table 4.1: Mexico’s revenue-sharing system and main intergovernmental transfers (as of 2006) 
% of total 
shareable revenue 
(2000-2006)
Allocation criteria Yr of law's passage
25.46 Automatic/Formula 1980
FGP Automatic/Formula
Other participaciones Automatic/Formula
Economic incentives Automatic/Formula
26.53 1997
FAEB Vague guidelines but mostly based on teacher's payroll 1997
FASSA
Vague guidelines but mostly based on medical 
infrastructure, payroll, and funds distributed in the 
previous year
1997
FAIS Formula 1997
FORTAMUN-DF Formula 1997
FAM Vague guidelines but mostly based on index of social 
vulnerability/educational needs 1997
FASP Formula 1999
FAETA Vague guidelines but mostly based on payroll 1999
3.77 Determined by each Ministry based on states' sectoral 
needs n.a.
PAFEF** 1.37 Vague guidelines but mostly based on financial,debt, and infrastructural needs 2000
FIES*** 0.86 Automatic/Formula 2003
Fund
Agreements of decentralization*
Source: Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP) --Diagnóstico 2007
**Aims at covering financial,debt, and infrastructural states' needs. Starting in 2008, the PAFEF was included as the 9th aportaciones sub-
***Additional oil revenues earmarked for financial, debt, and infrastructural needs
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All in all, since the 1980s, the evolution of the Mexican fiscal federalism has gone in 
the direction of imposing additional constraints on presidential fiscal discretion.  The 
progressive, but steady, increase of participaciones flowing to the states since 1980, the 
introduction, in 1997, of aportaciones as a part of the Sistema Nacional de Coordinación 
Fiscal (SNCF –National System of Fiscal Coordination) together with its concomitant 
decentralization of fiscal resources to the states, and the reassignment of a share of oil 
surpluses to the states (via the FIES) since 2003, have all contributed to decrease both the 
share of revenues that remain at the federal level of government. This has reduced presidents’ 
fiscal power vis-à-vis the states.  In addition, since these transfers are done automatically 
and, for the most part, based on fixed formulas, they have further diminished the level of 
presidential fiscal discretion, thereby reducing the federal government’s capacity to 
discipline governors through fiscal means. 
Figure 4.1 presents data about the percentages of revenues subject to sharing that 
have been transferred to the states, as well as the percentage that has remained at the federal 
government.  Between 1998 and 2006, states in Mexico have received an average of 52.84% 
of the taxes subject to sharing, while the federal government has retained a smaller share of 
the pie (an average of 47.15% during the same period).  In addition, between 1998 and 2006 
there were no significant shifts in the percentage of shareable revenues that flowed 
automatically to the states.   
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Figure 4.1: Intergovernmental distribution of taxes subject to sharing in Mexico  
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Source: SHCP --Diagnóstico 2007 
*Includes funds destined to the states (such as the Programa de Apoyos para el Fortalecimiento de las 
Entidades Federativas (PAFEF –Program of Subsidies to Strengthen the States, and Agreements of 
Decentralization) but that are not automatically delivered 
** As noted, some aportaciones sub-funds are not transferred automatically 
 
(b). Presidential fiscal discretion as a function of non-shareable revenues 
 Since not all taxes and revenues are subject to sharing, in order to fully estimate the 
level of presidential fiscal power/discretion vis-à-vis governors, one needs to look beyond the 
system of revenue sharing and the principal intergovernmental transfers.  The taxes and 
revenues that are not subject to sharing are, by default, retained by the federal government, 
which in turn has complete freedom to decide when and how to use them.  If these taxes and 
revenues are abundant or make up a large share of a country’s total revenues, presidents are 
able to expand their fiscal power vis-à-vis subnational rulers.    
In Mexico, a substantial amount of the country’s total revenues is obtained from oil 
exports –between 1997 and 2006, an average of 35% of Mexico’s revenues came from oil. 
Even though part of these revenues are transferred to the states to finance public works and 
projects of infrastructural development, another part, i.e., the extraordinary fees from oil, is 
Funds assigned 
to the federal 
government 
Funds sent 
“automatically”** 
to the states 
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excluded from the bulk of revenues flowing to the states.  These extraordinary revenues, 
which result from increases in oil prices, account for a substantial amount of the country’s 
income.  During the last three years of Fox’s tenure the price of oil increased worldwide, 
reaching in Mexico its historic maximum level, an additional 439,288 million of Mexican 
pesos (i.e., around 40 billion US dollars) entered the federal executive coffers (FUNDAR 
2006), giving the president additional resources to use with considerable discretion. 
A second mechanism also helped President Fox enlarge the share of oil revenues 
remaining exclusively under his control.  A common practice among Mexican presidents is to 
underestimate oil prices (FUNDAR 2006, CEFP 2007).90  This lowers the country’s 
projected total revenues and has a major implication for budget allocations, as spending 
decisions are made on the basis of underestimated revenues.  This process also has major 
implications for presidential fiscal discretion, as the extraordinary oil revenues resulting from 
the differential between the underestimated and actual oil prices, and which are not assigned 
to any budgetary item, remain under the exclusive control of the national executive.  The 
practice of underestimating oil revenues was common during the last 3 years of Fox’s 
sexenio (FUNDAR 2006, CEFP 2007), starting in 2003, giving the federal government the 
ability to increase its fiscal power and fiscal discretion over governors. 
Figure 4.2 below presents both shareable and non-shareable revenues during the Fox 
administration (2000-2006). The dotted and lined areas encompass the share of taxes that 
make up the revenue-sharing system. The dotted area reflects the bulk of revenues (subject to 
sharing) that automatically flowed to the states, such as all the participaciones sub-funds and 
                                                 
90
 This underestimation has not always been deliberate.  Given the changing nature of oil prices, an accurate 
estimation of oil prices is difficult. 
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the FIES, and the aportaciones. The lined area, by contrast, encompasses the proportion of 
taxes (subject to sharing) that remained at the federal level of government.  The white area is 
the federal revenue that came in the form of taxable and non-taxable but that was not subject 
to sharing, which also includes the revenues stemming from the extraordinary surpluses of 
oil.  Together, the white and lined areas represent the share of total (taxable and non-taxable) 
revenues that were administered by the federal government exclusively, and that could be 
used and distributed according to the federal government’s needs.    
 
Figure 4.2: Distribution of total (taxable and non-taxable) revenues across levels of government in 
Mexico 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on SHCP --Diagnóstico 2007 
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Figure 4.2 highlights several important aspects of presidential fiscal discretion/power 
in Mexico. First, one of the sources that expands presidential power, namely, the share of 
revenues that is not subject to sharing (i.e., white area), has progressively increased over the 
years, indicating that presidential power/discretion has become larger.  Yet, the share of taxes 
that makes up the revenue-sharing but that is assigned to the federal government (i.e., lined 
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area) has remained stable over time (accounting for approximately 30% of Mexico’s total 
revenues), indicating that, from the standpoint of the revenue sharing arrangement, 
presidential fiscal discretion/power has remained stable. Second, and related, figure 4.2 
reveals that the greater presidential fiscal power and fiscal discretion has come from 
increases in non-shareable revenues which began to augment in 2003, when oil prices 
peaked, and not, as occurred in Argentina, from changes in the shares of the revenue-sharing 
system.91  Finally, figure 4.2 shows that, in line with the discussion presented in chapter 2, 
presidential fiscal discretion and power are not fixed in timed but instead are subject to 
change.  In fact, President Fox’s fiscal discretion/power was low in the early 2000s.  Yet, due 
to the increase of oil prices, it became greater toward the end of his tenure. 
 
2) Argentina 
(a). Revenue-sharing system and main intergovernmental transfers 
 Although the Argentine revenue-sharing system dates back to 1934, when the first ley 
de coparticipación (coparticipation law (CL)) was passed, the “modern” system of revenue-
sharing was not created until 1973,92  when a new law stipulated how the total revenues 
subject to sharing would be distributed:  46.7% of the tax revenues would remain at the 
federal level of government and 53.3% would flow, on an automatic basis, to the provinces.  
These distributional percentages were altered in 1981 however, and would undergo 
substantial change thereafter (see table 4.2). 
                                                 
91
 As discussed above, the creation of the FIES in 2003, which stipulates that states will get a share of the 
extraordinary revenues from oil, has somewhat curtailed presidential discretion/power. 
92
 Before 1973 only a small portion of domestic taxes were subject to sharing. For a detailed description of the 
evolution of the Argentine revenue-sharing system, see Cetrángolo & Jiménez 2004. 
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Table 4.2: Size of provincial and national shareable revenues in Argentina 
Year of CL's reform Federal government
1934-1946 82.50% 17.50%
1947-1958 79% 21%
1959 66% 34%
1960 64% 36%
1961 62% 38%
1962 60% 40%
1963 58% 42%
1964-1966 54% 46%
1967 59.20% 40.80%
1968-1972 61.90% 38.10%
1973-1980 46.70% 53.30% (a)
1981-1984 48.50% 51.50% (b)
1985-1988
1988-1991 42.34% 57.66% (c)
1992-1993*
1999-2001
2002 41.24%** 58.76%
Provinces
no coparticipation law
minimum floor
fixed sum
 
Sources: CECE #9 (1995), laws 24130, 25535, 25400, 25570 
(a) Includes 1.8% destined to City of Buenos Aires and Fondo de Desarrollo Regional (FDR); (b) includes 
FDR; (c) includes ATN 
*Porto and Sanguinetti (1993) estimate that 54.07 remained at the federal level of government and 45.3 were 
transferred to the provinces 
"Does not include the 15% deduction withheld by the federal government 
 
 The first change occurred in 1988, one year before Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) left the 
presidency, when a new CL was passed stipulating that the federal government would receive 
42.34% of the revenues subject to sharing, while the provinces would get the remaining 
57.66%.93  These distributional percentages would be changed after the first two years of the 
Menem presidency (1989-1999), when Menem and the governors signed the Fiscal Pact I.  
The Pact introduced two major modifications to the existing revenue-sharing system.  First, it 
reversed the proportion of revenues distributed between the federal state and the provinces by 
                                                 
93
 For a description of the negotiations leading up to the passage of the 1988 CL, see Eaton 2004, Spiller & 
Tommasi 2007. 
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slicing off a substantial part of the provincial share and, second, it changed the criteria used 
to determine these shares. 
Regarding the first change, the Fiscal Pact I allowed President Menem to retain 15% 
plus a monthly fixed sum of US/AR$ 45,800,000 of the revenues previously subject to 
sharing with the provinces (Law 24130).  The deducted revenues were used to finance the 
national pension system, which at the time was in dire straits.94 Regarding the second change, 
President Menem negotiated with the governors a minimum revenue guarantee –the so-called 
piso mínimo (minimum floor), of US$ 725 million per month for the provinces.95  By 
adopting a rigid revenue floor, Menem departed significantly from the revenue-sharing 
practices of the 1930-1991 period, where the exact amount of the revenues flowing to the 
provinces and remaining at the federal government were determined by the ebb and flow of 
federal tax receipts (Eaton 2004).   
These two changes were soon to become “institutionalized,” as subsequent presidents 
emulated the distributional criteria introduced in the Fiscal Pact I. Indeed, during the 1990s 
and 2000s fractions of specific taxes included in the revenue-sharing system and subject to 
sharing were destined to finance specific federal and provincial programs, including 
education, health provision, public works, and housing.96  As a result of these deductions, 
between 1992 and 2002, the actual share of revenues flowing to the provinces diminished 
considerably, while the revenues staying at the federal government increased.  As Eaton 
                                                 
94
 The legal provision regulating this deduction was vaguely written, in way that allowed the federal 
government to cope with the costs of the social security system and “other expenditures” (Law 24130). 
95
 For an analysis of these negotiations see Eaton 2004; Cetrángolo & Jiménez 2004; Wibbels 2005; Spiller & 
Tommasi 2007; Olmeda 2008. 
96
 These tax appropriations have led to a convoluted system that has been labeled by local experts as the 
“federal fiscal labyrinth” (see Spiller and Tommasi 2007; Saiegh and Tommasi 1998).  
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(2004:148) notes, “although the 1988 coparticipation law had reduced the federal 
government’s share of revenues to 42.34%, the fiscal pacts of 1992 and 1993 effectively 
increased its share to 50.07%.”    
The second major change introduced in 1992, namely, minimum revenue guarantee 
sent to the provinces, was also emulated after the Menem presidency. Menem himself stuck 
to this practice, as exemplified by the signature of a second fiscal pact in 1993, the so-called 
Fiscal Pact II, which increased the minimum floor to US$ 740 million. Continuing with this 
tradition, in 1999 Alianzist President De la Rúa and the governors signed the Compromiso 
Federal (Federal Compromise) in which a fixed (instead of a minimum floor) sum was 
transferred to the provinces.  That amount, which was set at US$ 1.35 billion in 1999, was 
then increased to US$ 1.36 billion in 2001.   
Under the presidency of Peronist Eduardo Duhalde in 2002, the fixed amount and 
minimum floors were abandoned.  During his administration, revenues distributed to the 
provinces began to be determined by the ebb and flow of federal tax receipts.  Yet, unlike the 
post-1988 and pre-1992 practices, the federal government continued to withhold a substantial 
amount of the provincial share, as the 15% deduction, the monthly fixed sum of AR$ 
45,800,000, and all other deductions from domestic taxes remained in place. 
Altogether, both the 15 % withholding, coupled with the deductions from various 
domestic taxes subject to sharing, as well as the changes made by every president since 1983 
to the rules regulating the distribution of the coparticipation transfers, benefitted presidents at 
the expense of governors.  Indeed, as illustrated by figure 4.3 between 1992 and 2006, the 
size of the provincial coparticipation share remained well below the 56.66 percentage 
established by the 1988 coparticipation law.  Instead, the average share of revenues flowing 
  109 
to the provinces has been 46.2% of the total revenues subject to sharing, while an average of 
53.8% has remained at the federal level of government (see figure 4.3).  All in all, both of the 
post-1992 changes indicate that presidential power and discretion has expanded. 
 
Figure 4.3: Intergovernmental distribution of taxes subject to sharing in Argentina 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Ministerio de Economía --Cuenta de Inversión (1994-2006), Boletín 
Fiscal (1998)  
No data available for 1996 
 
(b). Presidential fiscal discretion as a function of non-shareable revenues 
To fully estimate the level of presidential fiscal power/discretion vis-à-vis governors, 
we need to analyze the revenues that were not subject to sharing.  As in Mexico, a substantial 
amount of Argentina’s total revenues is obtained from non-shareable revenues. However, 
unlike Mexico, where most of these revenues come from the windfall gains of oil, in 
Argentina these sources have manifold origins. In the early 1990s, the bulk of revenues not 
subject to sharing stemmed from the privatizations, the contributions to the pension system, 
and to a lesser extent, from international trade tariffs. In the 2000s, however, they mostly 
originated from export and import duties, both of which rose to unprecedented levels as a 
result of the worldwide increase of commodity prices. Between 1993 and 2007, the revenues 
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not subject to sharing accounted for an average of 46.18% of Argentina’s total income 
(Mecon --Cuenta de Inversión (1994-2006), Boletín Fiscal (1998)).  
Figure 4.4 disaggregates data regarding both shareable and non-shareable revenues 
during the Menem (1989-1999), De la Rúa (2000-2001), Duhalde (2002-2003), and Kirchner 
(2003-2007) administrations. The dotted and lined areas encompass the share of taxes that 
make up the revenue-sharing system. More specifically, the dotted area reflects the bulk of 
revenues (subject to sharing) that automatically flowed to the provinces, i.e., the 
coparticipación fund. The lined area, by contrast, encompasses the proportion of taxes 
(subject to sharing) that remained at the federal level of government.  The white area makes 
up the bulk of total revenues (taxable and non-taxable) not subject to sharing, including 
revenues stemming from the privatization of public enterprises, and export/import duties, 
among others.  Together, the white and lined areas represent the share of total (taxable and 
non-taxable) revenues that were administered by the federal government exclusively, and that 
could be used and distributed according to the federal government’s needs.    
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of total (taxable and non-taxable) revenues across levels of government in 
Argentina 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
Tax revenues flowing to the provinces
Tax and non-tax revenues remaining at the federal level of 
government
Tax revenues remaining at the federal level of government
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Figure 4.4 also reveals important aspects of the presidential fiscal discretion/power in 
Argentina.  First, the upward and downward movements of the dotted area (i.e., the 
percentage of taxes flowing to the states), indicate that presidents in Argentina not only have 
been able to manipulate the rules regulating the distribution of these taxes, but also that the 
fiscal power to gain leverage over governors has changed over time.  Second, and related, 
figure 4.4 indicates, in line with the theoretical claims advanced in chapter 2, that presidential 
fiscal discretion and power are not fixed in time but that instead have undergone significant 
changes.  Figure 4.4 indicates that, from a fiscal viewpoint, the most powerful presidents 
have been Menem (during his first administration) and Kirchner, both of whom enjoyed 
abundant resources that were not subject to sharing (see white area). By contrast, the least 
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fiscally powerful president has been Fernando De la Rúa.  Third, figure 4.4. reveals that the 
greater presidential fiscal power and fiscal discretion has come from increases both in the 
amounts of non-shareable revenues and in the amount of revenues subject to sharing, which 
grew larger between the 1995-1999 and 2003-2006 periods, under the presidencies of 
Menem and Kirchner, respectively. 
 
3) Mexico and Argentina in comparative perspective 
 Since the goal of this chapter is to identify the instruments of presidential control that 
are at the disposal of presidents in both Argentina and Mexico, I now compare the two 
countries (and country-presidencies) along the three sources analyzed before: (a) the type of 
revenue-sharing system and main intergovernmental transfers, (b) the stability of the rules 
that structure the distribution of funds between the central government and the subnational 
units, and (c) the fiscal power and fiscal discretion of presidents as a function of the revenues 
that are not transferred to the provinces.   
 One of the main similarities between Argentina and Mexico regards the type of 
revenue-sharing system.  Taxes in both countries are collected by the federal government and 
then distributed in two rounds, first between the federal government and the subnational 
units, and subsequently across the subnational units.  In addition, the two countries transfer 
taxes automatically and on the basis of fixed formulas, thus restraining the ability of national 
incumbents to manipulate fiscal resources.97  
                                                 
97
 Despite these similarities, differences exist regarding the share of revenues that flows directly to the states: 
whereas participaciones make up between 20% and 30% of the total revenues subject to sharing, 
coparticipation transfers oscillate between 30 and 40 %.   
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By contrast, one of the main differences between these two systems is the stability of 
shares that are subject to sharing.  Whereas in Argentina these shares have undergone 
significant changes during the latest post-democratic period, in Mexico they have remained 
substantially stable over time.  Figure 4.1 and 4.3 above display in graphic terms this 
contrast.  Figure 4.1 shows that in Mexico the proportion of taxes subject to sharing flowing 
to the states (i.e., colored areas) has remained stable at around 58.5%.  By contrast, figure 4.3 
indicates that in Argentina, the total provincial share (colored areas) has fluctuated from 
73.82% in 1994, to 63.83% in 2000, 79.38% in 2001, and 70.04 in 2006.  This fluctuation is 
much more pronounced if only the coparticipation provincial share (i.e., lower colored area) 
is analyzed.  In fact, this share changed from 45% (on average) during the early 1990s, to 
43% (on average) during the late 1990s, back to 44% in the early 2000s, and 49% in the mid-
2000s.   
 This marked contrast between the Mexican and Argentine shares flowing 
automatically to subnational units indicates, first, that Mexican presidents, unlike their 
Argentine counterparts, have manipulated to a much lesser extent the size of the subnational 
share.  Second, and related, it shows that the changes observed in Argentina have, for the 
most part, been detrimental to the provinces and favorable to the federal government. By 
contrast, the changes observed in Mexico, however mild, have benefited the states at the 
expense of the federal government.  Finally, the recurrence of the changes observed in 
Argentina points to the high frequency with which national incumbents have changed the 
rules regulating the revenue-sharing system.  Whereas during the post-1983 period, all 
Argentine presidents have altered the size of the provincial slice of the pie, only one major 
change has taken place in the post-democratic Mexican period. 
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 All in all, the evidence shows that there are very sharp contrasts regarding the way in 
which the revenue-sharing systems in Argentina and Mexico work, and that different patterns 
have in turn affected in very distinct ways the levels of presidential discretion and power in 
each country. Table 4.3 enumerates the major institutional changes introduced into Argentina 
and Mexico’s revenue-sharing system/main intergovernmental transfers.  It also estimates 
how these changes have affected presidential fiscal power and fiscal discretion vis-à-vis 
governors.   
 
Table 4.3: Main institutional changes to revenue-sharing systems and effects on presidential 
power/discretion in Argentina and Mexico 
Country 
Yr of 
institutional 
change
Type of change
Effect on 
presidential fiscal 
power
Effect on 
presidential fiscal 
discretion
1980 Participaciones  fund is created ↓ ↓
1997 Aportaciones  fund is created ↓ ↓
1999 Additional sub-funds are included in the Aportaciones fund ↓ ↓
2003 FIES fund is created ↓ ↓
1983 No coparticipation law ↑ ↑
1988 New coparticipation law is passed ↓ ↓
1992 Fiscal Pact I sets a minimum floor to be sent to the provinces ↑ no effect*
15% and US$ 45,800,000 are deducted from the 
provincial coparticipation pie ↑ no effect*
1992 Fiscal Pact II augments the minimum floor ↑/↓ no effect*
1999 Compromiso Fiscal  set a fixed sum to be sent to the provinces ↑ no effect*
2001 Compromiso Federal por el Crecimiento y la 
Disciplina Fiscal  augments fixed sum ↑/↓ no effect*
2002
Coparticipation percentages are put back in place (but 
15% and $ 45,800,000 are deducted from the 
provincial coparticipation pie)
↑/↓ no effect*
M
EX
IC
O
A
R
G
EN
TI
N
A
* No effect because transfers are still made automatically, thus maintaining presidential fiscal discretion low
 
 
A comparison regarding the actual fiscal power and fiscal discretion of presidents as a 
function of the revenues that are not transferred to the provinces reveals less pronounced 
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differences across states.  Yet, in relative terms, Argentine presidents have, on average, 
managed to maintain a larger share of revenues not subject to sharing than their Mexican 
counterparts than their Mexican counterparts (see figure 4.6 below).  Still, by the end of the 
period under study this difference had shrunk, as the size of Mexico’s revenues not subject to 
sharing grew larger.  
 
Figure 4.5: Share of total revenues not subject to revenue-sharing in Argentina and Mexico 
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Sources: Author’s calculations based on data provided by country Ministries of Economy. Argentina 
(Ministerio de Economía --Cuenta de Inversión (1994-2006), Boletín Fiscal (1998)); Mexico (SHCP --
Diagnóstico 2007)  
 
In summary, the country comparisons indicate that, overall, Mexican presidents are 
less fiscally powerful and have less fiscal discretion than their Argentine counterparts.  The 
comparison also shows that the sources of presidential fiscal power and discretion are 
different.  In Mexico fiscal power and fiscal discretion do not stem from the revenue-sharing 
system, but rather are directly proportional to the increase in the revenues that are not subject 
to sharing (i.e., extraordinary fees from oil, and oil surpluses).  In Argentina, the sources of 
presidential fiscal power and fiscal discretion originate from the manipulation of the revenue-
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sharing system, which has allowed presidents to decrease the amount of taxes transferred to 
the provinces, and from the abundant revenues that have not been subject to sharing.   
 
II. Partisan instruments of territorial and political control 
 In chapter 2, I argued that political parties are a central instrument for enhancing 
presidential control over subnational incumbents.  I noted that in order for presidents to 
exercise control over subnational co-partisans (either via control over nominations or through 
coattails), a president’s party needs, first and foremost, to be present in any given subnational 
unit.  Moreover, I noted that the effective (electoral) presence of the presidential party in the 
states or provinces is a key partisan instrument enabling presidents to constrict governors 
when provincial incumbents do not belong to the president’s party.98  Finally, I argued that 
the more homogenous this presence is, the higher the capacity of presidents to exert control 
over a larger size of both co-partisan and opposition governors.  
This section assesses the degree to which presidential parties in Argentina and 
Mexico are nationalized (i.e., have a homogenous electoral presence across all subnational 
units).  After measuring and discussing the evolution of party nationalization in each country, 
a cross-country comparison is used to determine in which country partisan instruments have 
been more prevalent. 
 
                                                 
98
 I referred to this type of control as partisan “control from below.”  This type of presidential control occurs 
when the nationally governing party, which has effective presence in a given province (i.e., at the municipal 
level and/or in the legislature), becomes an actual threat to the (opposition) provincial incumbent.  Presidents 
with the ability of taking hold over their state-level partisan structures stand in a powerful position to constrict 
(opposition) governors’ power from “below,” and consequently limit (opposition) governors’ autonomy.   
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(c). Presidential party nationalization 
 Countries vary considerably with regard to the territorial and geographical extension 
of their parties, and consequently with regard to the extent to which they are effectively 
present in subnational units (Caramani 2004; Jones & Mainwaring 2003; Calvo & Escolar 
2005; Leiras 2006, 2007; Gibson & Suárez-Cao 2008).  In some countries, the main national 
political parties are territorially extended throughout most political districts.  Moreover, not 
only are these parties effectively present in each electoral district, but they obtain similar 
shares of the vote in all districts.  By contrast, national parties have less chances of having an 
effective territorial presence in subnational units where strong provincial parties exist and 
monopolize electoral competition.  Similarly, in countries where the president’s core voters 
are concentrated in specific geographic areas (i.e. industrial regions, urban districts, or rural 
areas), partisan geographic and territorial extension is also limited.  
 To gauge the homogeneity of the presidential party’s electoral presence throughout 
the territory, I measure the level of nationalization of the presidential party.  Higher levels of 
presidential party nationalization are defined as situations where the presidents’ party vote 
shares do not differ much from one subnational unit to the next. By contrast, lower levels of 
party nationalization indicate exist if the presidential party’s vote share varies widely across 
provinces.  
The higher the level of presidential party nationalization implies that presidents have 
a similar percentage of co-partisans in all subnational units, upon whom they can rely to exert 
control from below over recalcitrant rulers. Conversely, the lower the level of party 
nationalization –that is, the more geographically concentrated the electorate is– the lower the 
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capacity of presidents to control (both from above and below) subnational co-partisans, and 
the greater the power of governors to act autonomously. 
 To measure the nationalization of the presidential party, I rely on Jones & 
Mainwaring (2003) seminal inverted Gini coefficient of the Party Nationalization Score 
(PNS).99  Jones & Mainwaring’s (2003) PNS assesses the extent to which a party wins equal 
vote shares across all the subnational units.  A Gini coefficient of 0 signifies that a party 
received the same share of the vote in every subnational unit; while a Gini coefficient of 1 
means that it received 100 percent of its vote in one subnational unit and 0 percent in all the 
rest (Jones and Mainwaring (2003:142)).  Jones and Mainwaring calculate the inverted Gini 
coefficient of the PNS by subtracting the Gini coefficient from 1 so that a high score 
indicates a high level of nationalization.100  
Figure 4.7 indicates three clear patterns of cross-country and cross-temporal level of 
presidential party nationalization in Argentina and Mexico.  First, Mexico’s level of 
presidential party nationalization has been, both before and after the transition to democracy 
in 2000, higher than in Argentina. Second, the level of presidential party nationalization in 
Argentina and Mexico has decreased over time.  Finally, this decline has been precipitous in 
Argentina contrasting sharply with the little decrease observed in Mexico. 
 
 
 
                                                 
99
 The PNS is measured by voting returns in legislative (lower chamber elections). 
100
 Measured in this way, the PNS has two main advantages.  First, it allows tracing changes in a party’s level of 
nationalization over time, and, second, the PNS is a useful tool to compare parties’ level of nationalization 
across countries. 
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Figure 4.6: Presidential party nationalization in Argentina and Mexico 
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calculations; Mexico: 1994-2000: Jones & Mainwaring (2003); PAN 2003-2006: Olmeda & Suárez-Cao n.d.; 
PRI and PRD 2003-2006: author's own calculations. 
 
 The higher levels of presidential partisan nationalization (close to a perfect 1 PNS 
score) observed in Mexico up to 2000, are not surprising, given the PRI’s hegemony and its 
concomitant ubiquitous territorial presence in every single electoral district of the country.  
By contrast, the relatively high level of presidential partisan nationalization observed after 
2000, when the PAN assumed the presidency, is more striking given the more urban 
character of the PAN, and its stronger territorial presence in the northern and central districts 
of Mexico101 (Mizrahi 2003, Shirk 2005, and the cluster of articles in the January 2007 issue 
of Political Science & Politics).  However, the fact that regional or state-level parties are not 
allowed to compete in national elections,102 contributes to explain the relatively high level of 
the PAN’s nationalization.  The absence of regional or state-level partisan organizations has 
                                                 
101
 This trend was altered in the last years, when the PAN began to attract a larger size of the electorate in the 
southern states (see Shirk 2005). 
102
 To participate in federal elections, parties are obliged to become national political organizations and to 
centralize their decision-making bodies (see Mizrahi 2003, Loaeza 2003, Olmeda and Suárez-Cao n.d.). 
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greatly contributed to increase the PAN’s chances of obtaining homogenous vote shares 
across all Mexican districts.103   
 The relatively higher levels of presidential partisan nationalization observed in 
Mexico, which reveal the president’s more homogenous electoral presence throughout the 
country, has allowed Panista presidents to expand their control over subnational incumbents.  
This control, which has for the most part been exercised “from below” (i.e., via the 
increasing municipal strength of the PAN), has, for instance, given Fox the possibility of 
challenging PRI governors’ authority and political power.  
 Figure 4.7 portrays Argentina as having less nationalized presidential parties than 
Mexico.  Still, despite their lower PNS scores, until the mid-1990s, Argentine presidential 
parties have gained fairly homogenous electoral support across all electoral districts.  In fact, 
both the UCR (during the 1980s) and the PJ (during the 1990s) managed to have an effective 
electoral presence in all provinces (electoral districts).  This trend began to change during 
Menem’s second administration (1995-1999), however, as the PJ started to loose terrain in 
some provincial districts, and it became more pronounced in the late 1990s and early-mid 
2000s, when presidential parties could only win elections in selected provinces (Calvo and 
Escolar 2005; Leiras 2006, 2007;  Gibson and Suárez-Cao 2008). 
 The lower level of party nationalization observed in Argentina can certainly be 
related to the existence of strong provincial parties, which are allowed to compete in national, 
provincial, and local elections, and which, unlike Mexico, have managed to grab a 
considerable portion of the vote.  Recent scholarship has indeed demonstrated that the 
increasing electoral success of provincial parties has had major implications for the 
                                                 
103
 The same holds true for the PRI and the PRD. 
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configuration of the Argentine party system, pushing the system away from the higher levels 
of nationalization seen in the early 1980s (see Calvo and Escolar 2005; Leiras 2006, 2007;  
Gibson and Suárez-Cao 2008).   
Recent party splits have further contributed to the de-nationalization of Argentina’s 
main political parties (see Calvo & Escolar 2005, Leiras 2007, Bonvecchi and Giraudy 
2008).  These splits, which have affected the two main parties, i.e., the UCR and the PJ, were 
vividly observed after the 2001 political crisis, when the Alianzist government was dissolved 
and later on in the 2003 presidential election, when the PJ fielded 3 different presidential 
candidates.  The PJ split, deepened in subsequent years with President Kirchner’s split from 
the PJ and his creation of the PJ-Frente para la Victoria (FpV) faction. Other major Peronist 
territorial leaders have also developed their own PJ fractions. 
 The increasing de-nationalization of Argentina’s main national parties, and in 
particular the de-nationalization of the presidents’ party since 2003, has meant that 
presidents, especially the latest Peronist presidents, have had a more limited capacity to 
territorially penetrate in all subnational units.  In part for this reason, they have been less able 
to rely on partisan instruments to exert control both over their co-partisans at the provincial 
level, and therefore control from below over the incumbents they do not control via intra-
party mechanisms.  
 In sum, Mexican presidents have had a more homogenous territorial penetration 
throughout the country than their Argentine counterparts.  Mexico’s presidents have managed 
to make considerable political and partisan inroads in all subnational units, thus augmenting 
their presence in all states, and, in turn, their control (from above and below) over governors.  
By contrast, Argentine presidents have progressively lost their capacity to penetrate in all 
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provinces, and thus have increasingly lost capacity to control governors via partisan means.  
The inability to obtain similar levels of electoral support in the country’s subnational units 
has meant that Argentine presidents have only managed to control (either from above or from 
below) a limited number of governors, i.e., the governors of districts where the president’s 
party is strong.  
 
III. Paths of fiscal, partisan, and fiscal/partisan presidential control 
 This section assesses the path of control –fiscal, partisan, fiscal/partisan– taken by 
each president. To adjudicate whether presidents followed the fiscal or partisan path of 
control, I evaluate which of the two instruments of political and territorial control is more 
salient at any given time.  If the level of party nationalization is high, and the level of fiscal 
discretion and fiscal power is low, I classify a given country-period as following the partisan 
path of control.  I proceed in the same way when fiscal discretion/power is high and party 
nationalization is low.  It should be clear that this classification is not meant to denote that 
presidents following the partisan (fiscal) path of control do not posses fiscal (partisan) 
instruments at all.  Rather, it is meant to denote that partisan (fiscal) instruments are 
considerably more accessible (and probably more effective) to control governors and SURs. 
As shown above, not all presidents have equal access to fiscal instruments of control.  
Indeed, Mexican presidents are rather constrained in their ability to control and/or discipline 
governors via fiscal (revenue-sharing) instruments.  By contrast, Argentine presidents seem 
to have much leeway to fiscally discipline and control provincial incumbents via the 
manipulation of the rules that structure the revenue-sharing arrangement.  The same holds 
true for partisan instruments of territorial and political control.  Whereas Mexican presidents 
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and some Argentine presidents (i.e., Menem and Alfonsín) have had greater capacity to 
disciplining governors (either from above or below) through partisan structures, others (i.e., 
Kirchner and Menem –during his first term) had been able to constrict governors’ political 
and territorial autonomy using fiscal instruments.  
Table 4.4 indicates the different combinations of fiscal and partisan instruments of 
presidential control, as well as their cross-country and cross-temporal variation, and finally, 
the last row of table 4.4 presents information about how these different instruments combined 
determine the different paths of presidential control.   
Table 4.4: Fiscal, partisan, and fiscal/partisan paths in Argentina and Mexico 
Mexico
Fox                
(2000-2006)
Menem                 
(1989-1994)
Menem             
(1995-1999)
De la Rúa 
(1999-2001)
Kirchner 
(2003-2007)
(a) Instability in 
rules/amount of 
automatic transfers
low high high high moderate
(b) Revenues not 
subject to sharing moderate
1 high moderate low high
President's party 
territorial extension high high high/moderate moderate low
Path of 
control 
taken 2
PARTISAN FISCAL-PARTISAN
FISCAL-
PARTISAN
MILDLY 
FISCAL3, 
but 
MOSTLY 
LACK OF 
CONTROL
FISCAL
3Due to modifications introduced to the revenue-sharing system
Argentina*
*Data for Alfonsín's administration are missing
Fiscal 
instruments
2Based on instruments most available to presidents
1Although higher after 2003 due to increase in oil prices
Partisan 
instruments
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 Table 4.4 indicates that presidents in Argentina have followed different paths to 
exercise control over subnational rulers.  Indeed, during the 1990s, when the presidential 
party was highly nationalized and when the president (i.e., Carlos Menem) managed to 
increase his fiscal power and discretion (both by manipulating the revenue-sharing system in 
his favor, and by taking advantage of the abundant revenues not subject to sharing), 
presidential control over governors was achieved via both fiscal and partisan instruments 
(i.e., it followed the fiscal/partisan path).  By contrast, during the early and mid-2000s, when 
the level of presidential party nationalization decreased and presidential fiscal 
power/discretion augmented –due to the windfall gains of export/import duties, Presidents 
Duhalde and Kirchner employed fiscal instruments of control to discipline governors (i.e., 
they followed the fiscal path).  Finally, the lower levels of party nationalization, coupled with 
the shortage of revenues not subject to sharing during the short-lived administration of 
President De la Rúa, limited the president’s capacity to discipline and control governors from 
above and below. 
 In Mexico, by contrast, the greater stability of the rules structuring the revenue-
sharing arrangement, as well as the lower availability of revenues not subject to sharing, 
especially before 2003, limited president Fox’s capacity to discipline and control governors 
via fiscal instruments.  However, the higher levels of presidential party nationalization gave 
Fox partisan instruments to control governors –either from above or from below (i.e., he 
followed the partisan path). 
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IV. Conclusion 
 This chapter explored the different types of presidential control (i.e., partisan and 
fiscal) available to recent presidents in Argentina and Mexico.  Different combinations of 
instruments of control set presidents onto any of the three paths of control –the fiscal, 
partisan, fiscal/partisan paths.  An examination of each of the post-1983 presidencies in 
Argentina revealed that presidents used multiple paths.  While Peronist President Menem 
followed the fiscal/partisan path, thus exerting control over governotds using two types of 
instruments, Peronist Presidents Duhalde and Kirchner disciplined governors using fiscal 
instruments.  By contrast, president Fox in Mexico followed the partisan path of presidential 
control. 
 The evidence presented in this chapter substantiates the theoretical claims advanced 
in chapter 2.  First, it shows that instruments of presidential control may vary over time, 
across and within countries.  The case of Argentina vividly illustrates this point, as not all 
instruments were equally available and attainable to each president. Second, the cross and 
intra-country comparisons further illustrate that presidential control over governors is exerted 
differently.  In fact, whereas in some countries and at a given time, control over governors is 
exerted via fiscal instruments, in some others and at other times it is exercised via partisan or 
fiscal/partisan instruments.  In sum, the evidence presented in this chapter strongly supports 
the notion that power relations in federations are structured differently, and are highly 
contingent on the access of presidents to varied types of instruments of control.    
 At the beginning of this chapter I made it clear that the analysis about presidential 
instruments of control would be conducted following the conventional approach adopted by 
most studies on federalism, which assumes that subnational units are homogenous entities.  
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As a result, in this chapter I have assumed that all governors are (or not) equally controllable 
by the central government.   
 However, one of central claims of this dissertation is that governors (and subnational 
units) are not all of one kind, and that this variation is key to preventing or neutralizing 
presidential control (either from above or from below), regardless of how much fiscal and 
partisan power presidents actually posses.  In fact, as noted in chapter 2, the ability of 
presidents to control governors is shaped by a combination of national and subnational 
factors.  To be able to politically/territorially penetrate in subnational arenas two conditions 
are necessary: (a) the president needs have the means necessary to subjugate an undemocratic 
governor, and (b) the undemocratic governor’s capacity to resist penetration from above must 
be minimal. Neither of these two conditions alone is sufficient for a president to gain 
leverage on provincial politics, rather it is the combination of both that is necessary. With 
these insights in mind, the next chapters focus on cross-subnational differences and look at 
how these interact with presidential instruments of territorial and political control, 
determining in turn trajectories of SUR continuity.   
 
  
 
Chapter 5: Subnational undemocratic regime’s reproduction from above: 
Quantitative evidence 
 
 This chapter turns back to cross-subnational differences and explores how these affect the 
prospects of presidential control over SURs.  In particular, I analyze how variations in 
subnational state administrations and financial autonomy neutralize or enhance the capacity of 
presidents to exert control over subnational undemocratic rulers/areas.  Analyzing the prospects 
of presidential control over SURs is crucial because, as I have argued in chapter 2, presidents 
who can hold nondemocratic governors hostage stand in an excellent position to manipulate and 
make undemocratic incumbents meet their strategic needs, and consequently might have 
incentives to promote rather than stop SUR continuity. 
 The chapter has three major goals.  First, using quantitative techniques, I seek to test (i) 
whether the control exercised by presidents over subnational rulers (i.e., the independent 
variable) leads to SUR reproduction from above (i.e., the dependent variable), and second, (ii) 
whether lack of presidential control leads to no reproduction from above at all.104  Third, the 
quantitative analyses seek to test whether these two theoretical claims have enough inferential 
leverage and are generalizable across the universe of SURs in contemporary Argentina and 
Mexico. To meet these two goals, I use different cross-sectional time-series analyses. 
                                                 
104
 In this chapter I only test the more general claim of my argument and do not study look at the specific 
mechanisms through which presidential control leads to SUR reproduction.  For that reason I do not assess the 
nature and likelihood of vertical coalitions.  
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 The chapter proceeds as follows.  The first part explores the actual forms through which 
presidents can promote, enhance, and ensure the continuity of undemocratic provinces/states. 
The second section presents the hypotheses that will be tested in the quantitative models.  The 
third section provides a discussion of the dependent and independent variables included in the 
analyses.105  Given that three different dependent variables are used to tap into different 
programs/funds through which SURs can be reproduced, the chapter estimates three different 
sets of models.  The results are analyzed in section five, after discussing, in section four, the 
analytic technique employed for the analyses.  The last section discusses the implications of the 
results, and concludes with some reflections about the generalizability of the findings. 
 
I. SUR reproduction from above 
 Presidents can contribute to SUR reproduction in different ways.  They can, for instance, 
stay neutral regarding SUR existence, in that they can maintain the status quo just by allowing 
SURs to survive.  For instance, presidents who avoid sanctioning or weakening undemocratic 
governors and who, for instance, consent to nondemocratic incumbents staying in power until the 
next electoral cycle takes place, contribute to SUR reproduction.  This type of reproduction can 
be referred to as “reproduction from above by omission.”  
Alternatively, presidents may deliberately engage in activities to promote and, thus 
indirectly reproduce SURs.  For instance, they may veto legislative pieces, such as a declaration 
of federal intervention, seeking to overturn undemocratic regimes in specific subnational units.  
They can also discourage bills or veto laws intended to enhance subnational democratization in a 
given SUR, or prevent independent agencies of control such as the Supreme Court, the 
                                                 
105 As I discuss below, data in each country are analyzed separately, not pooled. 
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Constitutional Tribunals, or auditing agencies from sanctioning undemocratic governors.  I refer 
to this type of reproduction as “passive reproduction from above.” 
Similarly, presidents can actively contribute to SUR reproduction by rewarding SURs 
with economic benefits, such as the funneling of additional federal transfers and federally funded 
programs, all of which contribute to enrich the coffers of undemocratic regimes, and thus expand 
nondemocratic incumbents’ authority within their domains.106  This type of SUR reproduction, 
which entails active presidential involvement, can be referred to as “deliberate reproduction from 
above.”  
 In this study, I focus on this latter type of SUR reproduction from above.  Instances of 
“reproduction by omission” are difficult to measure because they constitute none-events. Even 
though instances of “passive reproduction from above” are much easier to grasp, and their 
measurement is less controversial –events (such as vetoes) happened or not, they still can be 
difficult to measure given that it is hard to find out the back room negotiations that, for instance, 
my have led presidents’ to discourage bills intended to hinder subnational democratization. For 
all these reasons, I only focus on the type of reproduction that occurs via the transfer of federal 
funds, as this form is the easiest to assess (provided data is available).  In short, to evaluate if 
national politicians have contributed to the reproduction and enhancement of subnational 
                                                 
106 Previous works have found that national politicians in both Argentina and Mexico do not distribute earmarked 
public money/programs following formal criteria, but rather on the basis of partisan and political criteria (Porto & 
Sanguinetti 2001; Gibson and Calvo 2000; Gibson, Calvo, & Falleti 2004; Díaz-Cayeros 2004, 2006; Giraudy 2007; 
Magaloni 2006).  This biased distribution suggests that federal incumbents may also use these programs and funds 
to reproduce SURs from above. 
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undemocratic regimes I explore the way in which federal revenues not subject to sharing (i.e., 
discretionary revenues) have been distributed across provinces in Argentina and Mexico.107   
 
II. Hypotheses 
 As argued in chapter 2, presidential control over undemocratic rulers is more likely under 
three circumstances: (a) where provincial financial dependency on the center is high, (b) where 
bureaucratic state administrations prevail, and (c) where the president’s party has effective 
presence in the state.  Whereas the first increases subnational rulers’ vulnerability vis-à-vis the 
center, the second prevents undemocratic governors from exercising a tight control over 
provincial domains, thus increasing the state’s “porosity” and together with it the chances of 
presidential penetration (from below). Finally, the last factor augments presidential capacity to 
either exert more control over governors (in the case provinces are ruled by co-partisan 
governors) or take hold on mayors, and thus constrict governors from below.  Thus, the first 
general hypothesis is that presidents will tend to reproduce SURs that are financially dependent, 
that are bureaucratic, and where the president’s party has a strong presence either at the 
gubernatorial or municipal level, or at both levels. 
 Yet, in chapter 2 I also argued that for presidential control to be effective, subnational 
units/rulers’ “weakness” is not sufficient. Rather, national incumbents can only gain leverage 
over subnational rulers or subnational politics/arenas if a combination of (national and 
subnational) variables is present.  To be able to politically/territorially penetrate, and thus exert 
control over undemocratic provincial arenas, presidents need to have the means necessary to 
                                                 
107 Note that in chapter 4 I showed that both the Mexican and Argentine federal governments had considerable 
amount of money that was not subject to sharing, and which could consequently be discretionally distributed more.  
The funds and programs analyzed in this chapter are funded with this money. 
  131 
subjugate an undemocratic governor, and in turn, undemocratic governors’ capacity to resist 
penetration from above must be minimal.  Neither of these two conditions alone (except at the 
extremes) is sufficient for a president to gain leverage over provincial arenas, rather it is the 
combination of both that is necessary and jointly sufficient. 
 Based on these propositions I elaborate the following hypotheses.  First, if the president’s 
main instrument of control is partisan, I expect s/he will be more likely to exert control over 
undemocratic subnational units that have bureaucratic state administrations, and where the 
president’s party has a strong presence (either at the municipal or provincial level). Recall, that 
bureaucratic state-administrations facilitate the subsistence of opposition forces (either at the 
municipal or legislative level), and consequently enable presidents to side with local groups and 
rely on their local party branch to challenge and control undemocratic rulers from below.  Hence, 
my expectation is that the president will benefit the bureaucratic SUR with federally funded 
programs/transfers.108   
Second, if the president’s main instrument of territorial and political control is fiscal, s/he 
will be more likely to exert control over undemocratic regimes that are financially dependent on 
the center, that is, those provinces/states with financial imbalances (i.e., high indebtedness and 
high deficits). Thus, I expect the president to benefit the latter type of SURs with federally 
funded programs/transfers rather that SURs that are financially sound.109  
Third, if a president has access to both fiscal and partisan instruments of control, I 
anticipate s/he will exert control over SURs where (a) the president’s party is strong (either at the 
                                                 
108 In a case where the main instrument of presidential control is partisan, I do not necessarily expect presidents to 
reproduce financially dependent SURs. 
109
 In a case where the main instrument of presidential control is fiscal, I do not necessarily expect presidents to 
reproduce SURs where the president’s party is strong. This is because financially dependent rulers, regardless of 
partisan affiliation, will tend to cooperate with a president in order to get the resources they need.  
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provincial or municipal level), and where bureaucratic state administrations exist, or (b) where 
financial imbalances are prevalent. Hence, I hypothesize that the president will benefit either one 
of these SURs with federally funded programs/transfers.  Finally, if a president does not have 
either partisan or fiscal instruments of control, I expect him to be neutral regarding SUR 
reproduction.  Thus, I do not expect the president to benefit any type of SUR with federally 
funded programs/transfers. 
It should be reminded that presidents, as I noted in chapter 4, that not all presidents have 
equal access to fiscal instruments of control.  Indeed, Mexican presidents are rather constrained 
in their ability to control and/or discipline governors via fiscal (revenue-sharing) instruments.  
By contrast, Argentine presidents seem to have much leeway to fiscally discipline and control 
provincial incumbents via the manipulation of the rules that structure the revenue-sharing 
arrangement.  The same holds true for partisan instruments of territorial and political control.  
Whereas Mexican presidents and some Argentine presidents (i.e., Menem and Alfonsín) have 
had greater capacity to disciplining governors (either from above or below) through partisan 
structures, others (i.e., Kirchner and Menem –during his first term) had been able to constrict 
governors’ political and territorial autonomy using fiscal instruments. In light of these country-
specific traits, I refine the preceding hypotheses as follows.110   
First, given Fox’s (2000-2006) greater capacity to exert subnational control via partisan 
means, I hypothesize that he will reproduce (i.e., allocate more federal resources to) SURs where 
bureaucratic state-administrations prevail and where PAN partisan structures are strong (either 
at the local or provincial level).  Second, given Carlos Menem’s (1989-1999) capacity to exert 
                                                 
110
 The Alfonsín administration (1983-1989) is not analyzed in this chapter because most of the financial data 
needed for the models is not available.   
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control over SURs via both partisan and fiscal instruments, I expect him to reproduce (i.e., 
allocate more federal resources to) either SURs with high deficit and/or high levels of 
indebtedness, or/and SURs where bureaucratic state-administrations prevail and where PJ 
partisan structures are strong (either at the local or provincial level). Third, due to De la Rúa’s 
incapacity to penetrate provincial arenas via the party apparatus, and his lack of fiscal 
disciplining power, caused by the agonizing economic situation in which he ruled, I do not 
expect him to exert substantial control over SURs. Thus I anticipate he will not benefit any type 
of SUR with federally funded programs.  Finally, given Kirchner’s (2003-2007) greater capacity 
to control undemocratic governors via fiscal means, I expect him to reproduce (i.e., allocate more 
federal resources to) SURs that are financially dependent on the center, that is, those with high 
levels of indebtedness. 
 
III. Variables and operationalization 
1) Dependent variables111 
 There are different federal funds and programs that can be used to reproduce SURs from 
above.  However, as I discuss in detail below, I picked the funds and programs that the literature 
and my interviewees (in each country) have identified as being susceptible to presidential 
discretion, and which in consequence can be manipulated to favor some SURs over others.  In 
choosing the dependent variables, I selected the set of programs and funds that were more prone 
to be subjected to manipulation by each respective president. The reason for proceeding this way 
is because the funds/programs that are more susceptible to undergo presidential manipulation 
                                                 
111
 See tables 5.4 and 5.5 at the end of this chapter for a detailed description of the dependent and independent 
variables and their sources. 
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differ from country to country, and from time-period to time-period.  For instance, one common 
way in which president Menem benefitted allied province was through the channeling of 
employment programs and ATNs (Aportes del Tesoro Nacional).  Yet, because the 2000s 
economic context differed considerably from the 1990s, employment programs ceased to be a 
valuable carrot during the years of Kirchner’s presidency.  In a context of less unemployment 
and higher economic growth, funds for public works became a more efficient carrot to entice and 
reward provincial allies. That is the reason why I focus on ATN and employment programs when 
analyzing the Menem administration, and on funds for public works during the years of 
Kirchner’s presidency. 
 
Dependent variables: Mexico 
 For the years of the Fox administration, I look at the allocation of (a) the Pafef fund 
(Programa de Apoyos para el Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Federativas—Program of 
Subsidies to Strengthen the States), (b) funds for public works, and (c) the Oportunidades social 
program. The Pafef is a fund instituted in 2000, created with the purpose of addressing the 
financial, debt, and infrastructural needs of the states.  The fund is distributed by the Ministry of 
Economy and accounted for 1.37% of the total revenues subject to sharing during the 2000-2006 
period.  Pafef was measured as a share of a state’s total revenues.  
The second Mexican fund analyzed in this chapter is the one administered by the 
Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes (SCT –Secretary of Communications and 
Transport), the federal agency responsible for financing federally funded public works such as 
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highways, roads, bridges, ports, airports, etc..112  The funds accounted for 0.95% of Mexico’s 
total revenues in 2000, and 1.35% in 2005.  Funds for public works were measured as a share of 
a state’s total revenues.  
The third program analyzed in this chapter is the Oportunidades program (i.e., former 
PRONASOL and Progresa).  The program is a conditional cash transfer program distributed by 
the Ministry of Social Development that comprises several poverty alleviation, health, education, 
and nutrition programs.  Oportunidades was measured as a share of a state’s total revenues. 
 
Dependent variables: Argentina 
 For the years of the Menem administrations (1989-1994 and 1995-1999), I analyze how 
(a) ATN (Aportes del Tesoro Nacional –Contributions of the National Treasury), (b) 
employment programs, and (c) funds for public works were distributed across non-democratic 
provinces.  ATN, according to article five of the 1988 co-participation law, are distributed by the 
Ministry of the Interior to provinces that are “in emergency and have financial imbalances.” 
According to this law, ATN account for 1% of the total revenues subject to sharing.  ATN were 
measured as a share of a province’s total revenues. 
The second dependent variable analyzed during the Menem and De la Rúa’s 
administrations is employment programs. These programs comprise all means-tested programs 
of direct employment creation implemented in Argentina since 1993.113  The programs were 
managed and distributed by the Ministry of Labor, which sent them to the provincial 
                                                 
112
 Each state also gets funds for public works through some of the aportaciones sub-funds, but those are for state-
level projects. 
113 These programs include, among others, the Programa Intensivo de Trabajo (PIT), and the Plan Trabajar I, II and 
II, PEP PyME, Programa de Empleo Privado, PROAS, PRENO, Programas Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados. 
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governments, and these in turn transferred them to the municipalities.  In 2002, the programs 
covered 1.5 million heads of households and accounted for 7.5% of the federal government 
expenditures (see Giraudy 2007).  
The final fund analyzed during the Kirchner administrations regards the funds for public 
works.  These funds were administered by Ministry of Infrastructure, which distributed funds to 
the provinces for specific public works projects.  Funds for public works were measured as a 
share of a province’s total revenues.  
 
2) Independent variables  
 Turning to the main independent variables, I used debt and surplus to tap a 
province/state’s financial dependency on the central government.  Both predictors were 
calculated as the percentage of a state/province’s total revenues.  High scores of debt indicate 
higher levels of indebtedness, whereas high scores of deficit indicate lower levels of fiscal 
imbalance (negative scores reflect deficits; positive scores denote surpluses).  
The variable state administration measures the level of bureaucraticness/patrimonialism 
of each province’s administration.  The variable is an additive index that combines indicators of 
horizontal and societal accountability, rulers’ fiscal discretion, and patronage (see chapter 3 for a 
detailed explanation and justification of how the index was built).  The index ranges from 0 to 1, 
where 0 denotes low levels of bureaucraticness (i.e., high levels of patrimonialism) and 1 
indicates high levels of bureaucraticness (i.e., low levels of patrimonialism).   
The variable president’s party strength at the local level (PPSL) captures the electoral 
strength of the president’s party in the municipalities. It is coded as the share of municipalities 
controlled by the president’s party in any given year.  Co-partisanship between presidents and 
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non-democratic governors was measured in the following way.  For the case of Mexico, where 
some PAN governors have come to power through electoral coalitions with other parties, I 
created two dummy variables that capture whether Panista governors pertains to the PAN 
exclusively (i.e., governor PAN alone) or to a Panista electoral coalition (i.e., governor PAN 
coalition).  Each of the dummies score 1 for the years in which different PAN governors ruled a 
given state.  
The high correlation between PPSL and the label of the governor’s party did not allowed 
me include the two variables in the same model.  For that reason, I collapsed PPSL and the 
variable capturing co-partisanship between presidents and governors.  To do so, I created a new 
dummy variable (party gov=party pres) that scores 1 when presidential party equals governor's 
party. After standardizing PPSL between 0 and 1, I added both variables up (i.e., party 
gov=party pres and PPSL).  The sum of these two variables gave way to the new variable (i.e., 
pres/governor/mayor strength) that measures the capturing. 
The hypotheses about the relationship between bureaucratic state administrations and 
how these enhance presidential partisan penetration, and consequently presidential control and 
reproduction from above, suggests that there should be an interaction effect between the 
variables state administration and PPSL.  For this reason, I include an interaction term that 
multiplies both variables, namely, PPSL*SA.  To avoid collinearity, both variables were centered 
on their respective mean values.   
The argument about presidents who control SURs will tend to reproduce them assumes 
that this reproduction holds regardless of electoral cycles.  In other words, SURs are reproduced 
not only during electoral years, but instead on a constant basis (i.e. every year). Thus, I would 
expect no effect or a negative effect due to electoral processes on the presidential SUR 
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reproduction.  To capture the potential effects of electoral cycles I included three dummy 
variables, gubernatorial, presidential, and legislative election. All variables were coded as 1 
every year that either a presidential, legislative, or a gubernatorial election was held, and 0 
otherwise.  Given that electoral calendars across levels of government differ in each country (i.e., 
staggered vs. concurrent electoral calendars in Mexico and Argentina, respectively), different 
combinations of these 3 electoral variables were added in each country model. 114 
 Finally, when appropriate, I included a series of control variables.  In the Mexican 
models I added population, and a proxy for poverty, índice de marginación (marginality index).  
Population, measures the size of a state’s population.  Given that the skewed distribution of this 
variable might yield a non-linear relationship with the dependent variable, I took its natural 
logarithm. The índice de marginación, estimated by the CONAPO, is constructed using a factor 
analysis of census variables related to socio-economic deprivation (illiteracy, no elementary 
school education, housings, lack of access to drinking water, sewage and electricity, population 
density, quality of housing construction, population living in rural localities, and workers earning 
less than two minimum wages) (see Takahashi; Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Estévez n.d.).  
 In the Argentine models, I included the following control variables: unemployment, 
Menem2, Russia/Asia crisis, Tequila crisis, and Hyperinflation, Necesidades Básicas 
Insatisfechas (NBI –unsatisfied needs), and population.  Unemployment, which was only 
included in the models where the dependent variables is employment programs, measures the 
annual level of provincial unemployment.  Menem2 is a dummy variable coded as 1 for the years 
                                                 
114 The staggered nature of electoral calendars in Mexico permits the introduction of both national and subnational 
elections in the same model because the correlation among these variables is low.  By contrast, concurrent elections 
between national and sub-national systems in Argentina, which yield high correlations across the three electoral 
variables, only allow for the inclusion of one or two, at best, dummy variable.  
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of Menem’s second term, and was included to control for possible changes in the relationship 
between the Menem and undemocratic governors.  Hyperinflation (1989), Russia/Asia (1998) 
and Tequila (1995115) crises are dummy variables that capture the incidence of the 3 different 
economic crises that affected Argentina’s economy in substantial ways.116 Since poverty in the 
Argentine provinces has only begun to be measured in the early 2000s, I use NBI as a proxy. NBI 
captures the number of households that do not meet infrastructural basic needs.117 Finally, 
population measures the size of the provincial population. As discussed above, I took the natural 
logarithm of this variable. 
 
IV. Data and analytic technique 
The dataset 
 I use an unbalanced panel data set with 24 states in Mexico, 10 (model 2) and 12 (model 
1) provinces in Argentina (during the two Menem administrations). Data cover the universe of 
cases in both countries during the Fox (2000-2006) and Menem (1989-1999) administrations.  
Thus all undemocratic Mexican states and Argentine provinces, with the exception of the 
                                                 
115 Even though the Tequila crises occurred in 1994, its effects on the Argentine economy were most notably felt in 
1995. 
116
 This control was not necessary for the Mexican models, as no major economic crises occurred during the 2000-
2006 period. In addition, as Huber et al. (2006) indicate, the robust-cluster estimator of the standard errors, i.e., the 
technique employed to run the models (see discussion below), “is impervious only to correlations of errors within 
clusters. It requires errors to be uncorrelated between clusters. The latter assumption might be violated if 
unmeasured factors affect the dependent variable in all units at the same point in time. Economic crises could such 
contemporaneous effects” (p. 957). For that reason I included economic crisis dummy variables. 
117 Data correspond to the EPH (INDEC) conducted in May, Data for Río Negro province correspond to March and 
September, INDEC computes more than one unemployment value for Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, and Santa 
Fe. To get one single measure of unemployment for each of these provinces, I weighted their unemployment rates. 
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president’s states/provinces, are included in the data set.118 The reason why the non-democratic 
state Guanajuato and the undemocratic province of La Rioja, Fox and Menem’s home states, 
respectively, were excluded from the dataset responds to the fact that presidents might have 
favored their own strongholds with discretional funds not only to reproduce their own SURs but 
also, and perhaps more importantly, for reasons that are unrelated to the hypotheses advanced in 
this dissertation. For instance, as many interviewees reported, including former president 
Menem, Carlos Menem sent an outstandingly amount of money to La Rioja, not so much to keep 
the regime alive but also to reward the loyalty of former staffers and improve the wellbeing of 
many Riojanos. Given that is hard to separate out what was the main driving motivation leading 
presidents to channel funds to their home states/provinces, I decided to drop these subnational 
units from the data set. 
 The models performed for the De la Rúa and Kirchner’s administration (1999-2001 and 
2003-2007, respectively) were carried out in a modified fashion due to sample size issues.  As 
tables 5.4 and 5.5 at the end of the chapter show, only 8 provinces between 1999 and 2001 
(Formosa, La Pampa, La Rioja, Río Negro, San Luis, Santa Cruz, and Santiago del Estero), and  
four  provinces between 2002 and 2007 (Formosa, La Rioja, San Luis, and Santa Cruz) fall into 
the non-democratic category (i.e., below the 0.1 score).  Of these four provinces, one (Santa 
Cruz) was the home province of former president Kirchner, and for the reasons outlined in the 
preceding paragraph, was dropped from the dataset.  The combination of seven provinces for a 
time-series of two years (1999 and 2000) during De la Rúa’s administration leads to 14 
                                                 
118 Again note, that since subnational democracy is not static, a state/province which scores as undemocratic on one 
year might not do so the next year.  For instance, between 2000 and 2002 the state of Aguascalientes gets a score 
above 0.1, and thus is ranked as democratic. Yet, between 2003 and 2006 that same state, gets a score of below 0.1, 
and is then ranked as an undemocratic state.  This pattern is observable in several states (see tables A.1 and A.2, 
Appendix in this chapter for a list of the states that score below 0.1).  
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observations.  Likewise, the combination of three provinces for a time-series of four years (2003-
2007), leads to 12 observations.   
 Due to the small size of the datasets, I ran models for all (i.e., both the democratic and 
non-democratic) Argentine provinces, and dummied out the 3 provinces that rank below 0.1 in 
the access index, namely, Formosa, La Rioja and San Luis (these provinces are named after SUR 
in the regression models).  To test the main hypotheses outlined above, I interact each of the 
relevant variables (i.e., state administration, debt, surplus, president/governor co-partisanship) 
with the SUR variable, and obtain 3 new independent variables, namely, SUR*debt, SUR*SA, 
and SUR*pres/governor/mayor (see table 5.2).  I use an unbalanced panel data set with 19119 
provinces that covers the period 2002-2006120.  
 
The technique 
 When data are pooled across time and units, several of the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
standard assumptions, such as the independence of errors across observations are violated.  As a 
result, of these violations, the usual procedures for hypothesis testing are no longer appropriate 
(Long and Ervin 2000). Several authors have provided alternative solutions to deal with these 
violations, including fixed-effects and random-effects models (FEM and REM, respectively), 
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE), lagged dependent variable (LDV) (see Beck and Katz 
                                                 
119 Argentina has 24 provinces. The reason for dropping 5 provinces is because no data was available for Catamarca 
and Chaco.  Ciudad de Buenos Aires has been dropped because for its legal status, it is the only province that does 
not have municipalities, which has prevented the calculation of several dimensions of the exercise index.  Finally, 
Santa Cruz and Buenos Aires were dropped because both were Kirchner and Duhalde’s respective home states. 
120 Peronist President Duhalde’s one year-term was added to the Kirchner time-series.  Duhalde was Kirchner’s 
mentor and his main political supporter within the Peronist party.  During his first two years in office, Kirchner not 
only continued with many of his predecessor’s policies, but also kept Duhalde’s main ministries and political 
advisers.  Thus, Duhalde and Kirchner’s presidencies can be viewed as one.  
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1995), autoregressive models (AR) with corrections for first-order auto-regression (AR1) (see 
Achen 2000; Huber and Stephens 2001; Plümper et al. 2005, among others).  
 However, some of these analytic techniques, such as PCSE and AR models, are 
inappropriate given that the data used in this study are not temporally dominated (i.e., t > N), but 
rather cross-sectionally dominated (i.e., N > t).  Other techniques, such as FEMs, are also 
inadequate given the nature of several key independent variables, such as PPSL and bureaucratic 
state administrations.  Since these are variables that are relatively time invariant (i.e., they only 
change at a slow pace), a FEM will inappropriately absorb the significance of these explanatory 
variables (see Plümper et al. 2005, Achen 2000). Finally, autoregressive models with corrections 
for first-order auto-regression (AR1) are not viable due to the (time) gaps existing in the data set.  
 For all these reasons, I address the problem of correlated errors in panel data using a 
combination of OLS estimation of the regression coefficients with the use of a robust-cluster 
estimator of the standard errors. The robust-cluster variance estimator, as noted by Huber et al. 
2006, provides correct coverage in the presence of any pattern of correlations among errors 
within units, including serial correlation and correlation attributable to unit-specific components 
(957).  In addition, I also ran REM models to check for the robustness of the results.  None of 
these models changed the results in any meaningful way.  All procedures were implemented in 
Stata 9. Since all my hypotheses are directional, I conduct one-tailed t test for significance levels. 
 
V. Results 
 Tables 5.1 through 5.3 display the results for all sets of country-models.  In what follows 
I discuss in detail each president’s allocation of federally funded programs/transfers.   
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1) The partisan path of territorial and political control: Mexico under Vicente Fox 
 
Pafef (Program of Subsidies to Strengthen the States): model 1 
 As reported in model 1 of table 5.1, PPLS (president’s party strength at the local level) 
and state administration, the two variables which have been hypothesized as the main 
determining factors facilitating and enhancing presidential partisan control, have both a positive 
and significant effect on the dependent variable.  In fact, a unit increase in the state 
administration scale, that is higher levels of bureaucraticness, leads to a 10.5-unit increase of 
Pafef subsidies/total revenue, assuming all other independent variables remain constant.  
Likewise, a unit increase in of the president’s party strength at the local level, leads to a 1.78-unit 
increase of Pafef funds/total revenue. These results confirm that during 2000-2006 Mexican 
national politicians benefitted the more bureaucratic and Panista locally dominated undemocratic 
regimes.  In light of these findings it is possible to assert that, during his administration, 
president Fox rewarded, and thus contributed to reproduce, SURs that were easily penetrable via 
partisan structures.  In fact, he benefitted SURs where he could exercise control from below (i.e., 
where the PAN had control over municipal partisan structures).  
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Table 5.1: Mexico: Determinants of Pafef, funds for public works, and Oportunidades with Robust Cluster 
Standard Errors 
Independent variables
Debt -0.018 -0.111 * -0.093 ***
Surplus -0.00003 -0.023 ** -0.034 **
State administration (SA) 10.743 *** 1.987 * 1.627 *
PPSL 1.78 ** 1.852 ** 1.148 *
PPSL*SA 5.472 3.56 2.695
Presidential election -1.29 *** 0.486 -0.785 ***
Gubernatorial election 0.279 -0.467 * 0.006
Governor PAN alone -0.079 -1.253 -1.243 **
Governor PAN coalition 0.16 -0.043 0.431
Population -1.24 *** 0.266
Índice de marginación 0.412 ** 1.717 ***
Constant -4.52 *** 19.905 *** -4.775 *
R2 0.54 0.37 0.77
N 132 117 117
Oportunidades
Model 3
*p ≤ .1, **p ≤ .05,***p ≤ .001, (one-tailed test)
Pafef
Model 1 Model 2
Funds for 
public works
 
Supporting the chapter’s hypotheses, the two variables capturing the financial 
dependency of states on the central government are not significant.  These results indicate that 
indebtedness and fiscal deficits –the two factors that should guide the allocation of Pafef 
funds121, are not determining factors leading President Fox to benefit SURs.  Model 1 further 
indicates that the two electoral variables have not had any incidence on the allocation of Pafef 
funds across undemocratic states.  In fact, the presidential election variable is negatively signed 
and has a significant (p < .001) on the dependent variable, revealing that a lower percentage of 
Pafef funds were sent to SURs during election years.  This result show that president Fox did not 
made an electoral use of these funds; quite the contrary, during elections years he diminished the 
                                                 
121 Recall that Pafef funds were created to help states overcome financial crises and indebtedness. 
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amount sent to the states.  Taken together, these findings demonstrate that between 2000 and 
2006, SUR reproduction from above was not determined by electoral cycles but occurred beyond 
Election Day –that is, on a regular and steady basis.  Finally, neither the governor/presidential 
co-partisanship variable nor the interaction term PPLS*SA are significant, indicating that these 
variables do not have an effect on the overall allocation of Pafef funds.   
Overall, the findings show that during president’s Fox administrations more Pafef funds 
were funneled to the undemocratic states that had bureaucratic state administrations, and a strong 
PAN electoral presence at the subnational level, both of which allowed Fox to take hold at the 
municipal level and thus enhance his chances of exerting control from below over nondemocratic 
rulers. 
 
Funds for public works: model 2 
 Model 2 presents the results of the cross-provincial allocation of funds for public works.  
As reported in table 5.1, the most important theoretical variables, state-administration and 
presidential party strength at the local level, have been important determinants for the cross-
provincial distribution of the funds for public works. Both variables are positively signed and 
significant, showing that president Fox allocated a higher proportion of these funds to 
undemocratic states that had bureaucratic state-administrations and where the PAN presence at 
the municipal level was stronger.   
Yet, like model 1, the results of model 2 show that Fox did not benefit governors who 
belonged to the PAN and, who came to power without striking coalitions with other parties.  One 
of the reasons that might account for this counterintuitive result is that the SURs where these 
PAN governors ruled (i.e., Jalisco, Aguascalientes, Baja California and Morelos) are, relatively 
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speaking, rich and highly developed states, and consequently their infrastructure is, 
comparatively speaking, more developed. Probably for that reason, funds for public works were 
less needed than in less developed and poorest states.    
Like model 1, the coefficient of the interaction term PPLS*state administration does not 
have a significant effect on the dependent variable, indicating that the combined presence of 
these two variables did not matter for the overall allocation of funds.  In addition, model 2 
indicates that the two variables capturing the financial dependency of states on the central 
government, debt and surplus, are significant and negatively signed.  Even though Fox’s main 
instrument of control was partisan, he also benefited undemocratic states that were financially 
weak, i.e., states that had higher deficits, although he did not benefit states that had higher levels 
of debt.122 
In line with the findings obtained in model 1, model 2 also indicates that the cross-
provincial allocation of funds for public works has not responded to electoral cycles, revealing 
that a lower percentage of funds for public works were sent to SURs during election years. This 
could be interpreted as a sign that President Fox did not made an electoral use of public works’ 
funds. Quite the contrary, during elections years he diminished the amount that was sent to the 
states.  Confirming previous expectations that SUR reproduction occurs beyond Election Day, 
the variable gubernatorial elections is correctly signed and significant (p < .1).   
 Model 2 includes two additional independent variables, namely, índice de marginación 
(marginality index) and population.  These two variables were included to assess the impact of 
                                                 
122 The Mexican states that have the highest levels of indebtedness are the most populated, richest, and most 
developed states of the country (i.e., Jalisco, Nuevo León, and Estado de México).  These states have an easy access 
to credit.  Thus, despite the fact that, at first look, their high levels of indebtedness might reveal fiscal dependence 
on the central government, their dependence is in actuality low, as they buy debt from private lenders.  
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development, poverty, living conditions, and overcrowding on the dependent variable.  States 
with lower levels of development, higher levels of poverty, worse living conditions, that is, 
where public works are more deficient, should in principle receive a greater proportion of funds 
for public works.  In fact, as model 2 shows, higher shares of these funds were sent to states 
where the living conditions of the population where worse, as illustrated by the positively signed 
and significant coeffcient of the índice de marginación variable.  The model also indicates, that 
funds for public works were, on average, sent to states that were less populated. This result is 
difficult to interpret given that some of the least populated undemocratic states in Mexico (such 
as, Colima, Quintana Roo, Durango) score halfway on the index of deprivation, while others 
(such as Campeche and Hidalgo) score high.  What these findings undoubtedly indicate is that 
undemocratic states with fewer inhabitants have received a disproportionate share of funds for 
public works. 
 
Oportunidades: model 3 
 Model 3 regresses all independent variables on the Oportunidades program.  Evidence 
about the political manipulation of Oportunidades is mixed.  Some works note that, like its 
predecessors, PRONASOL and Progresa, Oportunidades has been manipulated to meet political 
needs (see FUNDAR 2006, Alianza Cívica 2006, Ley n.d.).  Still, other works indicate that 
Oportunidades has been distributed according to a technical and quite sophisticated formula, and 
consequently has not been subject to political manipulation (see Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and 
Estévez n.d., Fox 2006). My goal here is not determine whether Oportunidades has been 
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politically manipulated to buy votes, but rather to test whether it has been used to reward 
different types of undemocratic states.123   
 As model 3 indicates, the results substantiate the argument that Oportunidades was not 
used as a political handout.  In fact, the variables governor PAN alone and presidential election 
come out significant and negatively signed, indicating that undemocratic states ruled by PAN 
governors (who came to power with no electoral coalitions) obtained a smaller share of 
Oportunidades funds, and that during presidential elections, Oportunidades not only did not 
increase, but more importantly, its amount as a percentage of each state’s total revenues 
decreased.124  In addition, and most importantly, the findings obtained in model 3, show that the 
criteria used to determine the cross-provincial allocation of Oportunidades responded to poverty 
levels and living conditions of the general population.  The marginality index has a positive and 
significant effect (p < .001) on the dependent variable.125 
 Yet, despite these results, model 3 also shows that partisan as well as other socio-
economic and provincial variables were important determinants of Oportunidades’ allocation.  
Such is the case of PPSL, state administrations, and governor PAN alone, as well as surplus and 
debt, all of which come out significant.  Larger share of Oportunidades (as a percentage of each 
state’s total revenues) were allocated to SURs where the PAN had a stronger presence at the 
municipal level, and where states administrations were more bureaucratic, and by extension 
easier to penetrate via partisan instruments.  Still, as in model 2, Fox did not benefit governors 
                                                 
123 Previous studies have tested the political manipulation of Oportunidades across all states and not, as I am doing 
here, across undemocratic states. 
124
 See Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Estévez n.d., who note that no new beneficiaries were incorporated into the 
program in the years of federal elections. 
125 A regression of the marginality index (índice de marginación) alone on the dependent variable gets an R2 of .71.  
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who belonged to the PAN (and came to power without electoral coalitions).  As noted earlier, 
one of the reasons that might explain this result is that states where such governors ruled (i.e., 
Jalisco, Aguascalientes, Baja California and Morelos) are, relatively speaking, rich states and 
consequently have a lower proportion of the population needing the assistance of Oportunidades.   
In addition, like model 2, model 3 indicates that the two variables capturing the financial 
dependency of states on the central government, debt and surplus, are statistically significant and 
negatively signed.  Even though Fox’s main instrument of control was partisan, he also benefited 
undemocratic states that were financially weak, i.e., states that had higher deficits, and those that 
have higher levels of indebtedness.126  Finally, like models 1 and 2, the coefficient of the 
interaction term between PPLS and state administration does not have a significant effect on the 
dependent variable, revealing that the combined effect of these two predictors does not determine 
the cross-state allocation of Oportunidades funds.   
In short, models 1 through 3 of table 5.1 indicate that the cross-provincial allocation of 
different centrally administered and funded programs/funds was conducted along the theoretical 
expectations advanced in this dissertation.  All three models reveal that the most consistent effect 
on each of the dependent variables was the existence of bureaucratic state administrations and 
the strong PAN electoral presence at the municipal level. The results show that non-democratic 
states that had patrimonial state-administrations (controlling for the other variables in the model) 
did not benefit from any of the three programs/funds analyzed in this chapter.  Models 1 through 
3 further indicate that funds were transferred to non-democratic states where the PAN had a 
strong and effective presence at the municipal level.  
                                                 
126 See footnote 122.  
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Altogether, these results reveal that President Fox prioritize SURs where his party was 
strong, and where he could use this local structure as a springboard to trespass state borders, and 
in turn increase his leverage to constrict undemocratic rulers from below.  By rewarding these 
rulers Fox not only ensured their cooperation, but most importantly he contributed to reproduce 
the regimes that maintained controllable nondemocratic governors alive.  In addition, the results 
presented in Models 1 through 3 show that President Fox rewarded states were power was 
exercised along more bureaucratic procedures, and punished states where incumbents wielded 
power in a patrimonial and traditional way.  These findings reveal that Fox might have 
prioritized siding with nondemocratic governors who had a more technocratic and less traditional 
ruling style, rather than governors from politically backward states. 
 
2) The fiscal-partisan path of territorial and political control: Argentina under Carlos 
Menem 
 Table 5.2 reports the results of the allocation of different federal funds and centrally run 
programs across non-democratic provinces in Argentina.  As noted earlier, Menem had both 
fiscal and partisan instruments of political and territorial control to discipline non-democratic 
rulers.  As the models presented in table 5.2 indicate, president Menem used both instruments to 
exert control over weak and controllable SURs.  However, he made a selective use of different 
programs to exert either type of control.  For instance, employment programs, which were most 
notably implemented during his second administration, were used to favor SURs where he could 
exert partisan control.  By contrast, ATN and funds for public works were destined in a greater 
proportion to SURs that were financially dependent on the center and where, as result of this 
dependency, the president was able to exert fiscal (rather than partisan) control.  In sum, Menem 
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relied on a diversified portfolio of federally administered funds and programs to exert either 
partisan or fiscal control over SURs.  
 
Table 5.2: Argentina: Determinants of ATN and Employment programs (Menem) with Robust Cluster 
Standard Errors 
Independent variables
Surplus -0.038 * -0.031 * -0.002 -1E-05
State administration (SA) 1.71 3.393 -1.143 -0.143
PPSL 0.706 0.445 **
PPSL*SA 0.325 2.679 **
pres/governor/mayor strength 0.711 0.232 ***
pres/governor/mayor strength*SA 4.303 1.183 **
Presidential election 7.59 *** 7.648 ***
Legislative election 0.137 ** 0.138 **
Gubernatorial election -0.263 -0.276 -0.277 *** -0.261 ***
Menem2 0.0006 -0.086 0.32 *** 0.298 ***
Hyperinflation -1.852 *** -1.739 ***
Tequila -7.384 *** -7.293 ***
Russia/Asia -0.208 -0.084
Unemployment 0.003 -0.0001
Constant 1.109 ** 1.491 ** 0.015 0.086
R2 0.71 0.7 0.59 0.53
N 86 86 46 46
*p ≤ .1, **p ≤ .05,***p ≤ .001, (one-tailed test)
Employment 
programs
Model 2b
ATN ATN Employment programs
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a
 
ATN: models 1a and 1b127  
 As models 1a and 1b show, one the single most important variables determining the 
distribution of ATN between 1989 and 1998 was the surplus variable.  Undemocratic provinces 
with high financial deficits, and which in consequence were more dependent on the center, 
received a greater proportion of ATN, as indicated by the positively signed and significant 
                                                 
127
 Due to the high correlation (0.83) between Governor/president co-partisanship and PPSL, I ran two different 
models, one in which I analyzed the impact of the joint effect of these two variables (see discussion in the next 
sentence), and the second one in which I only explore the effect of PPSL and its interaction with SA.  To test the 
incidence of both PPSL and governor/president co-partisanship I standardized both predictors (between 0 and 1) and 
added them up, creating one single variable (named after PJ governor/municipal strength).   
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coefficient of the surplus variable.  In other words, SURs upon which Menem could exert fiscal 
control were rewarded with more ATN transfers.128  This higher proportion of funds flowed to 
financially imbalanced SURs regardless of the governors’ partisan affiliation (as the non-
significant coefficients of PPSL and PJ governor/municipal strength reveal).  Neither did the type 
of state administration matter (as shown by the non-significant results for SA, SA*PPSL, and 
SA* PJ governor/municipal strength variables).  What did matter was that these regimes were 
not financially sound.   
In addition, and contrary to the pattern observed in Mexico, these funds responded to 
electoral cycles.  As the positively signed and significant coefficient of the presidential election 
variable indicates, greater shares of ATN were distributed in 1989 and 1995, the two years 
during which general elections were held.  Finally, two out of the three variables included to 
control for the possible effects of economic/financial crises on ATN, are significant.  Both the 
Tequila and the Hyperinflation crises, which affected the tax collection capacity of the federal 
government, thus decreasing the amount of co-participatory funds and consequently the amount 
of ATN, also diminished the share of ATN that each SUR was allotted.  
Altogether, the distribution of ATN among non-democratic provinces indicates that these 
were used to reward only SURs that were easier to control due to their financial dependency on 
the central government.  SURs which had strong and well administered economies were not 
benefitted with these funds.129 In addition, the regressions confirm that the cross-provincial 
                                                 
128
 These results reveal that ATN funds worked largely as they were legally supposed to work, i.e., were allocated to 
provinces that were in emergency and had financial imbalances (although, as I discuss below, the distributional 
criteria also entailed some electoral calculus). In addition, it is worth noting that more than half of the ATN funds 
were sent to the province of La Rioja, Menem’s stronghold.  That discretional distribution is not captured in this 
regression given that, for the reasons outlined above, La Rioja has been excluded from the sample. 
129
 It should be noted that these results reveal that ATN funds largely worked as they were legally supposed to, i.e., 
were sent to provinces that were in emergency and had financial imbalances (although the criteria for distributing 
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allocation of ATN was contingent on electoral cycles, as greater shares of these funds were sent 
to the provinces during presidential elections.  This finding is consistent with other qualitative 
and quantitative assessments that confirm the clientelistic use and distribution of ATN (see 
Gibson & Calvo 2000, Cetrángolo & Jiménez 1997). 
 
Employment programs: models 2a and 2b130 
 Models 2a and 2b presented in table 5.2, provide evidence about the distribution of 
employment programs between 1993 and 1998.  Unlike models 1a and 1b, which reported that 
higher shares of ATN were sent to financial dependent SURs, models 2a and 2b indicate that a 
greater shares of employment programs was allocated to SURs where Menem’s party had a 
strong electoral presence, either at the local or municipal level, as indicated by the significant 
and positively signed coefficients of PJ governor/municipal strength (model 2a) and PPSL (in 
model 2b).  Moreover, SURs that combined a strong PJ local structure and bureaucratic state-
administration were also rewarded with greater shares of unemployment programs, regardless of 
levels of unemployment.  The combination of a strong electoral base at the municipal level with 
the existence of a bureaucratic state-administration, two factors that enhance partisan penetration 
and partisan control, were important determinants of employment programs’ allocation, as 
showed by the significant and positively signed coefficient of  PPSL*SA in model 2b.  Likewise, 
PJ-governed SURs (at both the provincial and local levels) which also had bureaucratic state 
                                                                                                                                                             
them also involved some electoral calculus). In addition, it is worth noting that more than half of the ATN funds 
were sent to the province of La Rioja (Menem’s stronghold).  That discretional distribution is not captured in this 
regression given that, for reasons outlined above, La Rioja has been excluded from the sample. 
130
 For an explanation of why I ran two separated models, see footnote 26. 
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administrations (as shown by the PJ governor/municipal strength*SA variable) were awarded 
with greater shares of employment conditional cash transfers.   
Like models 1a and 1b, electoral cycles also shaped the distribution of these subsidies.  In 
effect, the coefficients of the two electoral variables (i.e., gubernatorial elections and legislative 
elections) came out significant although differently signed.  Whereas the share of employment 
programs distributed across SURs decreased during gubernatorial races, it increased during 
legislative elections, suggesting that only federal electoral cycles shaped the distribution of these 
goods.  Finally, the increased unemployment rate, caused for the most part by the 
implementation of the neoliberal policies during Menem’s first term office, was most notably felt 
during Menem’s second administration.  As a result, higher share of these programs were 
allocated after 1995, as indicated by the positively and significant coefficient of the variable 
Menem2. 
To summarize, the distribution of unemployment programs was determined to a great 
extent by political, institutional, and electoral variables.  Non-democratic provinces which were 
more bureaucratic and where a strong local or provincial PJ presence existed, that is, SURs 
where Menem could easily penetrate with the PJ structure, were awarded with employment 
programs.  These pattern of penetration, which occurred during his second term, also coincided 
with the president’s ability to exert greater control over the PJ structure, which was only possible 
towards 1993, when he managed to get rid of strong PJ leaders who somehow disputed his power 
(see McGuire 1997, Levitsky 2003).  Electoral variables, especially national electoral cycles, 
also determined the allocation of employment programs, indicating that these might have been 
used as potential handouts to buy loyalties. 
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Models 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b provide evidence about Menem’s “diversification” strategy to 
benefit SURs upon which he could exert either partisan or fiscal control.  As the regressions 
indicate, he selectively rewarded undemocratic governors upon whom he could exert leeway, 
namely, non-democratic governors that were controllable due to their financial dependency on 
the central government or those whom he could discipline either by exerting partisan control 
from above or from below.  By rewarding them he not only ensured their cooperation, but most 
importantly contributed to reproduce the regimes that maintained these nondemocratic rulers 
alive.   
 
3) The fiscal path of territorial and political control: Argentina under Eduardo Duhalde 
and Néstor Kirchner 
 Table 5.3, model 1, explores the distribution of funds for public works during the short 
presidency of Eduardo Duhalde and the four-year term of Néstor Kirchner.  For the reasons 
outlined in the last paragraph of section IV.a, this model, unlike the previous ones, analyzes all 
Argentine provinces (with the exception of the provinces described in section IV.a, last 
paragraph). Non-democratic provinces are dummied out and then interacted with the independent 
variables that are of interest in this study, namely, SA, president/governor co-partisanship, and 
debt131. These three interaction terms, then, are the single most theoretically relevant variables of 
the model.  .
                                                 
131
 As chapter 4 noted, during the years of the Kirchner administration, several laws were passed to nationalize 
provincial debts.  As a result, to many indebted provinces the federal government become the lender of last resort.  
For this reason, during the Kirchner administration I focus more on levels of indebtedness rather than on financial 
deficits 
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Table 5.3: Argentina: Determinants of Funds for Public Works and Employment programs 
(Kirchner/Duhalde and De la Rúa) with Robust Cluster Standard Errors 
 
Independent variables
Debt 1.305 * 0.65 **
Surplus -0.039 * 0.005 **
State administration (SA) 2.018 ** -0.295 **
pres/governor/mayor strength 1.221 *** -0.029
Legislative election -2.035 *** -0.019
SUR 1.399 *** 0.024
SUR*SA -0.75 -0.262
SUR*debt 2.499 * -0.637 *
SUR*pres/governor/mayor 2.108 *** -0.011
Kirchner 2.499 ***
Population -0.185
NBI -0.022
Unemployment 0.011 **
Constant 3.953 * 0.253 ***
R2 0.27 0.5
N 94 40
Kirchner/Duhalde De la Rúa
*p ≤ .1, **p ≤ .05,***p ≤ .001, (one-tailed test)
Funds for public 
works
Employment 
programs
Model 1 Model 2
 
 Table 5.3 displays the results of the model for the Duhalde-Kirchner administration.  As 
can be observed, funds for public works, which were one of the main presidential handouts to 
entice, reward, and/or buy off both democratic and non-democratic governors, were employed 
much more extensively during the Kirchner administration, as evidenced by the significant and 
positively signed Kirchner variable.  These funds, as the regression shows, were allocated to 
SURs that were in financial and dire straits, as illustrated by the positive sign and the statistically 
significant level of the SUR*debt’s coefficient.  That is, non-democratic provinces which had 
higher levels of indebtedness, such as La Rioja and Formosa, upon which a fiscally powerful 
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president (like Néstor Kirchner) could exert much control, were benefitted with greater shares of 
funds for public works.  By contrast, SURs with sound economies and lower levels of 
indebtedness (such as San Luis) were penalized, in that they did not received funds for public 
works.  
 The interaction denoting non-democratic provinces belonging to the president’s party 
(i.e., SUR*pres/governor/mayor) comes out significant and with a positive sign. This indicates, 
that nondemocratic provinces that were allied to the national chief executive, received greater 
proportions of funds for public works.  In other words, SURs, like La Rioja and Formosa, upon 
which Kirchner and Duhalde could exert some sort of partisan control (even though this was not 
their main instrument to discipline governors), were benefitted by the central government.  
Unlike partisan affiliation, the coefficient of the SUR*SA variable comes out insignificant, 
revealing that, in line with the theoretical expectations, the interaction of these two variables 
does not matter for the overall distribution of funds for public works. 
Finally, regarding the variables that were not interacted with the SUR term, the results 
show that electoral cycles shaped the cross-provincial distribution of funds for public works.  In 
effect, in contrast to the Menem years, lower shares of these funds were channeled to the 
provinces when mid-term elections were held, indicating that president Kirchner did not use 
these transfers to reward loyal SURs during Election Day, as his predecessor did.  These results 
might be suggesting that Menem, unlike Kirchner, was more concerned with winning legislative 
races, as his policies –i.e., the liberalization of the economy, the labor market, and the financial 
sector, needed to be approved in Congress with solid majorities.  
Last it is worth noting that between 2002 and 2006, Argentine presidents rewarded non-
democratic provinces over democratic provinces, as reflected by the positively signed and 
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significant coefficient of the SUR variable.  A similar pattern followed indebted provinces, 
which received a greater proportion of funds for public works, as indicated by the positive and 
significant coefficient of the debt variable. 
In sum, the regression model 1 presented in table 5.3 indicate that the allocation of funds 
for public works during the years of the Duhalde/Kirchner administration was done along the 
lines hypothesized in this dissertation.  A president with considerable fiscal powers albeit weak 
partisan power, as was the case of Néstor Kirchner, could exert control over SURs that were 
financially dependent. Precisely because he managed to subjugate financially dependent SURs 
he benefitted them with monetary handouts, such as funds for public works. The results 
presented above are then congruent with Kirchner’s decision to avoid dismantling easily 
controllable SUR and with his willingness to contribute to their reproduction.  
 
4) Incapacity to exert political and territorial control over SURs: Argentina under 
Fernando De la Rúa 
 The last regression model regards the short-lived administration of President De la Rúa 
(1999-2002).  Table 5.3, model 2, presents evidence about the determinants of the cross-
provincial allocation of employment programs.  As noted in section IV.a, this model proceeds 
along the same lines as the regression models run for the Kirchner administration. Non-
democratic provinces are dummied out and then interacted with the independent variables that 
are of interest in this study, namely, SA, president/governor co-partisanship, and debt. These 3 
interactions, then, are the most important variables of the model. 
 As model 2 in table 5.3 reports, only one (SUR*debt) out of the three interacted and 
theoretically relevant variables is statistically significant. This result shows that President De la 
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Rúa transferred smaller shares of employment programs to indebted SURs.  His reluctance to 
benefit indebted, and allegedly more vulnerable SURs, can be interpreted as a consequence of De 
la Rúa’s incapacity to control SURs either via partisan or fiscal instruments.  As shown in 
chapter 4, De la Rúa was, comparatively speaking, a weak president vis-à-vis governors. 
Precisely for that reason he was limited in his capacity to exert control beyond the country’s 
capital.  As a result of this vulnerability, he saw no gain in benefitting SURs, upon which he 
could not wield political power and control, with greater shares of employment programs.  
 Another plausible explanation for De la Rúa’s refusal to benefit indebted SURs, has to do 
with SUR partisanship.  Only one –Río Negro province– out of the seven existing SURs during 
his administration was ruled by the UCR.  All other non-democratic provinces (i.e., Formosa, La 
Pampa, La Rioja, San Luis, Santa Cruz, and Santiago del Estero) were governed by the PJ.  In 
this context De la Rúa had few incentives to reward PJ-ruled SURs upon which he, nonetheless, 
could not exert partisan control, neither from above nor from below.132    
 Finally, the results displayed in model 2 of table 5.3, indicate that De la Rúa, unlike his 
immediate predecessor, Carlos Menem, allocated employment programs with far less political 
purposes.  In effect, De la Rúa channeled greater shares of employment subsidies to provinces 
that had higher levels of unemployment, as shown by the significant and positive sign of the 
unemployment variable, in contrast to Menem.  Likewise, the allocation of these programs was 
not determined by electoral cycles, as employment programs did not increase during electoral 
races.  Quite the contrary, as the legislative elections variable shows, the shares allocated to the 
provinces decreased in 2001, when mid-term elections were held.  All in all, the results show 
                                                 
132 The electoral presence of the UCR at the municipal level in PJ-ruled SURs was also very low. As a result he 
could not side with local UCR branches to exert control from below over Peronist nondemocratic governors.  
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clearly that De la Rúa did not benefit weak and vulnerable SURs with greater federally funded 
employment programs, thus revealing that a President who does not have sufficient instruments 
to control nondemocratic areas, has few incentives to reproduce regimes and governors who are 
not easy to control and subjugate.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 The results presented in tables 5.1 through 5.3 support the main argument of this 
dissertation as well as the hypotheses outlined in this chapter.  They show that presidents favored 
one specific type of undemocratic regime over another.  That is, contrary to current assessments, 
which claim that presidents reproduce all types of SURs, the evidence presented here indicates 
that neither Fox, nor Menem or Kirchner, rewarded all existing SUR during their respective 
administrations.  Instead, they selectively benefitted the undemocratic regimes upon which they 
could exert some type (i.e., fiscal or partisan) of control.  Most importantly, none of these 
presidents seems to have contributed to expand the power of SURs upon which they could not 
exert control.  In fact, as all the regressions models show, the SURs which were not easily 
penetrable or controllable by presidents were punished, in that they received a lower proportion 
of federally funded programs/transfers (other things being constant). 
 The results further confirm that different presidents in Argentina and Mexico relied on 
different instruments of territorial and political control to exert dominion over subnational 
undemocratic regimes.  Accordingly, Fox benefited SURs he could control via partisan 
instruments, while Kirchner rewarded non-democratic provinces that had high levels of 
indebtedness.  President Menem, for his part, who had access to both partisan and fiscal 
instruments, benefitted SURs that were either possible to control via partisan structures or via 
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fiscal means.  Finally, President De la Rúa, due to his limited access to both fiscal and partisan 
instruments, did not benefit SURs upon which he could not exert control. 
 The quantitative analysis conducted in this chapter, which encompassed the universe of 
cases (i.e., all SURs in the post-transitional period in Argentina and Mexico), helped gain 
inferential leverage and maximize the generalizability of the theoretical claims raised in chapter 
3.  In other words, the hypothesized causal relationship between the independent variable 
(control exercised by presidents over SURs) and the dependent variable (SUR reproduction from 
above) was demonstrated to hold true for all SURs in Argentina and Mexico.  Accordingly, it is 
possible to infer that all controllable and penetrable SURs which were rewarded with some kind 
of federally funded program/transfer, were enhanced and reproduced from above.   
This conclusion, however, does not substantiate the general theoretical claim of this 
dissertation, namely, that to survive, SURs need to deliver “goods” that are highly valuable to the 
central government.  I noted in chapter 3 that if national incumbents actively reproduce some 
SURs it is because these regimes deliver goods and strategic benefits to the central government.  
The quantitative analysis presented in this chapter cannot confirm whether this premise holds 
true, as the regressions only test (and demonstrate) the federal government’s “willingness” to 
reward weak and controllable SURs but do not provide information about what the central 
government got in return for this reward.  As a result, the quantitative analyses miss an important 
explanatory component of the model outlined in this study.  In addition, because the quantitative 
analysis only focuses on SURs that were controllable and reproduced from above, it does not 
offer insights into the second type of SUR survival, namely, SUR self-sustained reproduction.   
To address these shortcomings, the next chapters present in-depth qualitative evidence 
through which first I demonstrate how the mutually beneficial relationship between controllable 
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SURs and the central government operates, and how it in turn leads to SUR reproduction from 
above.  Second, I shall provide evidence about how SURs that are not controllable by the central 
government, and which in turn have not been rewarded with federal handouts, still manage to 
self-sustain.  In short, the remaining chapters aim at presenting in-depth, qualitative evidence 
about the on the causal pathways that lead to SUR reproduction from above, and SUR self-
reproduction.   
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Table 5.4: MEXICO: Dependent and independent variables, description, and sources  
 
Variable Description Source
PAFEF PAFEF as percentage of total revenue Informe de gobierno 2006, based on SCHP data
Public works Public works as precentage of total revenue Subdirección de Economía de Servicios de Investigación y Análisis (Cámara de Diputados)
Oportunidades Oportunidades expenditures as porcentage of total revenue Aregional Consultora
Main variables
Debt Debt as percentage of total revenue SHCP-UCEF
Deficit Deficit as percentage of total revenue SHCP-UCEF
SA: State administration See index chapter 3 Giraudy (chapter 3)
PPSL: President's party strength (local) Percentage of municipalities of presidential party CIDAC 
PPSL*SA President's party strength local centered on its mean multiplied by SA  centered on its mean Author
Governor PAN alone Scored as 1 for each PAN governor who did not rule in a coalition Based on CIDAC 
Governor PAN coalition Scored as 1 for each PAN governor who ruled in a coalition Based CIDAC 
Electoral variables
Presidential election Scored as 1 for each year of presidential election Author
Gubernatorial election Scored as 1 for each year of gubernatorial election Author
Legislative election Scored as 1 for each year of legislative election Author
Control variables
Population Logged population CONAPO*
Índice de marginación Lower levels indicate low drepivation, and vice versa CONAPO
**Projected 
Dependent variables
Independent variables
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Table 5.5: ARGENTINA: Dependent and independent variables, description, and sources  
Variable Description Source
Funds for public works Funds for public works as percentage of total revenues Cuenta Inversión (various yrs), Giraudy (2006)
ATN ATN as percentage of total revenues CECE (1997), Mecon
Employment programs Percentage of the total population who received employment progr. Giraudy (2007)
Main variables (Menem)
Debt Debt as percentage of total revenue Mecon-DNCFP
Surplus Deficit as percentage of total revenue Mecon-DNCFP
SA: State administration See index chapter 3 Giraudy (chapter 3)
PPSL: President's party strength (local) Percentage of municipalities of presidential party  Micozzi (2009)
PPSL*SA President's party strength local centered on its mean multiplied by SA  centered on its 
mean
Author
pres/governor/mayor strength Sum of 2 variables: party gov=party pres ^ and PPSL Author
pres/governor/mayor strength*SA pres/governor/municipal strength  centered on its mean multiplied by SA centered 
on its mean
Main variables (De la Rúa & Kirchner)
SUR Scored as 1 for each in which provinces obtained a score lower than 0.1 on the 
access index (chapter 3) Author
SUR*SA SUR  centered on its mean multiplied by SA  centered on its mean Author
SUR*debt SUR  centered on its mean multiplied by debt  centered on its mean Author
SUR*party gov=party pres^ SUR  centered on its mean multiplied by party gov=party pres  centered on its mean Author
Electoral variables
Presidential election Scored as 1 for each year of presidential election Author
Gubernatorial election Scored as 1 for each year of gubernatorial election Author
Legislative election Scored as 1 for each year of legislative election Author
Control variables
Population Logged population INDEC*
Unemployment Yearly unemployment Giraudy (2007) based on INDEC
Hyperinflation, Tequila, Russia/Asia Scored as 1 for each of economic crisis Author
NBI Lower levels indicate better living conditions, and vice versa  INDEC 
^Governor party scored as 1 when presidential party equals governor's party.  Both variables (i.e., party gov=party pres, and PPSL) were standardized between 0 and 1 
and then added up
*Projected 
Dependent variables
Independent variables
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Table 5.6:  Mexican states scoring below 0.1 on the access index (2000-2006) 
State year Access Score State year
Access 
Score State year
Access 
Score
Aguascalientes 2004 0.05 Guerrero 2000 0.03 SLP 2000 0.04
Aguascalientes 2005 0.05 Guerrero 2001 0.03 SLP 2001 0.04
Aguascalientes 2006 0.05 Guerrero 2002 0.07 SLP 2002 0.04
Baja California 2000 0.00 Guerrero 2003 0.07 Sinaloa 2000 0.02
Baja California 2001 0.04 Guerrero 2004 0.07 Sinaloa 2001 0.02
Baja California 2002 0.04 Guerrero 2005 0.00 Sinaloa 2002 0.02
Baja California 2003 0.04 Guerrero 2006 0.00 Sinaloa 2003 0.02
Baja California 2004 0.04 Hidalgo 2000 0.04 Sinaloa 2004 0.07
Baja California 2005 0.04 Hidalgo 2001 0.04 Sinaloa 2005 0.07
Baja California 2006 0.04 Hidalgo 2002 0.04 Sinaloa 2006 0.07
Campeche 2000 0.02 Hidalgo 2003 0.04 Sonora 2000 0.07
Campeche 2001 0.02 Hidalgo 2004 0.04 Sonora 2001 0.07
Campeche 2002 0.02 Hidalgo 2005 0.03 Sonora 2002 0.07
Campeche 2006 0.09 Hidalgo 2006 0.03 Sonora 2003 0.00
Coahuila 2000 0.02 Jalisco 2000 0.00 Sonora 2004 0.00
Coahuila 2001 0.02 Jalisco 2001 0.02 Sonora 2005 0.00
Coahuila 2002 0.01 Jalisco 2002 0.02 Sonora 2006 0.00
Coahuila 2003 0.01 Jalisco 2003 0.02 Tabasco 2000 0.00
Coahuila 2004 0.01 Jalisco 2004 0.02 Tabasco 2001 0.00
Coahuila 2005 0.03 Jalisco 2005 0.02 Tabasco 2002 0.00
Coahuila 2006 0.03 Edo Mexico 2000 0.03 Tabasco 2003 0.00
Colima 2000 0.02 Edo Mexico 2001 0.03 Tabasco 2004 0.00
Colima 2001 0.02 Edo Mexico 2002 0.03 Tabasco 2005 0.00
Colima 2002 0.02 Edo Mexico 2003 0.03 Tabasco 2006 0.00
Colima 2003 0.09 Edo Mexico 2004 0.03 Tamaulipas 2000 0.04
Colima 2004 0.09 Michoacán 2000 0.00 Tamaulipas 2001 0.04
Colima 2005 0.09 Morelos 2000 0.07 Tamaulipas 2002 0.04
Colima 2006 0.07 Morelos 2001 0.07 Tamaulipas 2003 0.04
Chiapas 2000 0.08 Morelos 2002 0.07 Tamaulipas 2004 0.05
Chiapas 2001 0.08 Oaxaca 2000 0.02 Tamaulipas 2005 0.05
Chiapas 2002 0.08 Oaxaca 2001 0.02 Tamaulipas 2006 0.05
Chiapas 2003 0.08 Oaxaca 2002 0.02 Tlaxcala 2004 0.00
Chiapas 2004 0.10 Oaxaca 2003 0.02 Tlaxcala 2005 0.00
Chiapas 2005 0.10 Oaxaca 2004 0.00 Tlaxcala 2006 0.00
Durango 2000 0.07 Oaxaca 2005 0.00 Veracruz 2000 0.03
Durango 2001 0.08 Oaxaca 2006 0.00 Veracruz 2001 0.03
Durango 2002 0.08 Puebla 2000 0.01 Veracruz 2002 0.03
Durango 2003 0.08 Puebla 2001 0.01 Veracruz 2003 0.03
Durango 2004 0.09 Puebla 2002 0.01 Yucatan 2000 0.00
Durango 2005 0.09 Puebla 2003 0.01 Yucatan 2001 0.00
Durango 2006 0.09 Puebla 2004 0.03 Yucatan 2002 0.00
Guanajuato 2000 0.03 Puebla 2005 0.03 Yucatan 2003 0.00
Guanajuato 2001 0.03 Puebla 2006 0.03 Yucatan 2004 0.00
Guanajuato 2002 0.03 Quintana Roo 2000 0.02 Yucatan 2005 0.00
Guanajuato 2003 0.05 Quintana Roo 2001 0.02 Yucatan 2006 0.00
Guanajuato 2004 0.05 Quintana Roo 2002 0.02
Guanajuato 2005 0.05 Quintana Roo 2003 0.02
Guanajuato 2006 0.02 Quintana Roo 2004 0.02
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Table 5.7: Argentine provinces scoring below 0.1 on the access index (1989-2006) 
State year Access Score State year
Access 
Score State year
Access 
Score
Catamarca 1989 0.03 La Rioja 1991 0.01 San Luis 2003 0.00
Catamarca 1990 0.03 La Rioja 1992 0.01 San Luis 2004 0.00
Chaco 1989 0.05 La Rioja 1993 0.01 San Luis 2005 0.00
Chaco 1990 0.05 La Rioja 1994 0.01 San Luis 2006 0.00
Córdoba 1989 0.00 La Rioja 1995 0.01 Santa Cruz 1989 0.04
Córdoba 1990 0.00 La Rioja 1996 0.01 Santa Cruz 1990 0.04
Córdoba 1991 0.00 La Rioja 1997 0.01 Santa Cruz 1991 0.06
Córdoba 1992 0.00 La Rioja 1998 0.01 Santa Cruz 1992 0.06
Córdoba 1993 0.00 La Rioja 1999 0.03 Santa Cruz 1993 0.05
Córdoba 1994 0.00 La Rioja 2000 0.03 Santa Cruz 1994 0.05
Córdoba 1995 0.05 La Rioja 2001 0.03 Santa Cruz 1995 0.05
Córdoba 1996 0.05 La Rioja 2002 0.03 Santa Cruz 1996 0.05
Córdoba 1997 0.05 La Rioja 2003 0.06 Santa Cruz 1997 0.05
Córdoba 1998 0.05 La Rioja 2004 0.06 Santa Cruz 1998 0.05
Corrientes 1989 0.05 La Rioja 2005 0.05 Santa Cruz 1999 0.07
Corrientes 1990 0.05 La Rioja 2006 0.05 Santa Cruz 2000 0.07
Corrientes 1991 0.06 Neuquén 1989 0.04 Santa Cruz 2001 0.07
Corrientes 1992 0.06 Neuquén 1990 0.04 Santa Cruz 2002 0.07
Corrientes 1993 0.10 Neuquén 1991 0.07 Santa Cruz 2003 0.03
Corrientes 1994 0.10 Neuquén 1992 0.07 Santa Cruz 2004 0.03
Formosa 1989 0.04 Neuquén 1993 0.07 Santa Cruz 2005 0.03
Formosa 1990 0.04 Neuquén 1994 0.07 Santa Cruz 2006 0.03
Formosa 1991 0.06 Río Negro 1989 0.07 Santa Fe 1989 0.06
Formosa 1992 0.06 Río Negro 1990 0.07 Santa Fe 1990 0.06
Formosa 1993 0.05 Río Negro 1991 0.05 Santiago del Estero 1991 0.07
Formosa 1994 0.05 Río Negro 1992 0.05 Santiago del Estero 1992 0.07
Formosa 1995 0.06 Río Negro 1993 0.05 Santiago del Estero 1993 0.07
Formosa 1996 0.06 Río Negro 1994 0.05 Santiago del Estero 1994 0.07
Formosa 1997 0.07 Río Negro 1995 0.10 Santiago del Estero 1995 0.07
Formosa 1998 0.07 Río Negro 1996 0.10 Santiago del Estero 1996 0.07
Formosa 1999 0.03 Río Negro 1997 0.10 Santiago del Estero 1997 0.06
Formosa 2000 0.03 Río Negro 1998 0.10 Santiago del Estero 1998 0.06
Formosa 2003 0.03 Río Negro 1999 0.09 Santiago del Estero 1999 0.10
Formosa 2004 0.03 Río Negro 2000 0.09 Santiago del Estero 2000 0.10
Formosa 2005 0.03 Río Negro 2001 0.09 Tucumán 1989 0.06
Formosa 2006 0.03 Río Negro 2002 0.09 Tucumán 1990 0.06
Jujuy 1989 0.06 San Juan 1989 0.09 Tucumán 1991 0.09
Jujuy 1990 0.06 San Juan 1990 0.09 Tucumán 1992 0.09
La Pampa 1989 0.04 San Luis 1989 0.00 Tucumán 1993 0.09
La Pampa 1990 0.04 San Luis 1990 0.00 Tucumán 1994 0.09
La Pampa 1995 0.08 San Luis 1991 0.00
La Pampa 1996 0.08 San Luis 1992 0.00
La Pampa 1997 0.08 San Luis 1993 0.00
La Pampa 1998 0.08 San Luis 1994 0.00
La Pampa 1999 0.07 San Luis 1995 0.00
La Pampa 2000 0.07 San Luis 1996 0.00
La Pampa 2001 0.07 San Luis 1997 0.00
La Pampa 2002 0.07 San Luis 1998 0.00
La Rioja 1989 0.00 San Luis 2001 0.00
La Rioja 1990 0.00 San Luis 2002 0.00
 
  
 
Chapter 6: Subnational undemocratic regime continuity in Mexico (2000-
2006). Oaxaca and Puebla in comparative perspective 
 
 One of the central theoretical premises of this dissertation is that presidents with the 
capacity of controlling nondemocratic subnational rulers will have incentives to manipulate 
SUR incumbents for their strategic benefit.  Under these circumstances, instead of promoting 
SUR dismantlement, presidents will likely opt to reproduce undemocratic regimes from 
above.  A second major theoretical premise of this study is that whenever presidents cannot 
control over undemocratic rulers, they will have few incentives to promote the continuity of 
SURs, much less to induce their rulers to become part in vertical coalitions.  In such a 
context, the center not only will avoid reproducing SURs from above, but whenever possible, 
it will seek to weaken these regimes.  Nonetheless, the entrenched position of autonomous 
and non-controllable undemocratic incumbents, coupled with presidents’ weak disciplining 
power, allows the former to keep their regimes alive.  When this occurs, a different trajectory 
of SUR continuity ensues, namely, SUR self-reproduction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply these two theoretical premises to the case of 
Mexico, a country that has recently experienced territorially uneven democratization.  To do 
so, the focus shifts from quantitative comparisons to qualitative examination and comparison 
of two subnational cases, Oaxaca and Puebla.  These subnational comparisons shed light on 
the hypothesized causal chains leading to SUR reproduction from above and SUR self-
reproduction.  Following Van Evera’s (1997) recommended method of breaking down the 
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causal chains into their components parts, this chapter examines how presidential control led 
to cooptation, which in turn facilitated the possibility of vertical coalitions, thus resulting in 
SUR continuity from above.  The chapter also explores the alternative causal chain, in which 
lack of presidential control leads to SUR self-reproduction, and examines the causal 
mechanisms that make the outcome possible, namely, the displacement/weakening and 
exclusion from vertical coalitions. Data for these examinations comes from archival 
documents, newspaper articles, official documents, plus 90 in-depth interviews with Mexican 
national and subnational top-rank officials (see list of interviews in the reference section of 
this dissertation). 
 The chapter is organized as follows: the first section provides a justification of the 
subnational case selection.  The second section presents the first case study (Oaxaca), which 
represents a case of SUR self-reproduction. The third section is devoted to the analysis of the 
second case-study (Puebla), which illustrates SUR reproduction from above.  
 The narrative and analysis of the two case studies is organized in the same fashion. 
First, the undemocratic character of the state is presented and evidence regarding how it 
operates is discussed. Much has already been said about undemocratic regimes, but except 
for the indicators presented in chapter 3, little concrete evidence has been presented to 
illustrate specifically how a SUR works. The second subsection of each case study discusses 
the two main subantional variables facilitating or preventing presidential control, i.e., the 
type of state-administration, and financial autonomy.  The third and fourth subsections of the 
case studies analyze the component parts of the causal chains outlined above. Accordingly, 
the third subsection explores the extent to which presidential control was possible, focusing 
on how the combined effect of subnational and national variables enhances or limits 
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presidential control. The fourth, and final subsection of the two case studies, explains how 
this control (or lack thereof) determines the prospects of vertical coalitions and, as a result, 
the type of SUR reproduction followed in each case.  
 
I. Subnational case selection 
 The purpose of conducting an in-depth study is to shed light on and exemplify the 
two causal chains leading to SUR reproduction.  The “diverse” case-study is best for this 
task; according to Gerring (2007), it allows to achieve maximum variance along relevant 
dimensions. This type of case study, then, “requires the selection of a set of cases that are 
intended to represent the full range of values characterizing the independent variable of 
theoretical interest” (Gerring 2007:98).   
 Given that the goal of this chapter is to illustrate how each causal chain is triggered 
by the capacity (or lack thereof) of federal incumbents to control SURs, the two selected 
cases score very differently on the main subnational variable facilitating or inhibiting 
presidential control. As chapter 4 demonstrated, the main instrument of territorial and 
political control during the 2000-2006 period was partisan.  Thus, in order to assess the 
existence of presidential partisan control, which eventually gave way to the hypothesized 
outcome of SUR reproduction from above, a case is needed where presidential partisan 
penetration existed or was enhanced.  By contrast, to estimate the lack of presidential partisan 
control in a given state, and thus the presence of the  second hypothesized outcome –SUR 
self-reproduction– a case is needed where presidential partisan penetration did not exist or 
was neutralized.  As noted earlier, one the main subnational variables capable of neutralizing 
or averting penetration is the nature of a state’s administration: whereas bureaucratic 
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administrations augment the chances of partisan penetration, and patrimonial administrations 
diminish it.  
In light of these considerations, I select one undemocratic bureaucratic state (Puebla) 
and one undemocratic patrimonial state (Oaxaca) (see graph 3.7, chapter 3).  These two states 
were selected out of the bulk of undemocratic-patrimonial and undemocratic-bureaucratic 
regimes because they have several aspects in common. Both rank within the group of the 
least economically developed states in Mexico, both states have been ruled by the PRI since 
the 1930s, and both are located in the south of Mexico. Still, the states differ on the main 
subnational variable of interest, namely, their state administrations.133  Oaxaca and Puebla 
then, not only allow for a most similar case design, but also make a controlled-comparison 
possible, facilitating in turn a more fine-tuned assessment of the main variables’ effect on the 
hypothesized outcomes.  
 
II. OAXACA: A case of SUR self-reproduction 
 
1) The political regime: How does a SUR operate in practice?134 
 The state of Oaxaca, probably more than any other state of Mexico, has long been 
acknowledged as a non-democratic state (Fox 1994; Snyder 1999, 2001; Gibson 2005; 
Benton forthcoming; Lakin 2008; Martínez Vásquez 2007; Sorroza 2006). Still, even though 
                                                 
133
 These states also differ regarding the secondary independent variables, financial autonomy, although in a less 
pronounced way. 
134
 Though I will provide a brief characterization of the administrations that anteceded 2000, the main focus of 
this section (and chapter) will be on José Murat’s (1998-2004) and Ulises Ruiz’ (2004-2010) administrations.  
The reason why I do so is because Murat and Ruiz were the Oaxacan governors who ruled after 2000, when 
national-subnational regime juxtaposition started. 
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the state has, since the 1980s, fallen into the lower places of the Mexican democratic index 
(see chapter 3), Oaxaca has experienced some political liberalization, especially in the 1990s.    
The 1990s were the years during which the PRI started to lose its grip on power, 
when the first signs of democratic openness were observed (Beer 2003; Ward and Rodríguez 
1994, 1999; Eisenstadt 2004, 2006; Magaloni 2006; Ochoa-Reza 2004).  Oaxaca was not an 
exception to this national trend.  For the first time in its history, in 1998, the PRI lost control 
over the state capital city (Oaxaca City) to the PAN.  Signs of political liberalization were 
also seen at the gubernatorial level, where the vote share of the PRI declined from an average 
of 86% in the 1980s, to 74.71% in 1992, and 48.84% in 1998, and finally to 49.42 in 2004, a 
precipitous decline.  This decline in the ruling party’s vote share shrank the PRI’s margin of 
victory while increased the number of effective parties (ENP) competing in gubernatorial 
races (see table 6.1).  Whereas in 1980, only 1.31 parties competed in gubernatorial elections, 
this number jumped to 2.56 in 1998, and even though it declined a bit in 2004, it remained 
above 2 throughout the mid 2000s.   
Yet the higher levels of competitiveness were accompanied by increasing electoral 
fraud.  As table 6.1 shows, the quality of elections during the 1990s gubernatorial races was 
overall low (Oaxaca scored 2 in a scale of 1 to 4, where 4 is no fraud at all) and very low 
during the 2004 elections (when the state got a score of 1).135 Although higher levels of fraud 
reveal the nondemocratic character of the regime, they also may denote increasing political 
competition.  That is, PRI-ruled governors stuff the ballot because they face a stronger 
opposition, one that has the power to win elections.   
                                                 
135
 In 2004, the PRI candidate won the governorship in an allegedly fraudulent election against the PAN-PRD-
Coalition “Todos Somos Oaxaca.” For a thorough account of how the fraud was committed see Cué (N.D.). 
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These signs of increasing competitiveness at the gubernatorial level were partially 
offset by the fact that the PRI continued to exercise tight control over the state’s legislature.  
As table 6.1 indicates, until 1989 the opposition only controlled 25% of the seats of the local 
legislature.  Consistent with the political opening observed in the 1990s, opposition parties 
increased their seats’ share to 40.47%, only to lose ground in 2004, when they controlled 
38.09% of the seats.  The control exercised by the PRI over the state legislature has had 
profound implications for the way in which Oaxacan rulers have exercised power.  It has, for 
instance, allowed PRI governors to rule virtually unchecked. 
 
Table 6.1: Oaxaca’s indicators of democracy 
Year of 
election ENP 
Margin of victory 
in gubernatorial 
races
ENPL 
Strength of the 
opposition in the 
legislature 
Clean 
elections*
Turnover 
(head)**
Turnover 
(party)**
(governor's 
race)
(between winner 
and runner up) in 
percentage terms
(legislative 
seats)
(% of seats 
controlled by the 
opposition)
(Index ch.3)
1980 1.31 82.60 n/a n/a n/a
1983 1.70 25
1986 1.32 82.51 1.72 25 n/a n/a n/a
1989 1.73 25
1992 1.72 65.29 2.04 32.25 2 n/a n/a
1995 2.40 40.47
1998 2.56 11.39 2.17 40.47 2 1 0
2001 2.38 40.47
2004 2.18 3.33 2.38 38.09 1 2 0
2007
Oaxaca's mean 1.82 49.02 2.07 33.34 1.67 1.20 0.00
States' mean 2.03 61.36 2.16 38.32 1.02 1.08 0.39
Min 1.08 4 1.19 8.69 1 0 0
Max 3.37 99.44 4.49 82.14 4 3 2
*The coding of this indicator starts in the 1990s  -the indicator captures levels of fraud
**1997 is the baseline, as it is the year that many Mexican scholars regard as the transitional year (see Magaloni 2005) 
Source: author's calculations (see Appendix chapter 3)
(cumulated)
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Governor’s ruling “styles” 
 Although Oaxaca has been governed by the PRI since the early 1930s, the no-
reelection clause for all Mexican elective posts has allowed for governors’ alternation in 
power.  The rotation of state executives had important implications for Oaxaca’s SUR.  First, 
it was crucial to accommodate different PRI political cliques (camarillas or PRI families) 
within the state, thus avoiding party defection and instability within the party ranks, and 
ensuring in turn the PRI’s continuity in power (see Smith 1979, Camp 1995, Magaloni 2006). 
Despite the fact that the PRI consolidated its power, the existence of executive turnover also 
helped lessen the undemocratic character of the regime.  This was the case because 
governors, who came from different camarillas, and had in consequence different ideological 
backgrounds, policy orientations, and bases of support, could rule the state in different ways.  
Whereas some of them were inclined to engage in more inclusionary, less repressive, and less 
authoritarian practices, others opted to confront, repress, and alienate the electorate.   
 For instance, the administrations of Governors Ramírez (1986-1992) and Carrasco 
(1992-1998) were much more inclusionary and less repressive than post-1998 
administrations.  Even though these two governors were guided by very different ideologies 
and political agendas,136 both courted local elites and organized groups in order to keep an 
inclusionary, non-repressive, albeit corporatist and controlled relationship with their bases of 
support.  Because they had a clear policy orientation and did not radically switch their 
governing agendas, both governors managed to maintain their original bases of support 
unaltered during their respective sexenios (see table 6.2). 
                                                 
136
 Ramírez had a neocorporatist /state-oriented project, whereas Carrasco, a disciple of President Zedillo’s 
policies, ruled the state following technocratic/neoliberal principles. 
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Table 6.2: Oaxaca’s governors, policy-orientation, and constituencies 
Period Governor Party
Governor's 
policy 
orientation
Relationship with local organized groups 
(business (B) and organizaciones (O))
1986-92 Heladio Ramírez PRI neocorporatist B= highly confrontational, O=highly inclusive
1992-98 Diódoro Carrasco PRI neoliberal / 
technocrat B=highly inclusive, O=inclusive
1998-04 José Murat PRI undefined B=inclusive*, selectively confrontational O=inclusive, highly co-opted, and repressive
2004-10 Ulises Ruiz PRI undefined B=moderately inclusive, O=exclusive, and highly 
repressive
*Inclusive during the first two years of his administration
 
 
 The more policy-oriented, ‘programmatic,’ stable, inclusionary, and less-repressive 
ruling styles of Governors Ramírez and Carrasco, contrasted sharply with the less policy-
oriented Governors José Murat (1998-2004) and Ulises Ruiz (2004-).  Governor Murat was a 
pragmatist, a governor who ruled the state with an non-ideological agenda and in an 
improvised manner. His ad hoc and changing ruling style gave him sufficient leeway to court 
different bases of support, but at the same time prevented him from having a longstanding 
and loyal base of support. In fact, one of the main traits of the Murat administration was the 
alienation of and confrontation with the local groups which had originally supported him.   
 For instance, most of the major local entrepreneurs who actively promoted Murat’s 
candidacy and finance his campaign would become targets of the governor’s attacks.  
Members of the business elite were systematically threatened and persecuted, eventually 
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falling victims of state audits commissioned by Murat.137 Prominent members of the local 
media were harassed up to the point of being found guilty and incarcerated for crimes they 
probably had not committed (interview López Lena).  Similarly, newspapers’ printing 
facilities were closed down or taken over (interview Gómez).  Perhaps the only group within 
the local business elite not suffering Murat’s attacks were the local contractors, who allowed 
the governor to divert public monies with shady deals that were made for the construction of 
public works (interviews Gómez, Aldaz, Cué). 
 Governor Murat’s pragmatic and non-ideological ruling style also led him to maintain 
a changing and manipulative relationship with the state’s organizaciones,138 one that 
oscillated between courting and crushing them.  On the one hand, he used a wide variety of 
state resources to co-opt, divide, and extort local organized groups in order to retain their 
support.139  On the other hand, when he could not wield control over these organizaciones, 
the governor never hesitated to threaten, crush, and even incarcerate its leaders and members 
(Martínez-Vásquez 2006, 2007; Sorroza 2006).  In sum, the lack of an ideological and 
programmatic agenda, gave the governor enough maneuverability to entice and repress 
different organized local groups.  
Like Murat, Governor Ulises Ruiz Ortiz (2004-2010), did not have a defined policy 
orientation, much less a programmatic governing agenda (interview Díaz Pimentel). Yet 
unlike Murat, who confronted but also courted local groups, Ruiz did not have an interest in 
                                                 
137
 Interviews: Gómez Nucamendi; Colmenares; Esteva (a); López Lena; see also Martínez Vásquez 2007, 
Sorroza 2006. 
138
 These include local branches of large confederations–such as the teacher’s confederation, as well as medium 
and small unions, social movements, street vendors, and all PRI corporatist organizations. 
139
 Interviews Bailón; Gómez; Murat; Cué; Altamirano; Díaz-Pimentel; Rito Salinas; Aldaz; Leyva, interview 
22, see also Sorroza 2006 
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obtaining the support of local organized groups.  Rather, he alienated and crushed both local 
business elites and organizaciones. Following his predecessor, the day after he assumed 
office, Ruiz ordered the take-over of the major local newspaper (Noticias) and fiercely 
confronted the most prominent business group of the state, the so-called Grupo Oaxaca 
(interview Gómez Nucamendi).  He also initiated a fierce confrontation with local organized 
groups with kidnappings, incarcerations, and persecutions of local grassroots leaders 
(Martínez Vásquez 2006, 2007, interviews Gómez, Díaz Pimentel). Finally, Ruiz’s 
confrontational and repressive practices also affected the local opposition.  Perhaps the most 
vivid example illustrating the governor’s repression and arbitrariness was the order of 
incarceration, issued in December 2004, of Oaxaca’s most popular leader –his former 
opponent and alleged winner of the 2004 gubernatorial race, Gabino Cué.140 This conflictive 
relationship with local organized groups and movements would reach its peak in 2006, when 
the state-government brutally confronted the teachers’/APPO (Asamblea Popular de los 
Pueblos de Oaxaca) movement, unleashing perhaps one of the most violent episodes of state-
led repression in the post-democratic period.141  
Ulises Ruiz’s lack of interest in courting local organized groups and local business 
has to be understood within the broader context of Mexican politics.  Ruiz was one of the 
closest friends, advisors, and campaign managers of Roberto Madrazo, the PRI’s national 
leader, and 2006 presidential candidate.  During his first two years as governor of Oaxaca 
(2004-2006), Ulises Ruiz spent very little time in the state, and delegated his power in his 
                                                 
140
 The governors’ strategy soon backfired, when massive popular mobilizations were organized to prevent 
Gabino Cué’s from being jailed (interview: Cué, see also Martínez Vázquez 2006, 2007).  
141
 The teachers/APPO conflict began in June and lasted until December 2006.  The 6-month clash resulted in 
23 persons being killed, hundreds being arrested and imprisoned, and in the filing of over 1200 complaints with 
human rights commissions (see LASA 2007, Human Rights Watch (HWR) 2007; Amnesty International 2007). 
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secretary of state, Jorge Franco “Chucky” Vargas.  Instead, he was based in Mexico City, 
where he ran and coordinated Madrazo’s presidential campaign (interviews Díaz Pimentel, 
Esteva(a)). Ulises Ruiz’ base of support was not in Oaxaca; instead, it came from the national 
PRI structure, and most concretely from the PRI’s presidential candidate, who at the time 
was a powerful figure within the PRI and in national politics.142  “Ulises Ruiz thought, quite 
reasonably, that he would become a national cabinet member in a Madrazo administration,” 
reported Díaz-Pimentel, the former president of the Oaxaca state-legislature.  “That is why,” 
Pimentel continued, “he cared more about Madrazo and his fate, than about governing the 
state of Oaxaca and its people.”143 
 In sum Oaxaca’s political regime, despite ranking among the least democratic states 
of Mexico, underwent some partial liberalization during the late 1980s and 1990s, under the 
administrations of Ramírez and Carrasco.  In contrast, signs of democratic setback were 
observed during the late 1990s and 2000s under the administrations of Murat and Ruiz. The 
contrast between the more confrontational and violent ruling styles of Governors Murat and 
Ruiz, and the more conciliatory governing styles of Governors Ramírez and Carrasco, 
indicates the fluctuating nature of democratic practices in Oaxaca.  
This underscores three important aspects of the Oaxacan political regime.  First, that 
democracy in the state has made (limited) progress and retrenched over the years.  Second, 
                                                 
142
 Under the party presidency of Madrazo, the PRI managed to win several municipalities, state-legislatures, 
governorships and even seats in the federal Congress.  These victories, which contributed to revert the PRI’s 
electoral performance after the 2000 defeat, empowered Madrazo, as he was viewed as the main architect 
behind the PRI’s post 2000 victories (interview 12, 18, 20). 
143
 A good example illustrating Ruiz’s unwillingness to rule the state, occurred when the governor moved his 
administrative office and residence, the palacio de gobierno, from the central Zócalo to the outskirts of Oaxaca 
City.  To many Oaxacans, the palacio de gobierno symbolized the place where “Oaxacans could petition the 
governor, and stay in touch with him” (interviews: Gómez; Díaz Pimentel; interview 23). 
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the mild regime openness observed in the 1990s (see Fox & Aranda 1996; Ward & 
Rodríguez 1999) was only temporary, and thus warns against the reification of temporal 
patterns into permanent ones.  Third, the retrenchment of democracy in Oaxaca since the 
early 2000s confirms previous scholarship claiming that national democratization in Mexico 
has been accompanied by partial subnational democratic rollback (Gibson 2005; Bautista 
2007; Martínez Vásquez 2006, 2007; Sorroza 2006). In the next section, I examine the 
variables that contributed to the continuance of Oaxaca’s nondemocratic regime after the 
watershed presidential election of 2000. 
 
2) Governors’ instruments of territorial and political control 
(a). Neopatrimonial state administration  
 Different state administrations structure the exercise of political power in distinct 
ways. Indeed, unlike neopatrimonial incumbents, who exercise power virtually unchecked, 
bureaucratic administrations prevent rulers from exerting tight control over state-agencies, 
opposition forces, local organized groups, and civil society, thus paving the way for the 
existence of autonomous local groups. As argued in chapter 2, the nature of state-
administrations has important implications for governors’ capacity to avoid penetration and 
control by the central government, and is thus a major effect on the prospects of SUR 
continuity.   
As noted in chapter 3, Oaxaca ranks among the most neopatrimonial states in Mexico. 
Indeed, as shown by the horizontal and societal accountability indicators of table 6.3, 
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Oaxaca’s agencies responsible for checking the executive branch are weak. 144  Indeed, with 
the exception of 2007, both indicators score a pefect zero.145  Likewise, governors in Oaxaca 
have, for the most part, employed the funds earmarked for specific municipalities in a highly 
discretionary fashion, as illustrated by the index of rulers’ fiscal discretion.  Finally, Oaxacan 
rulers have also bloated the state administration with public employees, thus augmenting 
patronage.  All these indicators reveal that Oaxaca’s level of neopatrimonialism is well above 
the mean of Mexican states, as shown by the last column and penultimate row of table 6.3.    
 
Table 6.3: Oaxaca’s indicators of neopatrimonialism 
Year Ruler's fiscal discretion* †
Societal 
Accountability*
Horizontal 
Accountability* Patronage* Neopatrimonialism*
1997 0.76 0 0 0.69 0.36
1998 0.48 0 0 0.69 0.29
1999 0.71 0 0 0.69 0.35
2000 0.82 0 0 0.64 0.36
2001 0.30 0 0 0.64 0.24
2002 0.82 0 0 0.65 0.37
2003 0.77 0 0 0.66 0.36
2004 0.56 0 0
2005 0.24 0 0
2006 0.39 0.46 0
Oaxaca's mean 0.59 0.05 0 0.67 0.33
States' mean 0.78 0.20 0.22 0.75 0.42
Min 0 0 0 0.05 0.15
Max 1 1 1 1 0.68
Sources: author's calculation (see Appendix chapter 3)
*Lower values indicate higher levels of neopatrimonialism
† Based only on the % of funds (from the Fondo General de Participaciones ) that the governor did not  transfer to 
the municipalities 
 
                                                 
144
 Horizontal accountability mesures the independence and efficiency of the agencies responsible for 
overseeing the use of money (i.e., state audits), whereas societal accountability measures the existence and 
efficiency of the laws of access to pubic information. 
145
 In 2007, Ulises Ruiz, who was under international and national scrutiny due to the violent repression of 
2006, was forced to implement policies aimed at increasing the transparency of his administration. It was in this 
context that he passed the law regulating the access to public information. An official from the Instituto Federal 
de Acceso a la Información (IFAI) (the federal agency responsible for overseeing the implementation of the 
laws of access to public information) reported that the Oaxacan law had several irregularities that would prevent 
Oaxacan citizens from gaining access to public information, once the law becomes effective (interview: Solís).  
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 In addition to controlling agencies of horizontal accountability, preventing instances 
of societal accountability, distributing funds in a discretional way, and relying on patronage, 
both Murat and Ulises Ruiz also sought to concentrate more power by expanding their 
control over municipal levels of government. As table 6.4 shows, when Murat won the 
governorship in 1998, the PRI controlled a sizeable percentage of the state’s municipalities 
(73.68%).  Even though that percentage dropped to 56% during his tenure, Governor Murat 
still controlled more than half of Oaxaca’s municipalities.146  However, despite his ability to 
exercise a tight grip over lower levels of government, Murat suffered a considerable setback 
in 1998 when the opposition PAN won the most populous municipality, the state’s capital 
(Oaxaca City).  This decline, which has continued, as the PRD began to control more 
municipalities, was offset in 2004 when the PRI managed to oust the PAN from Oaxaca City, 
thus resuming political control over the most populated center of the state.  In addition, in 
2007 under the administration of Ulises Ruiz, the PRI successfully reversed the trend by 
increasing the share of PRI governed municipalities to 60.93%. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
146
 Note that not all municipalities in Oaxaca are governed by political parties. In the 1990s, Governor Carrasco 
introduced changes in the municipal electoral codes with the purpose of giving municipal governments the 
freedom to eliminate electoral rules and political parties from local political processes and allowing them to use 
customary practices, the so-called usos y costumbres (uses and customs), to elect local authorities (see 
Eisenstadt 2007, Benton forthcoming). Usos y costumbres is currently used in 418 out of 570 Oaxacan 
municipalities.” Benton (forthcoming) shows convingly that the introduction of the usos y costumbres 
facilitated the PRI’s control over these municipalities. 
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Table 6.4: Percentage of municipalities under PAN, PRI, and PRD control147 
Year of 
election PAN PRI PRD Other parties
1997 7.04% 69.01% 21.83% 2.11%
1998 5.92% 73.68% 19.74% 0.66%
2001 14.67% 56.00% 24.00% 5.33%
2004 13.33% 49.33% 31.33% 6.00%
2007 4.64% 60.93% 31.13% 3.31%
Source: author's calculations based on CIDAC database
 
 
But the element that was more decisive to expand state incumbents’ power over lower 
levels of government, as well as their leverage over the state more broadly, was the existence 
of a neopatrimonial state-administration.  Common neopatrimonial practices used by 
Governors Murat and Ruiz to co-opt and repress opposition mayors included removing 
opposition mayors from office, financially choking opposition municipalities, commissioning 
state audits to investigate financial misdeeds (real or contrived), and inducing, buying off, 
and threatening opposition mayors in order to cause them to break ranks with their own 
parties and side with the governor.  
In addition, Governor Murat used a variety of state resources and programs to benefit 
those mayors who sided with him, and to penalize municipalities whose mayors refused to 
stay by his side.  As several opposition leaders and ex-mayors who refused to side with 
Murat reported, the governor would not give to opposition-ruled municipalities the 
participaciones and aportaciones which, by law, should have directly reached municipal 
coffers (interviews Esteva (a), Esteva (b), Altamirano, Gabino Cué).148 By contrast, these 
                                                 
147
 The figures above only apply to the municipalities where political parties are allowed to compete. 
148
 See also magazine En Marcha, Noviembre 2002; del Collado 2003; Martínez-Vásquez 2007; Lakin 2008. 
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funds flowed smoothly to those municipalities where opposition mayors were willing to side 
with the governor, and most notably to those opposition mayors who were eager to defect 
from their parties and join the PRI’s ranks.149   
Oaxacan governors further consolidated their power using a state-level constitutional 
prerogative, the desaparición de poderes (literally “power disappearance”), which allows 
governors to remove mayors from office under conditions of civil disorder and threats to 
local governability. Governor Murat used two different tactics to remove municipal 
executives from office.  First, he commissioned the state legislature to conduct state audits in 
those municipalities that did not comply with the governor’s orders.  Regardless of whether 
municipalities had engaged in state resource mismanagement or not, state auditors would 
constantly find evidence of state resource mismanagement in opposition municipalities 
(interviews: Esteva (a), Esteva (b), Altamirano).  That evidence alone would suffice to 
remove mayors from office.150 The second strategy was to create civil unrest and by so doing 
threaten local governability. With his skillful control over organizaciones, Murat sent thugs 
to take over municipal buildings.  The purpose of these takeovers was to create the 
appearance of civil disorder and lack of governability needed to allow the Oaxaca Congress 
                                                 
149
 Local party leaders of the opposition were not in a position to stop this defection.  This was in part because 
they did not have either selective or material incentives to sanction or induce copartisans’ defection (interviews 
Esteva(b), 12, 15).  This contrasted sharply with governors’ capacity to buy off mayors of all stripes by 
distributing material rewards. A vivid example showing opposition party leaders’ incapacity to avoid party 
defection occurred during a meeting held among the local PAN leader, PAN mayors, and Governor Murat. As 
the president of the PAN in Oaxaca put it, “in that meeting, [the PAN] mayor of Loma Bonita (Gustavo 
Zanatta) came to me and told me, in front of all the other mayors and the governor, that he was leaving the PAN 
and would join the PRI. Immediately after informing that he was becoming one of Murat’s mayors, Zanatta 
stood up, shook Murat’s hands, and handed him over a box of cigars.  Not only did he break ranks with the 
PAN shamelessly, but he did so in front of all of us.  Later on, the mayor would admit that Murat had offered 
him money and perks in exchange for his loyalty” (interview Esteva (b)). 
150
 State audits were generally not conducted in municipalities ruled by mayors loyal to the governor (see 
Martínez-Vásquez 2007). 
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to declare the desaparición de poderes (interviews Esteva (a), Esteva (b), Altamirano.  See 
also Lakin 2008, En Marcha: 2002).   
The removal of mayors reached unprecedented levels during Murat’s administration.  
Del Collado reports that between 1998 and 2003, Murat removed 25% of mayors (140 out of 
Oaxaca’s 570 municipalities).  According to del Collado (2003), after the 2001 local 
elections the PRD controlled 36 municipalities and, due to Murat’s (and the state 
legislature’s) removals, that number dropped to 29 by mid-2003.  Similarly, in 2001, the 
PAN controlled 29 mayoralties, and by mid-2003 only 17. Convergencia por la Democracia 
had won 6 municipalities in 2001, and only retained Oaxaca City by mid-2003.151 In sum, of 
the 140 removals, 48 were in opposition-controlled municipalities, while the remaining 
occurred in PRI-ruled mayoralties, suggesting that Murat not only attacked the opposition but 
also did not hesitate to punish PRI mayors.152   
After mayors were removed from office, the state government appointed loyal PRI 
administradores municipales (state administrators).153 Once in office, these administrators 
diverted federal funds sent to the municipalities (i.e., aportaciones) to the state government, 
thus illegally contributing to state coffers with resources that were originally destined for 
municipal projects (del Collado 2003, interview Esteva (b)). This strategy of appropriating 
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 For a similar account see Martínez-Vásquez 2007, Bautista 2007. 
152
 In fact, as many interviewees reported, Murat exercised control over PRI mayors by way of threats and 
violence.  Gabriel Esteva, a PAN federal delegate in the state of Oaxaca nicely illustrated how Murat disciplined 
his own copartisans: “before (the legislative) Election Day, Murat gathered PRI mayors and told them: ‘I 
appointed you, and I have the power to remove you from office if I want to do so.  I assign you the task of 
winning this election; if you don’t win in your municipality, you are out’” (see also Reforma October 19, 2003). 
153
 By law, municipal administrators should serve as provisional mayors until new, “extraordinary” elections are 
called.  In the case of Oaxaca, however, administrators stayed in office until the next upcoming electoral cycle 
(del Collado 2003). 
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earmarked funds for municipalities was also common in PRI-ruled municipalities, where 
many mayors gave up money from aportaciones –originally destined to public works, 
education and health programs, and handed it over to the governor and his allies (del Collado 
2003, interview Esteva (b)).   
Buying off, removing, and controlling mayors for the purpose of diverting municipal 
funds to the state-government gave Oaxacan rulers additional resources to keep the regime 
alive. Yet, there were also other factors that helped Murat and Ruiz to maintain the regime in 
place as well as their entrenched position. I now turn to these. 
 
(b). Financial discipline/autonomy 
 One of the instruments of gubernatorial territorial autonomy that can help neutralize 
presidential control while enhancing subnational undemocratic rulers’ power vis-à-vis the 
central government (and within state borders) is the financial autonomy of governors from 
the federal government.  Much of this dependence is contingent not only upon the amount of 
fiscal resources that SURs obtain from the center, but also on governors’ financial 
management of the provincial economies.  This section explores how these two sources of 
financial dependence shaped intergovernmental relations in Oaxaca. 
 Figure 6.3 and 6.4 indicate that Oaxacan governors managed to maintain low deficits 
and relatively low level of indebtedness.  With the exception of 2002, Oaxaca avoided fiscal 
deficits, and the same pattern can be observed with regard to its debt, which never surpassed 
more than 3% of the state’s GDP. 154  Contrary to what one might expect from Murat and 
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 It should be noted that despite the fact that Oaxaca did not incur large deficits, governors used most of the 
state’s revenues to finance current expenditures rather than capital expenditures (SHCP 2007).  
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Ruiz’s neopatrimonial style of government, they managed to maintain a sound economic 
politicy. Rather than engaging in fiscal profligacy and poor financial and fiscal performance, 
as one would anticipate in states ruled by neopatrimonial administrations, Oaxacan governors 
successfully avoided large fiscal deficits and high levels of indebtedness.155  Because of this, 
governors in Oaxaca did not depend on the federal government for financial assistance, and 
were thus in position to increase their autonomy from the center.   
 As figure 6.1 indicates, only 3% of the state’s total revenues come from local 
revenues.  This lack of local resources certainly could have put Oaxaca in a situation of 
tremendous fiscal dependency, one that could have restrained its rulers’ autonomy from the 
center.  However, as shown in chapter 4, the rules structuring Mexico’s revenue-sharing 
system and intergovernmental transfers allowed Oaxacan rulers to neutralize fiscal 
dependency on the central government. The strict fiscal rules regulating the distribution of 
revenues subject to sharing (participaciones) ensured a steady, automatic, and non-
discretionary flow of resources to Oaxaca.156  As figure 6.2 shows, almost 30% of the federal 
funds that were regularly channeled to Oaxaca came in the form of participaciones; that is, 
one third of Oaxaca’s revenues was guaranteed. In addition, even though the federal 
government could manipulate somewhat the distribution of some aportaciones sub-funds, 
                                                 
155
 Neopatrimonial rulers also have incentives to maintain a sound economy, for it is precisely this financial 
austerity that allows them to gain autonomy from the center and further preserve their political power.  For a 
similar finding see Hartlyn (1998), who demonstrates that during the neopatrimonial administration of Balaguer 
in the Dominican Republic, the economy was kept in check.  It was Balaguer’s financial austerity what 
contributed him to lessen the (financial) intervention of the U.S. in the Dominican Republic, as fiscal profligacy 
had several times facilitated US intervention (Hartlyn 1998: chapter 4).  
156
 Even though there are informal mechanisms to manipulate the distribution of these funds, such as the 
withholding of participaciones, evidence gathered in interviews indicates that, during the Fox period, the 
federal government did not resort to this strategy very often (interviews: Colmenares, Lepine).  The reason why 
federal funds were not withheld responded to the strict rules established in the Ley de Coordinación Fiscal 
which penalize the improper distribution of money by the federal government.  The law establishes that the 
federal government must pay interest every day it delays the payment of participaciones and aportaciones.   
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another 50% of Oaxaca’s revenues flowed almost automatically to the state.  As a result, both 
Murat and Ulises Ruiz were in fact provided with the funds they needed to run their state, as 
one close adviser of president Fox claimed:  “Given that the bulk of the federal funds flowing 
to the state [of Oaxaca] was in the form of aportaciones and participaciones, it did not matter 
to a great extent that Fox refused to send additional federal funds to Oaxaca. Murat gets 7 
pesos from participaciones and aportaciones.  He certainly could get another 3 pesos from 
the federal government. Still, it did not matter for Murat that he did not get those 3 pesos.  
There is not much difference, with the 7 pesos he gets from aportaciones and participaciones 
he can survive perfectly well” (interview 11). 
 In sum, two factors contributed to enhance Oaxaca’s financial autonomy from the 
center, namely, (a) governors’ ability to maintain financial discipline and avoid incurring in 
deficits and debt, and (b) and the regular flow of participaciones and aportaciones, which 
was ensured by the institutionalized and non-discretionary nature of Mexico’s revenue-
sharing system and intergovernmental transfers.  These two factors, coupled with the 
existence of a neopatrimonial state administration, enabled governors Murat and Ulises Ruiz 
to avoid instances of presidential territorial penetration and control from above.  Moreover, 
this combination of factors, in interaction with Fox’s own instruments of territorial and 
political control, prevented the central government from gaining effective control over the 
Oaxacan governors. In the next section I explore this interaction of factors.  
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Figure 6.1: Oaxaca:  Income sources 
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Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público [SHCP – UCEF] 
 
Figure 6.2: Oaxaca: Participaciones, Aportaciones, and Other federal 
revenues as a share of total federal revenue 
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Figure 6.3: Oaxaca: Total income – total expenditures (1997-2007)*(in 
millions of Mexican pesos) 
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Figure 6.4: Oaxaca: Debt as percentage of state GDP (1997-2007) 
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3) Interaction of governors and presidents’ instruments of territorial and political 
control 
 As I noted in chapter 2, the ability of presidents to control undemocratic governors is 
shaped by a combination of national and subnational variables.  To be able to 
politically/territorially penetrate and control subnational arenas two conditions are necessary: 
(a) the president needs have the means necessary to subjugate an undemocratic governor, and 
(b) the undemocratic governor’s capacity to resist penetration from above must be minimal. 
In other words, neither of these two conditions alone is sufficient for a president to gain 
leverage subnational politics, rather it is the combination of both that is necessary and jointly 
sufficient.  
 This section explores how national and state-level variables combined shaped the 
prospects of presidential control over Oaxacans rulers and territory, and how this in turn, 
affected the possibility of vertical coalition making and SUR reproduction.  It assesses Fox’s 
main instrument of presidential control (i.e. partisan instrument) and analyzes its 
“effectiveness” against the backdrop of Oaxcacan rulers’ own instruments of control. More 
specifically, I analyze how the lack of the president’s partisan presence, and the existence of 
a neopatrimonial administration and low financial dependency on the center enabled 
Oaxaca’s incumbents to neutralize presidential control. 
During the 1997-2007 period, President Fox’s PAN, did not have a strong presence in 
Oaxaca.  With the exception of the 1998-2001 period, when the party was able to control 
Oaxaca City, the PAN was unable to make political and electoral inroads in the state.  In fact, 
as illustrated in table 6.4, between 1997 and 2007, the PAN only controlled an average of 
9.12% of Oaxacan municipalities, and the party was not able to win any single plurality seat 
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in the state legislature, and where it only controlled a minor percentage of the proportional 
representation (PR) seats.  Of the total seats in the state legislature from 1997 to 2007, table 
6.5 indicates that the PAN’s control ranged from a low of 9.52% to a high of only 16.66% of 
the seats.  
Table 6.5: PAN’s electoral performance in Oaxaca 
Year 
% of PAN 
state 
legislators
% of PAN 
federal 
deputies
% of PAN 
federal 
senators
PAN vote share 
(federal 
legislative 
elections*)
PAN vote share 
(presidential 
elections)
1997 11.9 0 12.16
1998 9.52 0
1999 9.52 0
2000 9.52 10.52 0 24.66 26.46
2001 16.66 10.52 0
2002 16.66 10.52 0
2003 16.66 10.52 0 18.44
2004 16.66 10.52 0
2005 16.66 10.52 0
2006 16.66 10.52 0 16.73 16.77
2007 9.52 5.26 0
Sources: CIDAC data base; Honorable Cámara de Diputados;  IFE; Jones & Mainwaring 
(2003)
*Elections for federal deputies (average plurality and PR seats)
 
 
The electoral power of the Oaxacan PAN was not any different in national contests.  
Of Oaxaca’s 19 federal deputies, the party managed to win only two (one PR and one 
plurality) in 2000, two (PR) seats in 2003, and one (plurality) seat in 2006 (Honorable 
Cámara de Diputados, México).  The PAN’s performance in senatorial races has been even 
worse, as the party has never managed to win any of the three seats assigned to Oaxaca.  A 
similar pattern was observed during presidential elections, where the vote share of the 
Oaxacan PAN was also marginal, only obtaining 26.46% and 16.77% of the vote, in 2000 
and 2006, respectively.  
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The lack of a PAN presence in Oaxaca seriously affected Fox’s capacity to exercise 
control over recalcitrant Oaxacan rulers.  Because the PAN did not control many 
municipalities, and did not have a strong presence in the state’s legislature, Fox could not use 
the local PAN structure to limit the autonomy of the PRI Oaxacan governors from below.  
Yet, despite the party’s weakness, few efforts were made to strengthen the PAN in the state.  
As the local PAN leader noted, “when we asked Creel [Fox’s interior minister] to put more 
limitations on Murat’s despotic power –by then he was removing PAN mayors like no one 
before him did-- Creel asked us:  What is the actual power of the PAN in Oaxaca? Can it be 
used to undermine Murat’s authority? No, so there’s nothing we can do. And he was right, 
the PAN could not do anything to limit the governor’s authoritarianism” (interview Esteva 
(b)).  The unwillingness and incapacity of the Fox administration to strengthen the PAN’s 
presence in the state was further confirmed by one of Fox’s closest advisors, who noted that 
“one of Fox’s mistakes in Oaxaca, was that he did very little to strengthen the [our] party in 
the state.  We should have put more effort in consolidating the PAN’s presence in Oaxaca, 
we should have put more money in Gabino Cué’s campaign, because the only way in which 
authoritarian governors can be weakened is by making opposition parties, our party, 
stronger” (interview # 21). 
The inability to use his party to penetrate in Oaxaca and to control its rulers was 
aggravated by the existence of a neopatrimonial state administration which permitted and 
enhanced the use of practices to co-opt, crush, and control opposition mayors.  It was 
precisely because of these practices that Fox was prevented from using his own partisan local 
branch as a springboard to penetrate the state and control incumbents from below, as the few 
Panista mayors and politicians who controlled power positi
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regarded as “representatives” of Fox in Oaxaca. The local PAN leader noted, “a large 
percentage of the Panista mayors and Panista officials (such as the federal delegates –see 
below) ‘play’ for the governor. He easily co-opts them, and Panistas end up playing by his 
rules” (interview Esteva (b)).   
Two examples illustrate how the lack of strong PAN structure coupled with a 
neopatrimonial state administration prevented President Fox from gaining a foothold in 
Oaxaca.  The first regards the appointment of delegados federales (federal delegates) in 
Oaxaca.  Most of Mexico’s federal ministries have delegaciones federales (federal 
delegations) in the 32 Mexican states. The delegates appointed to these agencies are 
responsible for representing the federal government’s interests, and for overseeing the 
allocation of federal programs in each state.  After assuming the presidency in 2000, Fox 
appointed new federal delegates in the states.  However, given the lack of a strong partisan 
structure in Oaxaca, the president was unable to recruit delegates from his own party ranks.  
As a result, Fox’s was unable to name his own delegates and was forced to negotiate the 
appointment of delegates with the Murat. 157  This allowed Murat to gain more leverage over 
delagates, thus impeding the federal government from using delegates as brokers mediating 
between the federal government and the local population.  But more importantly, the 
negotiated appointment of delegates enabled Murat to position loyal officials in key agencies, 
and they ensured his control over the distribution of a vast number of social programs such as 
Oportunidades, which were key to expanding Murat’s power over the municipalities.    
                                                 
157
 Interviews Gómez Nucamendi, Martínez, Varela, Altamirano, Esteva (a), Esteva (b), Aldaz, interviews 14 & 
19, see also Martínez-Vásquez 2006, Gibson 2005.    
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In 2003 Fox managed to appoint PANistas (allegedly loyal) delegates.  However, 
Murat soon managed to undermine the delegates’ loyalty to the PAN. To do so, he 
blackmailed, threatened (through thugs he sent to the delegaciones), libeled, and bought off 
the new delegates, most of whom, frightened by the governor’s actions, ended up funneling 
federal programs and subsidies to the governor’s agencies, where they would be distributed 
by the governor’s criteria (interview Esteva (a)). 
The second example illustrating how the combination of a weak PAN structure and a 
neopatrimonial state administration resulted in both Fox’s incapacity to discipline and control 
Oaxacan rulers, and the capacity of the governors to avoid control from the center regards 
federal audits conducted in Oaxaca.  One common practice long used to control governors 
from the center is to send auditors to the states to review the administration of federal funds 
(interviews Carrasco, #23).  Given Murat’s and Ulises Ruiz’s misuse of federal funds, 
Oaxaca was audited on several occasions.  Federal audits, which are conducted by the 
Auditoría Superior de la Federación (Federal Superior Audit), are in practice carried out 
with the assistance of the state-level audit, an agency that is responsible to the state’s 
legislature.158  Given this organizational structure, a PRI controlled legislature can easily 
boycott any audit commissioned by the federal government.  
This was exactly what occurred in Oaxaca, where due to the monopoly of the PRI in 
the state’s legislature, both Murat and Ulises Ruiz were able to neutralize the potentially 
damaging effects of federal audits.  In fact, had the PAN had a greater control of the 
legislature, federal audits might have proven to be an important mechanism for keeping 
                                                 
158
 The reason why the Auditoría Superior de la Federación’s (AFS) works in tandem with state-audits is 
because of the former’s lack of personnel in the states.  This means that, at the end of the day, the personnel 
conducting the audits is recruited from local legislatures (interviews Martínez, De los Santos). 
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Oaxacan governors in check.159  The lack of a strong PAN structure, then, was detrimental 
for Fox’s attempts tboth to breach provincial borders and to constrict recalcitrant rulers in 
Oaxaca.   
Finally, the recurrent use of neopatrimonial tactics to co-opt and control other 
organized groups of civil society, such as the organizaciones, diminished Fox’s capacity to 
side with or take control of local organized groups, as they were all easily manipulated and 
controlled by the governor. Federal partisan penetration in Oaxaca was also restricted 
because Fox could not side with or win over other local opposition forces, such as the PRD. 
As shown in table 6.4, most of the opposition mayors and local legislators belonged to the 
PRD, and this diminished Fox’s chances of siding with Oaxaca’s opposition forces, as the 
PAN and the PRD stood at opposite sides of the ideological spectrum (see Eisenstadt 2004, 
2006; Díaz-Cayeros 2004). In addition, the existence of municipalities ruled by usos y 
costumbres, which legally preclude the participation of national political parties in local 
politics, further enhanced local isolation from the national political system, thus hindering 
Fox’s efforts to take hold on local opposition forces (interview Aldaz, see also Benton 
forthcoming). 
 In sum, the lack of a relatively strong PAN structure in the state, combined with the 
neopatrimonial nature of Oaxaca’s state administration helped Oaxacan governors thwart 
political and territorial penetration from above.  Fox’s incapacity to win over Oaxaca and its 
governors gave the president few incentives to promote the continuity of a SUR upon which 
                                                 
159
 Control of the state legislature is also central to prevent governors’ impeachment and removal from office.  
As several interviewees noted, Ulises Ruiz’ obsession with getting a solid majority during the state-legislative 
elections of 2007 responded to his need to prevent the formation of an opposition legislative coalition that could 
eventually impeach him.  Many observers believed that there was sufficient evidence, especially after the 2006 
teachers/APPO conflict, to remove the governor from office.    
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he could not exercise any control, much less, as I show next, induced their rulers to become 
part in vertical coalitions, a topic to which I now turn.   
   
4) Displacement from vertical coalitions and self-reproduction 
 Mexico’s first non-PRI president in 70 years, Vicente Fox, had to rule the country 
within an unfavorable context.  When he took office, 21 out of 32 states were ruled by PRI 
governors, no single party held a majority either in the Chamber of Deputies or in the Senate, 
and only around 300 municipalities (out of 2,417) were governed by his party, the right-
center PAN (Shirk 2000, Mizrahi 2003). Under these circumstances, Fox was forced to strike 
political coalitions with opposition parties, and these also included alliances with subnational 
undemocratic rulers.  In this political context, Fox had few incentives to dismantle SURs.   
 Fox’s need to build coalitions with nondemocratic state-level incumbents, however, 
did not lead him to indiscriminately side with any type of undemocratic governor. As 
explained in chapter 5, the president engaged in selective coalition building, always 
prioritizing alliances with governors whom he could control and induce to cooperate and act 
along the lines of his agenda, and avoiding alliances with autonomous and recalcitrant 
nondemocratic rulers. This was, in fact, what occurred with Oaxaca’s neopatrimonial rulers. 
 The Fox administration’s relationship with Oaxacan governors was one of continuous 
confrontation.  The violent episode in which a group of Sedesol officials was kidnapped in 
Mitla in August 2002; the sit-in in Mexico City’s Zócalo during which Murat and his people 
demanded the release of federal funds withheld by the minister of Communications and 
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Transport; 160  Murat’s ability mobilize groups to travel to Mexico City to protest Fox’s 
policies; the tensions surrounding the appointment of federal delegates in Oaxaca described 
earlier in this chapter;  the claim filed by Murat with the Supreme Court against the federal 
government in 2004161; the federal audits commissioned by Fox to investigate Oaxacan 
governors’ management of federal funds; the reticence of federal ministers to sign Convenios 
de Coordinación with the state of Oaxaca in 2002, as well as their resistance to visit the state 
to promote public works and federal programs after the violent kidnapping of 2002, are 
episodes revealing Murat’s refusal to confront the federal government.  Finally, also 
illustrating this uncooperative stance was s Murat’s leading role in the creation of the 
Governor’s National Confederation (Confederación Nacional de Gobernadores –CONAGO). 
The CONAGO was an organization created in 2001 to advance the collective interests of 
governors vis-à-vis the federal government.  Murat, together with Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador (the PRD contestant in the 2006 presidential election), were among the most 
influential governors who pushed for the creation of this organization.  One of the main 
reasons that led José Murat to create the CONAGO was the need to counterbalance the 
power of a PAN (opposition) president.  As Murat put it, “the CONAGO was created to limit 
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 In 2001, Murat was able to mobilize a considerable number of Oaxacans, including members of his own 
cabinet, local deputies, mayors, and members of the opposition, to go to Mexico City.  Once the protestors and 
Oaxacan politicians arrived in the country’s capital, they were joined by the governor himself in their sit-in in 
the Mexican Zócalo, where they (including Murat) spent 4 days and nights demanding the ministerial funds that 
had been withheld (interviews: Rito Salinas, Díaz Pimentel, Pérez Audelo, Moreno Tello; Sorroza 2006).  As a 
result of this mobilization, the funds, which had already been included in the federal budget and were earmarked 
for the construction an interstate highway, were eventually released.    
161
 This claim was filed following one of the audits commissioned by the federal government, which sought to 
investigate the misuse of aportaciones during the Murat administration.  In the claim, the governor argued that 
with the investigation, the federal government had violated the state’s sovereignty.  Contradicting Mexico’ 
LCF, Murat noted that the money coming in the form of aportaciones was not subject to federal rules, and 
argued that every peso that entered the state could be distributed according to state’s laws. Other claims against 
the federal government were also filed in 2001, also denoting Murat’s confrontational stance vis-à-vis the Fox’s 
administration. 
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Fox’s authority, which it did, but it also turned the relationship between Fox and myself into 
a difficult and confrontational one” (interview Murat). 162  
 Further demonstrating their unwillingness to cooperate with the federal government 
and to create vertical coalitions, Oaxacan governors refused to provide electoral support. 
With their tight control over local actors, resources, and territory, governors could have 
become important mobilizing partners of the president, never did so.  In effect, the results 
obtained in both local and national elections speak of the PAN’s incapacity to strike electoral 
coalitions with Oaxaca’s main political leaders.  Likewise, evidence gathered in interviews 
suggests that during the Fox administration, Oaxaca’s federal deputies and senators, contrary 
to other more cooperative PRI federal congressmen, refused to vote in favor of PAN 
legislative initiatives.  On several occasions, Murat ordered Oaxaca’s national congressional 
delegation to oppose key pieces of legislation initiated by the PAN, including the 2003 fiscal 
reform, and the 2005 federal budget, where support from other PRI legislators was 
decisive.163 In a way, both Murat and Ulises Ruiz did not have the need or the incentives to 
cooperate with a PAN president.   
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 It should be noted that the conflictive relationship between Murat/Ulises Ruiz and Fox was further 
exacerbated by the intra PRI split between the teacher’s union’s leader (Elba Esther Gordillo) and then PRI 
president (Roberto Madrazo).  On December 3, 2003, Elba Esther broke ranks with the PRI after a fierce 
confrontation with Madrazo, and the PRI’s most prominent leaders, among whom were Ulises Ruiz and José 
Murat.  Many interviewees reported that the two Oaxacan leaders were key to removing Elba Esther from the 
PRI.  Soon after this break-up, Elba Esther, one of the most influential and powerful political actors in 
contemporary Mexican politics, sided with president Fox (and later on with Calderón), and became an 
important PAN partner for legislative and electoral coalition building (interviews Jiménez, Rivera Domínguez, 
Rodríguez Uresti, Moreno Valle, interviews 13, 14, 23; for a thorough analysis of this relationship see Raphael 
2007).  The close and functional association between Elba and the PAN, as well as her conflictive relationship 
with Madrazo, Murat, and Ulises Ruiz, toughened Fox’s (and Calderón’s) stance vis-à-vis Oaxacan governors 
(interviews: Aldaz, Palacios Alcocer; interviews 14, 20, 22).    
163
 It is important to note, that Murat unlike other undemocratic governors (such as Ulises Ruiz, who only 
influenced a small number of PRI Oaxacan legislators –because, during his tenure, most of them belonged to 
the PRD), had a tight control over Oaxaca’s congressional delegation.  He managed to ensure Oaxaca’s deputies 
and senators’ loyalty not only due to the monopoly he exercised over legislators’ nominations, and because he 
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The uncooperative relation between Oaxaca and the national government, also led the 
federal government to displace Oaxaca’s rulers from vertical coalitions. Fox did not have an 
incentive to help Oaxacan governors and much less to reproduce Oaxaca’s SUR on whose 
cooperation he could not count. Rather he had enough reasons to weaken the regime, and that 
was what he did. The president, for instance, sought to threaten the stability of governor 
Murat by commissioning several federal audits to investigate Oaxaca’s rulers’ financial 
mismanagement.  In addition, he sought to limit the governor’s power by filing several 
claims with the federal Supreme Court against the state of Oaxaca accusing the incumbents 
of making unconstitutional use of aportaciones.  Also, whenever possible, Fox ‘punished’ 
Oaxacan rulers by discouraging the signing of Convenios de Descentralización.  Finally, 
contrary to how he behaved with other more supportive SURs (such as those of Puebla, 
Veracruz, or Hidalgo), Fox did not reward Oaxaca with additional programs and funds 
(interviews #1:2007, Murat). As figure 6.2 shows, almost all of Oaxaca’s federal revenues 
came in the form of automatic transfers, and only a very tiny part (i.e. “other federal funds”) 
was made up of funds sent at the discretion of the federal government.164  By so doing, the 
federal government managed to isolate and weaken Oaxaca’s SUR. 
Despite Fox’s strategies to weaken Oaxaca’s SUR, Governors Murat and Ruiz 
managed to keep the regime alive.  Several internal factors contributed to this survival.  First, 
the flow of automatic transfers (i.e., participaciones and aportaciones), which was ensured 
by the institutionalized and non-discretionary nature of Mexico’s revenue-sharing system 
                                                                                                                                                        
had financed their campaigns, but most importantly because he disbursed generous monthly payments that 
complemented the legislators’ salaries (interviews: Díaz Pimentel, Rito Salinas, Moreno Tello, Trejo, Aldaz, 
Esteva (b)).  
164
 For quantitative evidence see chapter 5. 
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(Giraudy, chapter 4), allowed Oaxacan rulers to get the funds they needed to run the state 
(interviews #1:2007, Colmenares). Second, as noted earlier, the strategy of co-opting and 
indiscriminately removing mayors from office allowed governors Murat and Ruiz to divert 
municipal federal funds sent to the municipalities (i.e., aportaciones) to the state government, 
thus contributing to fill Oaxaca’s coffers with federal resources that were originally destined 
for municipal projects. Finally, the ability of governors Murat and Ruiz to strike deals with 
private lenders and banks, coupled with their strong connections to high-level PRI national 
politicians165 enabled them to have access to additional resources to finance their regimes. 
This, in turn created opportunities to expand their authority and maintain the regimes alive.  
By so doing, Oaxacan incumbents succeeded in reproducing their SUR despite national 
democratization. 
 
III. PUEBLA: A case of SUR reproduction from above 
1) The political regime: How does a SUR operate in practice?166  
 The state of Puebla, as shown in chapter 3, ranks among the least democratic states in 
Mexico.  Like Oaxaca, Puebla has been governed by the PRI since the 1930s, with no party 
alternation in power for more than 80 years. Table 6.6 indicates that with the exception of the 
effective number of parties (ENP) competing in gubernatorial races, and the quality of 
elections (clean elections), the indicators of Puebla’s political regime reveal low levels of 
                                                 
165
 Murat and Ruiz were among the closest friends, advisors, and partners of Roberto Madrazo, the then PRI 
national leader and the 2006 presidential candidate. 
166
 Though I will provide a brief characterization of the administrations that anteceded 2000, the main focus of 
this section (and chapter) will be on Melquiades Morales’ (1998-2004) and Mario Marín’s (2004-2010) 
administrations.  The reason why I do so is because Morales and Marín were the Poblano governors who ruled 
after 2000, when national-subnational regime juxtaposition started. 
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competitiveness and inclusiveness.  In fact, the margin of victory of the winning party over 
the runner up has been very high (with a period mean of 40.59%), and the PRI’s control over 
the state legislature has been virtually indisputable.   
 
Table 6.6: Puebla’s indicators of democracy 
Year of 
election ENP 
Margin of victory 
in gubernatorial 
races
ENPL 
Strength of the 
opposition in the 
legislature 
Clean 
elections*
Turnover 
(head)**
Turnover 
(party)**
(governor's 
race)
(between winner 
and runner up)
(legislative 
seats)
(% of seats controlled 
by the opposition) (Index ch. 3)
1984 1.59
1986 1.53 69.11 n/a n/a n/a
1987 1.67 24.14
1989
1990 1.7 24.14
1992 1.88 53.27 4 n/a n/a
1993 1.67 24.14
1995
1996 2.22 43.59
1998 2.44 25.84 2 1 0
1999 2.04 33.33
2001 2.28 39.02
2004 2.45 14.12 2.14 36.59 2 2 0
2007
Puebla's mean 2.08 40.59 1.91 32.14 2.67 1.20 0.00
States' mean 2.03 61.36 2.16 38.32 1.02 1.08 0.39
Min 1.08 4 1.19 8.69 1 0 0
Max 3.37 99.44 4.49 82.14 4 3 2
*The coding of this indicator starts in the 1990s  -the indicator captures levels of fraud
**1997 is the baseline, as it is the year that many Mexican scholars regard as the transitional year (see Magaloni 2005)
Source: author's calculations (see Appendix to chapter 3)
(cumulated)
 
 
Yet, as occurred with most of the states in Mexico in the 1990s, Puebla’s political 
regime experienced a precipitous opening in 1995 and 1998 during the state-legislative and 
gubernatorial elections, respectively.  Table 6.6 shows that the number of effective parties 
competing for the governorship in the 1998 gubernatorial election jumped from 1.88 in 1992, 
to 2.44, at which point it remained stable thereafter.  Likewise, the margin of victory of the 
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PRI in the 1998 election shrank considerably, from 53.27% in 1992, to 25.84%, in 1998, and 
to 14.12% in 2004.  The increasing level of electoral competitiveness, however, was 
accompanied with increasing electoral fraud. As occurred in other states, such as Oaxaca, the 
quality of elections during gubernatorial races has decreased, and the index measuring clean 
elections scored 4 in 1992 to then fell to 2 in 1998-2004.  The higher levels of electoral fraud 
perpetrated by the ruling party may be indicating the PRI faced the real possibility of losing 
elections due to the existence of a stronger opposition. 
 Similar signs of political liberalization can be observed in the state legislature, 
although here the trend is more erratic and less pronounced.  The effective number of parties 
competing for state-legislative seats rose from 1.67 in 1993 to 2.22 in 1995.  In that same 
election, the opposition managed to win almost the majority of the seats (i.e., 43.59%).  
However, the opposition’s initial gains in the 1990s were soon offset by the progressive 
legislative recovery of the PRI and the opposition only won 33.33% of the seats in 1999, 
39.02 in 2001, and 36.59 in 2004, never again attaining the high results of 1995.  The 
decreasing legislative power of the opposition has had important implications for expanding 
the PRI hegemony in the state.  In fact, the control exercised over the legislature has allowed 
the PRI to prevent the governor’s impeachment, or the passage of legislation that could check 
the power of the state’s executive. 
 
2) Governor’s ruling “styles” 
 As in Oaxaca, different PRI undemocratic governors have ruled Puebla using very 
different political agendas and ideologies.  These different ruling styles had important 
consequences for the state’s political regime, as they determined the relationship between 
  201 
governors and local organized groups, as well as the nondemocratic character of regime.  
Whereas some rulers displayed a more inclusionary and conciliatory ruling style, others 
opted to follow a more confrontational and alienating style of government that exacerbated 
undemocratic procedures (see table 6.7).  
 
Table 6.7: Puebla’s governors, policy-orientation, and constituencies 
 
Period Governor Party Governor's policy 
orientation
Relationship with local organized groups 
(business (B) and organizaciones^ (O))
1992-98 Manuel Bartlett PRI developmentalist
B=selectively inclusive*, O=highly exclusive, 
alienation of PRI's corporatist structures and PRI 
local caciques
1998-04 Melquiades Morales PRI undefined B=inclusive O=highly inclusive and accomodative
2004-10 Mario Marín PRI undefined B=selectively inclusive, O=repressive**
*Mostly confrontational during the second half of the administration
**Especially during the first year of the administration (i.e., 2005)
^ The local population regards organizaciones  as the local branches of large confederations–such as the teacher’s 
confederation, as well as medium and small unions, social movements, street vendors, and all PRI corporatist 
organizations. 
 
 
 For instance, Governor Manuel Bartlett (1992-1998) was a PRI politician who had 
made his political career in Mexico City and had few political contacts with Puebla’s PRI 
politicians and the PRI’s local structure (i.e., mayors, local deputies, as well as members of 
all PRI local corporatist organizations).167  However, despite his lack of political insertion in 
the state, Bartlett did little to entice local PRI politicians and PRI brokers.  The governor’s 
                                                 
167
 Bartlett occupied important national posts during the presidential administrations of Miguel de la Madrid 
(1982-1988), and Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), and was a PRI presidential nominee on several occasions.  As 
minister of interior of De la Madrid, Bartlett played a key role during the 1988 presidential election, as he was 
responsible for validating Salinas’ (fraudulent) election.  In exchange for the 1988 famous “caída del sistema” 
(i.e., the computer system’s breakdown), which Bartlett orchestrated, he was offered the Ministry of Education 
under Salinas. When relations with Salinas deteriorated, Bartlett left the national government and became 
governor of Puebla.   
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project was to “modernize” Puebla, and in this the traditional PRI structures were a 
stumbling block.  Bartlett arrived in Puebla with the goal of “showing the rest of Mexico 
what he would have done with the country had he become Mexico’s president” (interviews 
Morales, Hernández y Genis, Ehlinger).  During his tenure, Bartlett invested heavily in 
public works, engaged in important projects of urban development, and placed a strong 
emphasis on the construction of technological schools/universities.  
 His state project was ambitious, and not only was targeted to modernize the state. It 
also aimed at aggiornating the local PRI and that necessarily included the isolation of the 
more traditional actors of the local PRI regime (interview Hernández y Genis, Alcántara, 
Velázquez).  Soon after assuming the governorship Bartlett began to replace and alienate 
traditional local PRI politicians.  Instead of relying on local PRI officials, Bartlett appointed 
out-of state ministers and refused to form electoral coalitions with local caciques, in part 
because he wanted to strengthen the PRI’s formal institutions and its bureaucracy.168 The 
strategy of modernizing the local PRI via the displacement of local and traditional PRI 
politicians and brokers worked well during Bartlett’s first years in office, yet it proved 
disastrous in 1995, when municipal elections were held.  
Indeed, one of the unintended consequences of Bartlett’s strategy vis-à-vis the local 
PRI structure was that the displaced caciques progressively opened up their strongholds to 
opposition parties, thus, for instance, allowing PAN politicians to campaign in the small 
towns of the interior.  As the former president of the local PAN branch noted, “as president 
                                                 
168
 Bartlett’s disdain for local traditional PRI structures and his preference for the PRI’s formal institutions was 
observed during the governor’s visits to Puebla’s interior.  In many occasions, as several Poblano politicians 
noted, Bartlett would arrive in the small towns and hold meetings with the PRI local representatives, while 
deliberately ignoring local caciques, even when the latter had control of the party machine (interviews: Fraile, 
Hernández y Genis, Escobedo, Velázquez, Moreno Valle). 
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of the PAN in Puebla, I had attempted, with little success, to campaign in the interior.  Every 
time I visited these parishes and handed out fliers, people would laugh at me and would 
return the fliers.  My party’s popularity changed abruptly in the mid 1990s, when the local 
caciques began to be ignored by Governor Bartlett.  It was in this context, for instance, that 
José Esquitín, a powerful and well known cacique from the Sierra in Puebla, allowed me to 
colonize and open a PAN branch in the Sierra. I began with 200 followers and little by little I 
was able to penetrate in the cacique’s strongholds” (interview Fraile). 
“The party’s traditional bases, and the people in the interior,” as Bartlett himself 
noted, “repudiated us.  They all turned to the PAN, who then began to gain considerable 
force” (see also Eisenstadt 2005, Snyder 2001a). The PRI’s electoral debacle was not only in 
the interior but also reached the urban centers, where for the first time since 1930 the party 
lost control of the state’s capital and other major urban areas, such as Atlixco to the PAN.169   
As a result of the 1995 electoral defeat, Bartlett was forced give up his 
confrontational stance, rapidly turning back to appeal to the PRI’s more traditional and 
corporatist sectors of the party and the caciques.  Threatened by the growing number of 
PAN-ruled municipalities, Bartlett also toughened his position vis-à-vis PAN mayors, and 
during the last half of his administration Bartlett even was said to commission thugs to 
generate conditions of ungovernability in PAN-ruled municipalities, and to violently 
apprehend officials of PAN ruled municipalities (interviews Mantilla, Hinojosa).170  The 
                                                 
169
 Several PAN local politicians argued the PAN had already been able to win the state’s capital in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, but obscure vote counting procedures and fraudulent practices had prevented the PAN 
from taking office in Puebla city (interview Hinojosa, Ehlinger). 
170
 It was also in this context that the famous “ley Bartlett” (Bartlett’s law) was put in place.  Claiming the 
state’s sovereignty, Bartlett altered the formula to distribute federal earmarked funds among municipalities.  
The new coefficients of distribution disproportionally favored the less populated municipalities of the state, and 
not incidentally, the ones which were ruled by the PRI. 
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governor also deepened his authoritarian practices vis-à-vis other social groups, such as the 
local elite, and most notably against local journalists and media owners who were 
systematically threaten and coerced (interviews Mejía, #24).  In short, Bartlett’s initial 
moderate attempt at dismantling the regime’s undemocratic institutions and practices were 
soon rolled back and replaced by a more traditional and authoritarian style of government. 
 Bartlett’s immediate successor, PRI Governor Melquíades Morales (1998-2004), 
ruled Puebla with a more conciliatory style. Unlike Bartlett, whose prior political career had 
taken place out-of-state, Morales worked his way up the PRI hierarchy, serving in different 
bureaucratic and electoral positions in Puebla.  In part because he was a local politician, but 
also in part because he learned the 1995 lesson well, Morales sought to incorporate all the 
state’s PRI cliques within his government.  In order to avoid the hostility of local PRI 
politicians and PRI caciques, Morales appointed members of all of Puebla’s PRI’s cliques as 
secretaries of state to ensure Puebla’s governability. 171  As one of his secretaries reported, 
“Melquiades [Morales] wanted to ensure governability, he knew that an unemployed 
politician is like a guerrilla soldier; he messes with you and seeks to destabilize the 
government” (interview Moreno Valle).  
 Morales’ accommodational strategy had one important drawback however: it 
prioritized politics over policy making.  Most of the appointed secretaries were prominent 
local politicians but inexperienced officials and policy-makers.  As a result, Morales’ 
administration was characterized by poor and uncoordinated policy implementation, as well 
                                                 
171
 For instance, Morales appointed Rafael Moreno Valle, the grandson of former Puebla’s governor, as 
secretary of finance; a representative of governor Piña Olaya’s (1986-1992) group was appointed as secretary of 
communications and transport;  Bartlett’s former attorney general, was appointed as secretary of government 
and, afterwards, as secretary of education (interviews Morales, Moreno Valle, Hernández y Genis). 
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as inter-ministerial deadlock (interviews: Moreno Valle, Velázquez).  Yet, despite his poor 
administrative performance, Morales was regarded as a popular governor.  His charisma;  his 
close and smooth contact with the popular, indigenous, and poor classes; his sensitivity to 
social issues; his collegial relationship with the organized local groups and the media;  his 
conciliatory style –all contributed to make his administration look less undemocratic.172 
 Morales’ successor, Mario Marín Torres (2004-2010), had served as Puebla City’s 
mayor between 1998 and 2001, and as secretary of the interior during the last half of 
Bartlett’s administration. Like Morales, Marín had made his political career in Puebla, but 
unlike his immediate predecessor, he was associated with the local PRI’s more authoritarian 
wing.  In fact, in his capacity as secretary of interior (during Bartlett’s term), Marín was 
responsible for several human rights violations, arbitrary detentions, and violent 
confrontations with the opposition (interviews Hinojosa, Mantilla, Ehlinger). 
As governor, Marín resumed the old undemocratic practices incurring in severe 
violations of human rights, especially in the small towns of the interior, while launching a 
fierce battle against local independent media and journalists, in who investigated the 
governor’s deals and mismanagements.  They were oftentimes sued for libel (interviews, 
Mejía, Ehlinger, Mantilla, Aguilar, Ibañez).  Finally, during his administration, many 
newspapers as well as radio stations were either bought by the government or simply forced 
to close down (interview Mejía).   
Marín’s confrontational reached a critical moment in February 2006, after the 
breakout of the Lydia Cacho scandal.  Cacho was an investigative journalist and director of a 
                                                 
172
 Most of the Poblano politicians interviewed during field work, agreed about governor Morales’s exceptional 
ability to establish cordial relationships with opposition forces, co-partisans, and the general population.   
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women’s rights center in Cancún (state of Quintana Roo), who uncovered several networks 
of pedophiles and child pornographers operating in Cancún.  The head of these networks 
were local businessmen and Poblano businessman Kamel Nacif, a close friend and campaign 
supporter of governor Marín.  Cacho had been arrested in Cancún, transported to and 
incarcerated in Puebla, in a questionable procedure carried out by Puebla’s police outside 
their home state. Puebla’s governor was implicated in the scandal through a tape of a 
conversation with businessman Nacif, in which the two men were discussing plans to arrest 
and prosecute Cacho.  The scandal, which created national outrage, also uncovered Mario 
Marín’s shady connections with a reprehensible business, his predisposition to participate in 
human rights violations and his determination to deter investigations and to imprison 
journalists.  
 The Cacho scandal, which erupted during the final months of the 2006 presidential 
campaign, had profound implications for Marín’s administration and the fate of the local 
PRI.  For one, most of Puebla’s organizations, as well as local business groups, openly 
condemned the governor’s actions, seriously weakening the governor’s base of support.  
Leaders of the main local business associations went to the point of filing claims with the 
federal congress against Marín’s human rights violations (Centro de Documentación, 
Información, y Análisis –Honorable Cámara de Diputados 2006). Similarly, the private sector 
withdrew capital investments from the state, claiming that the lack of rule of law was not 
propitious (interview Ibañez, Mejía).  Finally, Puebla’s society as a whole strongly 
repudiated the governor’s behavior, and this social censure was most notably seen in the July 
2006 elections, when the PRI lost considerable ground vis-à-vis the PAN.  As a consequence 
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of this popular disaffection, Marín had no choice but to slightly moderate his authoritarian 
ruling style. 
 The evidence presented so far indicates that Puebla’s political regime, despite ranking 
among the least democratic states of Mexico, underwent some partial liberalization during 
the first 3 years of Bartlett’s tenure and throughout the Morales administration.  By contrast, 
signs of democratic setback were observed during Mario Marín’s tenure. In addition, the 
contrast between the more confrontational and violent ruling styles of Governors Marín and 
Bartlett (during the second half of his administration), and Morales more conciliatory style, 
indicates that democratic practices in Puebla have fluctuated over time. Finally, the 
retrenchment of democracy seen in Puebla in the recent years confirms previous scholarship 
claiming that national democratization in Mexico has been accompanied by partial 
subnational democratic rollback (Gibson 2005; Bautista 2007; Martínez Vásquez 2006, 2007; 
Sorroza 2006). 
 
3) Governors’ instruments of territorial and political control 
(a). Bureaucratic state administration   
 The cross-provincial and cross-temporal evidence presented in chapter 3 indicates 
that Puebla, unlike other undemocratic regimes, has a moderately bureaucratic state 
administration.  In fact, as table 6.8 shows, of the different indicators that make up the 
neopatrimonial index, in Puebla, rulers’ fiscal discretion, patronage, as well as the aggregated 
index of neopatrimonialism, all score well above Mexico’s states’ mean (recall that lower 
values on each scale indicate more neopatrimonialism). Levels of patronage, measured as the 
size of the public administration, have undergone some improvement.  With the exception of 
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2001 and 2003, rulers’ fiscal discretion for the most part has been low.  Yet, a different 
pattern is observed regarding societal and horizontal accountability, as both indicators score 
below the other states’ mean. However, even though Puebla’s agencies of horizontal 
accountability rank below average, they have experienced a considerable improvement 
throughout 2000-2006.  Finally, even though Puebla has made some progress towards 
ensuring greater societal accountability, the state only passed a law of access to public 
information in 2004, several years after other more bureaucratic states, such as Jalisco and 
Querétaro, which were committed to ensuring greater transparency early in the period.  
Table 6.8: Puebla’s indicators of neopatrimonialism 
Year Ruler's fiscal discretion* †
Societal 
Accountability*
Horizontal 
Accountability* Patronage* Neopatrimonialism*
1997 0.82 0 0 0.89 0.43
1998 0.82 0 0 0.89 0.43
1999 0.82 0 0 0.90 0.43
2000 0.82 0 0.11 0.91 0.46
2001 0.49 0 0.33 0.91 0.43
2002 0.82 0 0.44 0.91 0.54
2003 0.20 0 0.56 0.91 0.42
2004 0.82 0.35 0.67
2005 0.82 0.42 0.78
2006 0.82 0.50 0.89
Puebla's mean 0.73 0.13 0 0.90 0.45
States' mean 0.78 0.20 0.22 0.75 0.42
Min 0 0 0 0.05 0.15
Max 1 1 1 1 0.68
Sources: author's calculation (see Appendix chapter 3)
*Lower values indicate higher levels of neopatrimonialism
† Based only on the % of funds (from the Fondo General de Participaciones ) that the governor did not  transfer 
to the municipalities 
 
 
In addition to enhancing agencies of horizontal and societal accountability, respecting 
the rules of fiscal distribution, and reducing patronage, Puebla’s rulers (Governor Morales 
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most notably) promoted other bureaucratic practices.173  One practice was to respect instead 
of suffocate opposition parties and opposition-ruled municipalities.  In fact, as table 6.9 
illustrates, after 2001 the PRI lost considerable electoral presence and political power at the 
municipal level to other parties, especially the PAN. 
 
Table 6.9: Percentage of municipalities under PAN, PRI, and PRD control 
Year of 
election PAN PRI PRD Other parties
1997 10.14% 86.18% 3.23% 0.46%
1998 6.45% 84.33% 6.45% 2.30%
2001 21.20% 65.44% 8.76% 4.61%
2004 26.73% 60.83% 7.37% 3.69%
2007 23.50% 67.28% 5.53% 3.69%
Source: author's calculations based on CIDAC database
 
 The more bureaucratic nature of Puebla’s state-administration may have deterred 
Poblano governors from using extreme tactics to crush, co-opt, and manipulate local 
opposition forces and local organized groups.  In fact, as many Poblano opposition leaders 
noted, unlike what happened in other neopatrimonial SURs such as Oaxaca, where governors 
blackmailed opposition mayors with state audits and removals from office, opposition (and 
even PRI) mayors in Puebla did not, for the most part, suffer these retaliations.   
Despite the fact that during Morales’ tenure other opposition groups began to threaten 
the PRI’s presence in the municipalities, the governor maintained a collegial relationship 
with the opposition.  Instead of isolating and financially choking opposition municipalities, 
Morales did not distribute federal and provincial funds with a partisan criterion (interviews 
                                                 
173
 Indeed, as table 6.8 shows, for the most part, progress toward more “bureacraticness” occurred under the 
administration of Melquíades Morales (1998-2004).   
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Velázquez, Moreno Valle, Ibáñez).  Instead, he not only transferred what was prescribed by 
the law, but he also rewarded opposition municipalities based on their financial performance 
and their efficiency in providing public goods.174 These incentives based on performance 
most notably benefited PAN-ruled municipalities (rather than PRI and PRD municipalities), 
which in general were ruled by less corrupt, more managerial, and more efficient mayors. 
Unlike Oaxacan patrimonial rulers, who blackmailed opposition mayors with state 
audits, opposition (and even PRI) mayors in Puebla did not, for the most part, suffer these 
retaliations.  As the first Panista mayor of Puebla City reported, “during Morales’ term, the 
governor ceased to threaten us with state audits, he would not commission state audits to 
extort us” (interview Hinojosa).  Morales also avoided using the very common practice 
among patrimonial rulers of removing disloyal and opposition mayors.  During his years in 
office, not a single mayor was removed in Puebla.  
This collegial treatment of opposition forces was also true in the state legislature, 
where Morales treated PAN and PRD legislators in a respectful and conciliatory manner 
(interviews Velázquez, Mantilla).  A similar relationship existed between the governor and 
the federal delegates.  Despite the fact that most of them had been appointed with Morales’s 
consent and only few belonged to the PAN, properly speaking, Morales did not co-opt and 
coerce federal delegates for the purpose of gaining control over federal programs and 
resources.  Instead, he was respectful of their autonomy, and by so doing created a closer 
                                                 
174
 For instance, Morales instituted a state program (FONCON), which consisted in a competitive process 
through which municipalities were assigned funds for public works. Municipalities offered to pay a given 
amount of money, and if that amount surpassed 50% of the total price, they were awarded the public work (in 
general, states in Mexico pay 50% of the public work, while the remaining part is paid by the municipality). 
Several ex-PAN mayors reported that it was mostly through this program that they managed to improve 
municipal infrastructure (interviews Velázquez, Contreras Coeto). 
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contact between the federal government and the local population, a core objective of the Fox 
administration (interview Mantilla). 
This cordial relationship with opposition parties, opposition mayors, federal 
delegates, and the citizenry more broadly, deteriorated when Mario Marín assumed the 
governorship in February, 2005.  During his first year in office, and before the Cacho scandal 
broke out in February, 2006, Marín maintained tense relationships with federal delegates, 
especially the Sedesol (Secretary of Social Development) delegate who refused to hand over 
Sedesol programs which the governor sought to use to favor Madrazo’s presidential 
campaign in Puebla (interview Mantilla).  Similarly, during 2006, Marín made more 
discretional use of the aportaciones, with which he favored PRI mayors at the expense of 
PAN municipalities, and he also kept a closer eye on PAN mayors’ expenditures, 
periodically threatening them with state audits (interview Contreras Coeto).  However, this 
shift to patrimonial practices lasted only briefly, becoming less pronounced after the Cacho 
scandal, when the governor lowered the level of confrontation with opposition mayors and 
promoted a more cordial relationship with the federal delegates.  
 All in all, the more bureaucratic character of Puebla’s state administration prevented 
Puebla’s governors from exercising tight control over the state, its people, the opposition, 
other organized groups, and especially over state resources.  In effect, the more bureaucratic 
nature of the state administration, as well as the more bureaucratic practices promoted by 
Puebla’s governors, all contributed to disperse political power, thus reducing governors’ 
political clout and territorial control within Puebla’s borders. 
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(b). Financial discipline/autonomy 
 Unlike the pattern observed in Oaxaca, which was stable throughout the period 
covered in this study, the performance of Puebla’s economy was erratic.  The data presented 
in figures 6.2 and 6.3 indicate that Puebla’s economy has suffered profound crises, as 
depicted by the massive deficit of 2004, as well as other more moderate ones in 2001 and 
2002.175  This pattern of profligacy, which was reversed in the 2004-2005 period, when total 
revenues surpassed total expenditures, was evident again (although in a less pronounced 
manner) in 2006, during Marín’s administration.176  A similar erratic pattern can be seen with 
the levels of indebtedness.  Whereas debt remained low (0.5% of the state’s GDP) during the 
2000-2003 period, it doubled after 2003, reaching the level of 1.2% of the state’s GDP in 
2003-2004, the highest point of the period.  All in all, the relatively high levels of 
indebtedness, as well as the financial vulnerability observed during recent years, have 
certainly decreased Puebla’s governors’ autonomy vis-à-vis private lenders and the federal 
government.  Thus, in contrast with Oaxacan rulers, Puebla’s rulers were more vulnerable to 
being subjugated by the federal government.177   
                                                 
175
 The steep increase of expenditures over revenues observed in 2003 responded to electoral cycles.  In 2003, 
the Poblano government used large amounts of money to win votes in the mid-term legislative and local 
elections. The “hoyo financiero” (financial hole), as this massive overspending was known, also caused 
important fractures within the PRI, especially between the finance minister (Rafael Moreno Valle) and the 
governor.  Moreno Valle, then a PRI candidate for the governorship, broke ranks with the PRI and joined the 
PAN.  He became a panista federal senator in 2006, and is considered as one of the main contenders for the 
2010 gubernatorial race.   
176
 As in Oaxaca, Poblano rulers have used most of the state’s revenues to finance current rather than capital 
expenditures (SCHP data 2007).   
177
 Even though the overall (averaged) levels of indebtedness in both states might look similar, Puebla’s debt, 
with the exception of 2006, has remained constantly higher than in Oaxaca’s. Perhaps more importantly, the 
size of the state’s surplus has been considerably lower in Puebla than in Oaxaca.   
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 However, this financial dependency was somewhat moderated by the fact that, as 
illustrated by figures 6.5 and 6.6, around 90% of Puebla’s total income comes from the 
federal government in the form of participaciones and aportaciones.  Since these funds flow 
automatically to the states, the bulk of Puebla’s income is guaranteed. In fact, not only is the 
flow assured, but it is not subject to presidential discretion, thus decreasing the financial 
vulnerability of Puebla vis-à-vis the federation.  
 In sum, Puebla’s financial autonomy from the center was somehow limited by the 
poor economic performance, which was characterized by large deficits, and lack of financial 
discipline, which translated into increased indebtedness.  Yet, the regular flow of 
participaciones and aportaciones, provided Puebla’s governors rulers with some financial 
relief as well as some financial autonomy from the center.  However, the existence of a 
bureaucratic state-adminsitration greatly contributed to increase Puebla’s vulnerability vis-à-
vis Fox.  In effect, this type of administration, in interaction with Fox’s own instruments of 
territorial and political control, contributed to expand the president’s capacity to exert 
leverage from below over Puebla’s incumbents.  In the next section I explore how this 
interaction of factors gave Fox strong incentives to contribute to reproduce Puebla’s SUR.  
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Figure 6.5: Puebla:  Income sources 
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Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público [SHCP – UCEF] 
 
Figure 6.6: Puebla:  Participaciones, Aportaciones, and Other federal 
revenues as a share of total federal revenue 
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Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público [SHCP – UCEF] 
Figure 6.7: Puebla: Total income – total expenditures (1997-2007)* (in 
millions of Mexican pesos) 
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Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público [SHCP – UCEF] 
*Debt service included.  2006 gets a score of 0, thus the absence of bar. 
 
Figure 6.8: Puebla: Debt as a percentage of state GDP (1997-2007) 
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Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público [SHCP – UCEF] 
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4) Interaction of governors and presidents’ instruments of territorial and political 
control 
 Although Puebla has been ruled by the PRI since the 1930s, opposition parties have 
managed to make political inroads in the state.  Most notably, the PAN, has over the years 
developed a solid partisan structure in Puebla that has allowed it to penetrate in areas that 
were formerly controlled by local PRI caciques. Indeed, from the watershed 1995 municipal 
election onwards, the party has been able to systematically won municipalities and seats in 
the local congress.  Despite the fact that the PAN was not able to win the state’s capital after 
1998, it increased the percentage of municipalities under its control from 10.14 in 1995 to 
26.73 in 2004 (see table 6.10).  The trend was mixed in local congressional races, however: 
the PAN controlled 35.89% of the seats between 1995-1998, 20.51% during 1998-2000, and 
25.64% between 2001-2006 (see table 6.10).  
The growing presence of the PAN in Puebla was also observed in national contests.  
As displayed in table 6.10 below, between 2000 and 2002, the PAN controlled 44.44% of 
Puebla’s legislative delegation (obtaining a total of 6 plurality and two PR seats).  Even 
though that percentage decreased to 38.88% (i.e., five plurality and two PR seats) during the 
2003-2006 period, the party managed to dominate the state’s congressional delegation in 
2006, when it won 70% of Puebla’s seats (obtaining 14 plurality and two PR seats).  A 
similar trend was observed in the federal senate, where the PAN controlled one seat (33.33%) 
between 1997 and 2005, and two seats (66.66%) since 2006 out of a total of three seats.  
Finally, the electoral performance of the PAN in Puebla during presidential elections was 
exceptional, as the two most recent PAN presidents, Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón, 
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received landslide victories in the 2000 and 2006 elections, respectively.  In both occasions 
the PAN won over PRI candidates, with 42.53% of the vote in 2000, and 37.49% in 2006.  
 
Table 6.10: PAN’s electoral performance in Puebla 
Year 
% of PAN 
state 
legislators
% of PAN 
federal 
deputies
% of PAN 
federal 
senators
PAN vote share 
(federal 
legislative 
elections*)
PAN vote share 
(presidential 
elections)
1997 35.89 33.33 24.76
1998 20.51 33.33
1999 20.51 33.33
2000 20.51 44.44 33.33 39.71 42.53
2001 25.64 44.44 33.33
2002 25.64 44.44 33.33
2003 25.64 38.88 33.33 33.18
2004 25.64 38.88 33.33
2005 25.64 38.88 33.33
2006 25.64 70 66.66 35.26 37.49
2007 20.51 70 66.66
Sources: CIDAC data base; Honorable Cámara de Diputados;  IFE; Jones & Mainwaring 
(2003)
*Elections for federal deputies (average plurality and PR seats)
 
 
The strong presence of a PAN structure in a state ruled by the PRI had profound 
implications for Fox’s capacity to penetrate the state and for his ability to constrain 
undemocratic PRI governors from below.  Unlike Oaxaca, where there was a dearth of 
Panista mayors and officials, the existence of co-partisans both at the municipal level of 
government and in the federal legislature allowed President Fox to expand his presence and, 
more importantly, to constrict Puebla’s rulers from below.  
The existence of Panista federal congressmen, for instance, was key to penetrate the 
state with additional federal resources and to further strengthen the PAN’s electoral base of 
support. With their tight connection with the federal government, Panista deputies and 
senators managed to get easy access to federal state-resources (i.e., money, social programs, 
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subsidies, among others).  These resources, which in turn were channeled to the Puebla’s 
PAN branch, were distributed among local Panista bases of support (interviews Ibañez, 
Moreno Valle), and also used to entice and buy off political loyalties.178 The access to federal 
resources was certainly decisive in increasing Fox’s presence in the state, and his ability to 
control (and threaten) PRI governors from below (interviews Ibáñez, Moreno Valle). 
More importantly, the capacity of the president to politically penetrate in Puebla was 
further enhanced by the existence of a bureaucratic state administration.  As noted earlier, 
bureaucratic state administrations constrain governors’ authority by limiting their capacity to 
exercise tight control over people, opposition forces, resources, and territory.  The 
combination of such an administration with the existence of a strong Panista structure were 
important factors enhancing President Fox’s control over governors. For instance, the more 
bureaucratic practices implemented by Puebla’s incumbents gave the PAN room to compete 
and survive at the municipal level and legislative level.  The lower levels of governors’ fiscal 
discretion (i.e., an indicator of more bureucraticness) observed in Puebla, limited governors’ 
ability to financially control PAN mayors, thus ensuring that PAN municipalities would not 
be financially suffocated but would instead have the money needed to stay alive (interview 
Velázquez).   
Additionally, and unlike what happened in Oaxaca, where Panista mayors and 
officials were co-opted and blackmailed by the use of neopatrimonial gubernatorial practices, 
in Puebla the existence of a more bureaucratic state administration gave Fox sufficienct room 
of maneuver to rely on loyal co-partisans both at the municipal level of government and in 
                                                 
178
 I witnessed this exchange during my fieldwork in Puebla, when I visited different Panista local branches, 
which at that time were campaigning for local elections. 
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the federal legislature.  This in turn, was decisive to allow him expand his presence in the 
state and, more importantly, gave him instruments to constrict the authority of Puebla’s rulers 
from below.  
Likewise, Puebla’s bureaucratic state-administration also allowed the president to 
penetrate the state via its federal delegates.  Unlike Oaxaca, where federal delegates where 
co-opted, threatened, and extorted by state authorities, federal delegates in Puebla had an 
ample room of maneuver to act as representatives of the federal government’s interests 
(interview Mantilla). As a result, federal officials from diverse secretaries managed to 
implement federal programs and distribute federal goods among the local population, further 
expanding the presence of the PAN and the federal government in the state.  
Finally, the existence of a more bureaucratic state administration allowed the federal 
government to side with local grassroots and organized groups which, unlike Oaxaca, 
maintained greater autonomy from the state-government.  In fact, by distributing a variety of 
state-resources and handouts, such as bags of cement, food, medicines, and corrugated 
roofing, the PAN managed to secure a foothold in many communities of the interior by 
making informal coalitions with former PRI corporatist structures (interviews Germán, 
Moreno Valle).   
In sum, the combination of a strong PAN structure in the state with the existence of a 
bureaucratic state administration, coupled with Puebla’s relatively high levels of 
indebtedness and financial deficits, which put Puebla in a more vulnerable financial position 
vis-à-vis the federation, all contributed to increase president Fox’s capacity to hold Puebla’s 
rulers hostage and exert control over them from below.   
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5) Mutually functional vertical coalitions and reproduction from above 
 As the first non-PRI president in 70 years, Fox had to rule the country within a 
context that was not entirely favorable.  In this context, the support of undemocratic 
governors, such as those from Puebla, was crucial. Governor Melquíades Morales, controlled 
a considerable number of PRI federal deputies (at least half of Puebla’s delegation), and 
consequently was a valuable partner for legislative coalition building.  As any other 
undemocratic PRI governor, Morales was also an important partner for electoral coalitions.  
With his control over the state’s party machine, he could easily tilt the electoral balance in 
Fox’s favor.  In addition to his legislative and electoral support, Morales exerted considerable 
leverage over other governors of the southeast, such as those from the states of Tabasco, 
Veracruz, and Chiapas. As a result of this influence Morales was an indispensable power 
broker to obtain the acquiescence of other governors. 
 In light of these factors, and given Fox’s capacity to control Puebla’s rulers from 
below, and thus induce them to support his presidential agenda, the president had strong 
incentives to strike coalitions with Puebla’s governors.  The governors, for their part, had 
incentives to maintain a collegial relationship with the center, especially in light of the state’s 
financial crisis.  For these reasons, Fox actively kept Puebla’s SUR alive, while its governors 
did not confront the national government but instead negotiated with it, providing it their 
support when it was needed.  Morales himself noted the detrimental consequences arising 
from a confrontation with the federal government: “It is not good to engage in a fight with 
the chef [referring to whom has the power in the house], it is better to negotiate with her. 
That is why unlike other governors, I preferred to avoid confrontations with the federal 
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government.  What was the purpose of filing a claim against Fox with the Supreme Court?  
You don’t win anything if you confront the president” (interview Morales). 
 This mutually beneficial exchange paid off on several occasions during Fox’s tenure.  
At the legislative level, Morales became an assiduous supporter of Fox’s initiatives.  He not 
only voted for Fox’s less ambitious and politically less controversial pieces of legislation, 
such as the law of access to public information and the civil service law, but most notably he 
sided with Fox in those initiatives that were fiercely opposed by the national PRI leaders, 
such as the 2003 fiscal reform.179  On these occasions, Morales, unlike other undemocratic 
rulers (like Murat from Oaxaca), did not hesitate to break ranks with his party and vote for 
Fox’ initiatives. 180  In the specific case of the 2003 fiscal reform, Morales negotiated 
additional funds for Puebla’s Chidren’s Hospital (Hospital del Niño Poblano), which he got 
after voting for the initiative (interview Ibañez).  This mutually beneficial exchange of 
legislative support and funds was observed in several occasions throughout Fox’s period, as 
the governor would receive federal financial support for diverse state projects, such as the 
construction of interstate highways, public works, and assistance for social development 
(interview Morales, Ibañez).   
In effect, and as confirmed by the quantitative analysis of chapter 5, the flow of 
federal funds to Puebla was smooth and constant. The upper dotted rectangles of figure 6.6 
nicely illustrate this point.  Unlike other undemocratic states, the federal funds that entered 
Puebla’s coffers went well beyond the automatic transfers (participaciones and 
                                                 
179
 The 2003 fiscal reform draft was so controversial that it split the PRI congressional delegation into two 
opposing bands: one favoring Fox’s initiative, the other against it. 
180
 The same occurred with other undemocratic (bureaucratic) governors, like the governors from Veracruz and 
Hidalgo, who also voted in favor of Fox’s draft. 
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aportaciones).  Additional evidence gathered from Mexico’s Treasury shows that Puebla, 
together with other undemocratic bureaucratic states (such as Jalisco and Veracruz), was 
among the greatest beneficiaries of Mexico’s PAFEF and Convenios de Descentralización 
(transfers that are distributed by the federation for earmarked projects in specific areas 
(education, agriculture, and rural development) (SCHP 2008).  All together, these examples 
underscore the collegial relation regarding financial transfers that existed between Puebla and 
the federal government, and which led Morales to note that “Puebla had more financial 
problems with Zedillo than with Fox; Zedillo, who was from my own party, cut more funds 
and sent less money to Puebla than what Fox did” (interview Morales).   
 Puebla’s rulers also became valuable electoral partners of President Fox.  During 
national contests (both legislative and presidential) the PAN did extremely well.  Not only 
did it obtain the greatest share of the vote during both the 2000 and 2006 presidential contest, 
but it was able to gain a considerable share of senators and federal deputies.  These results 
were quite remarkable in a nondemocratic state controlled by the PRI since the 1930s, and 
where undemocratic governors controlled their party machine.  Yet, a major factor that 
contributed to these Panista victories was that PRI rulers agreed not to engage in ballot 
stuffing and they guaranteed a lower turnout of PRI voters (interviews Ehlinger, Ibáñez, 
Velázquez).  In exchange, Puebla’s governors were left untouched and rewarded with 
political and financial concessions from the center.   
Finally, Morales played a key role as Fox’s ally in one the president’s most ambitious 
projects, the so-called “Plan Puebla-Panamá” (a program of economic development and 
international integration).  As noted earlier, Morales was very influential among the 
governors of the southeast, and his role as regional leader transformed him into the natural 
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interlocutor between them and the federal government. His brokerage, then, was key to gain 
the support of the other governors.  So Fox went on courting Morales, for “he knew that if he 
could have Morales as an ally, he could also count with the support of the other 
(southeastern) governors” (interview Ibañez).   
In sum, the capacity of Fox to wield control over governors Morales and Marín, 
coupled with the governors’ lack of autonomy from the center, and their more conciliatory 
relationship with the federation, all facilitated the building of vertical coalitions.  On the one 
hand, Fox had the instruments necessary to induce Puebla’s governors to accept his 
will/agenda. On the other, Melquiades and Marín had the need to cooperate with a PAN 
president.  As a result, both Fox and Puebla’s rulers had sufficient reasons to engage in 
mutually beneficial exchanges:  Fox not only did not dismantle Puebla’s SUR, but also 
contribute to reproduce it.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 The analysis of the case studies of Oaxaca and Puebla presented in this chapter offer 
evidence about how undemocratic regimes operate in practice, illustrating the way in which 
undemocratic rulers exercise political power within their strongholds. The chapter not only 
discussed the specific traits of two Mexican SURs, but also, and more importantly, shed light 
on the specific causal mechanisms that explain different trajectories of SUR continuity.   
 The analysis of Oaxaca and Puebla indicates that key differences across SURs –such 
as the nature of their state-administrations and financial autonomy– unleash distinct patterns 
of interaction with the national government, setting in turn states in different trajectories of 
SUR continuity.  This finding reveals that, contrary to what most explanations of regime 
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continuity indicate, SURs endure for different reasons, and that the causes and the causal 
mechanisms that explain why and how they are resilient are not the same.  Indeed, some 
SURs, as the cases of Puebla revealed, exist because they meet strategic needs of national 
politicians, thus inducing national incumbents to reproduce these regimes from above.  
Others, by contrast, as illustrated by the case of Oaxaca, continue to exist because specific 
characteristics of these regimes provide recalcitrant governors with the resources needed to 
maintain or expand their authority and power vis-à-vis local forces and the national 
government.  
 The in-depth, qualitative study of Oaxaca and Puebla also demonstrated that the two 
trajectories of SUR continuity are better explained by assessing the combined effect of 
national and subnational variables.  The cases of Puebla and Oaxaca revealed that the politics 
that played out at the intersection of national and subnational arenas, which was central to 
determine the territorial strategies employed by national regarding SUR continuity, could not 
be understood without taking into consideration state-level variables.  
 Finally, the evidence gathered from the in-depth study of Puebla and Oaxaca, 
provides a basis for inferring that the causal patterns and mechanisms that were found 
operating in the cases of Oaxaca and Puebla may also be present in other similar 
nondemocratic states. As noted in chapter 3, Oaxaca is not the only patrimonial-non-
democratic state in Mexico. Neither is Puebla the only bureaucratic-undemocratic state of the 
country.  Hence, the pattern of interaction between national and state-level variables seen in 
these two cases, as well as how these in turn shape the SUR continuity, might contribute to 
explaining the continuity of other similar Mexican SURs.  
 
  
 
Chapter 7: Subnational undemocratic regime continuity in Argentina 
(2002-2006). La Rioja and San Luis in comparative perspective 
 
 This chapter explores how presidential control, exercised via fiscal instruments, 
shapes the pattern of SUR continuity in Argentina.  Between 2003 and 2007, President 
Néstor Kirchner could not count on a strong and nationalized partisan structure to make 
inroads in provincial arenas.  This situation, which limited his power to discipline SUR rulers 
via partisan structures, contrasted sharply with his capacity to exert financial control over 
lower levels of government. Kirchner not only benefitted from the greater fiscal discretion 
and power conferred by Argentina’s fiscal federalism, but also was able to take advantage of 
a considerable amount of revenues not subject to sharing, most of which accrued from export 
duties.  The access to abundant resources allowed Kirchner to exercise the power of the purse 
over the provinces, giving him sufficient leeway to exert tight control over (non-democratic) 
provincial rulers who were in dire financial need.   
 As in chapter 6, the goal of this chapter is to present qualitative and comparative 
evidence showing how the capacity of presidents to exert control (or the lack thereof) over 
SUR incumbents shapes trajectories of SUR continuity.  The subnational comparisons are 
meant to shed light on the hypothesized causal chains leading to SUR reproduction from 
above and SUR self-reproduction.  To examine these causal chains of trajectories, I proceed 
following Van Evera’s (1997) recommended method by breaking down the chains into their 
components parts.  I thus look closely at how presidential control led to cooptation, which in 
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turn facilitated the possibility of vertical coalitions, thus resulting in SUR continuity from 
above.  I also examine the elements of the alternative causal chain, in which lack of 
presidential control leads to displacement/weakening, and in turn to exclusion from vertical 
coalitions, eventually facilitating SUR self-reproduction. 
To determine how the component parts of each of the causal chains affects the 
hypothesized outcome, I rely on evidence collected from archival documents, newspaper 
articles, official documents, as well as information gathered in 70 in-depth interviews with 
Argentine national and subnational top-rank officials (see list of interviews in the reference 
section of this dissertation). 
The chapter is organized as follows.  In the first section, I provide a justification of 
the subnational cases selected to illustrate Argentine SURs’ trajectory of reproduction.  
Following the logic presented in chapter 6, I then turn to analyze the province of La Rioja, a 
neopatrimonial and fiscally indebted province, which illustrates the trajectory of SUR 
reproduction “from above.” Subsequently, I study the province of San Luis,  bureaucratic and 
fiscally autonomous province, which represents a case of SUR “self-reproduction.”   
As in chapter 6, the narrative and analysis is organized in the same fashion. First, the 
undemocratic character of the state is presented and evidence regarding how it operates is 
discussed. Throughout this dissertation much has been said about undemocratic regimes, but 
little concrete evidence (except for the indicators presented in chapter 3) has illustrated 
specifically how a SUR works. The second subsection of each case study, discusses the two 
main subnational variables facilitating or preventing presidential control, namely, the type of 
state-administration and financial autonomy.  The third and fourth subsections of each case 
study analyze the component parts of the causal chains outlined above. Accordingly, the third 
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subsection explores the extent to which presidential control was possible, focusing on the 
combined effect of subnational and national variables on presidential control. The fourth and 
final subsection of the two case studies, looks at how this control or lack thereof determines 
the prospects of vertical coalitions and, as a result, the type of SUR reproduction followed in 
each case.  
 
I. Subnational case selection 
 As in chapter 6, two “diverse cases” (e.g., La Rioja and San Luis) serve the purpose 
of exemplifying and testing the two different trajectories of SUR continuity.181  Because this 
chapter seeks to demonstrate that different SUR trajectories are triggered by the capacity (or 
lack thereof) of federal incumbents to control SURs, two cases are selected that score very 
differently on the main variable facilitating or inhibiting presidential control. 
 Chapter 4 showed that fiscal control was the main instrument of presidential control 
available to President Kirchner between 2003 and 2007.  Thus, in order to assess if 
presidential fiscal control was effective and conducive to SUR reproduction from above, a 
case is needed where presidential fiscal penetration existed or was enhanced.  By contrast, in 
order to estimate if presidential fiscal control was not possible, thus leading to SUR self-
reproduction, a case is needed where presidential fiscal penetration did not existed or was 
neutralized.   
 One factor facilitating subnational rulers’ capacity to fiscally control provincial 
incumbents is their financial autonomy vis-à-vis the center. Profligate governors who engage 
                                                 
181To repeat, a  diverse case, allows researchers to achieve maximum variance along relevant dimensions. This 
type of case study, then, “requires the selection of a set of cases that are intended to represent the full range of 
values characterizing independent variable of theoretical interest” (Gerring 2007:98).  
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in overspending and have high levels of indebtedness can easily become hostages of the 
federal government.  By contrast, governors who are financially and economically 
responsible, and who, as a result, do not need to resort to the national government for 
financial aid, stand in a solid position to preserve their autonomy and independence from 
federal politicians, and can in turn self-reproduce their regimes.  
In light of these considerations, the key criterion for case selection was determined by 
the province’s financial dependence, and not by the nature of the state-administration as 
occurred in the Mexican case.182 I thus select one undemocratic financially dependent 
province (La Rioja), and one undemocratic financially autonomous province (San Luis) (see 
graph 7.1). The first case, La Rioja, is used to prove that in the presence of presidential 
control, SUR reproduction from above ensues.  By contrast, the second case, tests whether 
the causal relationship between lack of presidential control and SUR self-reproduction holds 
true. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
182
 In Mexico, because the main mechanism of control was partisan, the key criterion to select cases was the 
type of state-administration found in each state, as neopatrimonial administrations, which are more resistant to 
partisan penetration, hinder presidential partisan control, and bureaucratic administrations facilitate it.   
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Graph 7.1 Levels of democracy and financial dependency in the Argentine provinces (avg. 2003-2007)183 
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In addition, these two provinces were selected out of the bulk of undemocratic-
financially responsible and undemocratic-financially irresponsible regimes (i.e., La Pampa, 
Formosa, Santa Cruz, La Rioja, San Luis), because they have several aspects in common. 
Both provinces have been ruled by the Peronist party since 1983, both are located in 
northwestern Argentina, and even though their levels of socioeconomic development now 
differ substantially, they were similar in the early 1980s.184 In addition, both are small 
provinces, and both are highly dependent on revenues flowing from the central government. 
Despite these similarities, these two provinces differ on the main explanatory variable, 
                                                 
183
 Financial dependency is measured using and additive index of deficit and debt as a share of total income. 
184
 In fact, both San Luis and La Rioja, as I will discuss in detail below, have been equally benefitted from the 
Régimen de Promoción Industrial (RPI or industrial promotion regime) instituted by the federal government in 
the early 1980s.   
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namely, level of provincial financial autonomy.185 La Rioja and San Luis then, not only allow 
for a most similar case design, but also make a controlled-comparison possible, facilitating in 
turn a more fine-tuned assessment of the main variables’ effect on the hypothesized 
outcomes.  
 
II. LA RIOJA: A case of SUR reproduction from above 
1) The political regime: How does a SUR operate in practice?186  
 La Rioja, the home-province of former President Menem (1989-1999), has 
systematically obtained the lowest democratic scores. The province has been dominated by 
the Peronist party (PJ) since the democratic transition in 1983, and its governors and mayors, 
who up to 2007 were allowed indefinite reelection, have successfully entrenched their 
authority.   
 Table 7.1 presents disaggregated evidence substantiating La Rioja’s low scoring 
democracy. Signs of sustained “undemocraticness” can be observed by comparing La Rioja’s 
mean scores with the other provinces’ mean scores.  In all of the indicators presented in table 
7.1, La Rioja scores well below the other Argentine provinces’ mean.  A closer look at how 
each individual indicator has evolved over time reveals that gubernatorial elections in La 
Rioja have become less competitive over the years, especially during the 1990s, as both the 
effective number of parties running for gubernatorial elections and the effective number of 
parties obtaining seats in the local legislature have remained low, and never above the 2.13 
                                                 
185
 These provinces also differ regarding the secondary independent variable, namely, the type of state 
administration (see graph 3.5, chapter 3). 
186
 The main focus of this chapter will be on the administration of Peronist Eduardo Ángel Maza (1995-2006), 
whose term coincided with the presidency of Néstor Kirchner.   
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reached in 2003. In fact, these two indicators coupled with the party turnover indicator, 
which reports no party turnover over the entire period (see table 7.2), shed light on the 
sustained hegemonic character of La Rioja’s political regime.   
 
Table 7.1: La Rioja’s indicators of democracy 
Year of election ENP Margin of victory in gubernatorial races* ENPL 
Strength of the opposition in 
the legislature 
Turnover 
(party)
Turnover 
(head)
(governor's 
race)
(between winner and 
runner up)
(legislative 
seats)
(% of seats controlled by the 
opposition)
1983 2.00 16.75 1.36 16.00 0 1
1985 1.18 12.00
1987 2.02 28.22 1.27 10.34 0 1
1989 1.34 6.90
1991 1.52 60.19 1.13 10.00 0 2
1993 1.16 10.00
1995 1.41 66.83 1.26 10.00 0 3
1997 1.35 13.33
1999 1.92 37.63 1.28 16.67 0 3
2001 1.17 10.00
2003 2.13 15.10 1.72 36.67 0 3
2005 1.34 36.67
La Rioja's mean 1.83 37.45 1.30 15.71 0.00 2.17
Provinces' mean 2.58 16.25 2.30 45.56 1.55 2.89
Min 1.22 0.29 1.13 6.89 1 1
Max 4.45 84.56 8.91 100 4 7
*Higher values indicate lower levels of democracy
(cumulated)
Source: for calculations see Appendix to chapter 3
 
 
 In a similar vein, the large gap between the winner and runner-up further confirm the 
province’s low political competitiveness.  As table 7.1 shows, the two most competitive 
gubernatorial elections in the 1983-2005 period took place in 1983 and 2003. In 1983, the PJ 
won by a relatively low margin, obtaining 57.70% of the vote, against the 40.95% vote share 
garnered by the then electorally powerful UCR.  20 years later, in 2003, the incumbent PJ, 
Ángel “Didí” Maza, won by a margin of 15.10 points over the Frente con Todos, a new party 
formed in 2001 by Jorge Yoma (Menem’s ex-brother-in-law), after splitting from the 
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Peronist party. In between these two elections, electoral competition in La Rioja was very 
low, as were the other indicators of democracy, all of which experienced a pronounced 
decline in the 1990s. Finally, the low turnover of provincial executives, which have only 
rotated three times in the last 25 years, speaks to the PJ’s hegemony in La Rioja’s political 
system. 
 
Table 7.2: La Rioja’s governors 
Period Governor Party
1983-1987 Carlos Menem PJ
1987-1991 Carlos Menem* PJ
1991-1995 Bernabé Arnaudo PJ
1995-1999 E. Ángel Maza PJ
1999-2003 E. Ángel Maza PJ
2003-2007 E. Ángel Maza** PJ
*In 1989, Menem assumes the presidency. Alberto Gregorio Cavero 
(vice-governor) takes office
**In February 2007, Maza is impeached. Luis Beder Herrera (vice-
governor) takes office
 
 
 One important factor contributing to reduce electoral democracy in La Rioja has been 
the steady reform of electoral rules and institutions.187 As shown by Calvo and Micozzi 
(2005), most of these reforms have allowed incumbents to minimize the risk of electoral 
defeat, to improve their control over local legislatures, and to escape the negative 
consequences of more competitive national level races. Among these reforms were (a) the 
                                                 
187
 Interestingly, the strategy of restraining democracy by changing electoral rules and institutions (see 
discussion on provincial Supreme Court below) is not observed in Mexico, where state-level incumbents do not 
engage in wholeseale institutional reforms and/or electoral rule re-engineering as occurs in Argentina.  Future 
work should explore why subnational formal institutions and electoral rules undergo more manipulation in 
Argentina than in Mexico. 
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introduction of the ley de lemas188 in 1991, its elimination in 1992, and its re-introduction in 
2001189; (b) the 1987 introduction of rules to over-represent the rural districts of the province, 
where the PJ was stronger;  and (c) the modification of the legislature’s size, which entailed 
changing the number of seats from 54 in 1986, to 28 in 1991, then to 30 in 1998, 23 in 2002, 
and 36 in 2008 (see Leiras 2006, 2007).  A similar trend was observed regarding electoral 
rules for legislative races, which underwent signinficant transformations, all to favor 
incumbents. 
 Despite the fact that electoral democracy in La Rioja suffer severe setbacks as a result 
of these reforms, more informal but perhaps more powerful factor strongly shaping the 
nondemocratic fate of La Rioja’s regime was the role played by former President Menem. 
For over a period of 20 years, starting in 1983, when he was elected governor, up to 2003, 
when he stepped down from the runoff presidential race, Carlos Menem was the undisputable 
political leader and cacique of La Rioja.190  Despite leaving the province in 1989, when he 
assumed the country’s presidency, Menem pulled the strings of La Rioja’s politics, exerting 
tight control over incumbents in all levels of government, the Peronist party and its machine, 
as well as civil society, local organized groups, and the media (interviews Guzmán, Douglas, 
#26).  His political clout, which noticeably outlived his presidency,191 was decisive to thwart 
                                                 
188
 The “ley de lemas” (or apparentment system) allows parties to present different lists of candidates to 
compete in the same race.  The vote obtained by each candidate is then added up and assigned in toto to the 
party label. 
189
 As one anonymous interviewee noted, “the ley de lemas was introduced and rolled back depending on the 
relative power of the opposition forces;  when the opposition became stronger it was introduced, otherwise there 
was no need to have such a law (interview # 4). 
190
 Recall that in 2003, 4 years after having left power, former president Menem contended, for his third time, 
for the presidency.   
191
 An example of Menem’s influence after leaving the presidency occurred in 1999, when he returned back to 
La Rioja.  Instead of moving into one of the many properties he had acquired during his years in office, Menem 
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political liberalization in La Rioja.  Indeed, he not only managed to discipline the provincial 
branch of the PJ, thus preventing intra-party factional competition, conflict, and party 
defection, all of which could have increased the level of competitiveness in the province, but 
also actively promoted the passing of several of the above-mentioned laws in order to reduce 
the power of the opposition (interviews Guzmán, Douglas).   
 This changed in 2003, after Menem stepped down from the presidential race. His 
resignation to compete in the runoff against Néstor Kirchner, which revealed Menem’s 
decline in national politics, also affected his dominion over the province, as many local 
politicians ceased to view him as the powerful provincial caudillo he had once been.  His loss 
of power, influence, and authority over the Riojano political system, had important 
implications for La Rioja’s political regime.  For one, the 2003 election, which severely 
undermined Menem’s power both nationally and provincially, paved the way for some 
moderate political liberalization in La Rioja.  The hierarchical and relatively orderly 
functioning of La Rioja’s political system, through which Menem managed to exert tight 
control over incumbents in all levels of government, collapsed in 2003 after it became clear 
that the head of the hierarchy had lost its power.  This situation generated an important power 
vacuum, which resulted in ferocious intra-party fighting and party factionalism within the 
Riojano Peronist party (interviews Chamía, Maza, Bengolea).  
 The atomization of the PJ, which was first observed in 2001, when the Frente con 
Todos was created, but which became more visible after 2003, contributed to moderately 
increase the levels of competitiveness in the 2003 and 2007 elections. In fact, the slight 
                                                                                                                                                        
moved into the governors’ official home, which had been held vacant for the former president.  Only in 2002, 
did Menem leave the residency, giving Governor Maza the governor’s official home.  
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increase in the ENP, the ENPL, and the strength of the “opposition” in the local legislature 
can be seen as a direct result of the PJ’s atomization (see table 7.1). But perhaps the most 
visible example of how the vacuum left by Menem led to party factionalism occurred in 2006 
and 2007, when Governor Maza made it clear that he was seeking to serve for a fourth 
consecutive term in office.  After this announcement, local PJ popular leaders, who during 
years had been subjugated to the governor’s will soon rebelled and coalesced in an internal 
opposition front to undermine the governor’s power. This partisan infighting climaxed in 
2005/2006 when, under the command of the vice-governor, Luis Beder-Herrera, factions of 
the Riojano PJ orchestrated Maza’s overthrow via impeachment. 
 In sum, the decline of Menem’s power over Riojano politics indirectly contributed to 
moderately lessen the undemocratic character of the regime. Despite this mild liberalization, 
La Rioja’s indictors continued to score well below average, indicating that the province stood 
and still stands among the least democratic subnational units of Argentina. In the next 
section, I discuss the variables that contributed to maintain Riojano nondemocratic regime 
alive.  
 
2) Governors’ instruments of territorial and political control 
(a). Neopatrimonial state administration  
 Chapter 3 presented evidence about the cross-provincial variation of Argentina’s state 
administrations, and showed that La Rioja stood (and still stands) among the most 
neopatrimonial provinces of Argentina. Indeed, table 7.3 indicates that all of La Rioja’s 
indicators rank well below the other provinces’ means, and further shows that La Rioja’s 
scores are always closer to the minimum levels (see last 4 rows of table 7.3). The individual 
  235 
indicators in table 7.3 reveal that La Rioja’s agencies of control have been weak.  Such is the 
case, for instance, of the province’s Supreme Court, which has been subject to constant 
manipulation (i.e., change in its composition and size) by the provincial executive, thus 
weakening its ability to exercise control over other branches of power.192   
 A closer inspection of this indicator reveals that Riojano justices’ instability was 
relatively low during the 1980s, while it became high during the 1990s and considerable 
higher after 2000. Two major factors contributed to this instability.  First, using a variety of 
instruments, such as threats of impeachment –which not entail a loss job but also economic 
costs, as impeached justices are denied their pensions– and libel suits, governors’ succeeded 
in inducing the resignation of ‘autonomous’ and disobedient justices.193  Such was the case of 
the 2004 induced resignation of all sitting justices that allowed Governor Maza to appoint an 
entirely new Supreme Court (interview 5);   
A second factor leading to justices’ instability in office was the recurrent changes in 
the constitutional provision stipulating the size (i.e. number of justices) of the provincial 
Supreme Court. The provincial constitution was first changed in 1986, and subsequently in 
1998, 2002, and 2008.  In three of these four changes, governors altered the size of the Court, 
which went from having five members in 1986, three in 2002, and five in 2008.  In every 
                                                 
192
 Recall that the Argentine indicator of horizontal accountability measures the stability of provincial Supreme 
Court justices, i.e., the tenure of each sitting justice. The indicator is the yearly average tenure of each 
provincial Court justice weighted by the “seniority” of the political regime (see Appendix of chapter 3). A vast 
body of literature indicates that more stable courts are said to ensure greater judiciary autonomy, thus increasing 
justices’ ability to control the executive (Helmke 2005; Bill Chávez 2004; Iaryczower et al. 2002).  
193
 This strategy, as many interviewees reported, was even more frequent in provincial lower-courts, where 
judges were induced to resign.  As one top-rank official of La Rioja’s Supreme Court noted, “here in La Rioja, 
it is easier to remove judges (who, in theory have life tenure) than a public employee” (interview 26). 
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constitutional change, governors also made wholesale replacement of sitting Court justices, 
who should have remained in power despite the reforms.194   
In sum, either by changing the size of the Supreme Court or by inducing justices to 
retire, governors in La Rioja, most noticeably Governor Maza, managed to keep a 
subservient judiciary which, threatened by its own instability, was not able to exercise an 
effective check on the governor’s exercise of political power.  Quite the contrary, it validated 
(either by action or omission) most of the governors’ actions (interview 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
194
 For instance, in 2002, when governor Maza decided to alter the constitution and reduced the Court’s size 
from five to three members, instead of removing two justices, he proceeded to removed four justices.  By so 
doing, he used the constitutional reform as an excuse to make a wholesale alteration of the Court’s composition, 
one which paved the way to pack the Court with loyal justices (interviews Bruno, Mercado Luna, Porras, 
Lanzilotto, Juárez, interview 5). 
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Table 7.3: La Rioja’s indicators of neopatrimonialism 
Year Ruler's fiscal discretion*
Horizontal 
Accountability* Patronage* Neopatrimonialism*
1983 0 1 0.45 0.48
1984 0 0.9 0.36 0.42
1985 0 0.67 0.32 0.33
1986 0 0.75 0.22 0.32
1987 0 0.8 0.16 0.32
1988 0 0.83 0.23 0.35
1989 0 0.57 0.10 0.22
1990 0 0.63 0.13 0.25
1991 0 0.38 0.12 0.17
1992 0 0.21 0.15 0.12
1993 0 0.29 0.15 0.15
1994 0 0.35 0.13 0.16
1995 0 0.38 0.19 0.19
1996 0 0.33 0.04 0.12
1997 0 0.22 0.22 0.15
1998 0 0.27 0.22 0.16
1999 0 0.31 0.23 0.18
2000 0 0.3 0.27 0.19
2001 0 0.21 0.31 0.17
2002 0 0.25 0.32 0.19
2003 0 0.05 0.33 0.13
2004 0 0.09 0.33 0.14
2005 0 0.13 0.39 0.17
2006 0 0.17 0.32 0.16
La Rioja's mean 0.00 0.42 0.24 0.22
Provinces' mean 0.30 0.52 0.60 0.47
Min 0 0 0 0.12
Max 1 1 1 0.75
Sources: author's calculation (see Appendix chapter 3)
*Lower values indicate higher levels of neopatrimonialism
 
 
 One of the main traits of a neopatrimonial administration is that public money 
and public goods are provided with particularistic and discretionary criteria rather than on the 
basis of universal standards (Mazzuca 2007:46).  The type of the rules regulating the 
distribution of public funds, then, constitutes a good indicator of the level of 
neopatrimonialism prevalent in any political system.  Where these rules are permissive or 
where they simply do not exist, incumbents can distribute public monies virtually unchecked.  
La Rioja is one of the only three Argentine provinces (the others are San Juan and Jujuy), 
where a system to regulate the distribution of provincial transfers does not exist (hence, the 
zero scores in table 7.3).  Thus, Riojano governors are entirely free to determine the amount 
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that each municipality receives, the pace with which funds are distributed (i.e., on daily, 
monthly, quarterly or yearly basis), and whether or not these transfers are channeled 
automatically.195  This fiscal discretion, in turn gave provincial incumbents a tremendous 
capacity to control mayors, as they, for fear of being deprived of funds, abided by the 
governors’ decisions, agenda, rules, and policies.196   
During the 11 years of Mazista rule, all mayors, with the sole exception of La Rioja 
City mayor (i.e., the capital’s mayor), acted as mere delegates of the governor (interviews 
Porras, Ortiz, Chamía).  This occurred not only because most of them belonged to the 
governors’ party (see table 7.4), but above all because the majority of mayors had virtually 
no administrative capacity to raise their own taxes (even though they legally can), and thus 
became highly dependent on provincial transfers.  In other words, none of them stood in a 
solid financial position to oppose the governor’s policies, much less to refuse participating in 
and supporting Maza’s political cause. Quite the contrary, they were required to do as Maza 
requested, especially to deliver political support by mobilizing voters and the citizenry 
whenever elections and/or public rallies were organized (interviews Maza (a), Maza (b), 
Chamía).197  Had they refused to do so, as occurred in 2003 when a group of mayors 
                                                 
195
 As noted in chapter 3 (appendix), rulers’ fiscal discretion measures the cumulative years of existence of a ley 
de coparticipación municipal (i.e., the law regulating the allocation of fiscal resources between the provincial 
government and the municipalities). 
196
 Contrary to what happens in Mexico, automatic transfers flowing from the central government to the 
provinces are not earmarked. In comparison to their Mexican counterparts, who get federal earmarked funds 
(aportaciones), Argentine governors have much more discretion to distribute federal money among the 
municipalities (see Bonvecchi and Lodola (2008) for a discussion of how different types of federal transfers 
confer governors with different degrees of discretion within provincial borders). 
197
 The mayors’ loyalty to Maza never faded, not even during the violent riots that took place in December 
2006, when the PJ factions rallied by then vice-governor Beder-Herrera orchestrated Maza’s ouster (and later 
his impeachment).  All mayors, with the exception of Quintela, the capital’s mayor, mobilized people from the 
interior to go to La Rioja city, where they besieged the provincial legislative building and organized sit-ins to 
support Maza’s government (Clarín, La Nación, El Independiente (La Rioja) December 15, 2006). 
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coalesced demanding approval of a municipal coparticipation law to regulate the distribution 
of transfers, provincial money stopped flowing to the municipal coffers (interviews Bruno, 
Porras, Chamía).   
Table 7.4: Percentage of municipalities under PJ control 
Year of 
election
% of muncipalities belonging to 
the governor's party
1983 100.00
1987 94.44
1991 100.00
1995 100.00
1999 100.00
2003 88.89
2007 83.33
Source: author's calculations based on Micozzi 
(2009), and Secretaría de Asuntos Municipales 
de la Nación, Ministerio del Interior
 
 The lack of a provincial ‘coparticipation’ law also increased mayors’ dependency on 
Riojano governors by preventing mayors from soliciting loans and acquiring debt either with 
local or international financial institutions.  Because they could not show they had a steady 
and regular income, they were banned from requesting loans from international development 
agencies and national or international banks.  As a result, every time Riojano mayors wanted 
to apply for credit, they first needed to negotiate with Maza, who in turn would decide if the 
province would act as guarantor.  “To get Maza’s consent,” as La Rioja City’s mayor noted, 
“we needed to pledge yet more political allegiance” (interview Quintela, see also interviews 
Ortiz, De Leonardi).  
 Finally, the lack of a provincial coparticipation law further limited Riojano mayors’ 
autonomy by preventing mayors from deciding where and how to spend provincial transfers, 
as it was the provincial government who decided where and how to spend the money.  By so 
  240 
doing, Maza ensured that transfers would not be used to feeding party machines that would 
enhance mayors’ political bases of support (interviews Quintela, # 4). 
 The only mayor who stood in a position to ‘disobey’ the governor was La Rioja’s 
City mayor, Ricardo Quintela (2003-2011). Due to the successful implementation of policies 
targeted to increase tax collection in the capital, Quintela managed to moderately lessen his 
fiscal dependency on the provincial government and, moreover, was able to enhance his 
power vis-à-vis governor Maza.  This greater independence not only allowed him to oppose 
some of the governor’s initiatives, but most importantly helped him extract some 
concessions, such as the signature of Acuerdos Financieros Transitorios (Temporary 
Financial Agreements), through which the provincial governor committed to sending a 
regular and fixed amount of funds to the capital city.198  Despite the fact that these 
agreements ensured the steady flow of transfers to the city, the transfers remained non-
automatic and the amounts to be distributed were still unilaterally determined by the 
provincial government (interviews Quintela, Chamía, Barrionuevo, Ortiz (a), Ortiz (b), De 
Leonardi, interview 4).  As a result, La Rioja’s City was held (financially) hostage to the 
governor.  
The final indicator of neopatrimonialism presented in table 7.3 is rulers’ access to 
patronage.199  A close look indicates that patronage in La Rioja has, on average, been very 
high throughout the whole period under study and especially high after the years of Carlos 
                                                 
198
 During his tenure as federal deputy, Quintela had waged a long battle against the absence of a coparticipation 
law in La Rioja, fiercely confronting governor Maza.  Once he was elected mayor of La Rioja City, he 
intensified his battle by taking people to the streets, organizing sit-ins and public building takeovers, all 
demanding a coparticipation law.   
199
 Patronage, as noted in chapter 3, is measured as the number of inhabitants/1000 working in the provincial 
public administration.   
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Menem’s provincial administration (1983-1989).   In fact, La Rioja stands among the 
provinces with the highest rate of public employees per inhabitant, and has the city with the 
highest rate of public employees per inhabitant of the country, Chilecito. The fact that an 
average of 85 every 1000 inhabitants work in the provincial public administration confers 
governors with an impressive capacity to ensure the loyalty of a considerable portion of the 
local population, which for fear of being removed from office, becomes easy to discipline 
and manipulate.  
 In addition to controlling agencies of horizontal accountability, distributing funds in a 
discretional way, and relying on employment patronage, Governor Maza turned to other 
neopatrimonial practices to further entrench his political power in La Rioja. To prevent 
mayors from becoming autonomous, in 1998 Maza passed a law that temporarily suspended 
the municipalities’ magna charters (Cartas Orgánicas).  This suspension, which later on 
became permanent, prevented mayors from managing their electoral calendars, and allowed 
Maza to take advantage of coattail effects, to prevent (intra-party) opposition forces from 
strengthening, to determine the election and appointment of candidates, and to control the 
electoral processes.   
 A final strategy implemented by Governor Maza to increase his power over mayors 
was to centralize the municipal payroll.  This decision, which was carried out during Maza’s 
first term (1995-1999), greatly reduced mayors’ capacity to exert control over public 
employees.  As one top rank official of La Rioja’s municipality put it, “public employees 
became aware that their patron, the one who paid their salaries, was the governor (and not the 
mayor), and that’s why he became loyal to the governor and not the mayor” (interview 
Ortiz).  According to different municipal leaders, this decision prevented mayors from 
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building their own “troop of loyalists” to counterbalance the governors’ power (interviews 
Ortiz, Quintela, Chamía, De Leonardi). 
 
(b). Financial discipline/autonomy 
 One of the instruments available to governors to neutralize presidential control while 
enhancing subnational undemocratic rulers’ power is governors’ financial autonomy from the 
federal government.  Much of this dependence is contingent upon the amount of fiscal 
resources that SURs obtain from the center, but autonomy is also affected by governors’ 
management of the provincial economies.   
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 provide evidence about La Rioja’s financial situation. As 
indicated by figure 7.3, with the exception of 2005, La Rioja’s financial balance is positive.  
The lack of current deficits contrasts sharply, however, with the level of indebtedness.  In 
fact, figure 7.4 shows that La Rioja’s debt is shockingly high, reaching an average of 100.9% 
of the province’s GDP between 2002 and 2006. 
 This financial dependency on the national government has been further aggravated by 
the fact that 90% of La Rioja’s total revenues stem from the federal government. As figure 
7.1 indicates, La Rioja’s autonomous revenues (depicted by the solid white and solid grey 
rectangles) only constitute a negligible share of the province’s total income.  All other 
revenues flow directly from the central state’s coffers, but as figure 7.2 shows, of La Rioja’s 
total federal transfers, only 60% (on average) flow directly and automatically to the province.  
All other federal transfers are determined ad hoc, and are contingent upon bargains among 
the national and provincial governments.  In other words, approximately 40% of La Rioja’s 
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federal transfers are subject to negotiations between the federal government and Riojano 
governors.   
This dependency on non-automatic funds, coupled with the high levels of provincial 
indebtedness, plus La Rioja’s inability to buy debt beyond the federal government,200 has put 
La Rioja’s governors in an extremely vulnerable position vis-à-vis the national government. 
As one close advisor of governor Maza put it, “governors in La Rioja do not rule for their 
people, they rule for the president.  They spend most of their time in Buenos Aires lobbying 
in federal buildings for money, subsidies, and programs” (interview 2). This financial 
dependency, which became more acute after the 2001-2002 economic crisis when the 
province’s debt skyrocketed to unprecedented levels and when the federal government 
‘nationalized’ the provincial debt, contribute to increase the power of an already fiscally 
powerful president, as was the case of Néstor Kirchner. 
                                                 
200
 Due to the province’s size and its weak economy, La Rioja has limited capacity to both issue its own debt 
(i.e. provincial bonds) and buy debt beyond the federal government.   
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Figure 7.1: La Rioja:  Income sources 
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Source: Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal con las Provincias [Mecon – DNCFP] 
 
Figure 7.2: La Rioja: Type of federal revenues as a share of total federal 
revenue 
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Source: Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal con las Provincias [Mecon – DNCFP] 
Figure 7.3: La Rioja: Total income – total expenditures (1997-2007)  
(in millions of Argentine pesos) 
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Figure 7.4: La Rioja: Debt as percentage of provincial GDP (2001-2006) 
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3) Interaction of governors and presidents’ instruments of territorial and political 
control 
 As noted in chapter 2, the ability of presidents to control undemocratic governors is 
shaped by a combination of national and subnational variables.  To be able to penetrate in 
and control subnational arenas, two conditions are necessary: (a) the president needs have the 
means necessary to subjugate an undemocratic governor, and (b) the undemocratic 
governor’s capacity to resist penetration from above must be minimal. Taken alone, neither 
of these two conditions is sufficient for a president to gain leverage subnational politics, 
rather the combination is necessary.  
 In this section I explore how national and provincial variables combined shaped the 
prospects of presidential control over La Rioja’s incumbents, and how this in turn affected 
the possibility of vertical coalition making and SUR reproduction.  To do so, I assess 
Kirchner’s main instrument of presidential control, fiscal control or the distribution of funds 
to the provinces, and analyze its effectiveness against the backdrop of La Rioja’s rulers’ own 
instruments of control. 
 As noted in chapter 4, Argentine presidents’ partisan capacity to exert control over 
subnational units has been progressively limited.  Part of presidents’ inability to discipline 
provincial incumbents via partisan instruments reflects the increasing levels of party de-
nationalization observed since the late 1990s, but especially after 2003 (Calvo and Escolar 
2005; Leiras 2006, 2007; Gibson and Suárez-Cao 2008).  This process, which has especially 
affected the Peronist party, was first observed in the 2003 presidential election when the PJ 
fielded three different presidential candidates.  This lack of cohesiveness, intensified in 
subsequent years, when President Kirchner split from the PJ and created the PJ- Frente para 
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la Victoria (PJ-FpV) faction, and other major Peronist territorial leaders, who refused to align 
with Kirchner, created their own PJ fractions (Bonvecchi & Giraudy 2008). 
President Kirchner’s low capacity to control provincial incumbents via partisan 
structures contrasted sharply with his strong capacity to discipline governors with fiscal 
instruments.  President Kirchner benefitted from the windfall gains of an economy that grew 
at an 8.85% rate between 2003 and 2007 (INDEC 2007), increasing the government’s 
revenues to unprecedented levels.  In addition, and unlike any other president since the latest 
transition to democracy in 1983, Kirchner was able to take advantage of a considerable 
amount of revenues, most from export duties hat were not subject to sharing with the 
provinces (see figure 7.5).  This allowed Kirchner to dexterously exercise the power of the 
purse, and by so doing obtain the acquiescence and cooperation of several provincial 
incumbents regardless of their party affiliation and/or ideology (see Bonvecchi & Giraudy 
2008). 
Figure 7.5: Export/import duties as a share of total central government’s revenues 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
 
Source: Cuenta de Inversión, Mecon (1993-2007) 
 
 This indeed was the case of La Rioja’s governor.  Soon after Kirchner took office, 
Governor Maza quickly closed ranks with the newly elected president. This move was highly 
  247 
symbolic for a governor who was a close ally of one of Kirchner’s main political contenders. 
201
  Governor Maza, Menem’s longest serving disciple, had been one of the main architects 
and operators of Carlos Menem’s 2003 presidential campaign. His closeness to former 
President Menem, as well as his involvement in the 2003 election, put Maza in a very weak 
position vis-à-vis Kirchner, since the newly elected president still viewed Governor Maza 
(and Menem) as political opponents. As Maza noted “Kirchner was completely mad at me. 
Part of his anger came from the fact that I was Menem’s ally, but also because I had 
encouraged Menem to step down from the runoff.202  Kirchner seriously wanted a landslide 
over Menem, but once Menem stepped down, Kirchner had to assume the presidency as a 
weak president, with only 20% of the popular vote, and that is why he wanted me to pay 
dearly for my audacity” (interview Maza).   
And that was precisely what Maza did after 2003. During the first year and a half of 
the Kirchner administration, Maza as well as his ministers, were forced to show President 
Kirchner and his ministers deference and respect.  Between 2003 and 2005, as Maza himself 
and several of his closest advisers noted, the governor spent most of his time in Buenos 
Aires, holding weekly meetings with Kirchner and his ministers, and making both symbolic 
and substantial gestures of subordination, all of which were intended to prevent the financial 
isolation of La Rioja (interviews Ada Maza, Bengolea, Chamía).  “It was only by showing 
President Kirchner that I [Maza] could be counted on as one of his loyalists, that I could 
ensure that the president would keep on sending funds to the province, something that he did 
                                                 
201
 Recall that in that election Menem competed against the then victorious Néstor Kirchner. 
202
 Maza reported that he convinced Menem to step down because “they [Menem’s campaign team] had been 
informed that the Buenos Aires’ election observers (fiscales de mesa) had surrendered to Duhalde [Kirchner’s 
political mentor], and we no longer had money to buy them back” (interview Maza).  
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not do during his first year in office” (interview Maza). This was the way in which Kirchner 
managed to control and induce La Rioja’s governor’s cooperation. 
Another way in which president Kirchner exerted control over Maza, was by 
meddling inside provincial borders. Despite the fact that La Rioja had a patrimonial state-
administration, one which allowed Maza to control resources, territory, and mayors and the 
citizenry, his dominion was weaker in the province’s capital, where a disobedient mayor 
governed.  La Rioja city’s mayor became soon a Kirchner’s ally, as evidenced by the fedral 
transfers that began to be funneled directly to the municipality and not through the governor 
(interview Quintela).  By so doing, the Kirchner administration sent a clear message to the 
governor about its capacity to financially penetrate provincial borders, and more specifically 
about its capacity to win over mayors, and thus increase its ability to exert control from 
below.    
In sum, the ability of president Kirchner to use financial means to discipline and 
control undemocratic Riojano governors, coupled with Maza’s chronic and dire dependence 
on non-automatic federal transfers, contributed to transform La Rioja’s incumbent into one of 
Kirchner’s most loyal governors, one upon whom Kirchner could count when he needed 
political support. For this reason, Kirchner actively engaged La Rioja’s governor in vertical 
coalitions.  
 
4) Mutually functional vertical coalitions and reproduction from above 
 When Kirchner assumed the presidency in 2003, his party was split into 3 different 
factions: one led by former President Menem, the second one headed by San Luis’ former 
cacique, Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, and the third one led by Kirchner and his immediate 
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predecessor, Eduardo Duhalde.203 Each of these Peronist leaders had influence and wielded 
power over different parts of the country (Calvo & Escolar 2005). Thus, to further expand his 
territorial control and strengthen his position vis-à-vis the other Peronist leaders, Kirchner 
was forced to co-opt and stitch up alliances with governors.   
 It was in this context of territorialization and Peronist intra-party split that La Rioja 
became a highly prized political bounty.  With the province’s financial dependency on the 
central government and its high level of indebtedness, La Rioja’s governor became a natural 
partner, one who could offer President Kirchner the possibility of extending his rule (via his 
partisan label, i.e.,  PJ-FpV) in the interior, and who could provide much needed electoral 
and legislative support. But La Rioja was also an attractive electoral district because it was 
the home-stronghold of former president Menem, and “controlling La Rioja”, as one 
anonymous interviewee put it, “not only was worthy because it allowed Kirchner to extend 
his political influence, but above all, because it let him show the rest of the PJ that he had 
defeated Carlos Menem” (interview 4).   
In light of these factors, Kirchner had strong incentives to strike coalitions with La 
Rioja’s governor, while Maza, for his part, had very strong financial motivations to maintain 
a collegial relationship with the center.  As a result, both Kirchner and Maza had a mutual 
interest in cooperating.  Precisely for that reason, Kirchner actively kept La Rioja’s SUR 
alive, and Maza provided the political support that was necessary for Kirchner’s presidency.   
The political dynamic surrounding the 2005 mid-term elections nicely illustrates how 
the president reaped the political benefits of siding with a “controllable” SUR.  In that 
                                                 
203
 The intra-party split was so severe, that these three Peronist leaders competed against each other in the 2003 
presidential election in which Kirchner eventually became victorious. 
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election, Menem decided to run for one of La Rioja’s three senate seats, and it was precisely 
to avoid Menem’s victory (in his own stronghold) that Kirchner was forced to field a popular 
senatorial candidate that could prevent a Menemista landslide.  This was the context in which 
Kirchner asked Maza to run for the Senate seat.  As the governor himself put it, “we needed a 
very strong candidate to defeat Carlos Menem, and I, as the governor, was the only candidate 
who could do that” (interview Maza). In effect, Maza with his tight control over mayors, 
public employees, and the party machine, was the only candidate that could ensure a victory 
over the longstanding Riojano cacique Carlos Menem. “Running against Menem,” as Maza 
reported, “was not an easy decision to make. I talked to Carlos and told him that I could not 
support him, that I had to prioritize the province over his candidacy.  By then I was 
reestablishing my relationship with Kirchner, and if did not follow the president’s orders, the 
province would not receive a single penny from the federal government.  Carlos Menem 
understood it and said that I should care for the province” (interview Maza).   
Due to La Rioja’s vulnerability vis-à-vis the center, Governor Maza not only agreed 
to run against his own political mentor, but agreed to go to the polls leading the Kirchnerista 
PJ-FpV ticket, instead of running as a PJ candidate.  With this move, Kirchner not only won 
the first majority, i.e., two seats in the Senate and extended his territorial and partisan 
presence in La Rioja, but most importantly defeated his fiercest rival and longstanding PJ 
leader in his own stronghold.204 In exchange for this “service,” Kirchner rewarded La Rioja 
with the non-automatic funds that were essential to run the province.205   
                                                 
204
 In that election, the PJ-FpV also won two (out of five Riojano) seats in the House.  Carlos Menem won the 
senate seat for the first minority. 
205
 These funds, which in La Rioja are known as the “fondos extra-coparticipables” (extra-coparticipation funds) 
are as important as the coparticipation funds, which only account for 50% of the province’s total federal 
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Figure 7.2 shows the financial payoff of Maza’s alignment with president Kirchner.  
After Kirchner took office, La Rioja saw a decrease in the non-automatic transfers sent by the 
federal government (depicted with the dashed and solid white rectangles), which decreased 
from a 40% of the total federal revenues to about 20%.  In fact, when compared to 2002, the 
amount of current transfers funneled to La Rioja was considerably lower.  This trend was 
reversed in 2005, however, when president Kirchner considered Riojano support as critical.  
As figure 7.2 indicates, federal capital transfers augmented considerably in 2005, and 
reached an even higher level in 2006, the year before the 2007 presidential election.  In 
addition, other non-automatic transfers, such as current transfers (depicted by the 
transversally dashed rectangle), also flowed constantly and smoothly into Riojano coffers, 
indicating that during the years of the Kirchner administration, the president never stopped 
providing La Rioja’s SUR with funds for infrastructure development (i.e., capital transfers0, 
which made up around 20% of La Rioja’s total federal revenues.  
 The mutually beneficial relationship between Kirchner and Maza also paid off at the 
legislative level. Unlike other Peronist governors, Maza became an assiduous supporter of 
the president’s legislative initiatives.  Even though he did not control the entire Riojano 
congressional delegation,206 the deputies and senators who followed his orders supported all 
Kirchnerista bills, even the most controversial ones, such as the laws that were passed in 
2006 that further increased (in a non-constitutional way) presidential power vis-à-vis other 
                                                                                                                                                        
revenues. Without the “fondos extracoparticipables”, the province cannot cover its current and capital 
expenditures.     
206
 Of the five Riojano deputies, one belonged to the UCR, and while the remaining were Peronist deputies, 
Adrián Menem (Carlos Menem’s nephew) usually followed his uncle’s orders. In the Senate instead, Maza 
controlled the vote of Ada Maza (his sister) and Teresita Quintela, but could not discipline the third senator, 
Carlos Menem. 
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branches of government,207 as well as the bills that were introduced to extend the economic 
emergency of 2001, which also granted the executive extraordinary powers.  In exchange for 
this support, the government continued to sign the Financial Agreements that ensured the 
flow of “extra-coparticipation” funds, without which the governor could have not run the 
provincial economy (interviews Bengolea, Maza, Mercado Luna). 
 In sum, the need of President Kirchner to obtain Maza’s legislative and electoral 
support as well as the president’s capacity to wield control over Governor Maza, coupled 
with the governor’s lack of autonomy from the center, and their more conciliatory 
relationship with the federal government, all facilitated the building of vertical coalitions.  
On the one hand, President Kirchner had the instruments necessary to control La Rioja’s 
governor, and thus the means he needed to subordinate to him to his will/agenda. On the 
other, Maza had the need and the incentive to be deferential to Kirchner.  As a result, both 
Maza and Kirchner had sufficient reasons to engage in mutually beneficial exchanges:  
Kirchner not only did not dismantle La Rioja’s SUR, but also reproduced it, and its governor 
delivered the political and symbolic support that Kirchner needed.   
 
 
                                                 
207 These bills include:  the modification of the Consejo de la Magistratura’s composition, which allowed 
Kirchner to control the greatest share of its members (38.5%); the law regulating the use of presidential decrees, 
which further enlarged the president’s legislative capacity; the ley de Administración Financiera, which granted 
the chief of cabinet legal authorization to reassign budget allocations without Congress’ consent (for a 
discussion of how these laws increased presidential power see Giraudy 2007, Bonvecchi & Giraudy 2007). 
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III. SAN LUIS: A case of SUR self-reproduction208 
Like La Rioja, San Luis ranks among the least democratic provinces of Argentina.  A 
closer look at how the province’s indicators of democracy, reveals that, with exceptions of 
1983 and 1999, when the UCR209 obtained a relatively high share of the vote, elections in 
San Luis have become less competitive over the years (see table 7.5).  In effect, the effective 
number of parties running for gubernatorial elections has decreased throughout the years, and 
the margins of victory have become larger.   
 
Table 7.5: San Luis indicators of democracy 
Year of election ENP Margin of victory in gubernatorial races* ENPL 
Strength of the opposition in 
the lower chamber
Turnover 
(party)
Turnover 
(head)
(governor's 
race)
(between winner and 
runner up)
(legislative 
seats)
(% of seats controlled by the 
opposition)
1983 2.81 3.26 2.07 43.33 0 0
1985 1.92 50.00
1987 2.58 19.20 1.93 44.19 0 0
1989 2.14 32.56
1991 2.46 12.32 2.27 48.84 0 0
1993 2.75 48.84
1995 1.82 55.03 1.97 41.86 0 0
1997 2.60 39.53
1999 2.00 10.44 n.d. 51.16 0 0
2001 1.72 55.81
2003 1.23 84.56 1.68 25.58 0 1
2005 2.57 32.56
San Luis's mean 2.15 30.80 2.15 42.86 0.00 0.17
Provinces' mean 2.58 16.25 2.30 45.56 1.55 2.89
Min 1.22 0.29 1.13 6.89 1 1
Max 4.45 84.56 8.91 100 4 7
*Higher values indicate lower levels of democracy
Source: for calculations see Appendix to chapter 3
(cumulated)
 
 
                                                 
208
 Eeven though I will provide a brief characterization of the administrations that anteceded 2003, the main 
focus of this section (and chapter) will be on Alberto Rodríguez Saá’s (2003-2007) administration.   
209
 In 1999 the Radicals fielded candidates under the Alianza label. 
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 As in La Rioja, San Luis has been governed by the Peronist party since 1983. Yet 
unlike La Rioja, which was ruled by three different PJ governors, San Luis has been 
governed by two governors only,210 both of whom belong to the same family: Adolfo and 
Alberto Rodríguez Saá (see table 7.6).211  Accordingly, the levels of party and governor 
turnover, as noted by the two right hand columns of table 7.5, have been extremely low; in 
fact, they have been the lowest among Argentine provinces.  
 
Table 7.6: San Luis’ governors 
Period Governor Party
1983-1987 Adolfo Rodríguez Saá PJ
1987-1991 Adolfo Rodríguez Saá PJ
1991-1995 Adolfo Rodríguez Saá PJ
1995-1999 Adolfo Rodríguez Saá PJ
1999-2003 Adolfo Rodríguez Saá* PJ
2003-2007 Alberto Rodríguez Saá PJ
*In 2001, Rodríguez Saá assumes the presidency for one 
week.  Alicia Lemme (vice-governor) briefly served in his 
place
 
These numbers contrast somewhat with the legislative indicators.  As displayed by 
table 7.5, the effective number of parties competing for legislative seats in the house has 
fluctuated over time, reaching fairly high levels of competitiveness such as in 1993, when the 
ENPL reached 2.75. The strength of the opposition in the provincial legislature has 
                                                 
210
 Until 2007 and 2008, both San Luis and La Rioja’s (respectively) constitutions allowed for unlimited 
reelection. 
211
 Adolfo Rodríguez, the elder brother, governed from 1983 to 2001, when he stepped down to serve as 
Argentina’s president for one week during the 2001-2002 crisis. His brother, Alberto, in turn, assumed the 
governorship in 2003 (see table 7.6).  
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undergone radical fluctuations: the meager control of 25.58% of the seats by the opposition 
in 2003 contrasts sharply with the 55.81% control of the seats in 2001.212 
These fluctuations underscore three important aspects of the opposition in San Luis.  
First, that its power has ebbed and waned over time, and that those swings have been very 
pronounced. Second, that the power of the legislative opposition has, at times, been 
considerably high, indicating that the opposition could effectively gain positions in power.  
Finally, the fluctuations also reveal that, unlike other Argentine undemocratic regimes, such 
as La Rioja or Formosa, the opposition in San Luis has not been decimated, but quite the 
contrary has always remained active and moderately strong. 
Unlike La Rioja, San Luis’ hegemonic regime was not consolidated by the constant 
manipulation of electoral rules and constitutional provisions.  Instead, its entrenchment was 
largely possible due to a one-time constitutional reform in 1986.  This reform was clearly 
intended to reduce the opposition’s (i.e. the UCR) electoral power (Samper 1993, Guiñazú 
2003, interview Samper). To do so, Governor Adolfo Rodríguez Saá gained approval for the 
indefinite reelection for governors, for creating a new chamber, the Senate (which 
overrepresented rural areas where the PJ was most powerful),213 and for providing the 
executive with new and expanded decree powers (Guiñazú 2003: 81-83, Samper 1993; 
Suárez-Cao 2001). These new institutions, all of them highly detrimental to the opposition, 
                                                 
212
 The legislative indicators displayed in table 7.5 regard the lower house.  Still, because San Luis has a 
bicameral system, the indicators only provide partial information about the strength and access of the opposition 
in the legislature.  If one takes into consideration the composition of the Senate, the relative strength of the 
opposition becomes smaller, as the senate has been literally monopolized by the incumbent party.  The only 
exception was in 2007, when the opposition managed to win one out of nine seats.  
213
 In addition, the powers of the lower-chamber were trimmed and some key functions (the nomination of 
lower judges, the appointment of the General Attorney and the Accountant General, as well as the impeachment 
process) were transferred to the newly created senate (see Guiñazú 2003:82). 
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are regarded in San Luis as the key pillars upon which the Rodríguez Saás’ built their 
“dynasty” (interviews Laborda, Samper, Agúndez, Vergés, interviews 8 and 9; see also 
Samper 1993).   
 
1) Governors’ instruments of territorial and political control 
(a). Bureaucratic state administration  
The cross-provincial and cross-temporal evidence presented in chapter 3 indicates 
that San Luis, unlike other undemocratic regimes in Argentina, has a fairly bureaucratic 
state-administration.  In fact, as table 7.7 shows, of the individual indicators that make up the 
neopatrimonial index, only one –i.e., rulers’ fiscal discretion– is higher than the other 
Argentine provinces.  Instead, the patronage indicator comes close to the mean score.  The 
only indicator denoting relatively high levels of neopatrimonialism is the horizontal 
accountability indicator, measured as the stability of provincial Supreme Court justices, 
which scores below the provinces’ mean.214   
A closer look at the indicators of state-administrations presented in table 7.7 reveals 
that San Luis’ state administration has gone through different phases of neopatrimonialism.  
The 1990s stand out as the least bureaucratic years and this coincides with years in which the 
political regime was less democratic (see table 7.5), while the early 1980s as well as the 
early-mid 2000s, appear to be the more bureaucratic.  
                                                 
214
 Neopatrimonialism, as noted in chapter 3, is measured using the family resemblance concept structure.  The 
family resemblance concept structure “is as a rule about sufficiency with no necessary condition requirements” 
(Goertz, 2006:36).  Thus, it is possible that two or more provinces classified as neopatrimonial will not share all 
the defining attributes of neopatrimonialism but still capture a set of commonalities considered to be 
constitutive of this type of state administration.  This is the case of San Luis, which, with the exception of the 
horizontal accountability indicator, can be regarded, comparatively speaking, as a low scoring neopatrimonial 
province.  For another operationalization of neopatrimonialism see Behrend (2008). 
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Table 7.7: San Luis’ indicators of neopatrimonialism 
Year Ruler's fiscal discretion*
Horizontal 
Accountability* Patronage* Neopatrimonialism*
1983 0.04 1 0.55 0.53
1984 0.08 1 0.52 0.53
1985 0.12 1 0.51 0.54
1986 0.16 0.81 0.48 0.48
1987 0.2 0.72 0.49 0.47
1988 0.24 0.77 0.51 0.51
1989 0.28 0.74 0.54 0.52
1990 0.32 0.49 0.57 0.46
1991 0.36 0.54 0.59 0.50
1992 0.4 0.59 0.59 0.53
1993 0.44 0.32 0.57 0.44
1994 0.48 0.32 0.56 0.45
1995 0.52 0.37 0.53 0.47
1996 0.56 0.3 0.56 0.47
1997 0.6 0.17 0.61 0.46
1998 0.64 0.19 0.63 0.49
1999 0.68 0.24 0.65 0.52
2000 0.72 0.28 0.66 0.55
2001 0.76 0.32 0.62 0.57
2002 0.8 0.35 0.64 0.60
2003 0.84 0.38 0.65 0.62
2004 0.88 0.21 0.66 0.58
2005 0.92 0.17
2006 0.96 0.2
San Luis' mean 0.50 0.48 0.58 0.51
Provinces' mean 0.30 0.52 0.60 0.47
Min 0 0 0 0.12
Max 1 1 1 0.75
Sources: author's calculation (see Appendix to chapter 3)
*Lower values indicate higher levels of neopatrimonialism
 
Turning to the evolution of each individual indicator, table 7.7 shows that the 
Rodríguez Saás have followed a tradition of manipulating the size and composition of the 
provincial Supreme Court. The indicator “horizontal accountability,” which as noted earlier, 
measures the average tenure of Supreme Court justices, has drifted over time, falling to very 
low levels between 1993 and 2000.215  Wholesale changes in the size and composition of the 
                                                 
215
 Unlike other federal systems, in Argentina, the selection, appointment, as well as the specific number of 
provincial Supreme Court justices varies from province to province.  There are some provincial constitutions 
that establish a fixed number of justices, thus limiting to a great extent the capacity of rulers to engage in court 
packing.  Other provincial constitutions, by contrast, establish a fixed number of justices in the constitution but 
stipulate that the size of provincial Supreme Courts can be either augmented or diminished by statutory law.  
These laws, in turn, differ regarding the type of majority (i.e., 1/2 or a 2/3 majority) needed for passage.  
Finally, there are some other provinces where the number of justices is determined by statutory law (see 
Giraudy, Leiras & Tuñón 2009).  In San Luis, the constitution establishes a fixed number of justices (i.e., 9 until 
1997, and 5 since then) but notes that the tribunal can still be operational with a lower number of justices (i.e., 
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provincial Supreme Court occurred in 1991, when Governor Adolfo Rodríguez Saá 
introduced five new and loyal justices, adding five to the existing four that were already in 
office. With that move he ensured an “automatic majority.”  
As in La Rioja, another way in Adolfo Rodríguez Saá managed to maintain a 
subservient Supreme Court was by inducing justices to resign.  This frequently used practice 
was employed to get rid of justices who acted autonomously and who, in consequence, 
became a potential threat to the governor’s authority (interviews Agúndez, Taurant, Samper).  
In 1994, the five justices who were appointed in 1991 were removed from the tribunal, and in 
1996, two years after having been appointed, three allegedly loyal justices became victims of 
a massive libel operation orchestrated by the governor.  The justices, who had sought to 
create a more autonomous Supreme Court by opposing several of Adolfo’s initiatives, 
especially the bills drafted to undermine the independence of the lower courts and the 
judiciary, were attacked and libeled in the provincial newspapers and most radio stations, and 
accused of corrupt practices (interviews Samper, Taurant). After months of going through 
these attacks, the 3 justices resigned, allowing the governor to appointment, once again, 3 
new justices.  
This pattern of altering both the size and the composition of the Supreme Court 
continued during the administration of the younger Rodríguez Saá brother, Alberto, who took 
office in 2003, as 3 (out of 4) justices were removed in 2005, two years after he took power.  
Even though he went on to replace justices, Alberto, unlike his elder brother, has not changed 
the size of San Luis’ Supreme Court. 
                                                                                                                                                        
with 5 justices until 1997, and 3 justices since then).  This flexible rule gives governors constitutional 
permission to alter the size of the court.  
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 The constant manipulation of the province’s higher tribunal, contrasts sharply with 
the other indicators of neopatrimonialism, which, as noted earlier, suggest that San Luis has a 
relatively more bureaucratic administration than other SURs.  The ruler’s fiscal discretion 
indicator displayed in table 7.7 illustrates this point.  San Luis, unlike La Rioja, not only has 
a law regulating the distribution of funds across levels of government, but its law has been in 
place since the last transition to democracy in 1983.  The law regulating the distribution of 
municipal funds in San Luis works in a similar way to the federal coparticipation law (CL), 
in that it establishes that provincial funds be distributed on the basis of strict formulas.  
Moreover, as occurs with the federal CL, provincial funds allocated to the municipalities are 
transferred on an automatic and daily basis.216   
 The existence of such a law limited the Rodríguez Saás’ fiscal discretion, preveting 
them from blatantly blackmailing mayors by manipulating the pace and amount of provincial 
transfers. At the same time, the automaticity of the transfers gave mayors the possibility of 
gaining some autonomy from the provincial government, because the allocation of funds was 
required by law.  Equally important, the existence of such a law gave mayors the possibility 
of obtaining more precise information about when and how provincial money is distributed, 
thus making the process of funds allocation more transparent and in turn more accountable. 
 Finally, on the last indicator of neopatrimonialism presented in table 7.7, i.e., 
patronage, San Luis has scored low. Despite the fact that the size of the public administration 
in San Luis is not among the smallest in the country, no other province exhibits such a 
                                                 
216
 Even though funds are channeled via strict formulae and automatically, the law establishes that only that 8% 
of the federal coparticipation will be transferred to the municipalities, plus that 16% of the property tax and the 
tax on cars.  These percentages are low when compared to the most developed provinces of the country, such as 
Mendoza and Córdoba. 
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stability in the size of its payroll (Mecon-DNCFP, various years). In 1983, San Luis had 57 
public employees every 1000 inhabitants.  Ten years later, that number diminished to 55, and 
it reached its lowest level in 2004, when only 46 inhabitants out of every 1000 worked in the 
provincial administration (Mecon-DNCFP, various years).  This pattern of keeping a small 
and stable provincial administration is quite remarkable in the Argentine context, where 
provincial public administrations began to bloat their rolls during the 1990s, (Gibson and 
Calvo 2000, Calvo and Murillo 2004, Jones & Hwang 2005).   
 Unlike most Argentine provinces, San Luis did not follow this trend.  Quite the 
contrary, several policies were implemented to keep the size of the administration in check. 
Twice in the 1980s (i.e., 1987 and 1989), Adolfo Rodríguez Saá issued decrees freezing 
vacancies and suspended the overtime payment system (FUNIF 1999 [Tomo II], Guiñazú 
2003).  There is abundant anecdotal evidence about the governors’ fanatical determination to 
keep the public administration small. As one of his Ministers of Economy reported, “Adolfo 
would build new neighborhoods from scratch, with new houses, new schools, new police 
stations, new public libraries, and new hospitals.  However, his obsession with keeping the 
size of the public administration in check, would lead him to the ridiculous point of not 
wanting to hire new public employees to work in the police stations, the schools, the 
libraries, and the hospitals” (interview Marín).  He not only avoided bloating the provincial 
administration with unskilled workers, friends, and followers, but most importantly, aimed at 
hiring the most qualified professional and technocrats, especially in the Ministry of the 
Economy and Public Works (interviews Marín, Poggi, Samper, interviews 8 & 9).   
 The governors’ aversion to enlarging the provincial administration was so strong that 
the general public, with the passing of years, got accustomed to having one of the most 
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efficient and least clientelistic bureaucracies of the country.  In fact, when in 2003 the newly 
elected governor (Alberto) implemented the Programa de Inclusión Social, a mega project of 
social inclusion aimed at offsetting the rising levels of unemployment by hiring people to 
perform different communal jobs,217 the general public as well as most of the province’s 
technocrats severely condemned the program because it was viewed as a covert form of 
public employment (interviews Marín, Samper, Agúndez, Laborda, Otero, interviews 8 & 
9).218   
 Other policies implemented by Adolfo Rodríguez Saá to rationalize the public 
administration and trim inefficient public spending, included the selling off of the provincial 
automobile fleet in 1988, the passage of a law establishing a wage cap for public employees, 
the suspension of advanced payments for centralized and decentralized public 
administration’s personnel in 1989, the suspension of special pension’s regimes in 1990, the 
passage of a law regulating public employees’ conflict of interests in 1991, and the 
establishment of a civil service in 1993 (see FUNIF 1999 [Tomo II]).   
 During the years of Adolfo Rodríguez Saá’s administration, in sum, several policies 
were implemented to prevent the bloating of the provincial public administration, to enhance 
                                                 
217
 In 2003, the level of unemployment in San Luis reached the unprecedented levels of 15.6%. The province 
had always been characterized by its low unemployment rates, which on average never surpassed 7% (see 
Suárez Godoy 2004, FUNIF 1999). 
218
 The Plan de Inclusión Social is a conditional cash transfer program, that provides participants with cash 
allowances conditional upon certain verifiable actions, such as providing communal services, maintenance work 
in the public administration, etc.  Yet, unlike other employment programs implemented in Argentina and other 
poor countries, employees make contributions to the pension system and have healthcare coverage. 
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its efficiency and predictability, and to decrease typical patronage practices.  All these 
policies kept the levels of neopatrimonialism at a relatively low level.219 
 Also unlike other more patrimonial provinces, such as La Rioja, where incumbents 
exerted tight control over lower levels of government, the Rodríguez Saás’ could not exert 
absolute leverage on municipalities.  As table 7.8 indicates, Peronist-ruled municipalities 
never reached the percentages observed in La Rioja (see table 7.4), where the governor 
controlled at least 83.33% of the mayoralties; instead in San Luis, the PJ oscillated between 
controlling less than half of the total municipalities in 2003, to controlling all but one 
municipalities in 2007.   
 
Table 7.8: Percentage of municipalities under PJ control 
Year of 
election
% of muncipalities belonging to 
the governor's party
1983 51.61
1987 72.58
1991 66.67
1995 67.19
1999 59.38
2003 45.31
2007 98.46
Source: author's calculations based on 
Micozzi (2009), and Secretaría de Asuntos 
Municipales de la Nación, Ministerio del 
Interior
 
 In addition to its limited electoral presence in the interior, the Peronist party, could 
not dominate the most populated district, i.e., the province’s capital, San Luis City.220  With 
                                                 
219
 Even though levels of neoptrimonialism were low, it is important to note that San Luis’ governors incurred 
patrimonial practices, especially regarding the local media and access to public information (see Behrend 2008). 
220
 40% of the provincial population resides in San Luis City (Dirección Provincial de Estadísticas y Censos 
[DPEyC], Gobierno de San Luis).  Yet, the other main urban center of San Luis province, Villa Mercedes, 
where around 30% of the provincial population lives, has always been dominated by the PJ. 
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the exception of the 1990s, the city was ruled by opposition parties –the UCR from 1983 to 
1987, and the local dissident PJ between 1999 and 2007–.  This lack of control over the 
province’s principal urban center had important implications for San Luis’ SUR, in that it 
gave opposition forces and the general citizenry some room to maneuver: to document, 
denounce, and confront the Rodríguez Saás’ abuses of power and thus weaken the regime.  
Perhaps the most vivid example of this confrontation occurred in 2004, when thousands of 
regular citizens, opposition parties (organized under an umbrella organization, the 
“Multisectorial”) and several organized groups (among which were the highly combative 
teachers’ union) went to the streets demanding the end of the Rodríguez Saás’ rule.   
 The lack of political control over the capital city did not prevent the Rodríguez Saás 
from using nondemocratic and semi-illegal tactics to undermine the power of the opposition.  
In 2000, for instance, immediately after the incumbent PJ had lost the mayoralty of San Luis 
city to the opposition, the promoted the passage of a new law aimed at redistricting the city, 
which entailed the division of the capital into four different towns.  This law, whose purpose 
was to reduce the electoral clout of the opposition, sparked an impressive resistance in the 
streets, provoking the seizure of the local legislature.  As a result of these mobilizations, the 
Rodríguez Saás and PJ legislators repealed the bill.  Yet the governor did not give up, and 
created a new municipality (La Punta) from scratch in the outskirts of San Luis city. La 
Punta, where hospitals, schools, even an university, public housing, high tech centers, and 
soccer fields were built overnight, soon attracted San Luis city’s residents who, as the 
governor intended, moved away from the capital city and thus contributed to lessen the 
electoral weight of the province’s capital (interview Agúndez). 
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 Finally, perhaps the most aggressive action of the Rodríguez Saás against the 
opposition in the capital city was taken in 2003, when the governor, ignoring the right of San 
Luis’ mayor to call for municipal elections, announced his own electoral calendar.  Elections 
in the municipality were held twice that year, as both the mayor and the governor followed 
their own calendars, fielded their own candidates, and elected their respective mayors.  After 
the two elections were held, San Luis city was ruled by two mayors, had two seats of 
government, required citizens to pay local taxes to two mayoralties and municipal employees 
to work for two different patrons. This episode, one of the most unsual episodes in 
contemporary Argentine politics, lasted one year and a half and ended when the federal 
Supreme Court ruled against Alberto Rodríguez Saá and ordered “his” mayor, Angélica 
Torrontegui, to step down.   
 In sum, despite the fact that the Rodríguez Saá brothers altered the size and 
composition of the Supreme Court on numerous occasions, indicating that theirs was a 
regime that did not respect agencies and institutions of horizontal accountability, and also 
implemented several dubious practices to undermine the power of the opposition in the 
capital city, their power was more limited than in other nondemocratic provinces.  In contrast 
to patrimonial nondemocratic regimes, such as La Rioja, the more bureaucratic nature of the 
province’s administration contributed to disperse political power. 
  
(b). Financial discipline/autonomy 
 With no parallel in the country, the province of San Luis has, over a period of 20 
years, undergone one of the most radical economic transformations observed at the 
provincial level.  This section focuses on this striking economic revolution, which, coupled 
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with the implementation of policies that aimed at maintaining a balanced budget and very 
low levels of indebtedness, allowed San Luis to stand among the most financially responsible 
and economically sound provinces of the country.  This economic performance not only had 
important implications within provincial borders; it also became decisive in shaping the 
province’s relation with the federal government and, in turn, the prospects of San Luis’ SUR 
continuity.   
 Like most small provinces in Argentina, San Luis is highly dependent on federal 
transfers.  In fact, as figure 7.6 shows, around 60% of San Luis’ income stems from the 
federal government. Yet, unlike other small provinces, around 90% of these transfers are 
made up of automatic co-participation funds (as depicted by the black, light grey, and vertical 
lined rectangles in figure 7.7).  That is, even though the province relies on the federal 
government for its subsistence, the funds that make that subsistence possible flow to San 
Luis on a regular (i.e., daily), formula-based, automatic, and non-discretionary basis.   
 Also, unlike other small provinces, San Luis obtains a fare share of revenues from its 
own taxes.  As figure 7.6 indicates, an average of 20% of the province’s income comes from 
provincial taxes –a remarkable percentage given Argentine provincial governments’ low 
institutional capacity and lack of political will to tax their population. Finally, as figure 7.6 
reveals, San Luis’ dependency on other federal transfers (depicted by the dotted and lined 
rectangles) is, relative to the other provinces, very low.   
 I argued in chapter 2 that financially responsible and austere provincial incumbents 
who manage to keep their expenditures small, can further expand their autonomy from the 
center, as they do not need to resort to the federal government’s financial aid.  A closer look 
at how the Rodríguez Saás managed the provincial economy indicates that they proceeded in 
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a very responsible and orderly manner.  As figure 7.8 shows, during the 2002-2006 period, 
and only with the exception of 2005, when the province experienced a small deficit, the 
financial balance has been positive.  More strikingly is the pattern of indebtedness observed 
in figure 7.9.  San Luis not only has been able to maintain low levels of indebtedness, even in 
2002 when the economic crisis hit the country, but above all has become one of the 
Argentine provinces with the lowest levels indebtedness (Cetrángolo and Jiménez 2004, 
Cetrángolo et al. 2002, DNCFP –Ministerio de Economía).221   
 
                                                 
221
 What is more, financial autonomy is also possible in San Luis because most of the province’s lenders are 
international financial institutions and private lenders, not the federal government (interviews Poggi, Marín). 
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Figure 7.6: San Luis:  Income sources 
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Figure 7.7: San Luis: Type of federal revenues as a share of total federal 
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Figure 7.8: San Luis: Total income – total expenditures (1997-2007)  
(in millions of Argentine pesos) 
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Figure 7.9: San Luis: Debt as percentage of provincial GDP (2001-2006) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
  
Source: Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal con las Provincias [Mecon – 
DNCFP] 
  268 
 This efficient, responsible, and austere financial management of the provincial 
economy has put San Luis’ governors in a very powerful position to neutralize presidential 
penetration and control.  Since 1983, all Argentine democratic presidents have had hard 
times to discipline the Rodríguez Saás via fiscal instruments (interviews Marín, Poggi, 
Vergés, Montero, Samper).   
 The economic and financial success of San Luis was built on two pillars.  The first 
was Adolfo’s commitment to financial austerity and responsible management.  Indeed, soon 
after taking office, he attacked government inefficiencies and sold public companies (see 
FUNIF 1999).  As several of his close advisers reported, he became obsessed with improving 
provincial tax collection, taking decisive steps to streamline bureaucratic procedures.  During 
his 20-year administration, Adolfo promoted and signed several bills designed to balance the 
budget that obliged the government to spend half of its revenues on public infrastructure and 
investment, and which, at the same time, penalized unproductive and wasteful public 
spending.  Finally, the provincial government implemented a very tough policy with regard 
to public debt and savings, one which sought to maintain indebtedness at a minimum and 
savings at a maximum.222  In sum, Adolfo Rodríguez Saá himself kept a watchful eye over 
the provincial economy.  As his former Minister of Economy put it, “the governor met with 
me every Monday to review tax collection and public accounts, and to control levels of 
investment and public spending” (interview Marín). 
                                                 
222
 Probably the best example illustrating San Luis’ commitment to saving occurred in the 2001-2002 economic 
crisis.  Due to its impressive savings capacity, San Luis had a considerable amount of money in the Argentina’s 
National Bank. With the implementation of the so-called corralito, which froze bank accounts and assets, San 
Luis saw most of its savings confiscated.  Interestingly, San Luis was the only province affected by such a 
measure.  San Luis’ capacity to save is all the more striking given the context of economic hardship observed in 
the country and the provinces since the mid-late 1990s. 
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 The second pillar of San Luis’ economic and financial success was the province’s 
industrial policy. San Luis was one of four provinces which benefited from one of the 
country’s tax incentives programs for investment in underdeveloped provinces, the so-called 
Régimen de Promoción Industrial (RPI or industrial promotion regime).223  This regime, 
which offered a number of tax breaks to firms that settle in the province, was the driving 
force of San Luis’ spectacular economic growth and development.  Reforms in 1979, 1982, 
and 1983 delegated the authority to grant federal tax breaks from the national government to 
provincial administrations and thereby conferred upon governors an enormous capacity for 
development (Eaton 2001, Guiñazú 2003).  “By granting federal tax breaks,” as Eaton (2001) 
notes, “they could promote industries, provide jobs, and broaden locally generated tax 
revenues at the expense of other provinces” (2001:101).   
 Unlike La Rioja, which also benefitted from the RPI, San Luis took full advantage of 
the industrial promotion regime, making industrial development the government’s principal 
economic activity (see Guiñazú 2003).  Industrial activity only comprised 14.7% of the 
provincial GDP in 1980, before RPI was implemented. Ten years later, in 1991, it had 
reached 63.7%, and 50.3% in 2004 (DPEyC-San Luis). Needless to say, the process of 
industrialization brought about important improvements in most socioeconomic and 
demographic indicators. To list a few, the economically active population in the 
manufacturing sector grew 245.5% between 1980 and 1991; the percentage of households 
living in poverty decreased from 27.7% in 1980 to 18.6% in 1991; and the percentage of 
households with no water and electricity dropped from 34.1% and 27.2% in 1980, 
respectively to 19.9% and 12.1% in 1991 (see Guiñazú 2003:59-64).   
                                                 
223
 The other 3 provinces were La Rioja, San Juan, and Catamarca. 
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 Unlike governors from other provinces which also benefitted from the RPI, the 
Rodríguez Saás accompanied the process of industrial development with an impressive 
investment in public infrastructure.  Roads, highways, housing for workers, and sewage were 
built at an impressive pace and extension,224 providing not only better services for the newly 
installed industries, but also improving the living conditions of most sanluiseños.  
 In sum, the dynamism brought about by the industrial promotion regime, which led to 
spectacular levels of economic growth, coupled with the Rodríguez Saás’ austerity policies 
and efficient management of the provincial economy, as well as their low levels of 
indebtedness –all contributed to enhance the Rodríguez Saás’ financial autonomy from the 
federal government. This autonomy translated into presidential inability to discipline the 
Rodríguez Saás and had important implications for San Luis’s SUR’s reproduction. 
 
2) Interaction of governors and presidents instruments of territorial and political 
control 
 In this section I explore how national and provincial variables combined shaped the 
prospects of presidential control over San Luis’ incumbents, and how this in turn affected the 
possibility of vertical coalition making and SUR reproduction.  To do so, I assess Kirchner’s 
main instrument of presidential control, fiscal instruments or he distribution of funds to the 
provinces, and analyze its effectiveness against the backdrop of San Luis’ rulers’ own 
instruments of control.   
 President Néstor Kirchner, unlike any other president since 1983, counted on 
abundant fiscal resources to exert leverage on provincial governments and subnational 
                                                 
224
 As of 2007, San Luis has 1/3 of Argentina’s (paved) highways and roads (DPECyC-San Luis). 
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arenas.  The windfall gains of commodity exports, which enriched the central government’s 
coffers with revenues that were not subject to sharing, allowed Kirchner to dexterously 
exercise the power of the purse over provincial incumbents. However, San Luis’ sound 
economy and its low levels of indebtedness, coupled with the province’s capacity to collect 
relatively high amounts of tax-revenues, all contributed to lessen Rodriguez Saá’s financial 
dependency on the federal government.  This gave the governor the means necessary to avoid 
becoming hostage of Kirchner’s strategy of financial subjugation, and perhaps more 
importantly, gave him the chanceto become one of Kirchner’s staunchest opponents.   
 However, the existence of a more bureaucratic state administration, which limited the 
governor’s capacity to exert tight control over resources, territory, opposition forces, and 
local organized groups, generated opportunities for presidential penetration.  Even though 
Kirchner’s capacity to trespass on provincial borders and provincial power via partisan 
instruments was low (see chapter 4), the president’s fiscal leeway enabled him to make 
inroads in the province by co-opting opposition mayors from San Luis City, Daniel Pérsico 
(2003-2005) and Alfonso Vergés (2005-2007).  To do so, the president bypassed the 
governor and channeled federal funds and programs directly to the mayors (interviews 
Vergés, Agúndez, Montero, El Diario de la República November 20, 2006).  With this 
strategy, the president sought both to empower local popular leaders from the opposition and 
to extend his party label (i.e., the PJ-FpV) into the Rodríguez Saás’ stronghold to control 
them from below.  This strategy, however, proved short-lived, given that the opposition lost 
control of the capital city to Rodríguez Saá’s candidate in 2007.225  By so doing, President 
                                                 
225
 An additional factor contributing to Kirchner’s incapacity to put together a strong local coalition to control 
the Rodríguez Saás, was that the local opposition forces were extremely factionalized and divided (interview 
Montero). 
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Kirchner could not count on potential allies to control the governor from below. Moreover, 
he could not even pursue strategies of financial co-optation with mayors of the province’s 
interior, because the Rodríguez Saá’s policies of economic austerity and financial 
responsibility, which trickled down to the municipal level, prevented mayors from being in 
dire economic and financial straits, and, in turn, less in need for additional federal financial 
resources (interview Montero). In short, the lack of a relatively strong and sustainable PJ-
FpV structure in San Luis, coupled with the governor’s and mayors financial autonomy, 
helped San Luis’ governor to thwart penetration and control from above. The sound 
economic position of the province, not only strengthened San Luis’ SUR and expanded 
Rodríguez Saá’s autonomy, but was also detrimental to the construction of intergovernmental 
coalitions.   
 
3) Displacement from vertical coalitions and self-reproduction 
 Throughout the years of the Kirchner administration, the relationship between San 
Luis’ governor and the president was one of continuous confrontation, showing that neither 
side had incentives to engage in mutually functional relations of cooperation, nor to establish 
vertical coalitions.  In effect, not only did Kirchner avoid striking coalitions with Alberto 
Rodríguez Saá, but most importantly he sought to undermine from below the governor’s 
authority within San Luis. The governor, for his part, not only refused to support Kirchner’s 
agenda, but most importantly, boycotted the president’s initiatives, as no other governor in 
the country dared to do.    
 There are abundant examples illustrating the governor’s unwillingness to side with 
Kirchner.  For instance, unlike other PJ (and even opposition governors), Rodríguez Saá did 
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not hesitate to break ranks with the president by refusing to participate in several 
intergovernmental fora such as the Consejo Federal de Inversiones (i.e., the interprovincial 
agency responsible for financing different investment projects), and the Consejo Federal Vial 
(i.e., the agency responsible for coordinating highway construction), alleging that the federal 
government had treated San Luis in an unfavorable and discriminatory manner.  Additional 
accusations of financial discrimination went unheard in Buenos Aires, but were later 
transformed into a claim filed with the federal Supreme Court against the Kirchner 
administration.226 
 Additionally, Rodríguez Saá was the only PJ governor who openly confronted one of 
Kirchner’s linchpin policies, namely, the administration and (unconstitutional) appropriation 
of export duties.227  He not only denounced the president in the media, but filed yet another 
claim with the federal Supreme Court in which he demanded the complete refund of the 
income tax. Finally, the most eloquent example of Rodríguez Saá’s confrontational stance 
with the president occurred in the 2007 elections, when he ran as the Peronist dissident 
presidential candidate against Kirchner’s wife, demostrating that he had become one of the 
most visible and influential anti-Kirchnerista leaders within the dissident Peronist faction.  
 Rodríguez Saá’s uncooperative behavior was also observed in Congress.  Contrary to 
what occurred with Governor Maza, who instructed La Rioja’s congressional delegation to 
back most of Kirchner’s bills, Rodríguez Saá’s disciplined delegation opposed most of the 
                                                 
226
 This lawsuit has the potential of reversing most of Kirchner’s financial policies vis-à-vis the provinces. 
227
 Rodríguez Saá alleged that the “retenciones” (i.e., export duties) were unconstitutional because they reduced 
the producers’ income, and in turn the income tax.  A reduction in this tax, which according to the co-
participation law, is subject to provincial sharing, reduced the amount of money that was sent to the provinces.  
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president’s legislative initiatives.228  This refusal was vividly observed in 2006, when no San 
Luis’ deputy voted for Kirchner’s most valued initiatives.229   
 A similar unsupportive behavior was seen during campaigns and elections.  Unlike 
what occurred in La Rioja in 2005 and 2007, Rodríguez Saá refused to go to the polls in 
alliance with the Kirchnerista faction, i.e., the PJ-FpV.  Even though Kirchner managed to 
win the federal 3rd senatorial seat, he fared poorly in the lower house race, where he did not 
obtain a single PJ-FpV seat.  The electoral gains of the PJ-FpV in San Luis were even smaller 
in the 2007 mid-term and presidential race, where he did not obtain a single seat in the house, 
and received only 8.56% of the vote in the presidential race (DINE, Ministerio del Interior). 
In sum, by refusing to make alliances with the PJ-FpV, Rodríguez Saá prevented Kirchner’s 
faction from growing stronger in San Luis,230 and by so doing curtailed the president’s 
capacity to exert control from below.  
The uncooperative relation between San Luis and the federal government also led the 
federation to displace the Rodríguez Saás from vertical coalitions. Kirchner did not have 
incentives to reward San Luis’ governor and much less to reproduce a SUR on whose 
cooperation he could not count.  In effect, and contrary to how he behaved with other more 
cooperative and functional SURs such as La Rioja, Kirchner did not provide San Luis with 
additional federal programs and funds.  As figure 7.7 shows, every single penny that flowed 
from the federal government to San Luis came in the form of automatic transfers, that is, 
money that by law flows directly to the states. Unlike other non-democratic provinces, such 
                                                 
228
 Rodríguez Saá controlled all the delegation except for one senator, who responded to Kirchner’s PJ-FpV. 
229 See footnote 27. 
230
 The PJ-FpV only obtained 1 senatorial seat in 2005, not a single seat in the 2007 mid-term election, and only 
8.56% of the presidential vote that same year (DINE). 
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as La Rioja and Formosa, which received a considerable amount of non-automatic federal 
revenues as a reward for his support, President Kirchner did not transfer additional federal 
money to San Luis.   
Another way in which Kirchner sought to undermine Alberto Rodríguez Saá’s 
authority was by hampering the governor’s capacity to implement programs and policies in 
the province. As in most federations, the implementation of several provincial programs 
and/or policies requires federal approval.  By refusing approval, Kirchner delayed the 
implementation of different programs that were of utmost interest to the governor.  The 
federal government did not issue the permission needed to install new radio stations/bands, to 
approve the curricula of the newly created University of La Punta, to build the international 
airport near La Punta, to authorize new air routes between the province and other 
destinations, to build new stretches of provincial highways, and to produce new medicines in 
San Luis’ laboratories. Kirchner also suspended many important federal programs that 
operated in San Luis such as the Environmental Plan, various federal funded health 
programs, the plan to eradicate the Chagas’ disease, the plan to modernize several health-care 
centers, and the program of subsidies for small landowners and small firms, among others.   
Despite Kirchner’s strategies to weaken San Luis’ SUR, Governor Alberto Rodríguez 
Saá managed to keep the regime alive. SUR continuity in San Luis was possible because the 
governor had both the means necessary to self-reproduce the regime and to weather 
presidential attempts to destabilize the regime. In sum, Rodríguez Saá’s financial autonomy, 
which helped him prevent the penetration of a president as fiscally strong as President 
Kirchner, was key to shaping the nature of intergovernmental relations, and in turn the 
prospects of SUR continuity in San Luis.  
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IV. Conclusion 
 The analysis of the case studies of La Rioja and San Luis presented in this chapter 
offered evidence about how undemocratic regimes operate in practice, illustrating with 
concrete examples the way in which undemocratic rulers exercise political power within their 
strongholds. The chapter not only discussed the specific traits of two Argentine SURs, but 
also, and more importantly, shed light on the specific causal mechanisms that explain 
different trajectories of SUR continuity.   
 The in-depth qualitative analysis of La Rioja and San Luis indicates that key 
differences across SURs –such as their financial autonomy from the central government and 
to a lesser extent, the type of state administration, unleash distinct patterns of interaction with 
the national government, setting in turn provinces in different trajectories of SUR continuity.  
This finding reveals that, contrary to what most explanations of regime continuity indicate, 
SURs endure for different reasons, and that the causes and the causal mechanisms that 
explain why and how they are resilient are not the same.  Indeed, as the case of La Rioja 
revealed, some SURs endure because they meet strategic needs of national politicians, thus 
inducing national incumbents to reproduce these regimes from above.231  Others, such as San 
Luis, continue to exist because specific characteristics of these regimes provide recalcitrant 
governors with the resources needed to expand their authority and power vis-à-vis local 
forces and the national government.  
 The cases of La Rioja and San Luis also demonstrated that trajectories of SUR 
continuity are better explained by assessing the combined effect of national and subnational 
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 The case of La Rioja is, in fact, a dramatic demonstration of the power that financial dependency has on 
converting the governor’s loyalty, especially in light of the prior strong links of Governor Maza to former 
President Menem.   
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variables.  The cases of La Rioja and San Luis revealed that the politics that played out at the 
intersection of national and subnational arenas, which was central to determine the territorial 
strategies employed by national regarding SUR continuity, could not be understood without 
taking into consideration state-level variables.  
 Finally, the study of La Rioja and San Luis provides a basis for inferring that the 
causal patterns and mechanisms that were found operating in the cases of La Rioja and San 
Luis may also be in other similar nondemocratic states. As noted in graph 7.1, La Rioja is not 
the only nondemocratic fiscally dependent province present in Argentina, nor is San Luis the 
only fiscally autonomous nondemocratic province of the country.  Hence, the pattern of 
interaction between national and state-level variables seen in these two cases, as well as how 
these in turn shape the SUR continuity, might contribute to understanding the continuity of 
other similar Argentine SURs.  
 
  
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
As many scholars have noted, one of the most salient characteristic about the latest 
processes of democratization in the developing world is that national democracy has not 
always been accompanied by subnational democratization.  This study confirms this trend by 
taking a closer look at Argentina and Mexico, two countries where national democracy has 
not trickled down evenly. Indeed, as shown in chapter 3, subnational units in these two 
countries vary tremendously with respect to their levels of democracy. At least 20.8% of the 
Argentine provinces and 31.2% of the Mexican states still remain undemocratic –i.e., have 
not experienced any kind of movement towards higher democracy, whereas only 20.8% 
Argentine provinces and 18.7% Mexican states can be regarded as fully democratic. These 
results not only reveal that subnational nondemocratic regimes are ubiquitous, but perhaps 
more importantly, that they are “sticky.” 
 Understanding the conditions that make this resilience possible has been the central 
goal of this study.  In chapter 2, I proposed a new analytic model to assess subnational 
undemocratic regime continuity. I argued that existing approaches to the study of regime 
juxtaposition –the “territorial politics approach” and the “provincial approach,” provided 
partial explanations of SUR continuity, as they only explained some cases well but not 
others. However, I also noted that each of these approaches emphasized different and 
important elements of the national-subnational reality, and that precisely for that reason each 
of them should be synthesized into a more satisfying model.  
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From the first body of literature, I borrowed the idea that national politics and 
national institutions affect the prospects of SUR continuity.  Yet, in line with the provincial 
approach, I also recognized that subnational variables shape SUR survival. In fact, one of the 
main claims of this dissertation was that subnational variables strongly shape the pattern of 
intergovernmental interaction, thus determining whether and how SURs are reproduced. 
Building on these premises, I argued that the capacity of national incumbents to 
penetrate and control subnational nondemocratic arenas/governors gives the former 
incentives to engage in a strategy of SUR reproduction (from above).  An undemocratic 
governor who is subject to presidential manipulability and control can in fact be very 
beneficial for a president in need of political support.  With their tight control over voters and 
national legislative delegations, subservient undemocratic governors can provide important 
benefits to national incumbents (Gibson 2005).  If presidents can successfully induce 
governors to cooperate with the center, the latter might find it very convenient to engage in 
mutually beneficial vertical coalitions.  When this occurs, I contended that a first type of 
SUR continuity ensues, namely, SUR reproduction from above.   
Yet, presidential penetration and control over nondemocratic incumbents/arenas, is 
not always attainable.  In fact, recalcitrant and powerful undemocratic governors may stand 
in a position to prevent and/or neutralize presidential leverage and control. When this occurs, 
presidents have few incentives to promote the continuity of SURs upon which they cannot 
exercise any control, much less induce their rulers to become part in vertical coalitions.  In 
such a context, the center not only will avoid reproducing SURs from above, but whenever 
possible, it will seek to weaken these regimes.  Nonetheless, the entrenched position of 
autonomous and non-controllable undemocratic incumbents, coupled with presidents’ weak 
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disciplining power, allows the former to maintain the status quo and keep their regimes alive.  
When this occurs, I noted that a different trajectory of SUR continuity ensues. 
I further argued that control from the center over the periphery could be attained 
either via their party structures, and/or through fiscal leverage depending on the context in 
each country.  Accordingly, I identified 3 possible paths through which presidents can exert 
control over SURs –the fiscal path of presidential control, the partisan path of presidential 
control, and finally the fiscal-partisan path of presidential control.  The cross country 
comparison carried out in chapter 4 revealed that Argentine presidents, when compared to 
their Mexican counterparts, experienced more variation in terms of the accessibility to 
instruments of presidential control.  For instance, while President Menem (1989-1999) stood 
in a powerful partisan and fiscal position vis-à-vis governors,232 Kirchner’s (2003-2007) 
could exert control over subnational incumbents mostly via fiscal means.  By contrast, 
President De la Rúa (1999-2002) stood in a very weak position in relation to the provinces, 
as he could not discipline governors neither through fiscal nor via partisan instruments.  
Mexican President Fox, for his part, disciplined governors via partisan instruments, and only 
towards the end of this tenure could he resort to fiscal instruments (derived from the windfall 
gains from oil) to wield political power over lower-levels of government.   
After carrying out cross-country and cross-temporal comparisons to identify the 
distinct paths of presidential control followed by each president, I carried out within-country 
comparisons and explore whether different trajectories of SUR continuity were contingent 
upon undemocratic governors’ capacity to resist (or succumb to) presidential control.  To test 
these premise I conducted both quantitative and qualitative studies.  In chapter 5, I tested the 
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 His fiscal power, however, was somewhat reduced during his second administration (1995-1999). 
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more general claim of my argument by performing different cross-sectional time-series 
analyses, each of which was aimed at testing whether presidential control leads to SUR 
reproduction from above. The regressions ran in chapter 5 strongly confirmed the major 
theoretical statements of this study, revealing that President Fox benefited SURs he could 
control via partisan instruments, while President Kirchner rewarded non-democratic 
provinces that had high levels of indebtedness.  President Menem, for his part, who had 
access to both partisan and fiscal instruments, benefitted SURs that were either possible to 
control via partisan structures, or possible to control via fiscal means.  Finally, President De 
la Rúa, due to his limited access to both fiscal and partisan instruments, did not benefit SURs 
upon which he could not exert control. 
In addition, the regressions strongly supported the argument that presidents favored 
one specific type of undemocratic regime over another.  In other words, contrary to what 
current scholarship on subnational authoritarian regimes contends, neither Fox, nor Menem 
or Kirchner, rewarded all existing SUR during their respective administrations.  Instead, they 
selectively benefitted those regimes upon which they could exert some type (i.e., fiscal or 
partisan) of control.  Most importantly, none of these presidents contributed to expand the 
power of SURs upon which they could not exercise political leverage.  In fact, as shown by 
all regressions models, the SURs which were not easily penetrable or controllable by 
presidents were punished, in that they received a lower proportion of federally funded 
programs/transfers (other things being constant). 
In chapters 6 and 7, I shifted my research focus from quantitative comparisons to a 
closer qualitative, in-depth examination of two within-country comparisons in each country.  
The case studies of Oaxaca, Puebla, San Luis, and La Rioja showed precisely that different 
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types of SUR reproduction occurred along the paths indicated by the theoretical framework 
outlined in chapter 2.   
Chapter 6 analyzed the evolution of Oaxaca and Puebla, two states that scored very 
low on the democratic index developed in chapter 3. The analysis offered evidence about 
how undemocratic regimes operate in practice, illustrating with concrete examples the way in 
which undemocratic rulers exercise political power within their strongholds. In addition, 
drawing on data collected from 90 in-depth interviews with Mexican national and 
subnational top-rank officials, the chapter presented detailed evidence to substantiate that key 
differences between SURs –such as the nature of their state-administrations and financial 
autonomy, unleashed distinct patterns of interaction with the central government, thus setting 
states in different trajectories of SUR continuity.  
In effect, the study of the case of Puebla showed that the existence of a bureaucratic 
state-administration, which rendered state’s borders more penetrable, coupled with a strong 
presence of the PAN in Puebla, enabled Fox to both make political inroads in the state and 
take hold over his party structure and other opposition forces.  These factors contributed to 
expand the president’s capacity to constrict Puebla’s governors from below, giving Fox the 
possibility to induce Poblano rulers’ cooperation.  Because President Fox stood in position to 
obtain strategic benefits from Poblano incumbents, he opted to reproduce Puebla’s SUR from 
above. 
By contrast, the existence of neopatrimonial state-administration, together with a low 
Panista presence in the state of Oaxaca, allowed Oaxacan incumbents to neutralize 
presidential penetration and control, and in addition expand their power to confront the 
president and challenge his authority. Under these circumstances the federal government had 
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few incentives to strike vertical coalitions with Oaxacan rulers. Indeed, contrary to how Fox 
behaved with other more supportive SURs (such as Puebla, Veracruz, or Hidalgo), the 
president took a series of measures to weaken the regime, among which were refusal to 
funnel additional programs and funds, the commissioning of several federal audits to 
investigate Oaxacan incumbents’ financial misdoings, and finally filed several claims with 
the federal Supreme Court against the state of Oaxaca.    
Despite Fox’s efforts to destabilize the regime, governors Murat and Ruiz managed to 
keep Oaxaca’s SUR in place.  Several internal factors contributed to this survival.  First, the 
flow of automatic transfers (i.e., participaciones and aportaciones), which was ensured by the 
institutionalized and non-discretionary nature of Mexico’s revenue-sharing system, allowed 
Oaxacan rulers to get the funds they needed to run the state. Second, the strategy of removing 
mayors not only increased Murat and Ruiz’ political clout at the local level, but also served 
to fill the state’s coffers with the appropriation of federal transfers that were destined for 
municipal projects.  In effect, by appointing loyal administradores municipales (municipal 
administrators), Oaxacan governors were able to shift considerable federal money destined to 
municipalities into the state’s coffers. Finally, the ability of governors Murat and Ruiz to 
strike dealings with private lenders, and banks, coupled with their connections to the PRI 
national structure233 enabled them to get additional resources to stay in power, and in turn, 
created opportunities to expand their authority and maintain the regimes alive.  By so doing, 
Oaxacan incumbents succeeded in reproducing their SUR “from below” despite national 
democratization. 
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 Murat and Ruiz were among the closest friends, advisors, and partners of Roberto Madrazo, the then PRI 
national leader, and 2006 presidential candidate. 
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In chapter 7, I analyzed the evolution of two Argentine SURs, La Rioja and San Luis. 
As in chapter 6, the analysis of the Argentine cases illustrated with concrete examples the 
way in which a subnational undemocratic regime rulers works in practice. The cases were 
also employed to exemplify how differences across regimes, such as their levels of financial 
autonomy, unleashed distinct patterns of interaction with the central government, and set in 
turn, states onto different trajectories of SUR continuity.  
The case study of the province of La Rioja provided detailed evidence about how a 
vulnerable and controllable SUR can be held hostage by the central government.  La Rioja’s 
critical financial dependence on the center created the conditions necessary for President 
Kirchner, who had easy access to abundant resources, to control Riojano governor. 
Interestingly, this occurred even despite the fact that La Rioja had a neopatrimonial state 
administration that would, in theory, have allowed them to neutralize presidential control. 
These factors, contributed to expand the president’s capacity to win over Riojano governors, 
giving the president sufficient power to induce provincial incumbents to provide electoral, 
legislative, and symbolic support, as well as important reasons to reproduce La Rioja’s SUR 
from above. 
Conversely, the case-study of San Luis showed that a sound financial provincial 
situation was sufficient to neutralize the impressive (fiscal) power of President Kirchner.  San 
Luis’ austere and responsible financial practices and lack of financial dependency on the 
federal government provided Governor Alberto Rodríguez Saá with the means necessary to 
avoid becoming hostage of Kirchner’s strategy of financial subjugation.  In effect, San Luis’ 
financial autonomy not only prevented presidential manipulation and presidential control 
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from above, but also gave Alberto Rodríguez Saá the instruments needed to oppose 
Kirchner’s agenda and became one of his fiercest attackers.   
Because of the Rodríguez Saá’s uncooperative and confrontational stance, Kirchner 
did not have incentives to benefit San Luis’ governor, much less to reproduce a SUR on 
whose cooperation he could not count on.  Quite the contrary, the president had reasons to 
implement policies to weaken San Luis’ SUR.  As a result, and in stark contrast to how he 
behaved with other more cooperative and functional SURs (such as La Rioja), President 
Kirchner did not benefit San Luis with additional federal programs and funds, further 
punishing San Luis’ governor by delaying (or even suspending) the implementation of 
different federal programs that were of utmost interest for the governor. Yet, the governor’s 
sound economic and financial situation provided him with enough resources to reproduce 
San Luis’ SUR. 
In summary, the cases of Oaxaca, Puebla, La Rioja, and San Luis presented strong 
evidence showing how the key explanatory variables identified by the analytic framework 
operated to produce the hypothesized outcome.  At the same time, the four case studies 
fleshed out the causal mechanisms through which the presidential control (or lack thereof) 
unleashed different trajectories of SUR continuity.  In addition, each of the subnational case-
studies showed that existing theories, which assume that SURs endure for similar reasons 
are, to a large extent, inconsistent with what occurs in reality. Last but not least, the strength 
of the analytic framework was further substantiated with the analysis of La Rioja.  In 
addition, the case study of La Rioja also sheds important light on how the key independent 
variable, in this case, the financial dependency of the provincial government on the central 
state, was key to explain the type of SUR continuity unfolding in La Rioja.  This case is a 
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dramatic demonstration of the power that financial dependency has on converting the 
governor’s loyalty, especially in light of the prior strong links of Governor Maza to former 
President Menem.  It is also a clear demonstration of the capacity of a patrimonial governor, 
who in theory stands in a stronger position to act as a provincial levy against presidential 
penetration and manipulation, to “deliver” his province to the president due to financial 
necessity.  
 
Lessons from Argentina and Mexico 
Contributions to the study of regime juxtaposition 
 This dissertation improves previous studies on regime juxtaposition, and subnational 
political regimes in several ways. At the conceptual level, this thesis moves past current 
works on subnational political regimes by offering a detailed and comprehensive discussion 
of how to conceptualize democracy.  With the exception of Gervasoni (2006, 2008) most 
works of regime juxtaposition have paid little attention to issues of conceptualization, and a 
result have not been able to offer consist assessments about which regimes are democratic 
and what others are not.  Moreover, scholars of regime juxtaposition have in general adopted 
a “thick” or expanded definition of democracy and by so doing have augmented, in Sartori’s 
(1970) words, the concept’s intension and reduce its extension.  This, as noted in chapter 3, 
has had important implications because they have underestimated the number of existing 
nondemocratic regimes.   
This dissertation, by contrast, adopted a strategy of conceptual separation.  Building 
on the work by Mazzuca (1998, 2007), this study uses the access-exercise framework, which 
as shown in chapter 3, has the major advantage of avoiding the underestimation of existing 
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SURs, and consequently provides a better assessment of what regimes should be regarded as 
nondemocratic and what others as democratic.  In fact, this study shows that the number of 
SURs is much larger than what previous studies have indicated.  Having a clearer 
understanding of the universe of cases is important because it improves, as Munck (2004) 
notes, the researcher’s ability to construct theories, define strategies for measurement and 
case selection, and establish comparisons/contrasts among cases.  Thus, the classification 
presented in this dissertation, provides scholars of regime juxtaposition with tools to gain 
leverage on each of these tasks. 
 Second, this study makes an important contribution regarding strategies to measure 
democracy. Chapter 3 explicitly discusses the proper mathematical and quantitative tools that 
are needed to measure democracy.  Following Goertz’ (2006) strategy of increasing concept-
measure consistency, this dissertation, unlike previous studies measuring subnational 
democracy, ensures that the proper numeric measure of democracy reflects the basic structure 
of the concept (of democracy) adopted in the study.     
Third and related, this dissertation measures subnational democracy in all Argentine 
provinces and Mexican states, and across time.234 In so doing, it improves the current 
literature of regime juxtaposition in two major ways.  On the one hand, by measuring 
subnational democracy in all units, this study uncovers the universe of SURs, which up to 
now was not identified simply because previous works were essentially case studies. On the 
other hand, by measuring subnational democracy across time, this dissertation singles out 
cases that have remained nondemocratic since the latest transition to democracy, and those 
                                                 
234
 Solt (2003) and Gervasoni (2006) are the only studies measuring democracy at the subnational level in all 
subnational units in Mexico and Argentina, respectively, but their measures cover shorter time-spans. 
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that have made progress towards more democracy.  Altogether, these two contributions have 
the major advantage of helping researchers to refine the domain of cases to which theories 
(of SUR continuity or SUR change) are deemed to apply.  
This dissertation also makes an important analytic contribution to the study of 
subnational political regimes.  The proposed analytic framework has the major advantage of 
explaining SUR continuity across countries, as well as trajectories of SUR continuity within 
countries and through time using one single model.  In so doing, this study improves previous 
theoretical models on SUR continuity, in that it approaches regime juxtaposition from 
dynamic (i.e., temporal) and spacially-integrated (i.e., national and subnationally) point of 
view.  So far, scholars in this tradition have used static analytic lenses, in that they have not 
sought to explain the mechanisms that account for SUR continuity at different moments in 
time.  In addition, these studies have been spatially limited, in that they have focused either 
on several countries but on a single subnational case in each country (see Gibson 2005), or 
alternatively on several subnational cases within a single country (Snyder 1999, 2001; 
Gervasoni 2006, Montero 2007).  By addressing spatial and temporal variation using one 
single model, the framework developed in this dissertation provides more comprehensive 
tools to better assess SUR continuity across and within countries, and over time. 
 One of the major findings uncovered by this study is that instances that facilitate 
presidential control, either from above or from below, are important determinants of 
subnational regime continuity.  In other words, this dissertation has shown that democratic 
presidents are, under specific circumstances, active promoters of subnational nondemocratic 
regimes. In general, it is expected that democratic presidents who have leverage over 
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subnational areas or subnational incumbents will tend to promote political liberalization, 
especially if these areas or rulers are dominated by opposition forces. 
However, this dissertation has presented vast evidence showing that this is not 
necessarily the case. The four in-depth case-studies as well as the quantitative analysis 
presented in chapter 5, show that when presidents control, and thus have leverage to induce 
subnational undemocratic rulers to meet their strategic needs, they actively reproduce the 
very same regimes that keep these rulers in power.  This occurs regardless of partisan or 
ideological orientation.  Both center-right, and center-left parties, such as the PAN and the 
Peronist party during the Menem administration, and Peronism during the Kirchner years, 
respectively, have proceeded to reproduce controllable SURs, despite the fact that these 
SURs are from the opposition –as shown by the Mexican case of Puebla, and the Argentine 
province of La Rioja.  
At the same time, this study found that presidential incapacity to penetrate in the 
periphery, which in turn hinders president’s capacity to exert control (either from above or 
below) over recalcitrant rulers, tends to facilitate SUR weakening.  Put differently, the lower 
the chances are for presidents to constrict subnational rulers, the higher the chances for 
undermining the power of nondemocratic incumbents’ power.  This finding suggests that 
instances of subnational democratization, or, at the very least, SUR weakening, are, 
paradoxically, more likely to occur when democratic presidents cannot control and 
manipulate nondemocratic subnational rulers.  In fact, as shown throughout this dissertation, 
when presidents can control subnational nondemocratic areas they opt to reproduce them 
instead of promoting their democratization. Taken together, these two findings provide 
important insights into the conditions under which nationally democratic presidents are more 
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likely to promote democratization in subnational units.  Future studies, should test whether 
these are regular patterns or trends that are only observable in Argentina and Mexico. 
 
Contributions to the study of intergovernmental relations 
More than a decade ago, Guillermo O’Donnell (1993) noted that the power of the 
central state was not homogenous throughout the territory. More specifically, he argued that 
in many countries of Latin America “blue areas” characterized by robust rule of law 
coexisted with “green areas” where the rule of law was partially attenuated, and “brown 
areas” where the rule of law was extremely attenuated.   
This dissertation presents strong evidence to support to this theoretical insight, 
offering numerous examples that show that the power of the central state (wielded either 
through partisan or fiscal means) varies subnationally, and is mediated by different 
characteristics of the peripheral units.  As importantly, this dissertation reveals that the 
capacity of the central government to penetrate throughout the territory is not necessarily 
curtailed by the fact that subnational units are nondemocratic, as most studies of subnational 
authoritarianism claim.  Indeed, the cases of La Rioja and Puebla show that presidential 
penetration and control is possible despite subnational non-democraticness.  Rather, this 
study shows that what prevents the central government from penetrating (and thus 
controlling) subnational areas is the undemocratic nature of the political regime in 
combination with the patrimonial nature of state-administrations and the financial autonomy 
of subnational units, as exemplified by the state of Oaxaca and the province of San Luis.  
In summary, the evidence presented in this study indicates that the lack of penetration 
of the central state in the peripheries is shaped by a multiplicity of factors, and not only by 
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the nondemocratic nature of subnational political regimes. This finding, which has been 
largely overlooked by most studies of intergovernmental relations, is central to understand 
how power relations operate across levels of government, and under what conditions national 
politicians can expect to make successful political inroads in subnational arenas. 
Another important finding uncovered in this dissertation, which is closely related to 
the previous point, is that the central government exerts power over subnational units in very 
distinct ways.  I showed that political power over lower-tier governments can be exercised 
along two major instruments, namely, partisan or fiscal instruments.  Yet, throughout this 
study I demonstrated that these two distinct instruments are not always available to 
presidents.  As the study of the case of Mexico revealed, power to penetrate in lower levels 
government was mostly exerted via partisan instruments.  By contrast, in Argentina this 
power was exerted mostly via fiscal means, and also via political parties (before the 2000s, 
when political parties were still territorial strong organizations).  
Given the centrality played by parties and fiscal institutions to link national and 
subnational arenas in other federations, the patterns observed in this study might also be 
generalizable to other federations of the developing world.  For instance, in federal countries 
where parties are weak and presidential fiscal discretion is high, such as in Venezuela, 
Bolivia, or Russia, power relations might very likely operate following the pattern observed 
in Argentina. By contrast, in countries were political parties are relatively strong, as in India 
or Brazil –in the last couple years, power relations across levels of government might follow 
the trend seen in Mexico. 
In addition, and related, by acknowledging that political power in federations is 
wielded differently (i.e., via partisan, fiscal, or partisan-fiscal means), this study further 
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validates that federal systems are not of one type, as the burgeoning literature on ‘varieties of 
federalism’ (Stepan 2004; Obinger, Leibfried & Castles 2005) has argued, but rather 
different.  This is an important finding because federal systems, which are widely a key 
explanatory variable in studies of democracy, welfare states, development, and political 
parties, are usually regarded as being of the same kind. In fact, countries are dummied up and 
coded in a dichotomous way as being federal or non-federal.  This oversimplification in the 
treatment of federal systems might come at the cost of overlooking key distinctive aspects of 
federal systems that might be central to elucidate the political coalitions that are needed in 
different federal systems to exert intergovernmental power and that are central to explain 
democratic, welfare, and developmental outcomes.  This study has not concentrated on these 
coalitions, but future works should explore if the political coalitions needed to exert partisan 
power are any different from the political alliances that are required to exercise fiscal or 
partisan power across levels of government. 
This study also offers another important insight for scholars of federalism. As noted 
in chapter 2, in general, the vast and growing literature on federalism has viewed 
intergovernmental politics as taking place between presidents and governors as a whole.235  
In this view, authority and power across levels of government is assumed to be zero-sum, i.e., 
power or authority is either located at upper or lower-tier of government.  Moreover, this 
view assumes that all subnational units are equally powerful or equally weak vis-à-vis the 
central government.  Further, it assumes that all units (a) act in the same way, (b) are all 
constrained by the same provincial structures, and (c) behave according to the same rank of 
preferences. However, one of the central findings of this study is that subnational units and, 
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 Wibbels (2005), Bonvecchi (2005), Olmeda (2008). 
  293 
more specifically, subnational nondemocratic districts vary considerably from each other.  
This finding is important because it uncovers that differences across provinces matter, as they 
are decisive to shape patterns of political interaction across levels of government.  Hence, 
future studies within the subfield of federalism should develop analytic frameworks that are 
sensitive to cross-subnational differences.  By so doing, they will certainly overcome the 
imitated scope of their theories, and more importantly, will provide explanations that are 
more in tuned with real world.  
Finally, the findings presented in this study also have important implications for 
practitioners and policy-makers.  First, the generation of new and original data on 
subantional democracy and state-administrations provides valuable insights for policy-
makers and practitioners interested in designing policies aimed at fostering the even 
territorialization of democracy. By identifying the specific subnational areas that are non-
democratic, these officials can get a better sense of where to target policies enhancing 
subnational democratization and bureaucratization.  Second, as noted earlier, this study has 
shown that the power of the central state does not penetrate homogenously throughout the 
national territory.  This finding is important for policy-makers, as it highlights that the 
implementation of national programs and national policies is likely to be unsuccessful in 
those areas where the central state has no power to enforce them, or where it cannot count on 
subnational allies to promote policy-implementation.  One of the corollaries of this study is 
that the successful implementation of federally funded programs and policies in areas where 
the central state is weak is only possible where national and subnational actors can engage in 
vertical coalition making.  
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Issues for future research 
In this study I only concentrated on how different types of SURs, in interaction with 
national variables, unleashed distinct trajectories of SUR continuity.  Future works should 
look at how types of SURs affect the prospects of SUR change. Previous scholarship on 
(national) political regimes found that different types of regimes affect the probability and 
nature of regime change (Linz and Stepan 1996), and also the type of regime transition that 
they follow (Snyder 1992; Hartlyn 1998a, 1998b; Geddes 1999). For instance, Snyder (1992) 
and Hartlyn (1998a) have argued that transitions to democracy in neopatrimonial settings are 
characterized by a dynamic that is quite distinct than the one observed in non-neopatrinonial 
regimes.236 The classification of subnational regime types presented in this paper, coupled 
with the insights of the literature on regime change and regime transitions at the national 
level, can help refine theories about subnational regime change, advancing our understanding 
of the factors that foster or hinder state-level democracy. 
Second, the reconceptualization of subnational political regimes advanced in this 
study sheds new light on different aspects of subnational politics and subnational democracy 
that have so far been uncharted and that might merit further exploration. The access-exercise 
framework presented in chapter 3, indicates that states/provinces can be compared along two 
different dimensions, i.e., their political regimes and their state-administrations. These new 
criteria for comparing states/provinces provide scholars with useful insights to examine 
important topics that up to now have been unexplored. For instance, chapter 3 revealed that 
                                                 
236
 According to these authors, in neopatrimonial settings, organized groups, societal forces, and the political 
opposition, are generally repressed and/or prevented from participating in politics. These exclusionary 
conditions strongly shape the pattern of regime transition, as they are likely to unleash more violent and radical 
transitional processes, some of which can end up in incumbents being toppled by revolution . 
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most states/provinces scoring high on neopatrimonialism are located either in the least 
economically developed regions of Argentina and Mexico.  By lumping cases together along 
state-administrations, researchers can uncover whether neopatrimonialism is associated with 
(or caused by) (low) levels of economic development, and (high) inequality and poverty. 
Third, a comparison between access and exercise reveals that moves away from 
nondemocracy towards democracy occur in a more pronounced manner and at faster pace 
than moves away from neopatrimonialism towards bureaucratization.  One possible reason 
for this is that the social, economic, political, and institutional factors that drive changes in 
state-administrations are distinct from the factors that spark change in the political regime.  
In fact, as Mazzuca (2004) suggests, it is probable that the actors “who have an interest in 
pushing democratization often have an interest in maintaining neopatrimonialist practices of 
exercising that same power” (p.257). Such is, indeed, the case of opposition leaders who 
fought against nondemocratic rulers, but who once in power did not dismantle 
neopatrimonial state-administrations. Future research should explore how coalitions and 
actors promote or prevent changes away from neopatrimonialism.   
Fourth, the analysis of the case of Oaxaca showed that patrimonial rule and fiscal 
profligacy not necessarily go hand in hand, as scholars of African politics have noted (cf. 
Bratton and van de Walle 1997).  By contrast, the case-study analyzed in this dissertation 
reveals, in line with Hartlyn’s (1998a) findings, that patrimonial rule might be compatible 
with a financially balanced economy.  Indeed, there is evidence that many subnational 
neopatrimonial Argentina rulers, such as Vicente Saadi in Catamarca during the 1980s and 
Carlos Juárez in Santiago del Estero during the 1990s, had their respective economies in 
check.  Evidenced gathered in interviews, albeit not included in this study, indicates that 
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these governors were aware of the potentially high costs to creating dependency on the center 
through fiscal mismanagement. This finding has important implications for the study of SUR 
continuity and change, as they highlight that nondemocratic rulers who are fiscally and 
financially sound are in a stronger position to neutralize potential economic sanctions that 
could be used by the national government to weaken their regimes.237  The existence of 
sound economy, by contrast, gives subnational rulers opportunities to expand their authority 
and maintain the regimes alive.  Future studies should survey the implications of 
neopatrimanlism for the sustainability of SURs. 
Finally, this dissertation tested the analytic framework outlined in chapter 2 by 
focusing on two federal countries, and two subnational cases in each country.  The 
quantitative analysis presented in chapter 5, provided a first insight into the generalizability 
of the general theoretical claim of this study, namely, that (all) SURs in Argentina and 
Mexico that are deemed controllable by the center have been reproduced from above.  Future 
studies, should explore whether this also occurs in other federations where regime 
juxtaposition is prevalent. 
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 In fact the neopatrimonial SURs of Catamarca and Santiago del Estero are two good cases illustrating that 
SUR dismantlement via economic sanctions enforced by the central government was not successful, as these 
two cases were overthrown by force, namely, through federal intervention. 
 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX I 
SECTION I 
Access to State Power (political regimes) 
(a). Alternation (turnover) and clean elections 
Before turning to discuss the indicators used to operationalize democracy, two 
clarifications on the secondary-level level dimensions are in order.  The first regards the 
“turnover” indicator.  As Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán (2007) note, considering 
alternation (or turnover) as one of the constitutive elements of democracy might lead to the 
misclassification of cases (130-131).  Such is the case of countries/provinces where citizens 
are satisfied with the party that governs, and decide to reelect the party in power.  In such 
cases, there is no alternation, and following Przeworski et al.’s (2000) coding, that 
country/province should be (erroneously) regarded as a case with a nondemocratic regime.    
 The way in which democracy is conceptualized in this dissertation might also lead to 
the problems that affect Przeworski et al.’s coding. In fact, as figure 3.1 indicates, democracy 
has three (or four) defining attributes, namely, turnover, contestation (for both executive and 
legislative offices), and clean elections.  Because the necessary and sufficient concept 
structure of democracy entails that all constitutive dimensions of democracy be multiplied, a 
score of zero in the “turnover” variable would automatically imply a score of zero for 
democracy, regardless of how the other 3 constitutive dimensions score. As a result, regimes 
that do not experience party alternation due to the (high) satisfaction of the electorate would 
score a perfect zero, and thus would erroneously be classified as nondemocratic. If this 
happens, the classification of democracy I advance in this dissertation would have similar 
problems of misclassification as the ones seen in Przeworski et al.’s regime classification.  
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 To avoid the zero-scoring due to turnover, I make three operationalization decisions. I 
choose (1) to incorporate both party turnover and governor turnover, (2) to cumulate rather 
than dichotomize the party/head (turnover) variable, and (3) to add up and weight both 
measures.  As a result, the turnover variable only scores zero in those cases in which there 
has never (in the lifetime of a regime) been party turnover and head (i.e., governor) turnover.  
That is, turnover scores zero only in the cases where a single person and a single party have 
ruled consecutively since the onset of the last transition of democracy until present day.238  
Thus, the only instances which score perfect zero are the ones in which there was no party 
and head alternation at all, instances that any attentive analyst would certainly avoid coding 
as democratic.   
 Additionally, I have two theoretical and substantial reasons to include turnover as one 
of the constitutive dimensions of (subantional) democracy.  As Calvo and Micozzi (2005) 
show for the Argentine case, between 1983 and 2003, 32 constitutional reforms and 34 
electoral reforms reshaped the subnational electoral map of Argentina. These reforms, as the 
authors show, aimed at both securing control of provincial incumbents upon local 
legislatures, and entrenching their position in power.  Thus, the turnover indicator captures 
the incidence of electoral rules that were put in place to make provincial electoral systems 
less competitive and more hegemonic, and can then be regarded as a good proxy for abuse of 
political power.239 
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 The only case in which we observe this pattern is in the Argentine province of San Luis, where Adolfo 
Rodríguez-Saá (PJ) ruled his province from 1983 to 2001.  He stepped down from office because he served as 
president of Argentina for one week during the political crisis of 2001-2002.  Adolfo was replaced by his 
brother, Alberto Rodríguez-Saá, who has held the governorship since then.   
239
 The assessment and coding of how electoral rules affect political competition is definitely the best indicator 
to capture political competition.  Yet, because coding these rules in 24 provinces in Argentina and 32 states in 
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 For the Mexican case, the inclusion of turnover as one of the constitutive dimensions 
of (subnational) democracy is of paramount importance given the country’s tradition of 
partisan hegemony and lack of alternation.  In a country where the same party 9i.e., the PRI) 
has ruled for over 70 years (and in some states, over more than 80 years), and where the 
permanence of the same party in power was not been exclusively related to the satisfaction of 
the electorate with the ruling party’s performance (Magaloni 2006), it seems reasonable to 
take into account the incidence of the lack of turnover on democracy, especially when 
studying democracy at the state-level, as many states have not experienced alternation since 
the 1930s.240 
 Finally, in order to assess the impact of the turnover variable on subnational 
democracy, I operationalized and measured democracy with and without the alternation (or 
turnover) attribute.  The correlation between the two measures yields a score of 0.83 in the 
case of Mexico, and 0.62 in the case of Argentina.  The results thus indicte that the measure 
of democracy is not significantly altered when turnover is included. 
A final caveat is in order with regard to the secondary-level dimensions of 
democracy.  “Clean elections” is, perhaps, one of the most difficult concepts to 
operationalize and measure at the subnational level, for it demands reviewing in retrospect 
every single gubernatorial election held in 32 states and 24 provinces over a period of 25 
                                                                                                                                                        
Mexico, for over a period of 25 and 10 years, respectively, is a daunting task, I took turnover and the effective 
number of competing parites (see below) as proxies of poltical competition.  
240
 It should be noted that even though the two justifications for including turnover as one of the constitutive 
dimensions of democracy work for the Argentine and Mexican cases, they may not travel across all contexts. 
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years.241 I have thus decided, at the risk of under estimating its effect, to measure this 
variable in Mexican states only. The reason why I have not measured electoral conflict (or 
electoral fraud) in Argentina is because, as two of the most prominent scholars studying 
contemporary Argentina and Argentine politics have noted, there has been, since 1983, little 
fraud or manipulation of the vote-counting processes (Levitsky and Murillo 2005, Gervasoni 
2009).  
 
(b). Indicator description and aggregation  
As figure 3.1 shows, democracy is made up of 7 indicators.  Each of these indicators 
is measured following the formulae presented in tables 3.1 (Argentina) and 3.2 (Mexico).  
The necessary and sufficient concept structure of democracy provides in and of itself the 
justification for why I do not add up the secondary-level dimensions of democracy, and it 
also provides the justification for why I do add up the indicators.  At the indicator level, 
addition (rather than multiplication) becomes a desirable option because indicators are 
substitutable.  Substitutability is normally associated with the logical OR, which in turn is 
closely connected with arithmetic addition.  
Scales with larger metric structures are assigned larger weight when final scores are 
aggregated, thus driving scores in often misleading and inappropriate ways (see Goertz 2006; 
Munck & Verkuilen 2002). To avoid “scale effects,” i.e., the effects produced by the use of 
different of scales, I standardize all individual indicators between a range of 0 and 1.242  In so 
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 As I explain later on in methodological appendix II, the variable “clean elections” was constructed based on 
a thorough review of state newspapers.  I review the local-newspapers’ coverage in each state during the four 
subsequent weeks after Election Day. 
242
 This operation was done using a STATA package downloaded from http://www.komkon.org/~tacik/stata/. 
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doing, each indicator attains the same scale, and thus ensures that all indicators weight in 
exactly the same proportion.  The standardization of scales is also useful (and desirable) 
because it ensures the comparability of scales, and consequently facilitates a more 
straightforward interpretation and comparison of indicators.    
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Table I.1: Access Indicators (Argentina) 
Abbreviation Description Calculation Source
HEAD
Based on Przeworski et al.’s (2000) coding this indicator 
measures the cumulative rate of provincial chief executive 
turnover 
ACCHEAD is the number of changes of 
provincial chief executive [HEADS] 
accumulated during the life of a particular 
political regime.  [HEADS is defined as the 
number of changes of the chief executive in 
each year] 
Author's calculations 
based on BASECIAP
PARTY
Based on Przeworski et al.’s (2000) coding, this indicator 
measures the cumulative rate of provincial chief executive 
party turnover.   
ACCPARTY is the number of changes of the 
provincial chief executive party [PARTY] 
accumulated during the life of a particular 
political regime.  [PARTY is defined as the 
number of changes of the party in each year] 
Author's calculations 
based on Guía Electoral
ENP Laakso and Taagepera Index (1979) 1/Σsi2, with si representing the number of votes 
cast for party i during gubernatorial elections
Calvo & Escolar (2005) 
and author's calculations 
based on Guía Electoral
Margin victory
measured as v1 - v2, where v1 is the vote share 
of the winning gubernatorial candidate, and v2 
the vote share of the second-place candidate*
Author's calculations 
based on Guía Electoral
ENPL Laakso and Taagepera Index (1979) 1/Σsi2 with si representing the number of seats held by party i
Calvo & Escolar (2005) 
and author's calculations 
based on Atlas Electoral 
de Andy Tow
Gov's seats 100 - % of governor's party (or party coalition) legislative seats
Author's calculations 
based on Giraudy & 
Lodola (2008) Database 
*First round. The scale of this variable was reversed to make higher values reflect higher levels of “democraticness.” 
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Table I.2:  Access Indicators (Mexico) 
Abbreviation Description Calculation Source
HEAD
Based on Przeworski et al.’s (2000) coding this 
indicator measures the cumulative rate of provincial 
chief executive turnover 
ACCHEAD is the number of changes of provincial chief 
executive [HEADS] accumulated during the life of a 
particular political regime.  [HEADS is defined as the 
number of changes of the chief executive in each year] 
Author's calculations 
based on Rulers  Database
PARTY
Based on Przeworski et al.’s (2000) coding, this 
indicator measures the cumulative rate of provincial 
chief executive party turnover   
ACCPARTY is the number of changes of the provincial 
chief executive party [PARTY] accumulated during the 
life of a particular political regime.  [PARTY is defined 
as the number of changes of the party in each year] 
Author's calculations 
based on CIDAC's 
Electoral Database
ENP Laakso and Taagepera Index (1979) 1/Σsi2, with si representing the number of votes cast for party i during gubernatorial elections
Author's calculations 
based on CIDAC's 
Electoral Database
Margin victory
measured as v1 - v2, where v1 is the vote share of the 
winning gubernatorial candidate, and v2 the vote share of 
the second-place candidate*
Author's calculations 
based on CIDAC's 
Electoral Database
ENPL Laakso and Taagepera Index (1979) 1/Σsi2 with si representing the number of seats held by party i
Author's calculations 
based on CIDAC's 
Electoral Database
Gov's seats 100 - % of governor's party (or party coalition) legislative 
seats
Lujambio (2000) and 
CIDAC's Electoral 
Database
Clean elections Index that captures the existence, durability, and intensity of post-electoral conflicts
Post-electoral conflict ranges from 1 to 4, where 1= 
absence of post-electoral conflict, 2= post-electoral 
conflict lasted less than a week (7 days), and there were 
no dead and/or human/material casualties, 3= post-
electoral conflict lasted more than one week (from 8 to 30 
days), and/or people were held in custody, and/or there 
were human/material casualties, 4= post-electoral conflict 
lasted more than one month and/or there were deaths** †   
Based on a review of 
major local (state-level) 
newspapers (1991-2006) 
[see Methodological 
Appendix II]
*The scale of this variable was reversed to make higher values reflect higher levels of “democraticness.” 
**State-level newspapers were reviewed for a period of 4 consecutive weeks starting with the day the election was held.
†The scale of this variable was reversed to make lower values reflect higher levels of "democraticness."
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SECTION II 
Exercise of State Power (state administrations) 
 
Indicator description and aggregation  
One of the advantages of having a family resemblance concept structure is that (at 
both the secondary and indicator level) the substitutability relationship can be used to build 
“functional-equivalent” indicators.  This type of indicator, also known as “system-specific” 
indicator (Przeworski & Teune 1970), is very much praised and recommended among 
qualitative/comparative historical scholars, who deliberately seek to enhance measurement 
validity (Locke & Thelen 1995; Munck 1998, 2004; Zelditch 1971).243 This strategy of 
substituting indicators for functionally equivalent ones helps to overcome the problem of 
“indicator indeterminacy,” namely, that indicators measure different things in different cases 
and time periods.  
It is precisely to capture historical, cultural, and contextual diversity, and thus to 
ensure measurement equivalence, that I operationalize some of the secondary-level 
dimensions of neopatrimonialism using system-specific indicators. For instance, “rulers’ 
fiscal discretion” in Argentina is measured using the “rules of fiscal allocation” indicator.  
This indicator cumulates the number of years of existence of the law that regulates the 
distribution of fiscal resources between the provincial and municipal of governments.  By 
contrast, “rulers’ fiscal discretion” in Mexico is measured with the “appropriation of 
municipal funds” indicator, which reflects the percentage of fiscal funds that governors did 
not transfer to the municipalities.  Mexican states are obliged by law to pass on 20% of the 
                                                 
243
 See Hicks, Misra, and Ng (1995) for an example of how this strategy is applied. 
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transfers they receive from the Ley de Coordinación Fiscal to the municipalities.  The 
existence of this law, and the lack thereof in Argentina, justifies using different indicators to 
measure the more general secondary-level dimension “rulers’ fiscal discretion.”   
The same occurs with the horizontal accountability indicators.  In the case of 
Argentina I measure horizontal accountability with indicators that operationalize the level of 
judiciary independence (from the executive). In stead, in Mexico, the indicators used to 
measure horizontal accountability operationalize the effectiveness of the state-level agencies 
(i.e., agencies of fiscal control) responsible for controlling the executive branch’s use of 
fiscal resources.  The reason why I do not use indicators of the judiciary system in Mexico is 
because in Mexico, state-level judiciary systems are more homogenous than in Argentina. 
Unlike other subnational judiciary systems, in Argentina, each province dictates its own 
constitutional and statuary rules to select, appoint, and determine the number of provincial 
court justices. This variation is not observed in Mexico, where the rules regarding state-level 
judiciaries are very similar. 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 schematize how I measure each of the 6 indicators that made up 
each of the four secondary-level dimensions of neopatrimonialism.  The tables not only 
provide a brief disaggregation of these measures, but also reflect the mathematical operations 
I conducted to transform these measures into single numbers.  An extensive and detailed 
description of each of the individual indicators and sub-indicators is presented right below 
the summary tables.  
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Table I.3: Exercise Indicators (Argentina) 
Abbreviation Indicator
HA             
(Horizontal 
Accountability)
Independence of the 
judiciary (IJ) IJ
Patronage  Size of public 
administration (SPA) SPA
Rulers' fiscal 
discretion
a. Rules of fiscal 
allocation (RFA) APFF Ex
er
ci
se
=
(IJ
+
SP
A
+
R
FA
)/3
Calculation
 
 
 
Table I.4: Exercise Indicators (Mexico) 
Abbreviation Indicator Sub-indicator
i. Cumulative years of API law
ii. Sum of publicity of public 
information
iii. Cumulative years of API 
agencies
i. Cumulative years of modern fiscal 
law
ii. Agreement between state govt. 
and  ASF to supervise R33 and R23 
Patronage  Size of public administration (SPA) SPA
Rulers' fiscal 
discretion
Appropriation of Fondo 
General de Participaciones APFF
Ex
er
ci
se
=
(H
A
+
V
A
+
SP
A
+
A
PF
F)
/4
Calculation
SA                       
(Societal 
Accountability)
HA             
(Horizontal 
Accountability)
Access to public information 
(API) API=(i+ii+iii)/3
Agencies of fiscal control 
(AFC) AFC=(i+ii)/2
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DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL INDICATORS AND SUBINDICATORS 
1. Horizontal Accountability 
 
Independence of the judiciary (IJ) (Argentina) 
 This indicator measures the stability of provincial Supreme Court justices.  The 
indicator is the yearly average tenure of each provincial Court justice weighted by the 
“seniority” of the political regime.  (Source: Base de Tribunales Superiores de Justicia 
Provinciales, Giraudy & Tuñón 2008). 
 Calculation of IJ: The indicator was standardize between a range of 0 and 1. 
 
Agencies of fiscal control (AFC) (Mexico) 
 i. Cumulative years of modern fiscal law.  Measures the cumulative years during 
which states’ accounting systems were regulated by a “modern law of fiscal 
administration.”244 (Source: Figueroa Neri (ed.) 2005). 
 ii. Agreement between the state government and the Auditoría Superior de la 
Federación (AFS) to supervise budgetary item 33 (Ramo 33 (R33))245. Coded as 1 during the 
                                                 
244
 “Modern laws of fiscal administration” are the fiscal administration laws that have been approved after 2001, 
when the Ley de Fiscalización Superior de la Federación (LFSF) was passed.  The LFSF has institutionalized 
the “modern” Mexican accounting system and has established the legal basis for the exercise of a more efficient 
fiscal control.  After this law was passed in 2001, states were “induced” to update their accounting systems in 
compliance with the LFSF (see Figueroa Neri 2005).   
245
 Ramo 33 (or Aportaciones) is comprised of different conditional transfers (funds).  Among the most 
significant ones are the fund that is used to cover the payroll of teachers, the municipal social development fund 
(FAISM), and the poverty alleviation fund (FAIS).  Since these funds are allocated by the federal government 
they can, in theory, be subjected to federal oversight. Yet, during the late 1990s, there was some controversy as 
to whether these funds, which are managed by local governments, could be subjected to control by federal 
agencies.  The controversy arose after Puebla’s PRI governor Manuel Bartlett had allocated part of the 
Aportaciones in a way that was clearly detrimental to the opposition (PAN) municipalities. 
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years in which the state let the AFS control the allocation of R33, and 0 when it did not.246 
(Source: Diario Oficial (various years), obtained from http://www.asf.gob.mx/ [“Convenios” 
section]). 
 iii. Agreement between the state government and the Auditoria Superior de la 
Federación (AFS) to supervise budgetary item 23 (Ramo 23 (R23))247. Coded as 1 during the 
years in which the state let the AFS control the allocation of R23, and 0 when it did not.248  
(Source: Diario Oficial (various years), obtained from http://www.asf.gob.mx/ [“Convenios” 
section]).249 
 Calculation of AFC: All individual sub-indicators were standardized between a range 
of 0 and 1 to make their scales comparable.  I then took the average of i, and ii (which was 
the sum of both types of Agreements), and obtained the AFC indicator. 
 
2. Societal  accountability  
 
Access to public information (API) 
 i. Cumulative years of API law. Measures the cumulative years during which states 
were regulated by an API law. The first time point corresponds to the year in which the law 
                                                 
246
 To be coded as 1, the agreements signed between the local legislatures (and/or local fiscal control agencies) 
and the AFS had to explicitly state that both agencies (or other responsible agencies) would collaborate to 
supervise the allocation of federal fiscal resources within the Ramo 33 (R33). In several agreements the 
reference to this oversight was very vague; those years were coded as 0. 
247
 Ramo 23 comprises “contingent” funds that are conditionally allocated to states that have experienced 
natural disasters. 
248
 To be coded as 1, the agreements signed between the local legislatures (and/or local fiscal control agencies) 
and the AFS had to explicitly state that both agencies (or other responsible agencies) would collaborate to 
supervise the allocation of federal fiscal resources within the Ramo 23 (R23). In several agreements the 
mentioning to this oversight was very vague; those years were coded as 0. 
249
 ii and iii were transformed into one single measure. To do so, I added them up 
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became effective (vs. the year in which the law was passed).250 (Source: Estudio 
Comparativo de Leyes de Acceso a la Información Pública. 2007. IFAI 
http://www.ifai.org.mx/test/eym/edos.htm, and various state API laws).  
 
 ii. Sum of publicity of public information.  This indicator measures the quantity of 
mandatory public information that, by law, should be publicly available.  I grouped the 
information that all API laws established as “public” into different categories (i.e. “access to 
financial documents,” “rosters and salaries of public employees,” “beneficiaries of public 
programs” etc.).  Categories that were included in the laws were given a value of 1, and those 
which were not included in the laws were coded as 0.  I then added up all categories and 
obtained a score indicating the level of “publicity of public information.” (Source: Estudio 
Comparativo de Leyes de Acceso a la Información Pública. 2007. IFAI 
http://www.ifai.org.mx/test/eym/edos.htm, and various state API laws).  
 iii. Cumulative years of API agencies.  Measures the cumulative years during which 
API agencies operated. API agencies are the institutions responsible for managing all issues 
related with the management of public information (i.e. requests, regulations, sanctions, 
etc.).251  The first time point corresponds to the year in which these agencies were given legal 
status (i.e. became effective vs. the year in which they were legally established) and in which 
                                                 
250
 The reason to do so responds to the fact that in several states (i.e., Michoacán, Oaxaca, Puebla, Hidalgo, and 
Durango) laws were passed 18 months before they became effective.  In several interviews with officials at the 
Federal Institute for Access to Public Information (Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información [IFAI]) it was 
noted that the time elapsed between the date the law was passed and the date in which it became effective 
reflected governors’ lack of political willingness to improve the access to public information (Interviews with 
IFAI officials, 4/2/07, 4/18/07).  These officials noted that a “reasonable” time to set up all the 
regulations/agencies needed to put in effect the law was 6 to 12 months (at the most). 
251
 It is important to note that, as of 2007, not all API laws stipulate the creation of an API agency (examples 
are: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Tamaulipas, and Tlaxcala). 
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they were allocated with state-level funds to guarantee their operation. (Source: Estudio 
Comparativo de Leyes de Acceso a la Información Pública. 2007. IFAI 
http://www.ifai.org.mx/test/eym/edos.htm, and various state API laws). 
 Calculation of API: All individual sub-indicators were standardized between a range 
of 0 and 1 to make their scales comparable.  I then took the average of i, ii, and iii and 
obtained the API indicator. 
 
3. Patronage 
 
Size of public administration (SPA) (Argentina) 
 Measured as the number of inhabitants/1000 working in public administration. 
(Source: BASECIAP). 
 Calculation of SPA: this indicator was standardized between a range of 0 and 1. The 
scale was reversed to make higher values reflect lower levels of patronage. Scale reversion 
was done with the following formula: 1,000 – [# of public employees/1,000 inhabitants]. 
 
Size of public administration (SPA) (Mexico) 
 Measured as the number of public sector employees/1,000 inhabitants of the EAC 
(economically active population). Public sector employees = administrative personnel 
(teachers and doctors are not included). (Source: INEGI publication: Sistema de Cuentas 
Nacionales de México.  Gobiernos Estatales. Cuentas Corrientes y de Acumulación, various 
editions). 
 Calculation of SPA: this indicator was standardized between a range of 0 and 1. The 
scale was reversed to make higher values reflect lower levels of patronage. Scale reversion 
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was done with the following formula: 1,000 – [# of public employees/1,000 inhabitants of 
EAC].  
 
4. Rulers’ fiscal discretion 
 
Rules of fiscal allocation (RFA) Argentina) 
 Measures the cumulative years of existence of a municipal coparticipation law (i.e., 
the law regulating the allocation of fiscal resources between the provincial government and 
the municipalities). (Source: Fundación CECE (1996, 1997), Ministerio de Economía, and 
various provincial laws). 
 Calculation of RFA: The indicator was standardized between a range of 0 and 1. 
 
Appropriation of federal funds (APFF) (Mexico) 
 Allocation of Fondo General de Participaciones.  Measured as the % of funds 
governors did not transfer to the municipalities.252  (Source: INEGI publication: Finanzas 
Públicas Estatales y Municipales de México, Anexo A, various years). 
 Calculation of APFF: The indicator was standardized between a range of 0 and 1. 
 
                                                 
252
 Mexican states are obliged by law to pass on 20% of the transfers they receive from the Ley de Coordinación 
Fiscal to the municipalities. 
 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX II 
 
Clean elections 
Clean elections, and its negative pole, fraudulent elections can be measured in a 
variety of ways.  One possible approach to measuring the existence of electoral fraud would 
be to review the number of electoral court complaints submitted by political parties after each 
election.  In the context of Mexican politics, such a measurement strategy would produce 
misleading results.  First, the ineffectiveness of formal electoral and judicial institutions 
during the 1980s and 1990s, which led candidates and party leaders to resort to other more 
informal institutions (such as concertacesiones) to settle electoral disputes (see Eisenstadt 
2004, 2006), would underestimate the actual magnitude of electoral fraud.  Second, and 
conversely, the creation of more effective formal and judicial institutions during the 2000s, 
has led political candidates and party leaders to submit electoral court filings alleging 
fraudulent elections, regardless of whether elections were or not fraudulent.  Hence, counting 
electoral court filings during the last 8 years would overestimate the actual magnitude of 
electoral fraud. 
Another, much more sensitive measure to grasp how clean elections were, is to 
measure the occurrence and intensity of postelectoral conflicts.  Postelectoral conflicts as 
well as their intensity reflect the extent to which official electoral results do not correspond to 
a reality sensed and witnessed by the opposition party or parties.  I follow one of the leading 
experts on postelectoral conflict in Mexico, and assumed that postelectoral mobilizations 
were provoked by high perceptions of electoral fraud (Eisenstadt 2004:135-140).  Thus, the 
occurrence of postelectoral conflicts is considered as a proxy of electoral fraud. The intensity 
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(i.e., duration and severity) of postelectoral conflicts, in turn, is considered as a proxy of how 
“damaging and detrimental” the rigging was for the “defeated” party. 
 To code the existence and intensity of postelectoral conflicts in gubernatorial 
races, I reviewed state-level newspapers for a period of 4 consecutive weeks starting with the 
day the election was held. Postelectoral conflicts are defined as instances of social 
mobilization taking place after (gubernatorial) elections were held, in which protestors 
demanded the recounting of votes.253  The intensity of postelectoral conflicts was coded as 
follows: a score of 1 was given to states where there was no postelectoral conflict; a score of 
2 was given to states where post-electoral conflict lasted less than a week (7 days), and where 
there were no dead and/or human/material casualties; a score of 3 was given to states where 
post-electoral conflict lasted more than one week (from 8 to 30 days), and/or where people 
were held in custody, and/or there were human/material casualties; a score of 4 was given to 
states where post-electoral conflict lasted more than one month and/or where there were 
deaths.   
                                                 
253
 It should be noted that many gubernatorial elections in Mexico are held concurrently with legislative and 
presidential elections.  Concurrent elections are difficult to code because it is not always easy to determine 
whether postelectoral conflicts were driven by fraud in (either or both) state-level and/or national elections.  In 
the cases where concurrent elections were held and there was evidence of postelectoral conflict, the coding rule 
was to make sure that the postelectoral conflict revolved in fact around gubernatorial elections (regardless of 
whether it (also) affected legislative and/or presidential elections).  To do so, I reviewed more than one state-
level newspaper and a national newspaper. When it was not possible to discern whether postelectoral conflicts 
were driven by the occurrence of fraud in gubernatorial elections, the state was coded with 1.  
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Table II.1: List of state-level newspapers used to code instances of post electoral conflict 
State State-level newspaper
Aguascalientes Hidrocálido
Baja California Semanario Zeta
Baja California Sur Sudcaliforniano
Campeche Novedades de Campeche
Coahuila El Sol del Norte
El Siglo de Torreón
Colima Diario de Colima
Chiapas Cuarto Poder
Chihuahua El Heraldo de Chihuahua
Distrito Federal La Jornada
Durango El Sol de Durango
Guanajuato El Heraldo de León
El Sol del Bajío
El Universal
Guerrero El Sol de Chilpancingo
El Sol de Acapulco
Hidalgo El Sol de Hidalgo
Jalisco El Occidente
Ocho Columnas
Estado de México El Demócrata
El Sol de Toluca
Michoacán El Sol de Morelia
El Diaro de Michoacán
Morelos El Diario de Morelos
Nayarit Meridiano de Nayarit
El Heraldo de Nayarit
Nuevo León El Norte
Oaxaca El Imparcial
Puebla El Sol de Puebla
El Heraldo de Puebla
Novedades de Puebla
Querétaro Diario de Querétaro
Quintana Roo Novedades de Quintana Roo
San Luis Potosí El Sol de San Luis
Sinaloa El Sol de Sinaloa
Sonora Nuevo Día
El Independiente
Tabasco Avance
Milenio Tabasco
El Heraldo
Tamaulipas El Sol de Tampico
Tlaxcala El Sol de Tlaxcala
ABC Noticias
Veracruz El Sol de Veracruz
El Liberal del Sur
Yucatán Diario de Yucatán
Diario del Sureste
El Mundo al Día
Zacatecas Novedades de Zacatecas
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Map  II.1: Subnational democracy (Argentina, 1980s)* 
 
*The data are presented as decade averages 
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Map II.2: Subnational democracy (Argentina, 1990s) 
 
*The data are presented as decade averages 
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Map II.3: Subnational democracy (Argentina, 2000s)* 
 
*The data are presented as decade averages 
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Map II.4: Subnational democracy (Mexico, 1990s)* 
 
*The data are presented as decade averages 
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Map II.5: Subnational democracy (Mexico, 2000s)* 
 
*The data are presented as decade averages 
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Map II.6: Subnational neopatrimonialism (Argentina, 1980s)* 
 
*The data are presented as decade averages 
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Map II.7: Subnational neopatrimonialism (Argentina, 1990s)* 
 
*The data are presented as decade averages 
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Map II.8: Subnational neopatrimonialism (Argentina, 2000s)* 
 
*The data are presented as decade averages 
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Map II.9: Subnational neopatrimonialism (Mexico, 1990s)* 
 
*The data are presented as decade averages 
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Map II.10: Subnational neopatrimonialism (Mexico, 2000s)* 
 
*The data are presented as decade averages 
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